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i. ofwords in the main text of Thesis .7.7.:?.™
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the Scots law relating to two of the principal
types of security over moveable property. The first to be studied is pledge, the basic
form of real security in most legal systems. A historical account of the subject is
given, with a particular focus on Roman and Anglo-Norman law. This is followed
by a comprehensive discussion of the modern rules of pledge, including the secured
obligation, the constitution of the security and its enforcement. Comparative
material is used to draw conclusions on the state of development of the law.
In the second place, the law of lien is examined. Once again the historical
development of the security is traced in detail. Here the story is a longer one,
because the law only became settled into its modern form after the writings of
George Joseph Bell in the early nineteenth century. The substantive body of law on
lien is given a detailed analysis. Particular focus is placed on the type of obligation a
lien may secure, the type of property which may form the security subjects and the
type of holding which is required on the part of the creditor. Both special lien and
general lien are examined. Again, reference is made to comparative material.
The final section of the thesis explores the conceptual differences between pledge
and lien, a matter which has been the subject of little previous examination in
Scotland.
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PART 1 : INTRODUCTION
1. Security over moveable property. Scots law, like most or all other jurisdictions
makes a distinction between immoveable and moveable property.1 Whilst property
law is to a large extent a unitary subject, the clear difference between these two
types of property necessitates a variance in the rules in particular areas. The law
concerning real security is a clear example.
As to immoveable property - alternatively heritage or land - the law is relatively
straightforward. Since the passing of the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform
(Scotland) Act 1970, effectively only one form of heritable security is recognised :
the standard security.2 Three previous forms of security over land were abolished by
the Act, simplifying the law.3
In the field of moveable security the picture could hardly be more different. As
regards corporeal moveables, there exist a significant number of different types of
security, for example, pledge, lien, hypothec, bonds of bottomry and respondentia
and aircraft mortgage. As regards incorporeal moveables, there is the assignation in
security. Further, a company may grant a floating charge over any part of its
property and undertaking. This may include any part of its moveable property.4
Finally, the Department of Trade and Industry in 1994 published a consultation
paper proposing the extension of the floating charge and the creation of a new fixed
moveable security.5
The law of security over moveables can be seen to be a very complicated area.
Moreover it, like the law of real security in general, is an area which has been the
subject of little detailed research since Gloag and Irvine's magisterial Law ofRights
in Security was published in 1897.6 In the words of Zimmermann and Dieckmann :
"The largest hole in modern Scottish literature gapes in the area of security".' This
thesis marks the beginning of work in the whole area of moveable security. Due,
however, to the constraints of space it will be only possible here to consider two
types of moveable security, namely pledge and lien.
1. See K G C Reid. SME, vol 18, para 1: D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law.
(1991). paras 1.01-1.03: A P Bell, pp 19-21.
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2. Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 (c 35), s 9(3).
3. Namely the bond and disposition in security, the bond of cash credit and disposition in security
and the ex facie absolute disposition. See D J Cusine, Standard Securities, (1991), chapter 3.
4. Companies Act 1985 (c 6), s 462( 1).
5. Department of Trade and Industry Consultation Paper, Security over Moveable Property in
Scotland, November 1994. Discussed by J Murray at 1995 SLT (News) 31, H Patrick at 1995 SLT
(News) 42 and the present writer at 1995 SLT (News) 120.
6. See, however, A J Sim, SME, vol 20, paras 1-107 and D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in
Scots Law, (1991), chapter 11.
7. R Zimmermann and J A Dicckmann, "The Literature of Scots Private Law" (1997) Stell LR 3, at
10.
2. The law of property and the law of obligations. The law of real security is
found at the intersection of property law and the law of obligations,1 a fact which
makes the subject intrinsically interesting. On the one hand, property law governs
matters such as the creation, transfer and extinction of the real right in security. On
the other, the law of obligations governs the obligation the performance of which the
real right secures.
It is very important when approaching the law of real security that its binary
background is fully appreciated. In particular, over the last century and a half when
property law in Scotland has been in a state of malaise, the emphasis has sometimes
been placed too heavily on the obligational side of the subject.2 This thesis will
attempt to focus equally on the property law aspects of pledge and lien.
1. See generally, G L Gretton, "The Concept of Security", in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots
Conveyancing Miscellany, (1987), p 126.
2. See, for example, the discussion below of pledge by a pledgee, at paras 75-82.
3. Historical and comparative matters. As with most areas of law, the modern law
of pledge and lien is the product of its historical development. A key aim of this
thesis is to trace the development of these types of security from the very beginning.
This means examining the relevant Roman law, Anglo-Norman law, institutional
writings and case law. It need hardly be stated that Scots law is a mixed system, the
mixture to a large extent being a Roman and English one.1 In this thesis, an attempt
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will be made to show which parts of the law of pledge and lien are principally based
on Roman law and which are principally based on English law.
A feature of the law of real security in general is the great variations between
different legal systems.2 One of the aims of this piece of work will be to make some
comparisons between Scots law and the law of other jurisdictions. Particular
attention will be paid to English law, which has been of clear influence over the
years. A considerable number of references will be made to the law of South Africa
because it is another mixed system and also because, like Scots law, it is uncodified.
The rules of other jurisdictions, such as France, Germany, Quebec and Spain will
also be considered where appropriate.
1. See, for example, O F Robinson, T D Fergus and W M Gordon, European Legal History, (2nd cd,
1994), para 8.1.1. Of course, Scots law had other influences such as feudal law and Canon law.
2. See, for example, J G Sauvcplanne (cd). Security over Corporeal Movables, (1974) and VI G
Dickson, W Rosener and P M Storm, (cds). Security on Movable Property and Receivables in
Europe, (1988).
4. The approach taken. The remainder of the thesis is made up of three sections.
The first deals with pledge, the main type of conventional moveable security under
Scots law.1 The second deals with lien, a form of security which mostly arises by
implication rather than being created expressly.2 The third section is considerably
shorter than the previous two and compares pledge and lien.3 Throughout the thesis
the aim is to give a detailed exposition of the relevant law and to assess its state of
development.
1. See below, paras 5-115.
2. See below, paras 116-273.
3. See below, paras 274-281.
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PART 2 : PLEDGE
1. INTRODUCTION
5. Definition. A pledge1 is a real right in security over moveable property, created
by the transfer of possession of the property from its owner to another, in terms of
an agreement between them which seeks to use the property to secure the
performance of an obligation owed by the owner to the other.2 The party who is
granting the right in security over his property is known as the pledger or pledgor.*
The party receiving the security is known as the pledgee.4
1. In other languages : pignus, (Latin); gage, (French); Faustpfandrccht, (German): hSndpant.
(Danish); pand, (Dutch); pegno, (Italian); penhor, (Portugese) and prenda, (Spanish). Source : M G
Dickson, W Rosener and P M Storm (eds), Security on Movable Property and Receivables in
Europe, (1988), p 219.
2. See Stair, 1.13.11; Bankton, 1.17.1; Erskinc, III. 1.33; Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence,
(1978, ed R L Meek, D D Raphael and P G Stein) p 78; Bell, Commentaries, 11,19; Bell, Principles,
s 1363; Hume, Lectures, IV,2; Gloag and Irvine, pp 199-200; Shaw, p 10 and Robertson & Baxter
v Inglis (1897) 24 R 758, at 777 per Lord McLaren.
3. Ddbiteur, (French); Verpfandcr, (German); Mndpantsactter, (Danish); pandgever, (Dutch);
datore di pegno, (Italian); devedor pignoratfcio, (Portugese) and deudor pignoraticio, (Spanish).
Sec Dickson, Roscner and Storm, p 221.
4. Crdancier gagiste, (French); Pfandglaubiger, (German); hdndpantgever, (Danish); pandhoudcr,
(Dutch); creditorc pignoratizio, (Italian); credor pignoraticio, (Portugese) and acrcddor
pignoraticio, (Spanish). See Dickson, Roscner and Storm, pp 220-221.
6. Origins of the word. The word pledge in most languages is an assimilation of
three basic notions.1 These are the notions of a stake or a forfeit; a promise; and
collateral security.
(a) Pledge as a stake or a forfeit. In the beginning, if the owner of property pledged it
in security of an obligation which he later did not manage to perform then the
property was simply forfeited.2 Hence, the owner could be seen as gambling that he
could duly perform. If he could not, then he lost his goods. It is rare to view pledge
in this manner nowadays, as it seems universally to have become a term for
collateral security.3
4
(b) Pledge as a "promise". A day does not usually pass without a newspaper using
the word in this sense, for example "Devolution pledge on powers of councils".4
Thus, too, if a person "takes the pledge", then he vows to abstain from intoxicating
liquor from then on. This meaning of the word coheres with the idea of the owner of
the property promising to perform his obligation. It is really the intermediary
between the idea of pledge as complete forfeiture and pledge as collateral security.
Rather than placing the emphasis on forfeiture, it places it on the moral duty to
perform.5
(c) Pledge as collateral security. This is a straightforward progression from the
notion of "promise". For, if the emphasis is now on the moral duty to perform, then
failure to do so should only see steps being taken against the property as a direct
surrogate for performance. In other words the person to whom the obligation was
owed should only be able to recover the level of his loss caused by non-performance
and no more.6
1. See the important three part article, "The Pledge-Idea : A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas", by J
H Wigmore, at (1897) 10 Harv LR 321; (1897) 10 Harv LR 389 and (1897) 11 Harv LR 18,
particularly (1897) 10 Harv LR 321-325. The same ideas are found in the Hebrew expressions for
pledge used in the Old Testament : see J Hastings, Dictionary of the Bible, (1900) s v "Pledge".
Likewise, these notions lie behind the old Scots word for pledge, wad : see An Etymological
Dictionary of The Scottish Language, vol 4, (1882) sv "wad" and The Scottish National
Dictionary, vol x, (1976), sv "wad".
2. See Wigmore. For more on the Roman law, see R J Goebel, "Reconstructing the Roman Law of
Real Security" (1961-62) 36 Tul LR 29, at pp 32-33 and for the old English law, see F Pollock and F
W Maitland, The History of English Law before Edward /, (2nd ed, 1896, reprinted with new
introduction by Milsom, 1968), p 186.
3. For an examination of pledge in a number of legal systems, see J G Sauveplanne (ed), Security
over Corporeal Movables, (1974). And Wigmore writes at (1897) 11 Harv LR 18, 38 : "there are
evidences in nearly a dozen systems of law that the progress has been from a primitive forfeit-idea
to a later collateral-security idea." But, Adam Smith describes pledge as a "wager" ; Lectures, p 79.
Further, the old Scots word for pledge, wad is also used to mean "bet" or "wager". Robert Burns in
his Earnest Cry, (Ayr, 1786) writes "Faith ! I'll wad my new pleugh-pettle/ Ye'll see't or lang." One
of the lines from Sir Walter Scott's Heart ofMidlothian, (1818), is "I could risk a sma' wad". Even
in the twentieth century in the unattributed work Swatches o' Hamespun, (Aberdeen, 1924) comes
"I'll wad a croon it's Jamie Broon." For the full references to these and many other works using wad
in this sense, see The Scottish National Dictionary, vol x, (1976) sv "wad".
4. The Herald, 19th May 1995, p 8.
5
5. See Wigmore, (1897) Harv LR 321, 323. It is suspected that the reason why S C Johnson & Son
Inc have called their furniture polish "Pledge" and obtained a registered trade mark for the word is
because they are promising that their polish will perform well. This, however, is conjecture.
6. See Wigmore, (1897) Harv LR 321, 323 and H F Jolowicz and B Nicholas, Historical
Introduction to the Study ofRoman Law, (3rd ed, 1972) at p 302.
7. Variations on the theme of collateral security. Within its meaning as a form of
security, "pledge" can he viewed in at least five different ways.
(1) Pledge has often been used as a general term for security.1 Stair, to an extent,
adopts this treatment.2 Voct makes express reference to it.3 The reason probably lies
in Roman law, where the equivalent term, pignus, could be used as a generic term
for security.4 This scheme is indeed adopted by Baron Hume and Professor Rcid in
their respective studies of the real rights recognised by the law of Scotland.3
However, while this approach may be perfectly justified by reference to Roman law
it is perhaps best avoided now as it is capable of engendering confusion. In
particular, the courts have persisted even this century in designating a security over
the shares of a company as a "pledge of shares", when it is in fact an assignation in
security.6 There are many other examples in legal literature of using "pledge" in an
unduly wide fashion.7
(2) Pledge is a real right in security over the moveable property of another, as more
fully defined above.8 This is the sense in which the word will be used here.
(3) Pledge is quite often used to mean the contract between pledger and pledgee.9
Whilst there is no need to criticise this use, it will be more convenient to refer to the
"contract of pledge" when this sense is meant.
(4) Pledge is sometimes used to denote the piece of property which is subject to the
security.10 However, to avoid confusion the expression "pledged property" will be
adopted instead.
(5) Up till now pledge has been used as a noun. However, it is also a verb and use of
the verb will often be made.11
1. For example, by the Court of Session in Ker ofGrcenhcad v Scot and Elliot (1695) Mor 9122.
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2. Stair, 1.13.11. In the sense that he treats hypothec under the subject of pledge. So too does Bankton
: 1.17. As does Adam Smith, Lectures, pp 78-81.
3. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, (translated by Pcrcival Gane, 1956) 20.1.1. Voet uses pignus.
4. See D. 13.7.1 pr(Ulpian) and D 20.1.5.1 (Marcian) and para 18 below.
5. Hume, Lectures, IV,38 and K G C Rcid, SME, vol 18, para 4.
6. For example, Barron v National Bank (1852) 14 D 565 and Coats v Union Bank of Scotland
1929 SC (HL) 114. The correct analysis is found in Morrison v Harrison (1876) 3 R 406 : see too W
M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11, para 757.
7. For example, W A Wilson, "Security over Corporeal Movables in Scotland" in J G Sauveplanne
(ed). Security over Corporeal Movables, (1974) p 43, at pp 45-46. D M Walker, Principles of
Scottish Private Law, vol 3, (4th ed, 1989), pp 394-396 classes all manner of things under the
heading "Pledge", for example attempts to circumvent s 62(4) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54).
8. See above, para 5.
9. For example. Bell, Principles s 203; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 14 and E A Marshall, Scots
Mercantile Law, (2nd ed, 1993) at para 7-78.
10. For example, Adam Smith, Lectures, p 78 writes under the heading "Pledges" : "That is, a subject
which is given or pledged to an other for the security of a debt due to him." Another example is
found in Gloag and Irvine, p 219, where the debtor is referred to as the "owner of the pledge".
11. The verb is equally applicable to using pledge in the sense of a promise.
8. Etymology. Pledge comes from the old French law term plege which meant
"personal security" or "surety".1 This at first seems surprising as pledge is a real
security.2 However, as will be seen, the distinction between personal and real
security in medieval times was somewhat blurred.3 The French term for real security
has left its mark on our legal system too. Gage shares the same Germanic root as
wad, which was the term for pledge in Scotland in the Middle Ages.4 Wadset, the
principal form of real security over land at that time, also shares the root.5 Another
member of the family is the word wagcr.b This supports the earlier analysis that one
of the connotations of pledge is that of a stake. Also stemming from the same root
are the terms engagement and wedding? These reflect the "promise" notion.
In English law there is evidence of the same French roots. Pledge is a term of art in
England.8 The more formal term is vadiumr This has been stated to come from the
same Germanic root as wad and wadset.10 There is also probably a link with the
Latin vadimonium which meant bail in Roman law.11 This suggestion is supported
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by the fact that pledge is a type of bailment in English law.12 The English term for
security over immoveables is mortgage, which clearly comes from gage.13
The Roman law term for pledge, pignus, sometimes finds itself in use in Scots law.14
From it, we get the noun impignoration and the verb impignorate. These words have
been used as synonyms for pledge in its narrow and wide sense, although principally
in older authority.15
1. The modern French term is pleige. Plege itself comes from the early Frankish Latin, plcvium
which derives from the medieval Latin, plivium. Plivium is a derivation of the medieval Latin verb
plcvire, meaning "to warrant, assure, undertake for, engage". This probably has Germanic origins.
For a full discussion of the etymology, see The Oxford English Dictionary. (2nd ed), vol xi, (1989)
s v "pledge". See also V S Meiners, "Formal Requirements of Pledge under Louisiana Civil Code
Article 3158 and Related Articles" (1987) 48 La LR 129, note 6.
2. That is, security over a thing (res).
3. See below, para 36.
4. For wad as pledge see Balfour, Practicks pp 194-196. Erskine, 11.8.3, writes : "Wad, in the old
Saxon language, signified a pledge". For the etymology see An Etymological Dictionary of The
Scottish Language, vol 4, (1882), sv "wad" and The Scottish National Dictionary (vol x, 1976),
sv "wad". See also F Pollock and F W Maitland, History ofEnglish Law, (2nd cd), vol 2, p 117 and
J H Wigmore, "The Pledge Idea : A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas" (1897) 10 Harv LR 321, 322-
323.
5. Ibid and Walter Ross, Lectures on the History and Practice of the Law of Scotland relative to
Conveyancing and Legal Diligence, (2nd ed, 1822), 11,330.
6. Pollock and Maitland, op cit, n 4.
7. Ibid and TFT Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, (5th ed, 1956), pp 628-629.
8. See A P Bell, chapter 6 and N E Palmer, Bailment (2nd cd, 1991) chapter 22.
9. Pollock and Maitland, op cit, n 4 and N E Palmer, ibid.
10. See Pollock and Maitland, and Wigmorc, op cit n 4. In fact it seems that the Latin vadium
derives from wad and not the other way around. Wad originally meant cloth in Gothic. With the
Goths, cloth was anciently given and received instead of money and if a pledge was made, it would
be done by leaving a piece of cloth. A pledge thus became known as a wad. See An Etymological
Dictionary of The Scottish Language, op cit n 4.
11. For vadimonium as bail, see Gaius, Institutes 4,184.
12. See Palmer, op cit, n 8; G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), chapter 18 and
Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Lord Raym 909, 919; 92 ER 107, 109 per Holt CJ. Vadimonium itself
8
probably originates in wad : see An Etymological Dictionary of The Scottish Language, op cit n
4.
13. See A W B Simpson, A History of the Land Law, (2nd ed, 1986), pp 141-143 and pp 242-247
and Pollock and Maitland, vol 2, pp 117-124.
14. For example, Stair, 1.13.11. On the Roman law, see below paras 12-19.
15. For example, Ramsay v Wilson (1665) Mor 9113 and Pringle v Grihton (1710) Mor 9123.
9. Pawn. The word pawn has come to be used as a synonym for pledge, both north
and south of the border and beyond.1 Its origins are unclear, but a connection with
the Latin ponere, to put down, seems likely.2 The word shares the same root as the
Dutch and German law terms for "pledge", these being pand and Pfand
respectively.3 One exception to the general proposition that pledge and pawn arc
interchangeable is the bill of lading. These apparently can only be pledged.4 In
Louisiana, pledge is used as a general term for real security and pawn means a
pledge of moveable property.5
Since the eighteenth century, pawn has been more precisely used to refer to a pledge
to a pawnbroker.6 This is a person offering credit whose activities are governed by
statute, currently the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Pawnbrokers operate from
pawnshops, the traditional sign of the premises being three gold balls, tire symbol
used in front of the houses of the medieval Lombard merchants.7 Any further
reference to pawn will be to a pledge to a pawnbroker.
1. Indeed, according to Bankton, II. lO.pr a pledge in respect of moveables is "generally called a
pawn". For England, see N E Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), at p 1383. Shakespeare certainly
used pawn to mean pledge, albeit it in a figurative context : "My Honor is at pawne, And but my
going, nothing can redeem it" (2 Henry IV, II.iii.7 (1597)). Ben Jonson, Every Man in his Humour,
(1598), lV.vii uses the word in a more mundane manner: "We haue no store of monie ... but you
shall haue good pawnes . . . this Iewell, and this gentlemans silke stockins". For other literary
references and the full etymology of the word see The Oxford English Dictionary, vol xi, (2nd ed.
1989) sv "pawn".
2. See Wigmore, "The Pledge-Idea : A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas" (1897) 10 Harv LR 321,
322 note 3. The Oxford English Dictionary, ibid does not recognise any such derivation.
3. The root is the old French pan, which as well as meaning pledge meant piece of cloth. See The
OED, ibid. Thus, the origins of pawn seem remarkably similar to those of wad. See above, para 8, n
10. On the Dutch law, see W M Klcijn, J P Jordaans, H B Krans, H D Ploeger and F A Steketee in J
Chorus et al, introduction to Dutch Law, (2nd ed, 1993) pp 84-87. In German law, the precise
terminology is Vertragspfandrecht or Faustpfandrecht. See F Lent, Sachcnrecht : Ein
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Studienbuch, (14th ed, by K H Schwab, 1974), p 261 and F Baur, Lehrbuch dcs Sachenrechts,
(13th ed, 1985), p 527.
4. This is certainly the English position : Halsbury, vol 36, para 10In.
5. See R Slovenko, "Of Pledge", (1958) 33 Till LR 59.
6. That is, since the enactment of pawnbroking legislation. There were various pieces of legislation in
the eighteenth century, the first consolidating statute being the Pawnbrokers Act of 18(X) (39 & 40
Geo 3 c 99). See J K Macleod, "Pawnbroking : A Regulatory Issue", (1995) 24 JBL 155, 160. See
also The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law ofSecurity, pp 8-9.
7. See The Hutchinson Concise Encyclopaedia, (1989), sv "pawnbroker".
2. HISTORY
(a) Early systems
10. Ancient law : Biblical evidence. As one commentator has put it, "pledge
springs from natural law and is of the farthest antiquity", securing debts "in the
primitive relations of men."1 "Pledge" is mentioned no less than twenty four times in
the Old Testament, the first time being in Genesis Chapter 38.2 This can be dated
approximately to 1700 BC and concerns the pledge of a seal, its cord, and a staff.3
The items were to secure the delivery of a young goat and it appears that they
simply were to be forfeited if the kid was not delivered. Later, in Deuteronomy, God
through Moses lays down rules to try to protect debtors. For example, millstones
used for grinding com are not to be taken in security, because they are a man's
means of preparing food to keep his family alive.4
1. H Denis, quoted in V S Meiners, "Formal Requirements of Pledge Under Louisiana Civil Code
3158 and Related Articles" (1987) 48 La LR 129.
2. See R Young, Analytical Concordance of the Bible, (1879) sv "pledge".
3. Genesis 38:18.
4. Deuteronomy 24:6. Echoes of this can be found in the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, (c 18), s 16
(articles exempt from poinding). See also Deuteronomy 24:10-13.
11. Other early systems. The concept of pledge was also known in ancient Egypt.1
There, a gruesome business developed whereby a debtor would deliver the mummy
of his father to his creditor.2 The latter was very happy to lend on this basis, for the
pledged property was of significant religious value to the debtor and therefore he
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would be sure to discharge the debt so he could get his mummy back. Further,
according to Pufendorf, were the debtor indeed to fail to redeem the pledge, he
would be held in the greatest disgrace and be denied burial after his own death.3 The
ancient Greeks also widely used the pledge device, although probably in less
macabre a fashion.4 A mix of Tartarian and Arabian jurisprudence, supplanted by
Greek law, was the basis of the law in old Turkey. Ancient Turks in dispute about
what this meant for a pledge transaction, would refer the matter to the Mufti at
Constantinople.5 Pledge was also recognised in early India.6
1. V S Meincrs, "Formal Requirements of Pledge Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 3158 and
Related Articles" (1987) 48 La LR 129.
2. Ibid
3. Pufendorf, Dc Jure Naturae et Gentium, V. 10.13.
4. V S Meiners, op cit and J H Wigmore, "The Pledge-Idea : A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas
III" (1897) 11 HarvLR 18-21.
5. Sir William Jones, An Essay on the Law of Bailments, (1781). pp 84-85. His source is a
manuscript kept in the University of Cambridge Library.
6. J H Wigmore, "The Pledge-Idea : A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas II" (1897) 10 Harv LR 389,
416-417.
(b) Roman law
12. General. The most developed system of ancient law with respect to pledge and
unsurprisingly the most influential on the Scots law of today is the law of ancient
Rome.1 A comprehensive account of the relevant civil law will not be given here for
two reasons. Firstly, the subject has already been the subject of extensive research
by eminent scholars.2 Secondly, references to the specific rules of Roman law will
be made later, when consideration is given to the parallel Scots law rules.3 However,
it will be convenient at this stage to give an overview of the Roman law of security.
1. See below, para 42.
2. See M Kaser, Das Rbmische Privatreeht, (6th ed). translated by R Dannenbring as Roman
Private Law, (2nd ed, 1968), pp 129-134; R Sohm, Institutionen : Geschichte und System des
Rdmischen Privatrechts, (12th ed, 1905), translated by J C Ledlic as Institutes of Roman Law,
(3rd ed, 1907), pp 351-357; B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (1962) pp 149-153;
Thomas, pp 329-334; Buckland, pp 470-478; H F Jolowicz and B Nicholas, Historical
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Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, (3rd ed, 1972) pp 301-304; F Schulz, Classical Roman
Law, (1951), pp 400-427; R J Goebel, "Reconstructing the Roman Law of Real Security" (1961-62)
36 Tul LR 29 and texts cited therein.
3. See below, for example, para 98.
13. Real and personal security. In ancient Rome, personal security was in fact far
more common than real security.1 This conjures up images of the debtor finding a
third party to act as a cautioner, and indeed often this was what happened.2 But
equally, "personal security" meant that the debtor contracted with the creditor that if
he defaulted upon the loan he would become the creditor's slave until he discharged
the debt.3 Understandably, not all debtors would wish to take that risk and
consequently would, if they were rich enough to have valuable assets, opt for real
security.
1. B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (1962), p 151. The distinction between the two
types of security was very well established : see D.50.16.188.1.
2. Thomas, pp 334-339.
3. V S Meiners, "Formal Requirements of Pledge under Louisiana Civil Code Article 3158 and
Related Articles" (1987) 48 La LR 129.
14. Fiducia cum creditorc. This was the original form of real security in Roman
law.1 It involved the debtor transferring ownership of the res to the creditor by
mancipatio or in iure cessio, subject to a covenant, fiducia or pactum ftduciae, that
the creditor would reconvey upon the debtor fulfilling his obligation.2 The fiducia
would also contain conditions governing the circumstances in which the creditor
could sell the thing, much like an "events of default" clause in a modern commercial
loan. The essence of fiducia cum creditore was clearly the transfer of ownership.
The debtor lost his real right. This meant that the creditor could alienate the property
to a third party, even in breach of his fiducia, leaving the debtor with only his
personal actio fiduciac against the creditor.3 There were other disadvantages to the
debtor of this type of security too.4 Unless, there was a special arrangement by way
of prccarium, possession of the property was with the creditor, so the debtor could
not utilise it. Further, successive securities over the asset were impossible.
1. Buckland, p 471; B Nicholas, An Intrcxluction to Roman Law, (1962), p 151.
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2. Nicholas, ibid; R J Goebel, "Reconstructing the Roman Law of Real Security" (1961-62) 36 Tul
LR 29, 33-34.
3. Ibid: Thomas, p 329.
4. Nicholas, op cit, n 1.
15. Pignus. The unsatisfactory nature of fiducia led to the development of pignus,
which was in widespread use before the time of the Empire.1 This involved the
debtor transferring merely the possession of the res to the creditor.2 The debtor
retained dominium} He was therefore protected from the creditor making a
wrongful sale, although remaining unable to make use of his property. On the other
hand, for a long time, the creditor was only protected by the possessory interdicts
and was not regarded as having a real right.4.
1. Buckland, p 472.
2. Ibid; Nicholas, p 151.
3. Ibid: R Zimmermann, The Law ofObligations, (1990), p 220.
4. Buckland, ibid; Thomas, p 330.
16. Hypotheca. The drawbacks of pignus were particularly felt in agricultural areas,
where any valuable property a debtor had was needed to work the land. A practice
consequently developed of tenants "pledging" to their landlord in security of their
rent the property they had brought onto the land (invecta et illata).' However, this
form of pledge amounted merely to an agreement that if the rent were not duly paid,
the landlord should be entitled to take possession of the property.2 Probably around
the end of the Republic, this arrangement was given force of law by the Praetor
Salvius who granted the landlord an interdict (interdictum Salvianum) to seize the
invecta et illata} However, this simply amounted to a personal right against the
tenant.
Sometime later, but before Hadrian consolidated the Edict in c 130 AD, the right
became real when another Praetor, named Servius, granted the landlord an actio in
rem, the actio Serviana.4 Later Praetors granted an actio Serviana utilis (or actio
quasi Scrviana) in other cases of hypotheca. This area of law grew at an explosive
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rate, the Romans having even come up with a hypothec resembling the modern
floating charge.5 However it was Julian when codifying the Edict for Hadrian, who
took the last step and made the actio Scrviana available in all cases of hypotheca
and pignus also.6 By the middle of the Second Century AD therefore, pignus and
hypotheca had become iura in rc alicna?
1. Nicholas, p 152.
2. Ibid; F Schulz, Classical Roman Law, (1951), p 408.
3. Schulz, ibid; Thomas, p 332.
4. Ibid; Buckland, pp 472-473.
5. D.20.1.34.pr; Thomas, ibid; Buckland, ibid, p 475.
6. Schulz, op cit.
7. To use the terminology of the Commentators : see Nicholas, above, p 141 cf Buckland, p 471,
note 1.
17. Forfeiture versus collateral security. In the earlier eras of the civil law the
property given in security was almost certainly automatically forfeited to the
creditor upon non-performance by the debtor1. Whether the security was fiducia or
pignus does not seem to have mattered.2 Support for the existence of the forfeiture
type of pledge is found in the Digest where reference is made to the creditor who
has the right to sell the property under a special clause giving him the right to sue
the creditor for any unrealised deficiency.3 The thesis is that such a clause only
existed because initially the creditor had purely the forfeiture right.4 Further,
evidence of the forfeiture type of pledge is found in the early laws of the Germans
and Greeks.5
The forfeiture pledge acted as an in rein surrogate for any in personam rights the
creditor otherwise had. This meant that the risk (pcriculum) lay with the creditor. If
the property was worth less than the debt, the creditor could not recover the
deficiency (rcliquum) from the debtor. Conversely, if the property exceeded the
value of the debt, he could retain the surplus (hypcrocha).b The inequity here was
clear and the forfeiture pledge was consigned to history around the middle of the
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Republican era.7 Pledge had become a collateral security and forfeiture only
occurred if there was an express agreement (lex commissoria) to that effect.8
The demise of the automatic forfeiture rule meant that the creditor had to stipulate
how he intended to realise his security. As just mentioned, he could agree with the
debtor on an express forfeiture clause (lex commissoria). The alternative was to
stipulate for a right to sell (pactum de vendendo or distrahendo).9 Pledge now being
a collateral security, the creditor had to account to the debtor for any profit made
upon the sale. Similarly, he could sue the debtor for any deficit.10 The pactum dc
vendendo became implied in the classical era. However, to avoid abuse by the
creditor an elaborate system of notice was enacted.11 As for abuse of the lex
commissoria, this was brought to a halt by the Emperor Constantino abolishing it.12
The remaining remnant of the concept of the forfeiture pledge had been removed.
1. R J Goebcl, "Reconstructing the Roman Law of Real Security" (1961-62) 36 Tul LR 29, 32:
Jolowicz and Nicholas, p 302; R Zimmermann, The Law ofObligations, (1990), p 223.
2. Gocbel, ibid p 33.
3. D.20.5.9.1 (Pomponius) and D.46.1.63 (Scaevola).
4. Goebel, p 32.
5. Ibid p 33; J H Wigmore, (1897) 10 Harv LR 321, 327-329; (1897) 11 Harv LR 18, 19.
6. Goebel, p 33.
7. Ibid.
8. Thomas, p 331.
9. Buckland, p 474; Goebel, p 35.
10. Jolowicz and Nicholas, p 302.
11. Thomas, p 331, Buckland, pp 474-475.
12. Thomas, ibid, Zimmermann, p 224.
18. The distinction between pignus and hypothecs. What has been said thus far is
a fairly standard account of the development of the Roman law of real security, upon
which there is general academic consensus. However the presence of conflicting
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texts in the Corpus luris Civilis, plus the universally accepted fact that many of the
passages in the Digest were interpolated by Tribonian and his compilers, opens the
door to scholarly disagreement. In the area with which we are concerned, the
greatest controversy is perhaps the inter-relationship between pignus and hypotheca.
The orthodox view is the one which finds support from Ulpian :
"Proprie pignus dicimus, quod ad crcditorem transit, hypothecam, cum non
transit nec possessio ad crcditorem."1
This may be translated as :
"Strictly speaking, we use pignus for the pledge which is handed over to the
creditor and hypothec for the case in which he does not even get possession."2
As the orthodox position, this has certainly been accepted by leading Romanists.3
And it has been accepted by modern Scots law as the orthodoxy too.4 Here,
however, there is also heterodoxy.
The alternative thesis is that pignus and hypothec are capable of being condensed
into the same notion.5 Support for this may be found in the following opinion of
Marcianus :
"
Interpignus autem et hypothecam tantum nominis sonus differt,"6
This translates as :
"The difference between pignus and hypotheca is purely verbal."'
Persuasive arguments may be adduced to discredit the traditional dichotomous
approach. In the first place, it was formerly believed that hypotheca, due to its
Greek name, was a legal transplant from the law of ancient Greece.8 This is now
generally accepted to be untrue.9 Secondly, the actio Serviana (the relevant real
action) was common to both.10 Indeed, the word pignus occurs in the formula of the
action." Leading on from this and thirdly,, whereas hypotheca grew out of pignus,
pignus only became a real right through hypotheca.12 Fourthly and crucially, the
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passages set out above from Ulpian and Justinian both use the similar expressions
"strictly speaking" and "properly" which indicate that pignus and hypotlicca were
used interchangeably.13 Fifthly, it is argued that the discrete categorisation
represents the Justinianic rationalisation of the law and not what the situation was in
classical Rome.14 Sixthly, it has been doubted whether the above passage attributed
to Ulpian did indeed come from his pen.15 At any rate, the same great jurist writes
elsewhere :
"Pignus contrahitur non sola traditione, scd ctiam nuda conventione, etsi non
traditum est."16
This translates as :
"Pignus is contracted not only by delivery but also by mere agreement even in
the absence of any delivery."17
These arguments are cumulatively powerful. Goebel's analysis is difficult to resist:
. . Roman law in both its classical and post-classical eras knew only one
basic form of real security. Whether this form was known as pignus or
hypothecs or both, or whether preferred usage required pignus to indicate
possession in the creditor and hypothcca ... to indicate possession in the
debtor, is a topic of fairly minor importance. . . Accordingly, it is quite
inappropriate to speak of the legal rules of pignus or the legal rules of
hypotlicca as such. It is preferable to adopt a neutral terminology and present
the doctrines applicable to pledge as a whole, organized in categories strictly
according to the basic factual situations which engender these doctrines."18
1. D. 13.7.9.2.
2. Translation from T Mommsen, P Kruger and A Watson (eds), The Digest of Justinian (1985 )
Pennsylvania (4 vols). See also lnst.4.6.7.
3. For example. Buckland and Thomas, opcit.
4. Stair, 1.13.11; W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, (10th ed. 1995), chapter
19.
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5. See Wigmore, (1897) 11 Harv LR 18, 21-25; Goebel, (1961-62) 36 Tul LR 29, 37-44; Nicholas,
above, p 152; Jolowicz andNicholas, p 303.
6. D.20.1.5.1.
7. Translation from Mommsen etal.
8. See Jolowicz and Nicholas, p 303. This was the prevalent view amongst the older writers, for
example, R Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, (trans J C Ledlie, 3rd ed, 1907), p 354. W Burdick,
Principles ofRoman Law and Their Relation to Mtxlem Law, (1938), p 381 adheres to this view.
9. Goebel, p 35; Thomas, p 332; Nicholas, above, p 152.
10. Nicholas, ibid, Thomas, ibid; Buckland, pp 472-473.
11. Jolowicz and Nicholas, p 303.
12. That is, the actio in rem, the actio Serviana was available to a hypothecary creditor before being
available to a pledgee : Buckland, pp 472-473; Schulz, p 408.
13. Or at least pignus was. See Wigmore, (1897) 11 Harv LR 18, 23 n 3.
14. Gocbcl, pp 30-31. Wigmore's thesis in fact is that hypotheca was used as a substitute for fiducia
in the Digest, in other words that that fiducia by Justinian's time had become absorbed into pignus :
Wigmore ibid, at pp 381-383. However, this ultra radical revisionism has been questioned : Gocbcl,
pp 41-43.
15. G F Puchta doubts this: Pandekten, (12th ed, 1877), p 193. Sec Wigmore, p 23 n 3.
16. D.13.7.1.pr.
17. Translation based on that in Mommscn et al.
18. Goebel, p 44.
19. A unitary law of pledge. Another important point about pignus and hypotheca
is that each was competent for both immoveable and moveable property.1 Here, for
example, is Burdick ;
"In Roman law, both pignus and hypotheca applied to movables and
immovables alike. The notion entertained by some that pignus applied only to
movables while hypotheca applied exclusively to immovables, is erroneous.
Each applies to both classes of property."2
The modem Scots law of pledge, it goes without saying, is only applicable to
moveables. As regards heritable property, the standard security is the only
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competent method of securing an obligation upon land in Scotland.3
1. Thomas, pp 332-333; Wigmore, p 22; Buckland, pp 475-476.
2. W Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Mcxlcrn Law, (1938), p 382. See
also W M Gordon, "Roman Influence on the Scots Law of Real Security", in R Evans-Jones (ed),
The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, (1995), p 157, at pp 158-159. In Louisiana today, pledge
remains a general term for security. A pledge of moveables is known as pawn and one of
immoveables as antichresis. See R Slovenko, "Of Pledge", (1958) 33 Tul LR 59.
3. Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 (c 35), s 9(3).
(c) Early Scots law
20. General. The development of our law in the medieval era is a matter of
controversy. On the one hand there is the thesis of Lord Cooper of Culross and
Professor William Croft Dickinson, at one time the undisputed orthodoxy.1 On the
other hand there is that of the revisionist Mr W D H Scllar, Professor Hector
MacQueen and others.2
Both sides are agreed that by the time of the early fourteenth century, the legal
statesmen of Scotland were engaged in the construction of a legal system founded
upon Anglo-Norman law.3 However, for Lord Cooper and his school of thought this
was to turn out as a "false start"4 to the development of our law because of the onset
of the Wars of Independence.5.
For Lord Cooper the law of Scotland, certainly prior to the time of the Reception of
Roman law and perhaps even before Stair wrote his Institutions in 1681, was not of
great importance, other than to the legal historian. As he writes in succinct terms in
his pamphlet, The Scottish Legal Tradition, "[fjor present purposes we cannot
ignore pre-Stair law, but we need not linger beside it".6
The revisionist school has seriously called into question the existence of a "Dark
Age" in our legal history. For its members the time around the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries is no less than the formative period of the Scots law which
we know today.7 To the revisionist then, a study of the early Scots law of pledge is a
matter of far more than academic interest.
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1. See Lord Cooper, Selected Papers, (1957), pp 219-236; H L MacQueen, Common Law and
Feudal Scxiety, (1994), pp 2ff.
2. See WDH Sellar, "A Historical Perspective" in S C Styles (ed), "The Scottish Legal Tradition",
(2nd ed, 1991), pp 29-57 esp p 30; WDH Sellar, "The Common Law of Scotland and the Common
Law of England" in The British Isles 1HX)-1500 : Comparisons Contrasts and Connections, ed
R R Davies, (1988), pp 82-99; MacQueen, ibid.
3. MacQuecn, ibid.
4. Lord Cooper in The Scottish Legal Tradition, (2nd ed, 1991), p 70.
5. Ibid, p 68.
6. Ibid, p 67.
7. See MacQueen, op cit.
(i) Rcgiam Majestatcm
21. General In the history of Scots law, few treatises have generated greater
controversy than the Rcgiam Majestatcm. The fact that it is a collection of old laws
written in Latin is beyond question. However, the date of the work and its accuracy
as an account of medieval Scots law are matters upon which there has been
significant dissensus.1 As to the first of these, c 1318 seems the likeliest time of
publication.2 However, with regard to accuracy, the basic problem is that much of
Rcgiam has been copied from the English work of c 1187, the Dc Lcgibus ct
Consucmdinibus Angliac of Glanvill.3 Thus Stair regarded it as "no part of our
law".4 However, this statement is somewhat exaggerated, given that he was clearly
aware of the influence of English law upon our legal system.5 As Sellar writes,
"Regiam Majcstatem was an important, although not necessarily authoritative,
repository of Scottish customary law."6 Further, its influence on later works is not
difficult to show.7
Pledge merits five chapters in Book 3 of Rcgiam.H The terminology used is very
interesting. The word used for pledge is vadium. Pignus does get a passing reference
in the title to chapter 2, in the derivative form pignoris. It reads :
"Dc rebus creditis ct mutuo dato sub vadii vclpignoris positionc"
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The use of "vef ie "or" suggests that vadium and pignus were alternatives.
However, in the body of the text it is vadium which is used. The origin of the word
vadium is not difficult to trace and indeed has been dealt with previously, in the
discussion of etymology.9 Vadium is the Latin tenn used by English law to mean
pledge. It was in the Middle Ages and is today.10 Further, the fact of the matter is
that chapters 2 to 6 of Book 3 of Regiam are based closely upon parallel passages in
Glanvill."
1. See Lord Cooper's introduction to Regiam Majestatem, (Stair Soc vol 11, 1947, ed Lord Cooper);
A A M Duncan, "Regiam Majestatcm. A Reconsideration" 1961 JR 199; P Stein, "The Source of the
Romano-canonical part of Regiam Majestatem" SHR xlviii (1969), 107; A Harding, "Regiam
Majestatem among Medieval Law-Books" 1984 JR 97; H L MacQuecn, Common Law and Feudal
Society, {1993), pp 89-98.
2. MacQueen, pp 90-91.
3. See texts cited in note 1. The edition of Glanvill is G D G Hall (ed), Tractabus de Legibus el
Consuetudinibus Angliae qui Glanvilla voccator, (1965).
4. Stair, 1.1.16. See also Craig, Jus Fcudale, (1603; 1934 edition, translated by Lord Clyde), 1.8.11.
5. See W D H Sellar, "English Law as a Source", in Stair Tercentenary Studies, (Stair Sex; vol 33),
pp 140-150. See also his contribution to The Scottish Legal Tradition, (2nd ed, 1991), entitled "A
Historical Perspective", p 29, at p 39.
6. Ibid, p 144.
7. In particular Balfour's Practicks. Sec below, paras 35-36. Regiam has been cited in court in the
twentieth century : Lord Advocate v University ofAberdeen & Budge 1963 SC 533.
8. These may be found at pp 192-198 of Lord Cooper's edition.
9. See above, para 8.
10. For the Middle Ages, see F Pollock and F W Maitland, The History of English Law before
Edward I, (2nd ed, 1896, reprinted 1968), vol 2. p 117 and A W B Simpson, An Introduction to the
History of the Land Law, (2nd ed, 1986), p 141. For today, see N E Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed,
1991), chapter 22.
11. That is, Glanvill, X.6-10.
22. The old English law. As it is clear that the old English law heavily influenced
Rcgiam, it will be convenient to allude to it here and to make reference to it in future
paragraphs. This is particularly helpful because some scholarship has been already
carried out on the matter.1 Whereas vadium was the relevant Latin term, the English
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one was gage. This word came over from France after William the Conqueror and
must have quickly established itself as the term for pledge, as there are references to
gages of land in the Domesday Book.2 It appears that the Anglo-Saxon term for
pledge was wed, and in actual fact this shares the same Germanic roots as vadium
and gage? The early English law of pledge was unitary in respect of moveables and
immoveables.4
1. See F Pollock and F W Maitland, The History of English Law before Edward /, (2nd cd, 1968),
vol 2, pp 117-124; A W B Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the Land Law, (2nd ed,
1986), pp 141-143; TFT Plueknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, (5th ed, 1956), pp
603-609.
2. Plucknett, p 603; Pollock and Maitland, p 118. Apparently, one of the cases involved one Eadric
having gaged land to the Abbot of St Benet.
3. Pollock andMaitland. p 117.
4. Glanvill, X.6.
23. A unitary law of pledge. Regiam states categorically that both moveable and
immoveable property may be pledged.1 The exact wording used is "put into pledge",
in Latin, "ponuntur in vadium". It has already been suggested that ponere, the verb
to put, is a precursor of "pawn".2 The fact that Regiam recognises pledge as a
security in respect of both land and moveables is very important. It is suggestive of
Roman influence. For, as we have seen, the civil law treated pledge as a unitary
concept.3 Moreover, the approach in Regiam makes the point that the law of real
security like the law of property in general has a unitary foundation. As to the
accuracy of the account here, Erskine seems to have been in no doubt. He uses
Rcgiam as the authority for this statement of the early law of heritable security in
Scotland :
"Originally the property of the lands . . . remained with the debtor, agreeably
to the genuine nature of impignoration : it was the possession only which was
transferred to the creditor for his security."4
Whilst the basic law of pledge applied equally to moveables and immoveables,
Rcgiam does set out some particular rules restricted to each type of property. In
respect of land, a pledge could be a moxiuum vadium, which Lord Cooper translates
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as "mortgage".5 The correct translation should be "dead-pledge", for he translates
vadium into "pledge" everywhere else. "Mortgage" is the correct translation for the
English lawyer, because "gage" was a term of art in medieval law, as too
"mortgage" became. Regiam defines a mortgage as a pledge where the fruits and
rents received by the creditor as interest do not reduce the principal debt.6 Thus, tire
pledge is "dead", because its profits do not go towards the discharge of the debt.
Mortgages are regarded as usurious arrangements. Although not prohibited by the
King's court, a Christian creditor sins by entering into a mortgage. If he dies while
the mortgage is current his property is disposed of in the same way as that of a
usurer.7 After setting out the rules on mortgage, Rcgiam states that aside from these
rules the law on pledging immoveables are "the same as in the case of the pledge of
moveable goods".8 The unitary nature of the medieval Scots pledge is again
underlined.
1. Regiam Majestatem, 111.2.1.
2. See above, para 9.
3. See above, para 19.
4. Erskine, II.8.4. See also W M Gordon, "Roman Influence on the Scots Law of Real Security", in R
Evans-Jones, (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, (1995), p 157, at p 159.
5. Regiam Majestatem, III.2.5. See Stair Soc vol 11 (ed Lord Cooper), p 193. Although III.2
indicates that both moveable and immoveable property could be mortgaged, in practice it was just
immoveables. See III.5.
6. Regiam Majestatem, III.2.5.
7. Ibid, III.5.4.
8. Ibid. Note, however, also the rules governing the situation where pledged land is wrongously
withheld from the pledger: Rcgiam Majestatem. III.6.
24. The need for delivery. Chapter 2 of Book 3 of Regiam states that in pledge the
subject matter of the security is either immediately delivered by the debtor to the
creditor on receipt of the loan, or it is not so delivered. This has clear echoes of
pignus and hypotlicca] and suggests a flexible approach. In practice, however,
delivery was a necessity, because chapter 4 provides :
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"When a bargain has been made between debtor and creditor regarding the
pledging of some thing, if the debtor after having received the loan fails to
deliver the pledge, what action is open to the creditor in such circumstances,
especially in view of the risk that the same thing may have previously been
pledged, and may again be pledged, to other creditors ? Upon this point it
must be noted that the King's court is not in use to take cognisance of or
warrant such private bargains about the giving or receiving of pledges, or
other agreements if made out of court, or made in some court other than the
King's court. Therefore if such agreements are not observed, the king's court
does not interfere; and hence it is not bound to determine the rights of
different creditors, prior or postponed, or their respective preferences."2
From this it is clear that agreements resembling hypotheca were unenforceable.3 The
long obsession of Scots law with the maxim "no security over moveables without
possession" had begun.4
Lord Cooper is rather sceptical as to what extent the King's courts would ignore
such agreements.5 Skene suggested that the sheriff and barony courts would act as
enforcement agencies, but there is really no direct evidence on the matter.6
However, the English authorities are clear that there must be delivery.7 Glanvill
demands it, for otherwise the property might be pledged to successive creditors,
resulting in a situation much too complex for royal justice to resolve.8 As we shall
see, later authority indicates this is the Scottish position and it is therefore felt that
the wording of chapter 4 is far from being inaccurate.9
1. See above, para 18.
2. Rcgiam Majestatem, III.4.4-6.
3. At least in the royal courts.
4. A point which has also been made by Professor Gordon, in "Roman Influence on the Scots Law of
Real Security", in R Evans-Jones, (ed). The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, (1995), p 157, at p
168. For a discussion of the principle see Gloag and Irvine, chapter 7.
5. Regiam Majestatem. (1947 ed), p 196.
6. Ibid. Professor Gordon suggests that action could be taken in the ecclesiastical courts : "Roman
Influence on the Scots Law of Real Security", op cit, n 4, at p 161. Once again, however, there is no
clear evidence.
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7. Pollock and Maitland, vol 2, p 120; Plucknett, pp 603-604; Simpson, p 141.
8. Glanvill, X.8.
9. In particular Balfour's Practicks and the later obsession of Scots law with "no security without
possession".
25. Rights and obligations. There exists in Rcgiam a basic division between a
pledge for a limited period and one for an unlimited period.1 Thus a pledge could
secure a term or an on-demand loan. With both types of pledge, the pledgee is under
the same duty of care in respect of the property. He must keep it in safe custody and
is not allowed to make use of it nor do anything to it which will cause it to
deteriorate. He is liable to the pledger for any deterioration which is his fault.2
Where the pledged property is something which requires expense, for example, an
animal needing to be fed, it is a matter for the parties to decide who must bear this
cost.3 Regiam does not state who is liable if there is failure to come to an
agreement.4
1. Rcgiam Majestatem, III.2.1, III.3 and 111.4..
2. Ibid, III.3-4.
3. Ibid, III.3.3.
4. Cf the modern position, below, para 99.
26. Enforcement. Where property is pledged for a stated period the parties may
agree that it becomes the creditor's on default.1 In the absence of such an agreement,
the creditor may bring the debtor to court. If the pledge is admitted by the debtor, he
will be given a fixed period to discharge the debt. If he fails to do this, the property
becomes the creditor's. If the debtor denies that the property is indeed his, it falls to
the creditor. If the debtor denies the pledge, the onus is on the creditor to prove that
the property was pledged as loan security.
What can be seen here is that the pledge set out in Rcgiam appears to be a forfeiture
pledge rather than a collateral security pledge. It may be recalled that Roman law in
the 4th century AD by the order of Constantine had ruled out forfeiture as a remedy
for the creditor.2 If Rcgiam was a tru,: reflection of the medieval law, then these
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forfeiture rules make it seem jurisprudcntially backward.
1. Regiam Majestatem, III.3.4-11. Presumably the same rules applied for a pledge for an indefinite
period, as III.4 is silent on the matter.
2. See above, para 17; W M Gordon, "Roman Influence on the Scots Law of Real Security", in R
Evans-Jones, (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, p 157, at p 162..
27. A real right ? A very important question which requires an answer is whether
the medieval pledge was a real right. Now of course this terminology is bound to be
absent from the text as it is neo-Romanist and the reception of Roman law was still
to come.1 However, the notion is straight-forward enough. Could the creditor assert
possessory rights over the property against a singular successor of the debtor and the
world in general ? The answer as regards the English gagee was in the negative.2 He
was not permitted to use the relevant action to protect his possession ; the brieve of
novel disseisin.3 So if a stranger dispossessed him, it was the gagor who had the
remedy. If the gagor himself chose to dispossess the gagee, the latter had no remedy
and was reduced to being an unsecured creditor.4
The reason given for not allowing the gagec to regain possession was that in reality
he was entitled to the debt and not the property. If the court could award the creditor
his money then it did not require to award him possession.5 This is all very well in
an insolvency-free Utopia. However insolvency existed in medieval England as it
does today.6 The technical reason why the creditor had no possessory remedy was
simply that he was not regarded as being in possession.7 For the Roman law of
pignus filtering into medieval England at the time came from the Italian glossators
who denied that a pledgee exercised possession over the property he was detaining
in security.8 Given the lack of remedy, it was therefore unsurprising that the gage in
this form fell into disuse.9
In the case of Scotland, the passage in Glanvill which denies the pledgee a
possessory remedy against the pledger and third parties has not been transplanted
into Regiam,10 Further, Lord Cooper states that there is "no evidence in Scottish
records" that the debtor could reduce the creditor from being a secured creditor to
being an unsecured creditor by merely ejecting him from the pledged property."
Now of course the silence in the records does not necessarily mean anything; indeed
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the position could be the reverse. However, these two pieces of evidence could
suggest that the medieval Scots pledgee might have had the real right which his
English counterpart certainly had not. Be that as it may, given the great influence of
the Norman law, it is very difficult to make any definite conclusion on the matter.
1. The Reception of Roman law came in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See P Stein, "The
Influence of Roman Law on the Law of Scotland" 1963 JR 205.
2. Glanvill, X.l 1.
3. Ibid: Simpson, p 142.
4. Pollock and Maitland, vol 2, pp 120-121.
5. Ibid.
6. Consequently, the gage in this form died out as it was ineffective.
7. Glanvill, X. 11; Pollock andMaitland, ibid.
8. Polkxtk and Maitland, p 121 n 2; Bracton, Dc Lcgibus et Consuctudinibus Angliae, (ed G E
Woodbine, trans with revisions and notes by S E Thornc, 1968-1977), f 268.
9. Simpson, p 142.
10. Glanvill, X. 11.
11. Regiam Majestatem, (1947 ed), p 195.
(ii) Leges Quatuor Burgorum
28. General. The collection of laws of the Scottish burghs is another piece of early
Scottish authority.1 The title comes from the original four burghs from where the
laws emanated : Berwick, Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Stirling. The Leges Quatuor
Burgorum has been traditionally attributed to the reign of David I (1124-1153), but
it is most probably a later piece of work, maybe even as late as the thirteenth
century.2 Even so, this would make it earlier than Regiam (c 1318) and the question
may be asked why Regiam was examined first. The reason was that in terms of the
Scottish history of the last eight hundred years the works are broadly
contemporaneous and it was felt more appropriate to treat the one which deals with
laws enforced by the royal courts before the one which deals with those enforced by
the courts of the hurghs.3
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1. It may be found in T Thomson and C Innes (ed), The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, vol 1,
(1814;, 327-356.
2. H L MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Scx'iety, (1993), p 87; cf D M Walker, A Legal
History ofScotland, vol 1,(1985), p 95.
3. Rcgiam seems prima facie more important as its scope is not confined to the burghs.
29. Specific references to pledge. There is only one title out of the 119 which
treats pledge and it deals exclusively with land. It is title 79. Like Rcgiam, the Leges
Quatuor Burgorum is in Latin. Vadimortium is used for "pledge" . This surely
confirms the link between vadium and vadimonium already suggested and further
the English influence on medieval Scots law.' The term impignorata makes one
appearance as a synonym for vadimonium, which suggests as with Rcgiam that
pignus had made some sort of impact, if not much.
Although, the Leges Quatuor Burgorum was indeed originally a Latin work, a
parallel text in old Scots exists. This text uses the terms wed and wedset for pledge.
Now, as wc have seen, wed was actually the term for pledge in Anglo-Saxon
England, to be replaced by gage after 1066, although both terms share the same
Germanic root.2 The English influence is seen once more.
Title 79 states :
If any man has land pledged to another he may discharge the pledge when
ever he pleases except if it is pledged for a certain term. And when that term
comes he shall be given the opportunity at three head courts to redeem his
pledge. And if he does not redeem it, it shall be sold and the creditor shall
take his debt. And all that he gets which exceeds the debt shall be given to
him that owned the pledge."3
It is interesting to note the grace period which the debtor is given after the loan
becomes due for repayment. What however is most striking in comparison with
Regiam is that pledge is clearly treated as a collateral security. As we have seen,
Rcgiam, appears to regard forfeiture from pledger to pledgee as the remedy if the
latter defaults on the loan.4 As a matter of justice, the Leges Quatuor Burgorum
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seems to be ahead of Regiam,5
1. The English influence has been alluded to before, for example in para 21.
2. Pollock andMaitland, vol 2, p 117.
3. My translation from the Latin and old Scots text at APS, vol 1, 349. On the "head courts", see D M
Walker, A LcgaJ History ofScotland, vol 2. (1990), p 294.
4. Regiam Majestatem, III.3.4-11.
5. It is unclear whether this was due in any extent to Roman influence.
(d) The Period From 1400 To Stair
30. General. As will be seen, this period was one in which the law of pledge
gradually developed.1 At a more general level, the most important occurrence was
the establishment in 1532 of the College of Justice and the concurrent development
of the Court of Session.2 Their foundation gave rise to case law which slowly and
surely helped shape pledge into its modern form.
1. For a discussion of this period in general, see D M Walker, The Scottish Legal System, (7th ed,
1997), pp 99ff.
2. See R K Hannay, The College of Justice, (1990); D M Walker, The Scottish Legal System. (7th
ed, 1997), pp 102-103; J S H, "The Scottish College of Justice in the 16th century" (1934) 50 LQR
120.
31. Acta Dominorum Auditorum. This collection of the Acts of the Lord Auditors of
Causes and Complaints between the years of 1466 and 1494 contains the three
earliest reported Scots pledge cases.1 The word used for pledge in the reports is wed,
the same as in the Leges Quatuor Burgorum. The items pledged were precious
metallic objects, in particular silverware.2 In Cokbum v Twcdy of Drumcliori and
Fleming v Lord CrechtonA the Lord Auditors order pledged property to be restored
to the pledger on his discharge of the debt which the pledge secured.5
Elspeth of Douglas v Wach of Dawik6 appears to be an early example of the
application of the rule nemo plus juris ad alienum transferre potest, quam ipse
haberet.1 The Lord Auditors decree that that Wach shall deliver to Elspcth a gold
chain which one David Rcdehuch had pledged to him. A day is set down for Elspeth
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to prove that she owns the chain. The Lord Auditors leave Wach with a personal
action for his relief, presumably against David Redehuch.
The conclusions which may be drawn from the cases in the Acta Dominorum
Auditoruin are that pledges, certainly of precious metallic objects, took place in the
fifteenth century and that the Lord Auditors were prepared to intervene to prevent
proprietorial rights from being infringed in the course of such transactions.
1. Acta Dominorum Auditorum '.The Acts of the Lord Auditors of Causes and Complaints
1466-1494, (ed T Thomson), (1839).




5. See D M Walker, A Legal History ofScotland, vol 3, (1995), p 602.
6.(1484) ADA* 149.
7. See below, para 67.
32. The giving in security of Orkney and Shetland. In 1468 King Christian of
Norway conveyed Orkney to Scotland. In 1469 he did the same with Shetland. The
islands were to secure the wedding dowry of his daughter who was to marry King
James III.1 The security created by each conveyance has variously been described as
that of pledge, pawn, wadset, mortgage and impignoration.2 On examination of the
relevant documents which are in Latin, the terms used to mean security are pignore
and ypotheca and derivatives thereof.3 Their origins are clearly Roman. It is
interesting to note that the legal draftsman of the day was using these terms. For
although, pignus made a single appearance in both Regiam and the Leges Quatuor
Burgowm the general term used to denote security, or at least pledge, was vadium.4
However, an examination of similar contemporary documents giving land in
security leads to the discovery of the same terms which were found in the Orkney
and Shetland charters.5
30
The clue to what the precise nature of the security was lies in a basic knowledge of
political geography. In 1997 Orkney and Shetland are still part of Scotland. They
were never redeemed by Norway.6 Now, if Scotland has title to the islands the
contracts could never be ones of pledge in the strict sense of the word, because in
pledge ownership of the pledged property remains with the pledger.7 The relevant
security is actually wadset.8 Its roots lie in pledge, as set out in Regiain/' However,
the adoption by Scotland of the feudal system meant that a mere transfer of
possession of land would not give the creditor a nexus upon it. He had to become
part of the feudal chain, so a conveyance a me or do me was required.10 Pledge and
wadset thereupon conceptually parted company.
1. See generally, B E Crawford, "The Pawning of Orkney and Shetland" (1969) xlviii Scottish
Historical Review 35.
2. W D H Sellar, "A Historical Perspective", in The Scottish Legal Tradition, (2nd cd, 1991), p 43,
describes it as a pledge. So too does J Ryder in SME, vol 24 sv "Udal Law", para 302. T B Smith at
para 326, uses pledge and impignoration. J Mooney in Viking Congress, (ed W D Simpson, 1954),
pp 82-83 uses mortgage. G Donaldson, "Problems of Sovereignty and Law in Orkney and Shetland"
in Miscellany II, (Stair Soc vol 35, 1984) 13, 20 uses pledge, impignoration and wadset. Crawford,
op cit, uses all five terms.
3. For the Orkney deed, see J Mooney, Kirkwall Charters, (1952), pp 96-102, esp pp 100-101. For
the Shetland deed, see Crawford, op cit, at pp 52-53.
4. See above, paras 21 and 31.
5. See the deeds discussed by D M Walker in A Legal History of Scotland, vol 2, (1990), pp 684-
688.
6. There is actually dispute amongst historians over whether Norway ever intended to redeem :
compare Crawford, op cit n 1 and Donaldson, op cit n 2.
7. Erskinc, III. 1.33; Bell, Principles, s 1364.
8. On wadset generally, see Stair, 11.10; Walter Ross, Lectures on Conveyancing, (2nd ed, 1822),
11,330; G L Gretton, SME, vol 18, para 112.
9. See above, paras 21-27.
10. See authorities cited in n 8, as well as D M Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, vol 3, (1995),
pp 784-788.
33. The wad-wife. The sixteenth century saw the appearance in Scotland of the
wad-wife.1 This was a lady merchant and moneylender, one of whose business
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interests was the giving of loans to clients who would for security pledge some of
their moveable property to her. Wad-wives received specific mention in Burgh
Records of Edinburgh.2 One wad-wife was Janet Fockhart whose place of business
was in one of the closes off Edinburgh's High Street.3 The pieces of property which
were pledged to her were similar to those which were the subject matter of the
decisions in the Acta Dominorum Auditorum : small precious items.4 For example,
Lady Orkney, wife of Robert Stewart, Earl of Orkney pledged a diamond ring, a
chain and a pointed diamond ring for £100.5 When Fockliart died in May 1596, a
large amount of jewellery was in her possession, much of which was probably
unredeemed pledges.6 Another wad-wife was Elspeth McNair who was a
contemporary and neighbour of Fockhart's in Edinburgh. She appears, however, to
have run a smaller operation. Fockhart left £22467-3s-9d on her death; McNair
£663.7
The wad-wife can be seen as a foreninner of tire pawnbroker, although she does not
seem to have been subject to any specific form of regulation. It appears that the
pledges made to wad-wives were forfeiture pledges : nothing can be found to
suggest otherwise.8 However, such a hypothesis is consistent with legal writing of
the time.9
1. See D M Walker, A Legal History ofScotland, vol 3, (1995), p 718.
2. Extracts from the Burgh Records of Edinburgh 1403-1528, (1869), 106 (3rd October 1505);
Extracts from the Burgh Records ofEdinburgh 1573-1589, (1882), 28 (26th October 1574).
3. See M H B Sanderson, Mary Stewart's People, (1987). pp 91-101.
4. See above, para 31.
5. Op cit, n 3, at p 100.
6. Ibid.
7. Op cit, n 3 at p 101.
8. For example, any records of a wad-wife exposing pledged property to public sale on default upon
the loan secured and thereafter paying any excess money raised to the pledger.
9. See Balfour's Practicks, below para 35.
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34. The Burgh Records. In the sixteenth century, the Records of the Scottish
Burghs contain various references to pledge. Varying as these references are, a
recurrent feature is the use of wed, or a derivative, to mean pledge.1
A fascinating account of life in the 1500s may be gained from the Records. When
the plague hit Edinburgh on several occasions the council prohibited the pledging of
clothes and similar items and provided for harsh punishment to be meted out to
anyone not obeying their pronouncements. The following comes from 25th May
1530 :
"Item, that na maner of parsonis man nor woman tak ony claith in wedd fra
vthcris, or by ony auld clais, wou or lynnyn, vndcr the pane of burning of thar
chekis and banasing of the tounc for all the dayes of thar lyffis."2
On another occasion the council provided that anyone caught breaking the rule for
the second time would face death.3 The Draconian nature of these penalties shows
how concerned the city fathers were about the spread of pestilence.
The Lanark Burgh Records give an account of a complaint by one Archibald
Douglas against one James Douglas in respect of the alleged wrongful withholding
of a sword and two gilded knives pledged by the former to the latter a year before.4
The complainant argued that the items should be returned upon his payment of the
secured debt. Unfortunately, the Records do not tell us if and how the matter was
resolved.
The Stirling Burgh Records refer to a couple of instances of pledge. One was when
the council ordained that a piece of property known as the chalice of St James's altar
and St Peter's chalice was to be sold at 20 shillings per ounce.5 The money raised
was to be used for repairing the calsay, that is the paved area of the town, except for
four pounds which was to be paid to Baillie Johne Lescheman to whom the St
Peter's chalice was pledged for that sum. What is interesting about this is the fact
that it is the council, the debtor, and not the baillie, the creditor, which is doing the
selling. This appears to confirm the fact that sale by the creditor upon default was
not a recognised remedy in medieval Scotland.6 The normal remedy was forfeiture
of the property, either stipulated for in the contract of pledge or by court order.'
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Nevertheless, this case shows that forfeiture was not the remedy every time. Indeed,
it is an example of pledge acting as a collateral security.
The other case involved a gold chain weighing 6% ounces which belonged to Lady
Catcrne, Countess of Ergile.8 It had been pledged to one Thomas Wallace, tailor and
burgess of Stirling for 120 merks. The redemption of the chain is recorded.
However, it is not the countess who redeems it, but one Patrick Grahamc on behalf
of one Master Johne Carswele. Grahame warrants that he will relieve Wallace, his
heirs, executors and assignees in the event of any action by the countess or any
others in respect of the chain. It can only be conjectured what is going on here,
because in principle it is only the pledger and not a third party who may take the
property from the pledgee on payment of the debt.9 Most probably the time for Lady
Caterne to perform her obligation has passed and the chain has been forfeited to
Wallace. He is presumably worried in case there has been any irregularity and
insists that Grahame will indemnify him if Lady Caterne takes any action.
1. For example, Extracts from the Burgh Records of Edinburgh 1403-1528, (1869), 106, (wed);
Extracts from the Burgh Records of Lanark 1150-1722, (1893), 53 (wed); Extracts from the
Burgh Records ofStirling 1519-1666, (1887), 78 (wod).
2. Extracts from the Burgh Records of Edinburgh 1528-1557. (1871), 28. See also at 41 and 44
and Extracts from the Burgh Records ofEdinburgh 1403-1528, (1869), 106.
3. Extracts from the Burgh Records ofEdinburgh 1573-1589, (1882), 28 (26th October 1574).
4. Extracts from the Burgh Records ofLanark 1150-1722,(1893), 53 (15th February 1570-1).
5. Extracts from the Burgh Records ofStirling 1519-1666, (1887), 78 (10th April 1561).
6. See Stair, 1.13.11 and below, para 37.
7. See above, para 26 and below, para 36.
8. Op cit, n 5 at 79 (4th November 1561).
9. Simply because it is the pledger who retains ownership of the property. Only possession is
transferred to the creditor: Regiam Majcstatcm 111.3; Balfour, Practicks, p 194.
Balfour's Practicks
35. General. In his Practicks, Sir James Balfour of Pittcndreich gives an account of
the law of Scotland up to 1579.1 Unlike Rcgiam and the Leges Quatuor Burgorum
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the text is originally Scots and not Latin.2 Under the heading "Ancnt pledgis and
cautioneris", Balfour treats caution, that is personal security.3 And in the body of the
text there are numerous uses of the word pledge,4
This raises the question whether pledge was in widespread use as the term for
caution in medieval Scotland. On investigation, it is not difficult to corroborate
Balfour's use of the word. For, on semtinising the Latin of Regiam once more and
not Lord Cooper's translation, it can be seen that plcgius is the term used for
caution.5 The same term is used in the parallel passages in Glanvill.6 According to
the leading historians of English law, pledge was the term in Norman England for
personal security, gage of course being the term for security over a thing.7 Pledge is
said to have replaced the Anglo-Saxon term, borli.s To complete the picture, this
term has been taken into the Leges Quatuor Burgorurn as borch in the old Scots
version as a translation of plegius.9 These terms are used for caution.10 Balfour
himself uses the variant, borgh.n
Two conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, the English influence on Scots law
continues apace. Secondly, the distinction between the law of personal security and
the law of real security in both medieval Scotland and England was somewhat
blurred terminologically, if not in other respects.
1. Balfour, Practicks, (Stair Society, vols 21 and 22, 1962-63, ed P G B McNeill). For the date of
Balfour's work, see this edition at p xxxii and also D M Walker, The Scottish Jurists, (1985), pp 33-
53.
2. See above, paras 21 and 29.
3. See pp 191-194. See also the matter discussed at p 338 et seq under the heading "Anent
replegiatoun".
4. For example, in the very first sentence under "Anent pledgis and cautioneris", (c 1), which reads " .
.. gif ony man is borgh and pledge for ane uther..."
5. For example, at Book 3, chapter 1. And see D M Walker, A Legal History of Scotland, (vol 1,
1988), pp 342-344.
6. For example, Glanvill, X.5.
7. F Pollock and F W Maitland, The History of English Law before Edward /, (2nd ed, 1896,
reprinted 1968), vol 2 p 185 fn 2; T F T Plucknctt, A Concise History of the Common Law, (5th
ed, 1956), p 628.
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8. Ibid.
9. For example, at title 87 (T Thomson and C Inncs (ed), The Acts of Parliament of Scotland, (12
vols, 1814-75), (APS), vol 1,350).
10. The most cursory examination of the text bears this out.
11. At page 191, (c 1), first sentence.
36. Specific references to pledge. Balfour discusses pledge in the title immediately
after that on caution. The heading is "Anent thingis laid in wad".1 It will be
remembered that the old Scots text of the Leges Qiiatiior Burgorum used wed to
mean pledge.1 This has now evolved into wad, the root of the terms, as previously
instanced, being the Anglo-Saxon, wed? It is further noticeable that much of
Balfour's account uses Regiam as its chief source.4
Balfour's first point is that both moveables and immoveables may be pledged.3
When heritage is to act as security the more precise term, rather than the general
wad, is wadset. This terminology was found in the Leges Quatuor Burgorum?
However, Balfour actually uses the terms fairly loosely." The next point made is
important enough to be set out in full :
"ITEM, Efter that it is accordit and agreit betwix the debtour and the
creditour, ancnt the laying of ony thing in wadset, quhat kind of thing that
ever it be, movabill or immovabill, the debtour incontinent, efter he hes
ressavit the thing borrowit be him, sould put the crcditour in possessioun or
sasine of the wad."8
This passage acknowledges Regiam Majestatem 111,3 as its source. However, its
wording is somewhat original. Gone is the Regiam statement that either the property
is delivered to the creditor or it is not.9 Instead, the property should be delivered to
him. There is no express statement that the courts will not uphold agreements where
there is no delivery, but the implication is very clear. The creditor must receive
delivery of the property. There is no security without possession.
Next, there follows a discussion about pledges securing term and on-demand loans,
much like that in Regiam?0 It is curious that the creditor's remedy still seems to be
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the debtor forfeiting the property to him, particularly after the Leges Quatuor
Burgomm's much earlier recognition of pledge as a collateral security.11 After this,
Balfour looks at the distinct laws affecting pledges of moveables and immoveables
respectively.12 With respect to moveables, his emphasis is on the contractual duties
of the pledger and pledgee, such as the latter's duty of care in respect of the pledged
property. Indeed the two case decisions which he sets out, involve this aspect of the
pledge transaction. Coming from 1566 and 1569, they are the earlist recorded
Scottish court decisions discussing pledge.13 As regards immoveables the focus is
on deid wad, in other words mortgage, and the consequences of such usury. The
passage, bar the words deid wad, could have been lifted straight from Glanvill.14
Summing up on Balfour, we may note the continuing influence of the Anglo-
Norman law and the demand for the creditor to be put in possession. Further,
although the law retains its unitary basis, moveable and heritable security are
beginning to have distinct personas. This can be seen especially in regard to
terminology. The separation of the laws is a product of factual developments such as
the case law and the apparent confinement of mortgage to land.15
1. At page 194.
2. See above, para 29.
3. Ibid.
4. See the references at the end of c 1, c 2, c 3, c 4, c 5, c 8 and c 9 (pp 194-196).
5. C 1 : "Of divers kindis of waddis" (p 194). This certainly was the law originally. But, well before
Balfour wrote in the sixteenth century, in practice there was no such thing as a simple pledge of land.
The wadset, although originally a mere heritable pledge, now involved dominium being transferred
to the creditor, with the debtor only having a personal right to a reconveyance on discharge of the
debt. See above, para 34. Balfour seems to have followed Rcgiam too closely in this area, without
looking at what was going on in practice, for which see D M Walker, A Legal History of Scotland,
vol 2, (1990), pp 683-688.
6. See above, para 29.
7. For example, in c 2 (p 194).
8. C 2 : "The wad sould be deliverit to the creditour".
9. That is, that found in Book 3, chapter 3.
10. C 3 : "Of thingis wadset to a certane day"; c 4 ; "Of thingis laid in wad without a certane day."
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11. See above, para 27.
12. C 5 : "Of movabill gudis laid in wad"; c 8 ; "Of immovabill gudis laid in wad."
13. Foulis v Cognerlie, 6 April 1566 (c 6) and Douglas v Menzeis, 1 March 1569 (c 7).
14. Glanvill, X.8.
15. Although Balfour treats moveable and heritable security as more distinct concepts than Regiam
does, he underestimates the gulf which existed between them by the time which he wrote. See above,
note 5.
Hope's Major Practicks
37. General. Sir Thomas Hope produced two collections of laws, his Major
Practicks and his Minor Practicks.' The first of these, as the name suggests, is the
larger work and contains an admittedly brief section on pledge. The latest material
found in it may be dated at 1633.2
1. See D M Walker, The Scottish Jurists, (1985), pp 93-105.
2. Sir Thomas Hope, Major Practicks, (Stair Society vols 3 and 4, 1937-38, cd Lord Clyde). For the
date of the work see p xiii of this edition and D M Walker, op cit, p 101.
38. References to pledge. These are found in title 9 of book 2. The chapter is
entitled "De Pignore". Thus, for the first time, the Roman pignus is used as the
principal term for pledge in our law. Gone are vadium, wed and wad. The rationale
behind this is surely that Hope was writing amidst the period which saw the
"Reception" of Roman law into Scotland.1 This period would come to fruition in
1681 with Stair's seminal treatise, his Institutions.2 The key thing we can draw from
Hope's work is that the Romanisation of the law of pledge had begun much earlier in
the seventeenth century.
In the body of title 9, we find the term pawne used.3 This is the first appearance
made by it in Scots law too. Further, also seemingly making its Scots law debut is
hypotheca in the shape of hypothecated But wed is also to be found and
significantly, in a subsequent title pledge is used to mean caution.3
Like Balfour, Hope's emphasis is on the duties of the creditor and debtor. The
creditor is obliged to return the property on payment.6 If the property is destroyed
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without the creditor being negligent, the debtor retains the duty to discharge the
debt.7 He draws on Regiam as an authority.8
Hope then deals with two matters relating to hypothecs which need not directly
concern us.9 There is no suggestion that an express hypothec was permissible at that
time; indeed the evidence points the other way.10 The conclusion to be drawn from
Hope's work is that there is a struggle going on between Anglo-Norman law and
civil law, at the very least in respect of terminology.
1. See J Dove Wilson, "Reception of Roman Law in Scotland" 1897 JR 361; T Miller, "Reception of
Roman Law in Scotland" 1923 JR 362.
2. See below, para 42.
3. At para 1.
4. At para 3. Further in para 4, we find hypothecatione and hypothecation. The term had been
previously used in Latin deeds, for example in the Orkney and Shetland wadsets, but not in any work
purporting to state the law in English.
5. Title 11 : "De fidejussoribus". In para 2 we find plegia and in para 4, plcdgis.
6. Para 1.
7. Para 2.
8. See para 1.
9. Paras 3 and 4. Para 3 states that by Act of Parliament (1609 c 11) the Lords of Session have an
express hypothec over the king's customs for their salaries. In para 4, we are told of a 1612 case
where an exception founded upon a "gift of eschcit" defeated an earlier hypothecation.
10. Particularly para 4.
39. Sixteenth and seventeenth century case law. Of the five Scots cases found to
deal with pledge from this period, 3 deal with contractual matters and 2 with matters
of property law. The earliest, Foulis v Cogncrlic expresses the rule that if the
pledged property is stolen or lost without the creditor being negligent, the debtor is
still liable upon the debt.1 The second, Douglas v Menzeis states that the debtor
cannot repossess his property until he has discharged the debt.2 These are the two
cases reported in Balfour's Practicks and consequently use wad as the term for
pledge.
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The three later cases, coming during the Reception use the term impignoratc for the
verb to pledge. One concerns a contractual right of sale in favour of the creditor, he
being liable to restore any surplus to the debtor.3 Scots law at long last appears
therefore to have rejected forfeiture as the principal remedy for default upon the
secured obligation. The other two cases apply the rule nemo dat quod non habet to
pledge.4 This is uncontroversial.
1.(1566) Balfour 195.
2.(1569) Balfour 196.
3. Murray ofPhiliphauch v Cuninghamc (1668) 1 BS 575.
4. Ramsay v Wilson (1665) Mor 9113; Sample v Givan (1672) Mor 9117.
40. Jus Fcudale. Published in 1655 but written some forty years earlier, this treatise
of Sir Thomas Craig of Riccarton is our earliest institutional work.1 Written in Latin,
it focuses on the feudal land law of the time. It is therefore only of interest to us
because we have found evidence of pledge as a unitary concept.2
Craig deals with security over land under the heading "Reversions". He is in reality
expositing the law of wadset.3 As has already been seen, Craig was a fierce
opponent of giving Rcgiam any place as an authoritative Scots work.4 Setting out
the law of gage and mortgage found in that work and in Glanvill he regards these as
quite distinct institutions from the wadset of lands with its integral debtor's
reversionary right.5 He states merely that the mortgage "resembles our wadset".6
However, Craig is surely deluding himself, for it is very clear that wadset is a
developed and refined pledge of immoveable property. Leaving the etymology out, a
glance at either the Leges Quatuor Burgorum or Balfour exposes the connection.7
The refinement is nevertheless an important one, for in wadset unlike pledge
ownership of the subject matter of the security is transferred to the creditor.8
Craig can be seen to be aware of the development of the English law of mortgage
since Glanvill. As we have seen, mortgage for Glanvill meant a pledge of land
where the rents and profits received by the creditor in possession did not go to
reduce the debt : the pledge was thus "dead".9 This definition should have caused
some concern for the modern lawyer who understands mortgage in English law to
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mean a transfer of ownership of property to the creditor in security, for example a
chattel mortgage or a mortgage of realty under the Law of Property Act 1925. It
contrasts with pledge where only possession is transferred.10
Now as it happens this conundrum may be easily explained. In the fifteenth century,
mortgage had shed its original meaning and acquired its new one. It became used to
define where ownership was transferred to the creditor with the debtor having a
reversionary right which was extinguished if he did not discharge his obligation by a
certain date." At that date, the pledge "dies" and the debtor loses his right to recover
his property; mortgage was thus an appropriate, though surely confusing, tag for this
transaction.12 Craig was obviously aware that the English law or at least its
definitions had thus changed.13 However, the new meaning of mortgage was never
to come into Scots law.14
The main thing to take from the Jus Feudale is the increasing conceptual separation
of the law of security with regard to moveables and land. Pledge had become a
security confined to moveables. Wadset was the security for land. The declining
influence of the Anglo-Norman law may also be noted.
1. Craig, Jus Feudale, (trans Lord Clyde, 1934).
2. In particular, in Regiam. See paras 21-27 above.
3. Jus Feudale, 2.6.
4. See Jus Feudale, 2.6.25-26 and para 21 above.
5. Jus Feudale, 2.6.27.
6. Ibid.
I. Both the Leges Quatuor Burgorum, (title 79) and Balfour (pp 194-196 esp c 1 and c 8) treat
wadset and the pledging of land as one and the same thing.
8. See, for example, Erskine, II.8.4.
9. See above, para 23.
10. Halsbury, vol 36, para 103; Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585.
II. Sir Thom.es Littleton, Tenures, (c 1480), s 332; TFT Plucknett, A Concise History of the
Common Law, (5th cd, 1956), pp 606-608; A W B Simpson, A History of the Land Law, (2nd ed,
1986), pp 142-143.
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12. Jus FeudaJe, 2.6.27.
13. Ibid.
14. Balfour, writing towards the end of the sixteenth century, uses mortgage in the Glanvillian sense
: p 196 (c 9). The terminology might never have come into Scots law but the development of
heritable security from simple pledge to transfer of dominium certainly did. See above, para 30.
(c) From Stair To The Present Day
41. General. The period from 1681 onwards can to all intents be regarded as the
modem law.1 Consequently, it will not be necessary to make a systematic
examination of the authorities from this period, for this will come amid the more
general analysis in due course. Although some brief comments will be made, this
section should be regarded as no more than an overview of the period in question.
1. That is, the period beginning with the publication of Stair's Institutions.
42. Stair. Sir James Dalrymple, first Viscount Stair, laid the foundation stone of the
modem law with his Institutions of the Law ofScotland of 1681.1 The work owes its
civilian structure to Justinian's Institutes, being divided into four books.2 However,
many other authorities influenced Stair, such as the Bible, the various Practicks, the
reported case law and the works of foreign jurists.3 Of the last of these, both Grotius
and Pufendorf had written upon pledge by 1681.4 One authority which Stair made it
clear he was not following was Regiam.5
The main treatment of pledge is given in Book I of the Institutions in the section on
real contracts, which has a clear Roman basis.6 The treatment is not particularly
detailed and one thing which springs immediately from the text is the use of the
word pledge for the first time in our history to mean what we think of as pledge
today. Somewhere along the line, this word has changed it definition, from meaning
personal security to meaning real security.7 The same thing also happened in
England.8
It is also clear that Stair uses pledge only to mean security over moveables and not
land. He treats heritable security under the title "Wadsets & c." elsewhere, in Book
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II of his work.9 However, Stair is clearly aware of the unitary basis of the two forms
of security. His introduction to wadsets is but one example of this awareness :
"A wadset, as the word insinuates, being the giving of a wad or pledge in
security; it falleth in consideration here as the last of feudal rights : for
pledges are the last of real rights, as before in the title Real rights is shown;"10
Another point to take from this passage is the acknowledgement of pledge as a real
right in Scots law. As with the use of the term pledge, here too Stair was breaking
new ground. Under the heading of Pledge, Stair also treats hypothec but this need
not concern us in detail here."
1. See D M Walker, Introduction in Stair,; Stair Tercentenary Studies, (Stair Soc vol 33); Lord
Cooper, The Scottish Legal Tradition, (2nd ed), pp 67,69; D M Walker, The Scottish Jurists.
(1985), pp 106-157.
2. See A Campbell, The Structure ofStair's Institutions, (1954); Walker. Introduction, pp 17-20.
3. See Walker, Introduction, pp 20-21.
4. See Grotius, Inlcidinge tot de Hollandsche Rcchtsgdecrheid, (1631, trans R W Lee) III.8;
Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae ct Gentium, (1672). Stair may well have not read Grotius' treatise : see
Walker, Introduction, pp 20-21.
5. He writes at 1.1.16 ; "Craig doth very well observe . . . that those books called Rcgiarn
Majestatem are no part of our law, but were compiled for the customs of England".
6. At 1.13.11. For a discussion of the real contracts in Roman law, see B Nicholas, An Introduction
to Roman Law, (1962), pp 167-171.
7. As we saw above, in para 36, pledge formerly meant personal security. Balfour, in reporting
Foulis v Cogncrlie ((1566) Balfour 196) does use the term to mean real security. But otherwise he
uses wad to mean this and pledge to mean caution. See above, para 34.
8. See F Pollock and F W Maitland, The History of English Law before Edward /, (2nd ed, 1896,
reprint 1968), vol 2, p 185, n 2.
9. Stair, 11.10.
10. Stair, II.10.pr. Another example is found at 1.13.14 where he writes that "in wadsets, or
impignorations, that thereby is constitute a real right in the pledge".
11. Stair, 1.13.14.
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43. Erskine and other eighteenth century jurists. Published posthumously in 1773,
Erskine's Institute of the Law of Scotland is the most important institutional work
after Stair. He, however, deals with pledge in Book 3 of his treatise.1 The stnicture
of his treatise as a whole is different from Stair's, but pledge as in the earlier work is
dealt with among the real contracts.2 The treatment is relatively brief.3 ft is made
clear that pledge is a real right and there is evidence of the concept's original unitary
nature.4
A near contemporary of Erskine was Lord Bankton. His Institute was published in
1751 and his treatment of pledge is not unlike that of Stair and Erskine.3 Slightly
longer, he gives some useful detail. Generally, the great value of Bankton's work
lies in his comparative analysis of the contemporary English law rules.6
Another eighteenth century scholar with something to say about pledge was the
economist Adam Smith. His Lectures on Jurisprudence contain some useful
material.' In particular, he was very unhappy about the effect of licensing
pawnbrokers.8
1. At III. 1.33.
2. For a discussion of Erskine's stnicture, see W W McBryde's introduction to Erskine, Institute of
the Law ofScotland, (8th ed, ed Nicholson, 1989 reprint).
3. Merely to be found at III. 1.33.
4. At III. 1.33 he describes "a right of wadset" as "an heritable pledge".
5. Bankton, 1.17.
6. His study of the English rules on pledge may be found at the end of title 1.17.
7. Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, (1978, ed R L Meek, D D Raphael and P G Stein), pp
78-81 and 471.
8. See below, para 45.
44. Eighteenth century case law. There is very little to say on this matter, as the
number of pledge cases in this period was very small.1 None of these contain any
significant judicial wisdom on the subject. This contrasts sharply with England,
where early on in the century Chief Justice Holt gave an exposition of the relevant
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law in the famous case of Coggs v Bernard.2 His judgement remains influential to
this day.3
1. But see Piingle v Gribton (1710) Mor 9123; Mitchell v Burnet and Mouat (1746) Mor 4468
and Hariot v Cuninghame (1791) Mor 12405.
2. (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER 107.
3. See N E Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), chapter 22.
45. The development of pawnbroking. The professional pledge-taker or
pawnbroker has been a feature of society, here and abroad, since medieval times.' In
Scotland, for example, we had the wad-wife. She, however, tended to be more of a
general moneylender and businesswoman.2 In Britain the standard rates of interest
fixed by the Usury Acts were not high enough to cover the cost of small loans for
brief periods of time.3 Specialised pawnbrokers were few and far between.
The coming of industrialisation brought with it an increased demand for credit.
Legislation was therefore enacted in the eighteenth century to allow such
businessmen to charge higher rates of interest fixed by Parliament.3 Despite the
fixing of interest rates, the borrower risked exploitation by the broker. Many of the
borrowers were poverty-stricken and in no position to negotiate.4 One of the main
types of exploitation was providing for forfeiture on non-payment. It led Adam
Smith to lambast the licensing of pawnbrokers as "one of the great nuisances in the
English constitution, especially in great cities."4
The need for further legislation was seen, and this came, with the whole area
eventually being consolidated upon the passing of the Pawnbrokers Act 1800 (c 99).
This statute appears to have triggered the development of pawnbroking elsewhere in
the United Kingdom. It was at first not clear that the 1800 Act applied north of the
border.6 Local acts also regulated the business.7 Attempts to evade the legislation
led to Parliament intervening again and detailed work by the House of Commons
Select Committee on Pawnbroking came to fruition with a new consolidation
statute, the Pawnbrokers Act 1872 (c 93).8
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The main features of the pawnbroking legislation require the broker to have a
licence, require him to issue a receipt to the borrower, prohibit pawn taking from
those of nonage, regulate the redemption procedure and regulate the procedure for
realisation of the pawn if there is default. Where there is no specific statutory
provision, the common law applies.0
Whilst pawnbroking in Britain is subject to detailed state regulation, it remains
essentially a matter of private enterprise. The continental system of "Montes
Pietatis" or government pawnshops has never been introduced here.10
1. See J K Macleod, "Pawnbroking : A Regulatory Issue" 1995 JBL 155, 159f. Thus the plot of
Fyodor Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, (1866), involves the murder of an elderly woman
pawnbroker.
2. See above, para 33.
3. See Macleod, at 160.
4. For, as Bell (Principles s 209) writes, "Pawnbroking is one species of pledge, affording a resource
to poverty".
5. Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, (1978 ed, ed R L Meek, D D Raphael and P G Stein), p
80.
6. Macleod, at 161.
7. Such as the Glasgow Police Acts; see Macleod, ibid.
8. For the committee's report, see House of Commons Parliamentary Papers. 1870, vol VIII, para
391 etscq. See now the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c 39), ss 116-121.
9. See Bell, Principles, s 209. The same principles are found in the present legislation, the Consumer
Credit Act 1974 (c 39).
10. See Bell, Commentaries, 11,20; Bell, Principles, s 208 and the Spanish Civil Code, article 1873.
46. Bell and other nineteenth century jurists. George Joseph Bell's treatment of
pledge in his Commentaries on the Law of Scotland and on the Principles of
Mercantile Jurisprudence and Principles of the Law of Scotland is more detailed
than anything before. In the Commentaries he analyses it as part of his section on
real security.1 In his Principles he gives equal coverage to it as a contract and later
on as a real right in security.2
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David Hume, Bell's predecessor as Professor of Scots Law in the University of
Edinburgh, deals with pledge under the heading "Pledge and Hypotheck" in his
Lectures which were eventually published a century after his death.3
Notwithstanding the late publication, Hume's work was influential much earlier,
with judges referring to their personal lecture notes.4 Thus in an important
nineteenth century pledge case, Lord Benholme says :
"I cannot refrain from reading a passage [upon pledge] from a copy of Baron
Hume's lectures in my possession, the accuracy of which 1 have tested by
several comparisons, and particularly by comparing it with an extract from the
notes taken in the class by my brother Lord Cowan."5
Hume's Lectures, by this time published, were the decisive authority used by the
Second Division in the most recent Scots pledge case.6
W M Gloag and J M Irvine are the final Scottish jurists to merit particular mention
here. Their Law ofRights in Security, published in 1897, is the first and remains the
only monograph devoted to the subject. The book remains influential today.' It
includes a detailed discourse on pledge.8
It would be inappropriate to conclude this section without mentioning the American
legal writer, Joseph Story. His Commentaries on the Law of Bailments contains a
very erudite and comprehensive account of the civil and common law on pledge. It
has proved to be a highly influential work.9
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,19-24.
2. Bell, Principles, ss 203-209 and 1362-1367.
3. See D M Walker, The Scottish Jurists, (1985), pp 316-336.
4. See, for example Biggart v City ofGlasgow Bank (1879) 6 R 470, 475-476 per Lord Deas.
5. Christie v Ruxton (1862) 24 D 1182, 1186. See also. Lord Cowan, ibid.
6. Wolifson v Harrison 1977 SC 384.
7. See. for example Armour v Thysscn Edelstahlwerke AG 1990 SLT 891, 894 per Lord Keith
(HL).
47
8. At pp 199-219.
9. J Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments, (1829). Bell makes reference to it in his
Principles, for example (4th ed, 1839). s 203. Story is cited bv the Sheriff in Kirkwood and Pattison
v Brown (1877) 1 Guth Sh Cas 395. The work clearly influenced the decision of the English court in
the important case of Donald v Suckling LR 1 QB 585.
47. Nineteenth century case law. After a slow start, this period sees the great mass
of case law which, along with the institutional writings, amounts to the common law
of pledge. The latter fifty years stretching into the first decade of the twentieth
century contains all the leading cases in this area.' For the first time we have
reasonably detailed judicial opinions on matters such as what may be pledged and
what quality of delivery is required.2 In particular there is much discussion on the
pledge of documents of title.3
The profusion of case law reflects the fact that this period was commercially very
significant.4 Queen Victoria ruled much of the globe and there was much trade with
the many parts of the Empire. Important commercial statutes were being passed. The
Mercantile Law Amendment Act Scotland 1856 (c 60), the Factors Act 1889 (c 45)
and the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (c 71) all resulted in case law relating to rights in
security in general and pledge in particular.5
1. Cases such as Hamilton v Western Bank of Scotland (1856) 19 D 152: Moore v Gledden
(1869) 7 M 1016; Tod and Son v Merchant Banking Co (1883) 10 R 1009; North Western Bank
v Poynter, Son and Macdonalds (1894) 22 R (HL) 1 and Hayman v McLintock 1907 SC 936.
2. On the first of these matters see Christie v Ruxton (1862) 24 D 1182; Liqidator of Garpel v
Andrew (1866) 4 M 617 and Robertson v British Linen Co (1890) 18 R 1225. On the second, see
Hamilton, above; Mackinnon v Max Nanson (1868) 6 M 974 and Connon v Lindsay and
Oakeley (1869) 6 SLR 552.
3. See Gloag and Irvine, chapter 8.
4. See Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, "The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain", (1992)
108 LQR 570. However, pledges of small valuable items went on as they had for centuries : sec, for
example, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, "The Beryl Coronet" in Sherlock Holmes : The Complete
Illustrated Short Stories, (Chancellor Press, 1985), p 192.
5. The Factors Act 1889 was extended to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890 (c 40).
48. The twentieth century. This has seen little development in the law relating to
pledge. A number of textbooks on the general law and on commercial law have
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given an account of the subject.1 It would be fair to say that the same information
has often been given.2
In terms of the case law, the first twenty years of the century saw a batch of Sheriff
Court cases dealing with pawnbroking.3 After that time there appears only to be one
further Scots case with turns on a substantive question of the law of pledge.4 The
main legislative development has been the replacement of the Pawnbrokers Act
1872 by provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c 39).5 Recent concern has
been expressed diat these provisions regulating pawnbroking are too open to
evasion.6
Away from pledge, this century has seen important statutory reforms to the law of
real security in general.7
1. See Shaw, pp 10-22; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11 (1931), sv "Pledge", paras 753-778; T
B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, (1962), pp 472-475; J J Gow, Mercantile
and Industrial Law ofScotland, (1964), pp 272-275: J Lillic, The Mercantile Law of Scotland, (6th
cd, 1970), pp 88-91; D M Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, (4th ed, 1989), vol 3, pp 394-
398; 5; W A Wilson, The Scottish Law of Debt, (2nd ed, 1991), pp 90-93; W Wallace and A
McNeil, Banking Law, (10th ed, ed Caskie, 1991), pp 163-166; A J Sim. SME, vol 20, (1992),
paras 14-25; E A Marshall, Scots Mercantile Law, (2nd ed, 1992), pp 462-467; W M Gloag and R
C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, (10th ed, 1995), paras 19.10-19.13; L D Crerar, The Law of
Banking in Scotland, (1997), pp 269-282.
2. In particular there has been an emphasis upon actual, constructive and symbolical delivery. Sec
particularly, Gloag and Henderson, Walker and Marshall, op cit.
3. Singer Mfg Co v Martin (1904) 20 Sh Ct Rep 125; Niven v McArthur's Trs (1907) 23 Sh Ct
Rep 299; McMillan v Conrad (1914) 30 Sh Ct Rep 275; Singer Sewing Machine Co v Quigley
(1914) 30 Sh Ct Rep 56; Elliot v Conway (1915) 31 Sh Ct Rep 79; McPhater v Smith Premier
Typewriter Co (1917) 33 Sh Ct Rep 301; McKellar v Greemxtk and Port Glasgow Loan Co
(1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 93 and Hislop v Anderson (1919) 35 Sh Ct Rep 116.
4. Wolifson v Harrison 1977 SC 384.
5. Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c 39), ss 116-121.
6. J K Macleod, "Pawnbroking ; A Regulatory Issue" (1995) 24 JBL 155.
7. The law of heritable security was overhauled by the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland)
Act 1970 (c 35) which introduced the standard security, the only competent method of now creating
a heritable security. See D .1 Cusine, Standard Securities, (1991). Agricultural credits were
introduced by the Agricultural Credits (Scotland) Act 1929 (c 13). Floating charges were introduced
by the Companies (Floating Charges) (Scotland) Act 1961 (c 46). Receivership was introduced by
the Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) Act 1972 (c 67). The present legislation
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is the Companies Act 1985 (c 6) and the Insolvency Act 1986 (c 65).
3. THE ECONOMICS OF PLEDGE
49. General. The economic value of pledge was appreciated by Justinian :
"Pledge benefits both parties, the debtor because it helps him get credit, and
the creditor because it helps him give credit safely."1
The basic principle remains the same today. A potential lender will be far more
willing to give credit if in return he is given a nexus over an asset of the debtor's.2
Secured loans attract a lower interest rate than unsecured loans, for the creditor has a
lesser risk. If the debtor does default the creditor can go about realising his security.
The facilitation of the provision of credit by securities allows capital to be obtained
by would-be businessmen who go on to benefit our national economy.3 Further, in
the non-commercial sphere pledge has been seen as a mechanism to alleviate the
poverty of individuals.4
1. Justinian's Institutes, 3.14.4. (Quia pignus utriusque gratia datur, et debitoris, quo magis ci
pecunia credcrctur. et creditoris, quo magis ci in tuto sit crcditum.)
2. See Shaw, pp 1-2; Eighth Report of the Law Reform Committee of Scotland, The Constitution of
Security over Moveable Property; and Floating Charges, (1960), (Cmnd 1017) and M Bridge,
"The Quistclose Trust in a World of Secured Transactions", (1992) 12 OJLS 333, at 336-339. Not
everybody agrees with the conventional view ; see G L Gretton, Remarks on the DTI Paper of
November 1994 on Security over Moveable Property in Scotland (Edinburgh University Seminar
Paper, 23 February 1995).
3. Shaw, ibid.
4. Bell, Principles, s 209.
50. The value of pledge versus other securities. It has already been noted that the
number of pledge decisions this century has been small.1 The reason for this is that
pledge is rarely in use to secure large commercial loans. The problem with pledge is
that the debtor must deliver his asset or assets to the creditor. To fund a large loan
he will have to deliver a valuable amount in assets. Obviously it is very difficult to
run a business if your creditor has physical detention of your most valuable assets.2
And if you are unable to run your business you will be unable to pay back the loan.
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This, as we saw, was why Roman law introduced hvpotheca for agricultural tenants
requiring credit, whose only valuable assets were their implements.3
Whilst the Scottish courts have made some concessions to the needs of commerce,
such as allowing securities to be created over documents of title, the overriding
principle remains unchanged. There is no security over moveable property in Scots
common law without possession.4 The approach has been criticised but the courts
remain intransigent.5
Unsurprisingly, the need for security with possession in the debtor has led to
statutory reform. Floating charges were introduced for the use of companies in 1961
and although their regulating legislation is considered to have been badly drafted,
they fulfil a clear commercial need.6 They are not as alien to Scots law as has been
suggested, for as Sir Thomas Smith pointed out, security retcnta possessions is
consistent with the civilian foundation of modern Scots law.7 The introduction of
receivership in 1972 without regard to the differences in English and Scots private
law is more difficult to justify.8 However, the practical point is that floating charges
are used to secure large commercial loans and if there is default the company will go
into receivership.
In a recent consultation paper, the Department of Trade and Industry proposes an
extension to the current law in respect of non-possessory security.9 It wishes to see
all businesses being able to create floating charges over their property.10 Further, it
proposes the introduction of a new registered hypothec over moveables, to be
known as the "moveable security".11 The consultation paper does not make any
alterations to the existing common law securities.12 Its proposals are controversial,
but it continues an established trend which has seen pledge, documents of title apart,
being confined to the pawnbroker's shop.
1. See above, para 52.
2. The whisky industry, however, has been able to make use of pledge through the system of bonded
warehousing.
3. See above, para 16.
4. See Gloag and Irvine, pp 187-191; A J Sim, SMB. vol 20, para 8.
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5. For discussion, see Gloag and Irvine, pp 187-188; G L Gretton, "Security over Moveables
Without Loss of Possession", 1978 SLT (News) 107 and D O'Donnell and D L Carey Miller,
"Security over Moveables : A Longstanding Reform Agenda in Scots Law", (1997) 5 ZeiLschrift fiir
Europaisches Privatrccht 807, at 808-809. The courts have on occasion gone too far : see Emerald
Stainless Steel Ltd v South Side Distribution Ltd 1982 SC 1 (OH), overruled by Armour v
Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG 1990 SLT 891 (HL).
6. Professor Gretton is sceptical about the commercial need : see his "What Went Wrong With
Floating Charges?" 1986 SLT (News) 325. But compare R B Jack, "The Coming of the Floating
Charge to Scotland" in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany (1987) and look at the
number of bodies which wished to see the introduction of the floating charge : Eighth Report of the
Law Reform Committee for Scotland (Cmnd 1017, 1960) pp 1-3.
7. On the 'alien' nature of the floating charge, see Gretton, ibid. Sir Thomas makes his point in his
Short Commentary at p 474 and in Appendix 1 to the Eighth Report, ibid.
8. See, for example, Lord President Hope's invective in the last page of his judgement in Sharp v
Thomson 1995 SLT 837, 854-855. Cf the House of Lords judgement: 1997 SLT 636.
9. Department of Trade and Industry Consultation Paper, Security over Moveable Property in
Scotland, November 1994. Discussed by J Murray, "Reform of Security over Moveable Property",
1995 SLT (News) 31, H Patrick, "Reform of Security over Moveable Property : Some General
Comments", 1995 SLT (News) 42; A J M Steven, "Reform of Security over Moveable Property :
Some Further Thoughts", 1995 SLT (News) 120 and D O'Donnell and D L Carey Miller, "Security
over Moveables : A Longstanding Reform Agenda in Scots Law", (1997) 5 ZeiLschrift fiir
Europaisches Privatrecht 807.
10. Consultation paper, para 2.10.
11. Consulation paper, para 2.11.
12. Consultation paper, para 2.9.
4. THE OBLIGATION SECURED
51. A valid obligation. As a right in security, pledge is parasitic upon the
obligation which it secures.1 Consequently, the validity of the pledge is dependent
on the validity of the underlying obligation. Any valid causa may be secured, be it a
monetary debt or an obligation ad factum praestandum} The law is the same in
other jurisdictions and has been clear for some time.3 Thus in Genesis, a pledge
secured the delivery of a young goat.4 The question as to what extent a pledge can
secure a contingent debt is an open one. As a general rule, it is suggested that if a
debt is too contingent to be assigned, then it is too contingent to be secured by a
pledge.5
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1. See G L Gretton, "The Concept of Security" in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing
Miscellany I1987) 126, 128. As F Lent, Sachenrecht: Ein Studienbuch, (14th cd, by K H Schwab,
1974), p 261, puts it : "Das Pfandrecht . . . ist strong akzessorisch". See also the Civil Code of
Louisiana, art 3138. See the BGB, art 1252.
2. Bell, Principles s 203. In the vast bulk of cases the pledge secures a debt. Indeed this is why many
writers (eg Erskine III. 1.33) do not mention any other form of obligation. However, it is clear that a
non-monetary obligation may be secured : Moore v Gledden (1869) 7 M 1016.
3. See the valuable discussion by Joseph Story : Commentaries on the Law of Bailments, (1839), s
286. See also the Civil Code of Louisiana, arts 3136 and 3140 and R Slovcnko, "Of Pledge", (1958)
33 Tul LR 59, at p 65; the Spanish Civil Code, art 1861; the Civil Code of Quebec, arts 2660 and
2687; and the BGB, art 1204.
4. Genesis 38.17-18.
5. See G L Gretton, "The Assignation of Contingent Rights" 1993 JR 23.
52. Extent to which the obligation is secured. Unless there is express agreement
to the contrary, the entire obligation will be secured.1 Thus, where it is a monetary
debt, in the words of Bell ;
"Pledge operates as a security for the whole debt, and is not weakened by
payment of a part of the debt, but remains as complete for the last shilling as
for the whole."2
This will obviously include interest due upon the debt.3 The statutory rules on
pawnbroking do not alter the basic rule.4
1. A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 16; L D Crcrar, The Law ofBanking in Scotland, (1997), p 270.
2. Bell, Principles, s 1365. See also J Story, Bailments, s 301 and the Spanish Civil Code, art 1860.
3. D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), p 245 n 12. The law is the same
in Germany : BGB, art 1210 and South Africa : G Lubbe, LAWSA, vol 17, para 478.
4. McMillan v Conrad (1914) 30 Sh Ct Rep 275.
53. Effect of assignation of the creditor's right. There is a dearth of authority here.
Our law would seem to recognise the following basic principle, as enunciated by
Erskinc ;
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"Assignations, when properly perfected, carry to the assignee all rights which
corroborate or strengthen the right conveyed".1
Thus, where a debt is secured by a bond of caution, the cautioner remains liable
where the debt is assigned.2 The general principle may be referred to by the maxim
accessoriurn sequiturprincipale3 Now, be this as it may as a principle of our law, it
is not easy to reconcile with certain principles of the law of pledge. As a preliminary
point, where the pledged property is of a special character, for example, a valuable
painting, the pledger will not wish to see it leave the pledgee's hands. In this
situation the right of pledge cannot be assigned.4
More generally, pledge depends on the pledgee being in possession.5 However, the
application of the accessorium sequitur principale here would mean that a party to
whom a debt secured by a pledge is assigned, automatically and immediately
becomes pledgee, although he is not necessarily put in possession of the
impignorated property. It is inconceivable that the principle requiring a pledgee to
be in possession does not take priority here. Erskine himself can be cited to prove
this. Speaking about the remedies a pledgee has if the pledger defaults upon the
secured obligation, he says :
"Some creditors have attempted to make a pledge effectual for their payment
by assigning the debt to a trustee; who, upon that conveyance may arrest the
pledge in the hands of his cedent, the original creditor, and then pursue a
forthcoming against him. But in this way the original creditor may, by a prior
arrestment of the pledge used by another creditor, lose his right of
impignoration; which, from the nature of all real contracts, cannot subsist but
where he who is in the right of the debt is also in the possession of the
pledge."6
Thus the maxim accessorium sequitur principale is overridden by the general rules
of pledge. That the assignee must be put in possession is made clear by Professor
Reid.7 However, Erskine's statement seems to deny that even putting the assignee in
possession will give him the right of pledge. For what he is saying is that when the
pledgee assigns the debt his right of pledge is extinguished. Once a right is
extinguished it is gone. Simply transferring possession of the formerly impignorated
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property is not going to revive it. The only way to make the assignee himself
pledgee is to get the co-operation of the owner of the property, that is the pledger.
The assignee will only validly obtain the right of pledge, if the pledger is willing to
recognise him as pledgee.
Another point in favour of this conclusion is the fact that the assignation of a pledge
does not merely involve the assignation of a real right. It involves the assignation of
obligations, such as to exercise ordinary care in respect of the property and,
importantly, to restore the property upon payment of the secured debt.8 Obligations
in general cannot be assigned, unless the person to whom the obligation is owed
agrees.9 A useful comparison may be made with the law of leases, lease being
another subordinate real right. Bar a couple of exceptions which the common law
has developed, a lease may not be assigned without the landlord's consent.10 Of
course, it is possible to give the tenant express power to assign in the lease.
There is an old Scottish case in which the court seemed to recognise an assignee as
a pledgee where possession had been transferred to him.11 The case conflicts with
the conclusion newly reached, in that the co-operation of the pledger does not seem
to have been sought. However, the matter was not discussed, the main point of the
case being something different.12 Certainly, our conclusion is in accordance with
South African law.13 Under it, a cession (assignation) of a pledge without the
pledger's consent results in the pledgee's real right being terminated.14 On one view
this is because the pledgee's action is regarded as an express or tacit renouncement
of his real right.15 The better view, according with Erskine, is that the pledge is
extinguished because the secured obligation no longer exists between the pledger
and the pledgee but between the pledger and the pledgee's cessionary (assignee).16
By way of contrast, English law allows the assignment (assignation) of a pledge
without the pledger's consent. This is because it is regarded as an assignment of the
"interest" or "special property" which the English pledgee has in the pledged
property.17 English law regards such an "interest" to be disponible.18 Under German
law, the assignation of the secured debt causes the right of pledge to be assigned
too, unless the parties agree otherwise.19
1. Erskine, III.5.8.
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2. Lyell v Christie (1823) 2 S 288.
3. See W Bell, Dictionary, (7th ed, 1890), sv "Accessorium sequitur principalc". See also
Comments By Scottish Law Commission on Consultation Paper by DTI on Security over
Moveable Property in Scotland (November 1994), (March 1995), p 43.
4. See discussion on this with regard to a pledge by a pledgee, below para 78. Note A J Sim, SME,
vol 20, para 25.
5. Bell, Principles, s 1464. See below, para 102.
6. Erskine, III. 1.33.
7. KGC Reid, SME, vol 18, para 657.
8. See below, paras 96 and 100.
9. K G C Rcid, SME, vol 18, para 662.
10. See J Rankine, Law ofLeases in Scotland, (3rd ed, 1916), p 173.
11. Ramsay v Wilson (1666) Mor 9113.
12. The claim of the assignee against a subsequent pledgee of the property. The property had been
unlawfully removed from the assignee and pledged to the latter who was in good faith. The court
held that the pledgee had no right to retain the goods, his pledger having no title to pledge.
13. See Ocrtcl NO v Brink 1972 (3) SA 669, 675 per Boshoff J : "A pledgee has no right to cede
pledged property to another without the owner's consent". Sec also Deutschmann v Mpeta 1917
CPD 79 and H S Silberberg and J Sehoeman, The Law ofProperty, (3rd ed, 1992), p 474.
14. Wille's Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa, (3rd ed, ed Scott and Scott, 1987), p
146.
15. Ibid; G Lubbe, LA WSA, vol 17, para 502.
16. Wille, op cit, n 14.
17. Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585; HaJliday v Holgate (1868) LR 3 Ex 299; A P Bell, p
146; Halsbury, vol 36, para 125.
18. Ibid.
19. BGB, arts 1250-1251.
5. RETENTION FOR OTHER DEBTS
54. General. A vexed question is whether the creditor can detain the subject matter
of the pledge for debts other than those which the pledge was contracted to secure.
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What is the position, for example, if the creditor makes the debtor some further
advances ? Indeed, it is not clear even if the creditor expressly provides that the
pledge is to secure "all sums" due to him by the debtor whether such an agreement
will be upheld. Now, of course as a matter of contract such an agreement would be
valid.1 The problem is if there are third parties involved, such as other creditors of
the debtor executing diligence or - if the debtor becomes insolvent - a trustee in
sequestration.
1. On the basis of freedom of contract.
55. Bell's approach. It was not until the fourth edition of his Principles that Bell
plucked up the courage to tackle the matter and even then he seems to have been
nervous as he by mistake introduces it as "where additional advances have been
made to the creditor".1 He of course meant to say debtor. Bell's first statement is that
when an item of property is transferred by the debtor to the creditor ex facie
absolutely but truly in security, the debtor has no right to demand a reconveyance
until he has discharged his entire debt due to the creditor. Future advances are
encompassed by this. To provide authority for this, Bell refers to the heritable
security by absolute disposition with an unrecorded back-bond, the mortgage of a
ship and the assignation of a debt.2 The specialised example of the ship apart, none
of these cases involve a corporeal moveable. However, Bell attempts to provide an
all-embracing rationale for the rule applicable to all forms of property when he
writes that in these situations the creditor has "a right ostensibly universal and
absolute" rather than an express security.3
Bell's second statement is that where a moveable has been given in pledge without
limitation of security, the fact that the creditor has possession suggests that any
further advances are made because of that possession. Therefore any further
advances are secured. However, if the pledge is expressly limited to a specific
advance at the time of constitution, as against third parties it is limited to this
advance. Bell cites only English authority to support this.4 Thirdly, he states that the
security may be expressly extended to cover further advances. However such an
agreement is only good if made before third parties take any action against the
creditor.5
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1. Bell, Principles, s 1367. Sheriff Guthrie corrected the mistake when he edited the 6th edition,
1872. Bell briefly considered the subject in his Commentaries (11,22) However proper analysis was
lacking : see Lord Handyside in Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152, 156.
2. The heritage case was Pringle's Creditors, sub nom Brough's Crs v Jollic (1793) Mor 2585; the
ship case, Balleny v Raeburn and Co June 7, 1808 FC and the debt case was Dougal's Crs 1794
Bell's Ca 41.
3. Bell, Principles, s 1367.
4. Demaimbry v Metcalf(1715) Prec in Ch 412; 1 Bell's Illustrations 441.
5. Op cit, n 3.
56. Subsequent authority. Since Bell's death there has been some case law
development. There is the important judgement of the Lord Ordinary (Handyside) in
Hamilton v Western Bank ofScotland,1 which begins by stating that apart from Bell
there is little authority on the matter.2 The factual situation involved was that some
warehoused brandy had been made the subject of a security by the owner indorsing
the delivery order to his bank, with intimation to the warehousekccper. This was
done to secure the discount of some bills. The bank then made a further advance.
Lord Handyside viewed the transaction as pledge. He accepted Bell's opinion that a
pledge originally specific to its subject may not be tacitly extended to cover other
debts due. However, he reserved judgement on the validity of Bell's comments with
regard to third parties.3 In the Inner House, his judgement was reversed on the basis
that the transaction was not pledge but absolute transfer in security.4 However, in an
obiter part of his judgement Lord Deas states that he would have concurred with
Lord Handyside had he regarded the matter as one of pledge.3
In Rintoul and Co v Bannatynd goods had been pledged in security of a specific
advance. This advance was repaid. However, the creditor attempted to retain the
goods in security of a prior claim. Upon a petition he was ordered by the sheriff to
return the goods. Although the creditor then tried some blocking tactics which
became the main focus of the action, he does not seem to have disputed the general
principle that a pledge cannot be tacitly extended to cover other debts.
In Alston's Tr v Royal Bank ofScotland' the Lord Ordinary (Low) seems happy to
accept Lord Handyside's opinion of the law as expressed in Hamilton.H That case
involved the deposit in security of negotiable instruments with a bank. In the
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reclaiming motion the bank argued that the deposit was an ex facie absolute transfer
in security so that it therefore could retain the instruments against all debts. The
depositor, conversely, argued it was a pledge and consequently that the bank could
not retain for a general balance. Hence, on this point of law, although not the
interpretation of the facts, both sides agreed with the Lord Ordinary. In the Inner
House it was held that the securities were pledged in security "as against any sum
which might be due ... on [the] current or cash account. . . [and] deposited not as
against any specific debt or obligation".9 Thus the court seemed happy with the
notion of an "all sums" pledge. Of course, here no third parties were involved.
Since Bell, other writers have attempted to treat the subject. Gloag and Irvine
examine the case law, as we have just done, with the same conclusions.10 Indeed,
given that there has been no relevant case law since their time of writing, their
statement that it "seems never to have been settled" whether a pledge can be tacitly
extended, remains true today." Graham Stewart states the property pledged is
security only for the specific advance made. However it may be shown that by
agreement it was extended to cover other debts or further advances. But he adds that
if prior to the agreement to extend an arrestment is used by another creditor of the
pledger, then the arrester will be preferred as against the debt which the pledge has
been extended to cover.12
More recent writers have also touched upon the subject. According to Professor
Walker, a pledge will be good security for advances made subsequently to the
original pledging.13 However, he cites Hamilton as his principal authority, where the
transaction was held not to be one of pledge. Thus Professor Walker is misleading.
Professor Wilson states that the subject cannot be retained for payment of debts
other than the one for which it was pledged.14 However, Professor Crerar takes a
view similar to that of Graham Stewart.15
1.(1856) 19 D 152, 155-158.
2. At 156.
3. At 157.
4.(1856) 19 D 152, 158-167.
5. At 165.
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6.(1862) 1 M 137.
7.(1893) 20 R 887.
8. At 890.
9. Per Lord Trayner at 894.
10. Gloag and Irvine, pp 213 - 214.
11. Ibid, p 213.
12. J Graham Stewart, The Law of Diligence, (1898), p 172. Like Bell, he uses an incorporeal
property case (Clyde v Dunnet (1833) 11 S 791 affd McL and Rob 28) and a heritable property
(Union Bank v National Bank (1885) 13 R 380 rev 14 R (HL) 1) security case to help to justify his
conclusions.
13. D M Walker, Principles ofScottish Private Law, vol 3, (4th ed, 1989), p 396.
14. W A Wilson, The Scottish Law of Debt, (2nd ed, 1991), p 92. See also A J Sim, SME, vol 20,
para 16. Cf D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), para 11.12..
15. L D Crerar, The Law ofBanking in Scotland, (1997), p 270.
57. Comparisons with other securities. Before trying to draw these various strands
of authority together, it will be useful to examine the rules which govern this
situation with respect to other forms of property. Bell himself took this approach.1
With regard to security over incorporeal property the law appears settled. An cx
facie absolute assignation will secure all debts owed by debtor to creditor, unless the
parties have agreed otherwise.2 On the other hand, an assignation expressly in
security will only secure the original debt for which it was assigned to secure.3
Now it would be very easy to draw a direct comparison between pledge and an
assignation expressly in security and then one between an ex facie absolute
assignation of an incorporeal moveable and an ex facie absolute transfer of a
corporeal moveable. In the latter case the comparison is valid.4 The fact that there is
a body of legal thought which regards an assignation expressly in security as simply
a pledge of debt makes the first comparison attractive also.3 However, on closer
analysis this would seem misguided. For the correct comparison with an assignation
expressly in security of an incorporeal moveable is with a transfer expressly in
security of a corporeal moveable and not with pledge.6
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With respect to land, pre 1970 the ex facie absolute disposition in security was good
for "all sums".7 However, the bond and disposition in security was not.8 But the rule
in the second case came not from common law, but from the Bankruptcy Act of
1696 (c 5).9 This Act affected the wadset, the direct ancestor of the bond and
disposition of security.10 And of course, as has been shown, the wadset was a
development from pledge.11 The suggestion therefore is that at common law, an "all
sums" pledge is valid, but only if expressly provided for.
1. See above, para 55.
2. Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152; National Bank v Forbes (1858) 21 D 79; National
Bank v Dickie's Trs (1895) 22 R 740.
3. Ibid.
4. Both involve transfer of title to property.
5. Particularly in South African law ; see S Scott, The Law ofCession. (2nd ed, 1991), chapter 12.
6. On which, see J Graham Stewart, The Law of Diligence, pp 157-158. Therefore it is not the best
idea to directly equate them as does E A Marshall in Scots Mercantile Law. (2nd ed, 1992), para 7-
111.
7. See Gloag and Irvine, p 142.
8. Ibid.
9. See Erskine. II.8.36; Bell, Principles, s 911.
10. Very little research has been done on the wadset, but see G L Gretton, SME. vol 18, para 112.
11. See above, paras 35 and 40.
58. Conclusion. The relevant law may be tentatively summarised :
1. If a pledge is expressly stated to be specific to a certain debt, then there may be
no retention for any other debt. On this the authorities agree.1
2. Where a pledge is originally specific to a particular debt but both parties later
agree that it will cover another debt or other debts, this arrangement will be upheld.2
This agreement may be express or implied but obviously it is best to have something
in writing.3 However, if there has been an arrestment executed or some other third
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party intervention prior to this new agreement, the creditor will only be preferred to
the extent of the original debt.4
3. An "all sums" pledge is valid.3 However, it is suggested in this situation that if a
third party creditor of the pledger gives notice to the pledgee that he has made an
advance to the pledger, then he should be preferred in the event of the pledger's
insolvency as against any later contracted advances made by the pledgee. In short
the equitable rule which applied at common law and is now provided for by statute
in respect of heritable security should be applied to pledge.6
1. See Bell, Principles, s 1367; Graham Stewart. p 172; A J Sim. SME. vol 20, para 16 and Lord
Handyside's judgement in Hamilton.
2. Bell, ibid; Graham Stewart, p 172; Carey Miller, p 245; cf Wilson, p 92 and Sim. ibid.
3. It is risky to rely upon Bell's presumption based on possession, above.
4. Graham Stewart, op cit n 2; Crerar. p 270.
5. Alston's Tr, Sim; being valid for the wadset too, pre 1696, see above, para 57.
6. At common law, Union Bank v National Bank (1885) 13 R 380 rev 14 R (HL) 1. By statute, the
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, (c 35), s 13.
59. Other systems. Story, writing in 1829, attempted to compare the common and
the civil law on this important matter. He states that under the former, subsequently
contracted debts will be secured by the pledge if there is express or implied
agreement by the parties to this effect.1 Otherwise the later debt or debts will be
unsecured. This would appear to remain the position under modern English law.2
As regards the civil law, Story points out that the law may well be different and that
a pledgee has an automatic right to detain for "all sums". He tells us that Pothier was
convinced this was the civil law, in particular being the law of France.3 Story then
states it to be the law of Scotland, that unless there is the "clearest evidence" that the
pledge is restricted to a particular debt it will secure all debts. However, for this he
relies on a brief passage from Bell's Commentaries which predated Bell's thorough
analysis of the subject in his Principles in which he departs from his previous
viewpoint.4 Leaving this apart, Story is not wholly in agreement with Pothier's
statement of the civil law :
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"Perhaps it yet remains doubtful, whether the rule of the civil law was
intended to apply to any cases, except those, in which there was an
implication, that the subsequent debts should be tacked to the preceding by
the consent of the parties."5
Such a conclusion is consistent with the views tentatively suggested above with
regard to Scots law. However, in Spanish law where the parties have contracted
further debts, the pledgee has the right to retain the property in respect of those debts
which were dcmandable prior to the original debt being paid.6
In South Africa an express "all sums" pledge appears to be valid. On the other
hand, if there is no express provision it is doubtful whether the pledged subject can
be retained for debts other than the one for which it was first pledged/ Moreover, it
is clear that any such detention, in the absence of an express "all sums" clause,
would be ineffective as against third parties.9
1. J Story, Bailments, (1829), s 304.
2. G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law. (1952), p 359. He relies on Dcmaimbry v Mctcalf
(1715) Pree in Ch 419; 23 ER 1048 (cited by Bell, and Story himself).
3. Story, s 305, citing R Pothier, Du Nantissement. n 47. See now the French Civil Code, art 2082.
4. Bell, Commentaries, 11,22. Proper analysis was lacking here : see Lord Handyside in Hamilton v
Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152, 156 for a full discussion.
5. Story, s 305.
6. Spanish Civil Code, art 1866.
7. G Lubbe. LA IASA, vol 17, para 477.
8. Ibid, para 479.
9. Ibid. Bank's Tr v SA Bank(1848) 2 M 381; Smith v Family's Tr 1904 TS 949.
6. SUBJECT MATTER
60. General. Bell's basic statement is that the "subject of pledge must be capable of
delivery".1 By this he means capable of actual delivery.2 Therefore if a subject is not
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capable of such delivery, for example, underground pipes, another method of
creating a security must be found.3
1. Bell, Principles, s 205.
2. For of course land is capable of delivery : symbolical delivery.
3. Darling v Wilson's Tr (1887) 15 R 1X0 at 183, per Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff. However surely
such pipes would be heritable as a result of accession : Crichton v Turnbult 1946 SC 52.
61. Corporeal moveables. In general any item of corporeal moveable property may
be made the subject of a pledge.1 Examples include silver plates;2 clothing;3 yarn;4
brandy;5 horses;6 and jewellery.7 In practice only goods of a reasonable value which
will be easily marketable in the event of the debtor's default are pledged.8 For
example, it goes without saying that a gallon of milk will not be acceptable to secure
a term loan of 6 months.
Where a pledge will frustrate the purpose of a statute, it will not be allowed. Thus in
one case a company attempted to impignorate its Register of Shareholders.4 This
breached its statutory duty to keep the document at its office to be open for public
inspection and was consequently held to be invalid.
Other subjects which may not be pledged are the letters of guarantee of a company
limited by guarantee.10
1. Bell, Principles, s 205; Commentaries 11,21; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 15.
2. Murray ofPhiliphauch v Cuninghamc (1668) 1 BS 575.
3. Hariot v Cuningham (1791) Mor 12405.
4. Paton v Wyllic (1833) 11 S 703.
5. Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152.
6. Kirkwood and Pattison v Brown (1877) 1 Guth Sh Cas 395.
7. Wolifson v Harrison 1977 SC 384.
8. Hume, Lectures IV,6-7.
9. LiquidatorofGarpcl v Andrew {1866) 4 M 617.
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10. Robertson v British Linen Co (1890) 18 R 1225.
62. Bills of lading. These in law are regarded as the symbols of goods being
shipped. Therefore the question of whether they may be pledged can be resolved
into the question of whether it is permissible to constitute a pledge by symbolic
delivery. This is matter is dealt with fully elsewhere. However for the sake of
convenience it is submitted here that bills of lading may indeed be pledged.1
1. See below, para 94.
63. Incorporeal property. In general this may not be pledged.1 The way in which a
security is created over such property is by assignation.2 It is of course possible tor a
debtor to deliver documents evidential of such property, eg a personal bond, into the
hands of his creditor. If the debtor requires the documents, eg to get payment, then
the creditor may be given a feeling of security. However, he has no real right of
which he can avail himself against third parties, except that over the actual
documents.3 Despite the continual description by the courts of a security over shares
as a "pledge of shares", such a security is no such thing.4 It is an assignation and the
creditor gets no real right in security until he becomes registered by the company as
the shareowner.5
In Germany it is possible to pledge rights in much the same conceptual way as
corporeal moveables.6 The laws of many other European countries take a similar
approach.7 In South Africa, where there has been some German influence, there are
moves in this direction. Its version of our assignation expressly in security, the
cessio in securitatem debiti, has been viewed on occasion as amounting to a pledge
of a debt.8 The result of this is that there needs to be no retrocession of the
incorporeal which is the subject of the security, if and when the dcbtor/cedcnt
discharges his debt due to the crcditor/cessionary.4 Whether such jurisprudence will
come to Scotland is a matter of conjecture.
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,22.
2. Ibid, Strachan v McDougle (1835) 13 S 954.
3. Inncs v Craig 22 June 1821 FC, (1821) 1 S 82. Except if it is bearer paper.
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4. For example, Barron v National Bank (1852) 14 D 565: Coats v Union Bank of Scotland 1929
SC(HL) 114.
5. Ibid.
6. BGB articles 1273-1296. "Das Pfandrecht an Rechtcn". See F Lent, Sachcnrccht : Ein
Studienbuch, (14th ed, by K H Schwab, 1974), pp 272-277 and M G Dickson, W Roscncr and P M
Storm (eds), Security on Movable Property and Receivables in Europe, (1988). pp 65-66.
7. For example, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain. See Dickson. Rosener and Storm, ibid. For
Holland, see W M Klcijn, J P Jordaans, H B Krans, H D Ploeger and F A Stckctce, in J Chorus ct al,
Introduction to Dutch Law, (2nd ed, 1993), pp 84-87.
8. See S Scott, The Law ofCession, (2nd ed, 1991), chapter 12.
9. Ibid, pp 232-233 and pp 238-239.
64. Negotiable instruments. As an exception to the general rule regarding
incorporeals, negotiable instruments such as bills of exchange may be pledged.' The
rationale is that the debt is inseparable from the piece of paper.2 This brings us to a
major problem. If there is such inseparability, it does not seem that there can be a
valid pledge, for in pledge title remains in the pledger. Further, the giving of the
instrument to a creditor will in most circumstances make him holder of the
instrument.3 As holder, he is entitled to payment upon the instalment.4 This means
he can realise his security without going to court which is where a pledgee must
normally go for realisation.
These matters are problematic. Here is what Bell had to say in the 2nd edition of his
Commentaries:
"The possession of a bill [of exchange] is held to be so strictly connected with
the right, that the whole interest passes by indorsing the bill. And as bills thus
impledged are blank indorsed, they are, in the eye of the law, completely
transfcaed to the pledgee, under such condition as the parties have agreed
upon."3
This passage clearly denies the possibility of a true pledge of a bill. However, in the
4th and subsequent editions of the same treatise, this passage has been reworked.
Instead, Bell begins by writing that where the instrument is indorsed to the creditor
or blank endorsed by the debtor, the creditor has all the rights of an onerous indorsee
being able to realise his security without judicial aid.6 Such a transaction, is the clear
implication, should be treated as assignation rather than pledge.
This interpretation is confirmed by what Bell writes next. In the 4th edition, he says
that sometimes "a bill is pledged without being indorsed". But in the 5th edition
this has become sometimes "a bill is more correctly pledged without being
indorsed".x In this situation the creditor merely has the right to detain and can only
indirectly operate payment of the debt secured.9 Obviously this means by going to
court. As Gloag and Irvine point out, this passage can be interpreted narrowly or
widely.10 It definitely covers the delivery of an order bill without indorsement to the
creditor. However, it may also mean where a bearer bill has been similarly delivered
in security. English authority which would be persuasive on this matter is
inconclusive but logic at the end of the day points to the narrower interpretation."
In brief then, the following is suggested as being a statement of Scots law :
1. If an order negotiable instalment is indorsed in special or in blank by the holder to
a creditor, or a bearer instrument is merely delivered to the creditor, then this
operates as a transfer rather than a pledge of the instrument.12 In other words if the
creditor becomes the holder then the trnasaction is not pledge.
2. If an order negotiable instrument is delivered without indorsement to the creditor,
then it is being pledged and not transferred.13 In this situation the creditor does not
become the holder and will require judicial assistance to realise his security.
1. Bell, Principles, s 205; Hume, Lectures, IV,7; Gloag and Irvine, p 545. See also the American
Law Institute, Restatement of the Law ofSecurity, (1941), s 1.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,23.
3. Unless it is an order bill which is not indorsed to the creditor.
4. Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (c 61) s 38.
5. Bell, Commentaries, (2nd ed, 1810), pp 443-44. A similar statement is made by Hume, Lectures,
IV,7.
6. Bell, Commentaries, (4th ed, 1821), 11,28; (5th ed, 1826), 11,23; (7th ed, ed McLaren, 1870), 11,23.
7. At 11,28.
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8. At 11,23. In the 7th ed also at 11,23.
9. Ibid. Hogg v Muir, Wood and Co, 18 May 1(320 (unreported), which Bell discusses in footnote 3
suggests outright assignation rather than pledge, as "all sums" detention was allowed. His
disapproval of it seems justified by logic.
10. Gloag and Irvine, p 608.
11. On the English authority, Byles on Bills of Exchange, (26th cd, 1988), pp 226-227 (a similar
statement from an earlier edition being referred to by Gloag and Irvine, p 608) suggests the wider
interpretation in denying the creditor a power of realisation. However, J Paget, Law of Banking
(11th cd, 1996), p 582 suggests no such limit.
12. Bell, Commentaries, 11,23.
13. Ibid. Sec also A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 60.
65. Title deeds to heritable property. There is a disagreement between Hume and
Bell on whether these may be pledged. Hume opines that they "cannot be detained
from the purchaser, or heritable creditor [of the land] under the pretence of a pledge .
. . in any one who has got the possession of the ipsa corpora as in security."1 In
contrast, Bell writes that as corporeal moveables they can be pledged, but do not
give any right in the land.2 The matter was settled in the Inner House in Christie v
Ruxton,3 where Hume was preferred, the court regarding title deeds as having "no
intrinsic value in themselves".4
Christie v Ruxton is often stated as being authority for the proposition that a security
over heritage cannot be created by mere deposit of title deeds.3 In England such
action results in an equitable mortgage over the land in favour of the depositee.6
However, it was clear that no such result would happen in Scotland long before
Christie and the point was not argued in the case.7 In Bell's words, the English
position is "inconsistent with the genius of the Scottish law".8
1. Hume, Lectures, IV,7.
2. Bell, Principles, s 205.
3. (1862) 24 D 1182.
4. At 1185 per Lord Benholme. This point was also made by Hume, op cit n 1.
5. For example, W A Wilson, The Scottish Law ofDebt, (2nd ed, 1991), p 99.
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6. Bell, Commentaries, 11,23-24. A written document signed by the parties is now also required. See
the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 19S9, (c 34) s 2 and United Bank of Kuwait pie v
Sahib [ 1996] 3 All ER215.
7. Hume, Lectures, IV,7-8.
8. Bell, Commentaries, 11,24.
66. Land. As we have seen, in early Scots law land could be pledged in much the
same way as moveables.1 However as the centuries went on the law of heritable and
moveable security became bifurcated and it is quite clear that in 1997 land may not
be pledged. The only way of creating a security over heritable property is the
standard security.2
1. See above, para 19.
2. Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, (c 35) s 9(3).
7. THE RULE NEMO PLUS JURIS AD ALIENUM
TRANSEERRE POTEST, QUAM IPSE HABERET
67. General. For a person to be able to give a right of pledge over property, lie must
own that property or be authorised by its owner to pledge it.1 The rule nemo plus
juris ad alienum transfcrrc potest, quam ipse haberet2 applies equally to the creation
of a pledge as it does to the creation of any other real right. Here is Lord Kinncar:
"The general rule is perfectly well settled, that the possessor of corporeal
moveables can give no better title to a purchaser or pledgee than he has
himself acquired from the owner."3
The rule is axiomatic and applies in many legal systems.4 In one case a relict
impignorated the moveables of the deceased including his heirship moveables. The
heir had a good action against the possessor for their return.3 Good faith on the part
of the pledgee is irrelevant.6 In another case the owner of jewels delivered them to
another in custody. The custodier impignorated them to a third party who was in
good faith. This was held to be no defence in an action for recovery of his property
by the owner.'
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1. Bell, Principless 1364; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11.(1931), para 773.
2. D.50.17.54. Also known as the rule nemo dat qutxl non habet: see K G C Rcid, SME, vol 18,
para 669. This abbreviated broeard may have come from the Commentators; see D L Carey Miller in
D L Carey Miller and D W Meyers (eds), Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law : A
Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith QC, (1992), p 13, at p 17.
3. Mitchell v Heys & Sons (1894) 21 R 600, 610.
4. For English law, see Attenborough v Solomon [1913] AC 76 at 84, per Lord Haldane LC. See
also the Spanish Civil Code, art 1857 and the Civil Code of Louisiana, art 3142. In German law.
however, pledge by a non-owner will give the pledgee a real right (dingliches Recht) if the pledgee
is in good faith. Sec the BGB. art 1207 and F Baur. Lehrbuch des Sachenrcchts, (13th ed. 1985). pp
532-533.
5. Semple v Givan (1672) Mor 9117. See also Ramsay v Wilson (1665) Mor 9113 and Tweddle v
Duncan (1841) 3D 998.
6. Gloag and Irvine, p 203.
7. Pringlcs v Gribton (1710) Mor 9123. See also McKellar v Greenock and Port Glasgow Loan
Co (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 93 and McPhater v Smith Premier Typewriter Co Ltd (1917) 33 Sh Ct
Rep 301.
68. Possessor under contract of sale or return. If goods are sent to someone under
a contract of sale or return (or sale on approbation) the question may be asked
whether that person may validly pledge the goods. In Brown v Marr, Barclay and
Co1 a party had fraudulently obtained jewellery upon such a contract and then
pawned it. The court viewed a contract of sale or return as a sale under a resolutive
condition. In other words ownership passed to the fraudulent party subject to
reversion to the seller if they were returned to him. Given this, the pledge was valid
and despite the fraud the pawnbroker obtained an absolutely good title as he was in
good faith.2
In the later case of Macdonald v Wcstrcn,3 the court took a different view of the
contract of sale or return. It held that it was a sale under a suspensive condition, so
where a person had obtained goods upon such a contract and then been sequestrated,
the ownership of the goods in his possession was held to be with the seller. The
opinions expressed in the two cases somewhat conflict/
Not long after Macdonald, the Sale of Goods Act 1893 was passed. It provided that:
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"Where goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or 'on sale or return', or
other similar terms, the property therein passes to the buyer : (a) when he
signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller, or docs any other act
adopting the transaction ; .. ,"5
As Gloag and Irvine point out, it is clear that such a contract is one of sale under a
suspensive condition.'1 Their conclusion is therefore that a pledge in the
circumstances outlined would be invalid.7 However, there is an alternative
conclusion. That is that by pledging the property the buyer is doing an act which
adopts the transaction.8 Thus ownership passes to him and the pledgee gets a good
title. This alternative conclusion is the one which both the Scottish and the English
courts have adopted.4 Further, its application happily is consistent with the
conclusions reached by the courts in both Brown and Macdonald, although not
admittedly with the reasoning expressed in the first case.10 To reiterate, then, the
pledge of goods obtained under a contract of sale or return will confer a good title
upon the pledgee.
1. (1880) 7 R 427.
2. Ibid. See also A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 23.
3.(1888) 15 R 988.
4. See Gloag and Irvine, pp 246-247.
5. Sale of Goods Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 71) s 18 (4). Now found in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c
54) as s 18 rule 4.
6. Gloag and Irvine, p 247.
7. Ibid.
8. P S Atiyah, The Sale ofGoods, (8th cd, 1990), p 291.
9. Bryce v Ehrmann (1904) 7 F 5; Kirkham v Attenborough [1897] 1 QB 201; London Jewellers
Ltd v Attenborough [ 1934] 2KB 206.
10. That was, that a contract of sale or return amounted to a sale under a resolutive condition.
69. Owner with voidable title. The rule is that if a person holding a voidable title
to property pledges the goods to another who is in good faith and gives value before
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his own title is avoided, then the pledge is absolutely good.1 The cardinal example
of the voidable title holder is the fraudster.2 This echoes the rule where ownership is
being transferred.3 According to Gloag, the onus of proof that the pledgee, in such
circumstances, did not take in good faith, rests on the owner of the goods.4 He can
only cite English authority to suppport this conclusion?
1. Brown v Marr, Barclay and Co (1880) 7 R 427.
2. As in Brown, ibid. See W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11. para 776.
3. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54), s 23.
4. Gloag, op cit, n 2.
5. Whitchorn v Davison [1911] 1 KB 463. The same rule probably applies here due to the
presumption in favour of the evidence of the pledgee arising out of his possession : sec Hariot v
Cuningham (1791) Mor 12405.
70. Agents. Property may be pledged on behalf of its owner by an agent.1 The
validity of the pledge will depend on whether the agent has authority, express or
otherwise, from his principal to pledge the goods.2 A mere depositary certainly has
no such authority.3
It appears that at common law in Scotland factors had a general power to pledge the
goods of their principals.4 Therefore pledgees were protected if it turned out that in
fact there was no express authority for the particular pledge in question? However
this was not the position in England where a series of statutes was passed in the
nineteenth century to give those transacting with factors some protection? The
consolidating statute was extended to apply to Scotland also and its inter-relation
with the common law is somewhat unclear.7 It is not intended to pursue the matter
here, where focus will be placed upon the statutory provisions.8
The Factors Act 1889 applies to mercantile agents and mercantile agent is defined
as :
"a mercantile agent having in the customary course of his business as such
agent authority cither to sell goods, or to consign goods for the purpose of
sale, or to buy goods, or to raise money on the security of goods"?
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The Act goes on to provide that where such an agent is, with the consent of the
owner, in possession of goods or of the documents of title to goods, any sale,
pledge, or other disposition of the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary
course of business of a mercantile agent shall be valid as if he were expressly
authorised by the owner of goods to make the same.10 The person taking under the
disposition, for our purposes the pledgee, must be in good faith and not have notice
at the time of the disposition that the agent had no authority to do what he is doing."
It has been held that a forwarding agent who has goods left in his hands to be
forwarded is not a factor and may not validly pledge.12
1. Bell, Principles, s 1364 ("delivery can he given effectually only by one having the ownership or
disposal"); Gloag and Irvine, p 203; A J Sim. SME, vol 20. para 21. See also the Civil Code of
Louisiana, arts 3145 and 3146.
2. A J Sim, ibid; K G C Rcid, SME, vol 18, para 670.
3. Stuart v McGregor (1829) 7 S 622; Smith v Allan & Poyntcr(l&59) 22 D 208.
4. Mitchell v Burnet & Mouat (1746) Mor 4468; Colquhoun v Findlay, Duff and Co 15 Nov
1816, FC.
5. See Lord Rodger, "Pledge of Bills of Lading in Scots Law", 1971 JR 193, at p 211.
6. Sec J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law ofScotland, (1964), pp l()5ff.
7. Factors Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict c 45) extended to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890 (53
& 54 Vict c 40) s 1.
8. See Gow, op cit, n 3.
9. Section 1(1).
10. Section 2( 1).
11. Ibid.
12. Martinez y Gomez v Allison (1890) 17 R 332.
71. Personal Bar. Where the pledger has neither title nor authority to pledge the
property but the owner of it has acted in such a way as to let the pledgee be misled
into believing that the pledger is the owner or has authority to pledge it, then the
owner is personally barred from denying the pledge.1 Personal bar is a general legal
doctrine and its application to pledge is carefully examined by Gloag and Irvine.2 In
73
their view two factors must be present to enable personal bar to operate against an
individual, namely (1) that he must have conducted himself in a manner calculated
to mislead another and (2) that the other must have been actually misled by reliance
on that conduct. '
Giving another individual possession of one's property does not amount to an act
calculated to mislead third parties, for mere possession of a corporeal moveable
generally does not give the possessor power to transfer it or create rights over it.4 As
Gloag and Irvine state, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which personal bar
will arise in a pledge context.3 The point is bomc out by an absence of case law.6
1. Sec A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 23.
2. Gloag and Irvine, pp 203-206.
3. Ibid, at p 204. See Lord Kinnear in Mitchell v Heys and Sons (1894) 21 R 600, at 610.
4. Gloag and Irvine, pp 204-205.
5. Ibid.
6. The two eases analysed by Gloag and Irvine are not true pledge cases. Mitchell, op cit, concerns
lien. Pochin & Co v Robinow & Marjoribanks (1869) 7 M 622 concerns a transfer in security.
72. Buyers and sellers in possession. Where a person having bought or agreed to
buy goods obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or the
documents of title to the goods, the delivery by that person, or by a mercantile agent
acting for him, of the goods or documents of title, under a pledge, to any person
receiving the same in good faith and without notice of the original seller's rights will
have the same effect as if the person making the delivery were a mercantile agent in
possession of the goods or documents of title with the consent of the owner.1
Likewise, where the seller of goods or his mercantile agent, having sold the goods,
remains in possession of the goods or documents of title to them, a pledge of these
to a pledgee receiving the same in good faith and without notice of the previous sale,
will have the same effect as if the owner of the goods had given express authority to
the seller to pledge.2
1. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54) s 25( 1); Factors Act 1889 (c 45) s 9. See P S Atiyah. The Sale of
Goods, (8th ed. 1990). pp 376-388.
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2. Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 24: Factors Act 1889 s 8. See Atiynh, ibid, pp 371-375.
73. Hire Purchasers. A contract of hire purchase is one where property is taken on
hire and the hirer is granted an option to purchase it on fulfilling certain conditions
stipulated in the contract.1 Therefore a hire purchaser does not have ownership of
the property and it would be presumed that the rule nemo plus juris ad alienum
transferre potest, quam ipse habcrct would apply if he purported to pledge them.
However, in two Sheriff Court cases it has been held that a pledge by a hire
purchaser is valid. In Acme Machine Co v Scanlan,2 where two Acme wringing
machines had been pawned, the parties found themselves before Sheriff Guthrie. He
opined that Acme in allowing their property to be hire purchased were responsible
for letting the fraudulent pawning be committed.3 He said that pawnbrokers were
under no duty to take "extraordinary precautions to ascertain that the title to the
machines is satisfactory." "In general", he continued, "the actual possession of
moveables presumes property".4 The case at its heart seems based upon a vague
notion of personal bar.
The second case, Benton and Co v Rowan5 has much the same ratio. The sheriff
makes a questionable comparison with a case where a person fraudulently had
obtained goods on sale or return." In that situation the person can confer good title; a
hire purchaser generally cannot.7
The sheriffs' conclusions arc too wide an interpretation of personal bar to accept. As
has been seen, personal bar only operates where the true owner has acted in a
manner calculated to mislead third parties and there has been reliance on his actings
by the party raising the doctrine.8 Entering into a contract of hire purchase and
handing over possession in terms of that contract cannot be said to be activity which
is calculated to mislead. Pressed to a logical conclusion, the sheriffs conclusions
mean that one who hires out his goods to someone who then pawns them, would
also have to pay the pawnbroker to get them back. And, to be consistent, if the
goods were sold rather than pawned, the buyer would get a good title. Acceptance of
this would confer on a hirer the same power to confer title as a buyer or seller in
possession, a power which only exists under statute.9
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The true backdrop to the cases is judicial dislike of hire purchase. The sheriff in
Benton described it as:
"a bad system, leading to deception, imposition, and litigation, and worst of
all, involving the ignorant and improvident of the poor into undertaking to pay
for articles prices far beyond their true value".10
However, he makes a concession at the end of the judgement. He docs not allow the
pawnbroker interest and expenses because of the nature of the items pawned. He
says :
"I think the look of these new, paltry toys ought to have excited manifold
suspicions in the mind of any man of skill who would pause to conjecture the
probabilities of their history."11
The items in question were wrist watches.
In the same year as Benton, the House of Lords in an English case held that as a hire
purchaser docs not own the goods subject to the contract of hire purchase, he
therefore may not validly pledge them.12 Further, he does not fall within the
provisions of the Factors Acts as a person who has "bought or agreed to buy goods"
and therefore cannot validly pledge upon that basis.13 This decision was followed
without question or discussion in a later Scottish Sheriff Court case.14 Acme and
Benton cannot be regarded as good law.
1. Sec W M Gloag and R C Henderson. Introduction to the Law of Scotland, (10th ed, 1995), para
16.51.
2. (1887) 3 Sh Ct Rep 148.
3. At 149.
4. At 149-150.
5.(1895) 11 ShCtRep 144.
6. Brown v Marr. Barclay and Co (1880) 7 R 427, discussed above, para 68.
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7. A person who obtains goods upon sale or return, adopts a sale by pledging them and thus can
confer a good title. This is the case even if he is a fraudster provided that the pledgee is in good faith
and the pledge takes place before the original contract is avoided. See above paras 68 and 69.
8. See above, para 71.
9. See the previous paragraph.
10. (1895) 11 Sh Ct Rep 144, 145, per Sheriff Campbell Smith.
11. Ibid.
12. Helby v Matthews [ 1895] AC 471.
13. Factors Act 1889 (c 45) s 9; Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54), s 25(1).
14. Singer Sewing Machine Co Ltd v Quigiey (1914) 30 Sh Ct Rep 56.
74. Lack of title or authority : consequences. If the pledger neither owns the
property in question nor has authority from its owner to pledge then the pledgee
does not obtain a real right in the property.1 He will have a personal action against
the pledger and it is suggested that the basis of this action is breach of warrandice.2
In practice such an action would probably be pointless. If the pledger is solvent, the
debt will be repaid anyway and the non-existence of the pledge will not matter, if
the pledger is insolvent, a personal action against him will be of no avail.
1. Bell, Principles, s 1364.
2. Cf English law where the pledgor warrants that he has title to the property and is liable in damages
if he has not : Chcesman v Exnll (1851) 6 Ex 341; G W Paton. Bailment in the Common Law.
(1952), p 353.
8. PLEDGE BY A PLEDGEE
75. General. The question of whether a pledgee may himself validly pledge the
property already pledged to him, while retaining his own right of pledge, has never
been authoritatively resolved in Scots law. Such a transaction has been called both
subplcdge1 and rcplcdgc.2 The present writer, however, is not happy with cither
word. Subpledge suggests a subordinate pledge being created over the original
pledge, that is a right in security in a right in security. This inaccurately reflects
what is going on, for a pledge is an incorporeal right and incorporeals generally
cannot be pledged.3 Rather what is happening is that property already pledged is
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purportedly being made the subject of a second pledge, with the original pledgee
now acting as a pledger. Rcplcdgc is too wide a term. For instance, it could simply
refer to the situation where property released from a pledge is pledged once more.
1. For example, W Guthrie, in Bell, Principles, s 206; Gloag and Irvine, p 212; A J Sim, SME, vol
20, para 25.
2. For example, G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), p 368; N E Palmer, Bailment,
(2nd ed, 1991), p 1402.
3. See above, para 63.
76. The English approach. The English law in this area was set down by the
Queen's Bench Division in the important ease of Donald v Suckling.' There it was
held by three judges to one that where a pledgee himself pledges the impignorated
property to a third party without the pledger's authority, the pledger will be unable to
recover the property from the third party until he discharges the debt secured by the
original pledge.2 The action of the pledgee may well amount to a breach of contract
on his part, but not one so fundamental to extinguish the pledge.3
The majority were influenced by Story, although in the end going further than the
American writer.4 Story had opined that a pledge by a pledgee would be upheld, but
not if the second pledge was for an amount more than the original debt.3 In fact this
was the situation in Donald. Yet the majority would not let the pledger recover his
property until he paid over the sum for which it was pledged. In a later case, Donald
was followed, it being held that where the pledged property is damaged as a result of
the second pledge, the pledger will only have a claim against the pledgee for
damages once he discharges the original debt, for until then he has no right to regain
possession of the subject.6
1.(1866) LR 1 QB 585.
2. See generally, G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), pp 368-369; N E Palmer,
Bailment. (2nd ed, 1991), pp 1402-1404.
3. Cockburn CJ at (1866) LR 1 QB 585, 618 seems to be of the view that there is a breach of contract
by the pledgee. Mcllor J at p 608 apparently believes that there is no breach. For discussion, see
Palmer, ibid, at pp 1403-1404. See also M G Bridge. Personal Property Law, (2nd cd, 1996), p 148.
4. See Mellor J at pp 606-607 and Blackburn J at pp 613-614.
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5. J Story, Bailments, s 324.
6. Halliday v Holgate (1868) LR 3 Ex 299.
77. Scots law authorities. The English rule, that a pledge by a pledgee docs not
amount to a complete repudiation of his obligations under the original pledge and
that the pledger still must discharge the secured debt to recover his property, is set
out in all the modem works on pledge south of the border.1 All seem agreed.
However, in Scotland we have dissensus, there being no decided case turning upon
the matter.2 Sheriff Guthrie, in one of his addenda to Bell's Principles, adopts the
English rule carte blanche.3 Gloag and Irvine effectively do the same, although they
put particular emphasis on the point that the original pledge contract may bar pledge
by the pledgee.4 Writing some thirty years later, Gloag simply represents Donald v
Suckling as the law of Scotland.5 Hume opined that a pledgee might not impignoratc
the pledged property himself, unless the original contract of pledge expressly
permitted such action.6
Let us start with a more modem writer. Sim doubts whether a subpledge, as he calls
it, is valid unless the pledgee has either express or implied power to constitute it.'
Here is his reason :
"A pledgor might be content to entrust, say a valuable painting to a pledgee of
his choosing, but might be far from willing that it should be sub-pledged to
another."8
Although this point has value, the law on this singular matter is surely already clear.
All three of the judges in the majority in Donald stated that where the pledged
property was of a special character the pledgee was not allowed to part with it.4 It
seems safe to assume that our law too requires the same where there is delectus
pcrsonae in the pledge contract.
Returning to the problem in general, there are in fact four reasons why the law of
Scotland is not in accordance with the law of England here. The first three arc
capable of variance by contract; the fourth is not.
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1. G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), pp 368-369; Halshury, vol 36, para 125; N E
Palmer. Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991). pp 1402-1404: VI G Bridge. Personal Property Law, (2nd ed,
1996), p 148.
2. There is, however, a valuable long obiter passage on the matter in the judgement of Lord Maxwell
in Wolifson v Harrison 1974 SLT (Notes) 55 (OH).
3. At para 206.
4. Gloag and Irvine, p 212.
5. W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11, para 769.
6. Hume, Lectures, IV,2.
7. A J Sim, SME. vol 20, para 25.
8. Ibid.
9. Mellor J at (1866) LR 1 QB 585, 608; Blackburn J at 615 and Coekburn CJ at 618.
78. Reason (1) ; The absence of any right in the pledgee to use the pledged
property. In English law the pledgee is generally entitled to make use of the
property pledged to him.1 The Scottish pledgee, bar one narrow exception, has no
such right.2 It is submitted therefore that he may not himself pledge the property.
For, by doing this in order to obtain a loan from the third party to whom lie is
making the pledge, the pledgee is surely using the pledged property to get credit.3
This certainly is the obiter opinion of Lord Maxwell :
"I cannot see the logic of saying that a pledgee may not 'use' the subjects
without express agreement (Bell [s 206]), Gloag and Irvine, Rights in
Security, p 213) and at the same time saying that he may, for example, sub-
pledge them".4
It must be admitted that our law does not regard the use of pledged property as a
breach of the pledge contract so fundamental as to bring it to an end.3 However, the
position of Scots law with regard to use as opposed to that of English law, points to
the two systems taking a different approach as regards pledge by a pledgee in
general.
1. See below, para 97.
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2. Ibid. The exception is where use is necessary to maintain the value of the property.
3. Admittedly not physical use.
4. Wolifson v Harrison 1974 SLT (Notes) 55, 57.
5. Hume, Lectures, IV, 2-3; Kirkwo<xJ and Pattison v Brown (1877) 1 Guth Sh Cas 395; Wolifson
v Harrison 1977 SC 384.
79. Reason (2) : The absence of any right in the pledgee to "deal" with the
pledged property. In English law a pledgee has the "whole present interest" in the
pledged subject.1 This interest allows him lawfully to give up possession of the
property to an assignee or a pledgee of his own.2 Further, on default the pledgee has
an implied right to sell the property.3 The power of the pledgee to deal with the
subject pledged is shown by the case of Johnston v StcarJ There the pledgee sold
the pledged goods a day before he was entitled to. However, the court held that "the
wrongful act of the pawnee did not annihilate the contract between [pawner and
pawnee] nor the interest of the pawnee in the goods under that contract."3 Without
discharging the debt, the pawner could not recover his property. Thus in terms of
English property law, a pledgee can give third parties rights in the pledged property.
He may well be in breach of contract. However, he will not be liable in damages and
the rights of the third party will remain protected until the pledger discharges the
debt which the property secured.
In Scotland a pledgee does not have the "whole present interest" in the pledged
property : he has a subordinate real right in it.6 He has no implied right to assign his
pledge.7 He has no implied right to sell the property on default.8 A sale by a pledgee
who has no right to sell is completely ineffectual.6 Scots and English law differ here
and this is the second reason why a pledge by a pledgee is not permissible north of
the border.
1. Per Wilkes J in Halliday v Holgate (1868) LR 3 Ex 299, 302. The "interest" is commonly referred
to as "special property", for example by Cockburn CJ in Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585, or
in Halsbury, vol 36, para 104. Lord Mersey in The Odessa [1916] 1 AC 145 at 158-159 prefers the
term "special interest".
2. Mores v Conham (1609) Owen 123 at 124; 74 ER 946 at 947 per Fleming CJ; Donald v
Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585; Halsbury. vol 36, para 125: N E Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), p
1402-1404.
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3. Re Morritt, ex parte Official Receiver (18X6) 18 QBD 222: Re Hardwick, ex parte Hubbard
(1889) 17 QBD 690; The Odessa [1919] AC 145 at 149 per Lord Mersey: Halsbury, ibid, para 128;
Palmer, ibid, p 1410.
4. (1863) 15 CBNS 330; 143 ER 812.
5. 15 CBNS 334-335.
6. See above, para 5.
7. See above, para 53.
8. Stair, 1.13.11; Erskine, 111.1.33; Bell. Principles, s 207. See below, para 105.
9. Hislop v Anderson (1919) 35 Sh Ct Rep 116.
80. Reason (3): The rule nemoplusjuris adalicnum transferrcpotest, quam ipse
haberct. As we have seen, this rule applies equally to the creation of pledge as it
does to the creation of any other real right.1 Given that a pledgee does not own the
pledged property, the rule must mean that a pledge by him is completely ineffectual,
unless the pledger gave him express or implied authorisation to do the same. This
very point was noted by Shee J, the dissenting judge in Donald v Suckling.'
However, his fellow judges avoided the problem by focusing on the "interest" which
a pledgee under English law apparently has in the pledged property.3 It is submitted
that Scots law is incapable of overriding nemo plus in this fashion.
1. See above, para 67.
2. (1866) LR 1 QB 585, 600-601. The interesting point about Shee J's judgement as a whole is that he
relies on Stair, Erskine and Bell, a point noted by Lord Maxwell in Wolifson v Harrison 1974 SLT
(Notes) 55, 58.
3. For example, Mellor J at 613 and Cockburn CJ at 618-619.
81. Reason (4) : The rule mobilia non habent scquclam. Three reasons have
already been given why it is thought that a pledgee may not validly repledgc the
security subjects in Scotland. They would indicate that Gloag and Guthrie are
misguided on this matter.1 However, Hume may still be correct when he states that a
pledgee given power to pledge may validly do so.2 For, it is clear that as a matter of
contract a pledger could give a pledgee power to pledge, just as he could give him
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power to use the pledged property or a power to sell it. Clearly, the nemo plus rule
cannot apply if the pledgee's actions arc authorised.
In terms of contract law Hume is correct. In terms of property law he is incorrect.
For, by the operation of the maxim mobilia non habent scquclam, the delivery of the
pledged property by the pledgee to his own pledgee will bring his right of pledge to
an end.3 Here is Erskine :
"[I]n a pledge of moveables, the creditor who quits the possession of the
subject loses the real right he had upon it".4
This very statement was relied upon by Slice J, the dissenting judge in Donald v
Suckling? Bell made the same point in more than one place.6 It may be argued that
here the pledgee remains in civil possession through his own pledgee.' This,
however, is of little assistance. For Scots law only sanctions a pledgee with natural
possession delivering it to another and retaining only civil possession for the most
limited of purposes.8 Pledging to a third party is not one of them.
Consequently, the effect of the pledgee pledging to a third party is that the third
party docs acquire a real right, where the pledgee has the authorisation of the
pledger. However, in giving up possession the pledgee loses his own right of pledge.
Thus only the third party now has a subordinate real right in the property. In effect
the pledge has been assigned. It is simply not possible for the pledgee to pledge the
property to a third party and at the same time maintain his own right of pledge.
1. That is, in regarding Scots law to be the same as English law. See above, para 78.
2. Hume, Lectures, IV,2.
3. The maxim is used by Bankton, 1.17.1 and 3 in relation to pledge but apparently not since. For
discussion, see H S Silberbcrg and J Schoeman, The Law ofProperty, (3rd ed, 1992), pp 479-480.
4. Erskine, III. 1.33.
5.(1866) LR 1 QB 585, 603.
6. Bell. Principles, ss 206 and 1364; Commentaries 11,22. See also W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol
11, para 771.
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7. The law of Louisiana takes this approach. See R Slovenko. "Of Pledge", (1958) 33 Tul LR 59, at p
95. See also American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law ofSecurity, (1941), pp 83-85.
8. See, below, paras 101-103.
82. Summary. Under Scots law, a pledgee has no right to pledge the impignorated
property to a third party. If the pledgee is given power by the pledger to do this, the
third party does obtain a real right. However, the surrender of possession on the part
of the pledgee results in him losing his own real right. Scots law does not permit
pledgees to pledge the property to a third party, whilst retaining a real right of
pledge themselves.1
1. See above, paras 78-81.
9. CONSTITUTION OF PLEDGE
83. General. The real right of pledge in a moveable subject is constituted by
delivery of the subject to the pledgee, in terms of an agreement between pledger and
pledgee to do the same.1 Consequently, pledge involves an animus or mental
element in terms of the parties' respective intentions to transfer and to receive
possession for this purpose, along with a corpus or physical element in terms of the
act of delivery.2 The agreement between the parties is a matter governed by the law
of obligations; the delivery thereupon is governed by the law of property.J
1. See above, para 5. A similar approach is taken in most systems. See, for example, the Civil Code
of Spain, arts 1857 and 1863; the BOB, art 1205; the French Civil Code, art 2071 and the New
Netherlands Civil Code, arts 3.227 and 3.236.
2. See D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), para 11.04.
3. The position is the same in South Africa ; see G Lubbe, LA VKSA, vol 17, para 485.
84. Pledge as a real contract. Under Roman law, pledge or pignus was one of the
four real contracts.1 By that law, such contracts were not constituted until delivery.
Therefore, originally at least, an agreement to pledge was unenforceable until the
debtor delivered the subject matter to the creditor.2 The acceptance of non-
possessory security by the later Roman law greatly reduced the importance of this
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rule. However, all the major Scots institutional works treat pledge as a real contract.3
The logical deduction to make from this is that under Scots law if X agrees to pledge
his watch to Y and then changes his mind before delivery, there is no contract so X
may not be compelled to deliver nor be liable in damages. Such a conclusion is a
worrying one and it is therefore not surprising that the law is in fact otherwise. Here
is Erskine :
"If there was barely an obligation to give fa subject in pledge with no
delivery], it resolved into a nudum pactum, which by the Romans, was not
productive of an action. But, by the law of Scotland, one who obliges himself
to give ... in pawn, may be compelled by an action to perform; though
indeed, before the subject be . . . impignorated, it docs not form the special
contract of . . . pignus,"4
Bell says something similar? It is fair to take issue with the statement that the
special contract is not formed until delivery. What he is trying to say is that the
contract is useless in terms of creating a security unless there is delivery, for until
then the creditor has no real right. Bankton seems to have a better understanding of
the matter:
"[I]f the proprietor only covenants a pledge, or hypothec on his goods . . . and
retains them still in his own possession, all who purchase from him the same
are safe ... no conventional pledge in moveables being competent by our law,
without delivery of the same to the creditor; at the same time the debtor who
evacuates such covenanted security is guilty of breach of faith, and liable to
the creditor in damages upon that head."6
To summarise, an agreement to pledge is a contract which may be enforced by
specific implement and which will give rise to a claim for damages if its terms arc
breached.7
1. See B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (1962), pp 167-171 and R Zimmermann. The
Law of Obligations, (1990), chapters 6-7, The others were mutuum (loan for consumption),
comnuxlatum (loan for use), and depositum (deposit).
2. Nicholas, p 167; Zimmcrmann, p 221.
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3. Stair, 1.13.11; Bankton, 1.17; Erskine, III.1.33: Bell, Principles, s 203. In actual fact, Regiam,
Balfour and Hope treat pledge in close proximity to the other real contracts, indicating the Roman
influence upon them.
4. Erskine, III. 1.17.
5. Bell, Principles, s 17.
6. Bankton, 1.17.1. See also Hume, Lectures, IV, 1.
7. The measure of damages is unclear.
85. Validity of the contract. Like any other contract certain prc-requisitcs arc
required to make it valid. The parties must have reached consensus about what they
are doing, they must not be under undue influence and they must have the relevant
legal capacity.1 Writing, although in practice desirable, is not required except in the
case of a pledge regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 ie a pawn.2 This
contrasts with some other jurisdictions. In France, a civil pledge (gage civil) requires
cither a document drawn up by a notary or a private contract which is then
registered.3 In Spain, a pledge is not valid against third parties unless its terms arc
set out in a public deed executed before an authenticating officer such as a notary
public.4
In the absence of writing the parties' intentions will be inferred from their actings in
relation to possession.5 The intentions must indicate nothing which is inconsistent
with the creation of a real right of pledge.6
1. See W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law ofScotland, (10th ed, 1995), chapters 4-9.
2. Bell, Principles, s 204; Taylor v Nisbet (1901) 4 F 79 per Lord Moncreiff at 86. Under the
Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c 39), the pawnee is obliged to issue the pawner with a copy of their
agreement, notice of his cancellation rights and a pawn-receipt with a specified form and content: s
115; Consumer Credit (Pawn-Receipts) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983 No 1566).
3. French Civil Code, art 2071. In contrast, a pledge in the course of a business (gage commercial)
does not require writing.
4. Spanish Civil Code, art 1865; M G Dickson, W Rosener and P M Storm (cds), Security on
Movable Property and Receivables in Europe, (1988), p 255.
5. D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), para 11.05.
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6. The parties did not pass this test in Mackinnon v Max Sanson and Co (1868) 6 M 974. where
the contract allowed the debtor to remove the items from the creditor's possession. Sec Carey Miller,
p 234.
86. Proof of contract. Pledge has always been provable by parole evidence.1 There
is an evidential presumption in favour of the pledgee as against the pledger because
he is in possession of the property.2 The acceptance by the law of parole evidence to
prove a pledge contrasts with the position of loan at common law. Loans required to
be proved by writ or oath.3 Given that pledges invariably secure loans, this led to a
somewhat perplexing situation. When the matter came up for decision in the Sheriff
Court, the sheriff noted the "apparent inconsistency".4 However, lie was of the view
that the favour which the law shows to possession sufficiently accounted for the
relaxation in the case of pledge of the rule that loan must be provable by writ or
oath.3 The matter has been made academic by the Requirements of Writing
(Scotland) Act 1995, which abolished proof by writ or oath6
1. Bell, Principles, s 204; A G Walker and N VI L Walker. Law of Evidence, (1964), p 152; Hariot
v Cuningham (1791) Mor 12405; Walker v Scottish & Newcastle Breweries Ltd 1970 SLT (Sh
Ct) 21. "
2. Hariot v Cuningham (1791) Mor 12405.
3. Stair, 1V.43.4.
4. Niven v McArthur's Trs (1907) 23 Sh Ct Rep 299.
5.1hid.
6. Requirements ofWriting (Scotland) Act 1995. (c 7), s 11.
87. Private knowledge of a prior right. Due to an absence of case law on the
subject, it is not clear whether the doctrine of "offside goals" applies to pledge.1 To
give the paradigm case, if A agrees to pledge to B and then does the same with C
who is in bad faith and takes delivery, it is not clear whether B can reduce C's right.
However, the position is equally unclear if rather than pledging to C, A transferred
to him ownership of the property in question. In South Africa, the "offside goals"
rule, or the "doctrine of notice" as it is called there, does apply to pledge.2 It applies
in Sweden too.3
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Despite the lack of authority, it may be suggested with a reasonable level of
confidence that the rule will apply in the first example which has been outlined.
Undertaking to pledge to B and then pledging to C is very similar to agreeing to sell
to B and then selling to C. In that case of "double sale" the rights of IB and C are
incompatible and it is clear that the "offside goals" aile applies. The same
incompatability exists in the case of pledge so it is submitted the rule applies here
too.
The way in which Professor Reid's reformulation of the Scots law on "offside goals"
has gained acceptance by the courts would suggest that the rule applies in the
second situation given above, as well as in other similar cases.4 On this however we
cannot be so sure.
1. On this doctrine generally, see K G C Rcid, SME. vol 18, at paras 695-700.
2. See G Lubbc, LAWSA, vol 17, para 488; H S Silberberg and J Schoeman. The Law of Property,
(3rd ed, 1992). p 72; Wille's Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa, (3rd ed, ed T J Scott and
S Scott, 1987), pp 58-59; Coaton v Alexander (1879) 9 Buch 17.
3. B Helander in J G Sauveplannc (ed). Security over Corporeal Movables, (1974), at p 249, 252.
4. See Scotlifc Home Loans (No 2) Ltd v Mair 1994 SCLR 791, 795 per Sheriff Principal Maguire.
10. DELIVERY
88. General. The subject matter of the pledge must be delivered to the pledgee to
give him a real right in it.1 On this subject, Scots law has affixed itself to the original
principles of the Roman pignus.2 Anything resembling the later hypothecs, which as
we saw became assimilated with pignus, is not countenanced.3 Here is Stair :
"But our custom hath taken away express hypothecations, of all or a part of
the debtor's goods, without delivery . . . [so] that commerce may be the more
sure".4
The rule which demands possession for accomplishment of the real right has been
explained by Gloag and Irvine and subsequently repeated by others as a general rule
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embracing all security over moveable property.3 Sim explains the thesis the most
succinctly :
"The rule expressed in the maxim traditionibus, non nudis pactis, dominia
rcnim transferentur makes possession by the creditor a pre-condition for the
validity of his security right in a question with a competing purchaser for
value or a liquidator or trustee in sequestration."6
However, surely the thesis is misguided. The Latin maxim comes from the Codex of
Justinian and concerned transfer of dominium ie ownership.7 It had absolutely
nothing to do with the creation of security in Roman law. Now, of course, one can
correctly use it when referring to an cx facie absolute transfer of moveables which
will require delivery. But that is not because it is a method of creating a security, it
is because it involves transfer of ownership. Pre 1893 in Scotland the maxim applied
to every transfer of moveables. Then statute altered the position for sale, while
expressly providing that transfers in security were still to be governed by the
common law.,s All the cases where attempts were made to avoid delivery by using a
sham sale were simply attempts to avoid the general common law on transfer of
ownership.9 Casting them as attempts to avoid a specific principle of no security
without possession is misleading.
As for pledge, the demand for delivery comes from two specific sources and has
nothing to do with the brocard traditionibus, non nudis pactis, dominia rcrum
transfcrcntur. Firstly, as Stair says, it comes from custom, in other words Scots
common law.10 We saw that in the Middle Ages the royal courts were unwilling to
enforce pledges where there had been no delivery.11 As Bell wrote :
"In this country the common law very early declared itself against
conventional hypothecs. This repugnance may be traced back to the days of
Sir James Balfour (p 194) and even to the Regiam Majestatcm (lib 3, c 3)".12
The second source is the continental civilian systems which have also shunned
conventional hypothecs.13 When Stair wrote his Institutions in 1681, he must have
been aware that the non-possessory pledge had been rejected in early Scots law and
in civilian Europe. Commerce is indeed "the more sure" without the conventional
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hypothec, which has been almost completely rejected by our common law.'4
1. Bankton, 1.17.1; Bell, Principles, s 1364.
2. See above para 15.
3. See above para 18.
4. Stair, 1.13.14. See too, Bankton, 1.17.7; Erskine, 111.1.34; Bell. Principles, s 1385.
5. Gloag and Irvine, pp 188 ct seq. Disciples of this approach include Lillic in The Mercantile Law
of Scotland, (6th cd, 1970), p 88, and E A Marshall, Scots Mercantile Law. (2nd cd, 1992). para 7-
15.
6.KGC Reid, SME, vol 20, para 8.
7. C.2.3.20 (Diocletian, 293) ; Traditionibus ct usucapionibus dominia rerum mm nudis pactis
transferentur. Sec also D.50.17.54. See W M Gordon, "Roman Influence on the Scots Law of Real
Security", in R Evans-Jones (ed). The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, (1995), p 157, at p 170.
8. Sale of Goods Act 1893, (56 & 57 Vict c 71), ss 17. 18 and 61(4); now Sale of Goods Act 1979, (c
54), ss 17, 18 and 62 (4).
9. Sec Gloag and Irvine, pp 221-236.
10. Stair, 1.13.14.
11. Above, paras 24 and 36.
12. Bell, Commentaries, 11,25.
13. See Bell, Commentaries, 11,25; T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland,
(1962), pp 472-474. The need for delivery remains in these systems today. Sec, for example, the
BGB, art 1205 and the Civil Code of Spain, art 1863.
14. The exceptions being the (now obsolete) bonds of bottomry and respondentia. See Gloag and
Irvine, pp 297-302.
89. Types of delivery. The law recognises three categories of delivery ; actual,
constaictive and symbolical delivery. The traditional textbook treatment of
moveable security, after the recitation of traditionibus, non nudis pactis is to have a
general discussion of the three types, stating that they apply to the creation of any
form of moveable security at common law.1 This approach is open to question for
two reasons. Firstly, delivery is really a matter for general property law and not
security law in particular and therefore it should not take up the amount of space it
does in accounts of moveable security.2 Secondly, it ignores a leading case the ratio
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of which is that pledge may only be created by actual delivery.3 The approach taken
here will be to analyse the forms of delivery with specific reference to pledge.
1. See, for example. J Lillic, The Mercantile Law of Scotland, (6th ed, 1970), pp 88-89 and W M
Gloag and R C Henderson, An Introduction to the Law of Scotland, (10th cd, 1995), paras 19.11-
19.13. E A Marshall in her Scots Mercantile Law, (2nd ed, 1992), paras 7.80-7.92 purports to
discuss the three forms of delivery with specific regard to pledge. However, most of the cases cited
are not in fact true pledge cases and the treatment in reality is the same as that of Gloag and
Henderson and Lillic.
2. Admittedly, many of the cases involve attempts to create securities.
3. Hamilton v Western Bank ofScotland (1856) 19 D 152. See below, para 92.
90. Actual delivery. This is where the pledger has natural possession of the
property to be pledged and physically delivers it to the pledgee or his agent.1 Actual
delivery is also recognised to take place where the property is locked up and the
creditor is given the only key to the enclosure in which it is locked.2 The basic
concept of actual delivery is not difficult to grasp. However the case law has on
occasion conflicted.
In Johnston v Sprott,2 the owner and occupier of a mine was lent money by his
grieve. He agreed to pledge for this horses, machinery and implements at the mine.
However there was no outward change in the possession of these subjects and in the
words of the successful argument "for aught the lieges could discover Johnston [the
grieve] continued to possess as servant."4 The court in what Hume described as a
"wholesome judgment"5 thus held there was no valid pledge.
Contrast Moore v Glcddcn,6 There, a building contract provided that "all plant
brought or left on or near the site of the works contracted for should ... be held to
be the property of and belong to the [railway company]".7 The purpose of this
provision was to ensure that the contract was duly performed. The plant was duly
brought on to the company's property. It later came up for decision whether the
company had a valid security. It was held by seven judges (an eighth judge
dissenting) that a real right of pledge had been constituted in favour of the
company.8 This case is a problematic one and difficult to reconcile with Johnston.
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Although the plant was brought on to the company's ground the contractor continued
to use it to perform the contract. Although the difference with Johnston is that there
was no movement there at all, the truth is that the very nature of a contractor's job is
to take his plant around with them. His tools, machinery, wagons and so forth exist
for a specific purpose : they arc there to be taken to his jobs. Just because they are
situated at the site of his present job docs not mean he has ceased to possess them :
in the words of the dissenting judge, Lord Kinloch : "Possession of moveables is an
individual and personal, not a territorial thing.""
The two reasoned judgements of the majority place too much emphasis on the terms
of the building contract.10 They arc in reality giving effect, in Lord Kinloch's words
to a "paper possession"11 and when Lord Ncavcs states that "[pjaction cannot supply
the place of possession",12 it is difficult to be convinced that he puts this principle
into practice in his decision.
1. See A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 10.
2. West Lothian Oil Co Liquidator v Mair (1892) 20 R 64.
3.(1814) Hume 448.
4. [hid, p 450.
5. At 450.
6. (1869)7 M 1016.
7. At 1017.
8. Cf the modern English ease of Rc Cossictt Contractors Ltd [1996] 1 BCLC 407, where a
similarly worded contract was held to create an equitable charge. 1 am grateful to Mr W James
Wolffc for drawing this case to my attention.
9. At 1024.
10. See Lord Ncaves at 1021 and Lord Cowan at 1025-1026.
11. At 1024.
12. At 1021.
91. Other forms of delivery. These will be summarised here. Constructive delivery
is where the subject matter is not physically delivered. The main form is where the
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property is in the custody of a third party such as a warehouseman and the owner
intimates to the third party, usually via a delivery order, that it is now to be held on
behalf of his transferee.' It is essential that the custodier is informed; otherwise there
is no delivery.2
An examination of most textbook treatments of moveable security suggests that the
form of constructive delivery outlined is the only form.3. There arc in fact three
other forms. Traditio brcvi manu is where the property is already in the possession
of the would-be pledgee, for example under a contract of hire.4 Delivery is effected
by a change in his animus as to the nature of his detention. Traditio longa manu
involves possession being transferred by the pointing out of the property to the
transferee so he may deal with it at his pleasure.5 Constitutum possessorum is where
the transferor undertakes to detain the property on behalf of the transferee but retains
physical control of it throughout the transaction.6
Symbolical delivery is effected by the actual delivery of a thing which the law
regards as amounting to a symbol of the goods.7 For our purposes, it means the
transfer of a bill of lading.
1. W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, (10th ed, 1995), para 19.13: D L Carey
Miller. Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), para 11.07; W M Gordon, SME. vol 18. para
620.
2. Inglis v Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70.
3. For example, Gloag and Henderson, para 19.13.
4. W M Gordon, SME, vol 18, para 622; G Lubbe, LAWSA, vol 17, para 491.
5. Ibid.
6. W M Gordon, SME, vol 18, para 623; Milligan v Ross 1994 SCLR 430.
7. Gloag and Henderson, para 19.12; Carey Miller, paras 11.08-11.09; W M Gordon, SME, vol 18.
para 621.
92. The apparent monopoly of actual delivery. In Hamilton v Western Bank of
Scotland,' cases of brandy belonging to the debtor were in a warehouse. The bank
wished security over them. A delivery order for the cases was executed in favour of
the bank and delivered to it. Intimation was made to the storekeeper. The debtor
93
later became bankrupt. The bank sought to realise its security. There was a dispute
over whether it covered an additional loan made by the bank. In the Outer House,
Lord Handyside regarded the transaction as pledge so therefore the further advance
was not secured.2 After an amendment of the pleadings, the First Division held in
contrast that the transaction was one of ex facie absolute transfer and therefore that
the additional loan was secured.3
The principal reason behind the Inner House decision is given by the judges. It is
that pledge may only be constituted by actual delivery.4 Constructive delivery is not
allowed. Neither is symbolical delivery. These are only permitted for transfer of
ownership. The fact that the parties intended to pledge the property is irrelevant.
Given, as has already been stated, that delivery is a general property law notion
relevant to the creation of all real rights, this reasoning is jurally illogical. Hamilton
has therefore been subject to criticism over the years; beginning with Lord McLaren;
moving through Gloag and Irvine, and Graham Stewart; and up to the present day
with Rodger and Grctton.4 Rather than reiterating all their arguments here, an
attempt to express some fresh points will be made.
We begin with the justification of the decision, given by Lord President McNeill :
"By presenting the delivery order to the storekeepers . . . the defender
obtained what has not been unfrequcntly called constructive delivery . . . But
it is not a thing which has been recognised by any authority I know, as coming
in place of that custody, which is of the essence of the contract of pledge - the
value of which consists in having the custody without the property of the
goods. Nor is there in the dicta of our writers any encouragement to go farther
in that direction."5
Here is some authority which should have been drawn to his attention. Stair, in
writing about delivery says :
"yet utiliter and cquivalcntcr, possession lawfully attained by virtue of the
disposition, although not delivered by the disponcr, will be sufficient; as if the
disponer were not in possession himself, and so cannot deliver it; yet the
acquirer may recover it from the detainer".6
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Then he makes clear that this statement is not confined to transfer of ownership :
"Possession is requisite, not only to the conveyance of the property of moveable
goods, but also of . . . pledges".7 Stair clearly has no objection to pledge being
constituted by constructive delivery.
In terms of earlier case law, there is nothing to support Hamilton : in fact quite the
opposite. In Bogle v Dunmorc and Co< the court recognised that a bill of lading
represented possession and not title to goods. The clear implication is that the
pledge of such a document title is possible. In Colquhoun v Findlay, Doff and Co'
goods were in a warehouse. Their owner granted a delivery order in favour of his
creditor which was intimated to the storekeeper. It was held on the particular facts
in question that the nature of the transaction was an absolute transfer in security.
However, in the references made to pledge both by pursuer, defender and the court,
nowhere is it suggested that a pledge by constructive delivery was incompetent.
However the bluntest denial of the principle expressed in Hamilton comes in Auld v
Hall and Co.U) There, goods once more were in a warehouse. The owner purported
to sell them to a third party. However, no intimation was made to the storekeeper.
The owner became bankrupt. The sale was held invalid. Here is what Lord President
Hope had to say :
"This case, although new in some respects, must be determined according to
principles long established in law. Moveables cannot be effectually
transferred or pledged without delivery, if in the possession of the party
transferring or pledging, or if in the possession of a third party, without
intimation to the custodier."11
Although the comments on pledge are obiter they are unequivocal. The authority of
Hamilton is gravely weakened. This is particularly true, because Lord Deas, one of
the judges in Hamilton, in a later judgement expressly approved Lord President
Hope's statement.12 The conclusion is simply that Hamilton is not good law.




4. Bell, Commentaries, (7th ed, ed Lord McLaren. 1870), 11.21 (n 1); Gloag and Irvine, pp 256-257;
J Graham Stewart. The Law of Diligence, p 155 n 3; Lord Rodger. "Pledge of Bills of Lading in
Scots Law", 1971 JR 193: G L Gretton. "Pledge, Bills of Lading. Trusts and Property Law", 1990 JR
23.
5.(1856) 19 D 152, 159.
6. Stair. III.2.5. See D L Carey Miller in D L Carey Miller and D W Meyers (eds), Comparative and




9. 15 Nov 1816, FC.
10. 12 June 1811, FC.
11. Ibid.
12. In Wyper v Harveys (1861) 23 D 606, at 629-630.
93. Pledge by constructive delivery. It is submitted that pledge by intimation to a
third party custodier is competent under Scots law. As well as what has been said in
the preceding paragraph, reference may be made to the decision of the Whole Court
in Robertson & Baxter v Inglis.' There, an attempt was made to utilise the Factors
Acts to evade the requirement of intimation to the custodier which the common law
demands for constructive delivery.2 The case actually involved an assignation in
security. However the judges felt happy to discuss constructive delivery as regards
pledge.3 A number of them believed that the common law sanctioned pledge by
constructive delivery. Here is Lord Moncreiff :
"Pledge being a real right requires for its completion delivery of the goods
pledged or equivalents for delivery; and where the goods are in possession of
a third party, the mere transfer to the pledgee of a delivery-order or warrant is
not of itself sufficient, without intimation to the custodier to complete the
pledgee's right."4
Further, the judges who pronounced that actual delivery was a necessity seemed to
hide behind the case of Hamilton? Acceptance of delivery by intimation to a third
party custodier brings Scots law into line with other systems.6
96
It is suggested that pledge by traditio brcvi manu is also permissible. No authority
can be offered to support this conclusion, other than that which is comparative.'
However it seems illogical that where the intended pledgee already has possession,
for example under a contract of hire, that he must hand it back to its owner and then
have it redelivered to him to effect a valid pledge. A change in animus is surely
enough.
Pledge by either traditio longa manu or constitutum posscssorium both have very
doubtful validity. In each of these there is lacking the publicity which the law of
security generally demands to protect third parties. However, Professor Gordon for
one would not object to a pledge being created in these ways.8 The present writer
has yet to be convinced.
1.(1897) 24 R 758.
2. Factors Act 1889, (52 & 53 Victc45),ss 1(1). 3.
3. Basically, because the definition of pledge in the Factors Act is wider than the common law
meaning : 1889 Act, s 1(5).
4. At 817. See also Lord McLaren at 777 (Lord President and Lord Adam concurring). Lord Kinnear
at 780; Lord Stormonth Darling at 789.
5. See Lord Kincairney at 785.
6. See G Lubbe, LAWSA, vol 17, para 491; BGB, art 1205(2). Note too the American Law Institute,
Restatement of the Law of Security, (1941), s 8; Uniform Commercial Code, s 9-305. set out and
discussed in J J White and R S Summers. Uniform Commercial CcxJe, (4th cd, 1995), vol 4, para
31-12.
7. See Luhhe, ibid, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Security, (1941), s 7:
BGB, art 1205( 1); Civil Code of Louisiana, art 3152.
8. See his commentary to Milligan v Ross 1994 SCLR 430,435-436.
94. Pledge by symbolical delivery. The story of pledging bills of lading has been
well set out by Lord Rodger.1 It begins of course with Hamilton.2 Then comes the
unequivocal view of the House of Lords in an English case, Scwell v Burdick that a
bill of lading symbolises the possession of goods and not title thereto.3 Possession
and title may coincide but they do not have to. Consequently, bills of lading may be
validly pledged in English law.
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The most important Scottish development is the case of North Western Bank v
Poyntcr, Sons and Macdonaldsd There, an importer had expressly agreed to pledge
a bill of lading to his bank. It was duly delivered, but later handed back so that the
merchant could sell the goods on the bank's behalf the bank having a power of sale
under the contract of pledge. After an arrestment of the price of the goods, there was
a dispute as to whether the right of pledge had been lost by redelivery to the pledger.
Now if Hamilton was to be followed the court would have dismissed all the
arguments based on pledge, for there was no actual delivery of the goods. However,
in both the Court of Session and the House of Lords there was no reference to
Hamilton. The judges were happy to treat the transaction as one of pledge and on
the facts held that the real right had not been lost by redelivery. Consequently,
Poynter sub silcntio overrules HamiltonP
However in a later case, Hayman v McLintockP Hamilton was once again upheld as
governing the situation where pledge is attempted of a bill of lading. The
judgements in Hayman upon the matter are difficult to comprehend and the decision
has been cogently attacked by Professor Grctton.7
One further argument has produced itself since Professor Gretton wrote. In England,
one result of Scwcll was to hold that a pledgee of a bill of lading did not have the
statutory rights that one having dominium had through his detention of the same.
This was felt to be unsatisfactory and the law was amended by the Carriage of
Goods By Sea Act 1992.8 The relevant provisions therein apply to Scotland also.
This means that Parliament must regard a pledge of a bill of lading in Scotland as
valid, for if Hamilton was still good law there would be no need for these provisions
to apply north of the border.
1. Lord Rodger, "Pledge of Bills of Lading in Scots Law" 1971 JR 193.
2.(1856) 19 D 152.
3.(1884) LR 10 App Cas74.
4. (1894) 22 R (HL) 1.
5. See Rodger and G L Gretton. "Pledge. Bills of Lading, Trusts and Property Law" 1990 JR 23, at p
31. Pledging of bills of lading is competent in other jurisdictions. See. for example. Lubbe, LAWSA.
vol 17, para 419 and the Civil Code of Quebec, art 2708.
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6. 1907 SC 936.
7. Grctton, op cit n 5, at p 25.
8. Carriage of Goods By Sea Act 1992 (c 50), s 2.
95. Limitation of Hamilton by the Factors Acts. By the Factors Act 1889 a
mercantile agent may validly pledge goods in his possession.' It is further provided
that : "A pledge of the documents of titles to goods shall be deemed to be a pledge
of the goods."2 "Document of title" includes any bill of lading, dock warrant,
warehouse-keeper's certificate, and warrant or order for the delivery of goods.3 The
natural reading of these provisions is that when it comes to a mercantile agent
Hamilton has no application. Also seemingly irrelevant are the normal rules on
constructive delivery. In Robertson & Baxter and Inglisi the Whole Court employed
all manner of means to avoid this conclusion. The House of Lords got round the
problem by stating that on the facts the provisions did not apply, as the purported
pledge was by the owner of the goods and not a mercantile agent.3. However the
Lord Chancellor seemed willing to read the provisions literally were the right factual
situation to come upT At any rate, these provisions impinge upon Hamilton.
1. Factors Act 1889 (c 45), s 2.
2. Ibid, s 3.
3. Ibid, s 1(4).
4.(1897) 24 R 758.
5. Inglis v Robertson & Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70. The case actually involved an assignation;
however the definition of pledge in the 1889 Act s 1(5) includes this.
6. At 71. See A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 18.
11. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PARTIES
96. Redemption. The basic right of the pledger is to have the pledged property
returned to him upon his discharge of the obligation secured. The basic duty of the
pledgee is to effect that return.1 This much is self-explanatory and appreciated from
the earliest days of our law.2
99
The pledgee must restore the subject matter of the pledge in pristine condition,
subject to normal wear and tear.-' In Lord Duncdin's words : "who ever heard of a
person who had a pledge being allowed to give that pledge back again in a different
condition from that in which he got it ?"4 Unless there is an agreement providing
otherwise, the pledgee must return the property which was actually pledged and not
some equivalent article.5
1. Erskine, III. 1.33; Bell, Principles, s 206. See D.44.7.1.6; BOB. art 1223; Spanish Civil Code, art
1871; G Lubbe, LA tV5.4. vol 17, para 494.
2. Douglas v Mcnzcis (1569) Balfour 196.
3. W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11, para 767; A J Sim, SME, vol 20. para 24.
4. Johnston v Irons 1909 SC 305, 317.
5. Op cit n 3; Crcrar v Bank of Scotland 1921 SC 736, 1922 SC (HL) 137. (The ease actually
involves an assignation of shares. However, it illustrates a general principle).
97. Use of the property. It is an important question whether the pledgee may make
use of the pledged property. From the earliest days, when people were the subjects
of pledge, the answer has been in the negative. Pufendorf tells us that in the
kingdom of Pegu wives and children might be pledged.1 However if the pledgee
slept with a pledged wife or daughter, the loan was forfeited and the wife or
daughter had to be returned. He docs not tell us what happened if the pledgee
interfered with a son.
In Roman law, making use of a pledged subject was clearly prohibited.2 Ulpian
writes that where a slave girl has been pledged and the pledgee puts her to
prostitution or engages her in some other disreputable conduct, the pignus of her is
discharged on the spot.3 In fact usage of the subject matter of a pledge in Roman law
amounted to theft.4 The early Scots law did not have such a severe rule. It was
simply a rule that the pledgee :
"may on na wayis use nor handle the samin, quhairby it may be maid worse
then it was the time that it was gcvin him in wad".3
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Hence usage was permitted if it was clear that the pledged property would remain in
its pristine condition. And of course by that time it was clear that people could not
be pledged in the same manner as inanimate objects.
With the Reception of Roman law into Scotland the prohibition on use here became
an absolute one.6 However, the pledgee in breach of this rule is not regarded as
being a thief. Further and importantly, the right of pledge is not extinguished by the
pledgee using the property.7 Instead he is liable in damages. The quantum is the cost
to hire the property for the period it was used.8 Therefore it would seem that the
theoretical basis of the claim is recompense for unauthorised use, the pledgee being
liable in quantum lucratus.g
There is a general problem here. In the words of Lord Stott, the net effect of the rale
is "to give carte blanche to the pledgee to enjoy the use of items deposited with him
as security . . . subject only to . . . some sort of post factum accounting to the
owner."10 The view is reinforced by the conclusion of the sheriff in Kirkwood and
Pattison v Brown.11 He held that where a horse was pledged to coal merchants it
might be used to do work for the firm, provided that the value of the service
performed was paid to the pledger. However, Lord Stott would seem to have
overlooked the fact that under the traditional rule, the pledger would be able to get
an interdict against the pledgee if he wished to stop the use. Therefore, the correct
decision in Kirkwood should have been a reassertion of the absolute prohibition,
followed by an observation that no interlocutory action had been taken and then as
before an award of the relevant hire cost to the pledger.
An exception to the general rule is admitted where use is necessary to maintain the
value of the pledged property.12 The cardinal example is the impignorated animal. A
horse which is not exercised will become very unhealthy. However the level of use
must be no more than is required for this purpose. Deploying the animal to deliver
coal as in Kirkwood is not permissible. Nor is riding the horse in the 3.20 at
Musselburgh. At the other extreme there is obiter authority to the effect that if a
pledged horse is not exercised the pledgee will be liable to the pledger in damages
for the deterioration in the animal's health caused thereby.13
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There is nothing to stop the pledger and pledgee agreeing that the latter is allowed to
use the pledged property. Such an arrangement is termed a pactum antichresis and
was common in Roman law.14 The perceived benefit gained by the pledgee is
normally set off against interest due on the debt. Further any surplus could be agreed
to be set off against the principal sum. The case of Moore v Glcddcn13 would appear
to be an example of an antichretic pledge. Plant was pledged by a contractor to a
railway company. However the contractor continued to use the plant. He could only
do this as the company's agent, hence the pledge was antichretic.
On the matter of the use of pledged property, South African law and most civilian
systems take the same approach as we do.ih However. English and Scots law part
company due to the civilianism of the latter. The English rules were set out by Chief
Justice Holt in the landmark decision of Coggs v Bernard.17 The principal one is that
the pledgee may use the property if it will not be the worse for it. Therefore,
jewellery may be used but clothes may not.lx A second rule is that if the pledgee
must incur cost in respect of the upkeep of the property, then he has a specific right
to use it in recompense for this. For example, horses require to be fed and a pledgee
will expend money in doing this. In return he may ride the horse. The difference
between the English and Scots law can be seen; it is unfortunate that Gloag and
Irvine adopt the wrong set of ailes.19
1. S Pufendorf, Dc Jure Naturae et Gentium, V.10.13.
2. Thomas, p 330.
3. D. 13.7.24.3.
4. D.47.2.55.pr.
5. Balfour, Practicks, p 195.
6. Bell, Principles, s 206.
7. Hume, Lectures, IV.2-3; Wolifson v Harrison 1977 SC 384.
8. Hume, ibid.
9.WM Gloag, Contract, (2nd cd. 1929). p 329.
10. Wolifson v Harrison 1977 SC 384, 392.
11.(1877) 1 GuthShCas 395.
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12. Hume, op tit, n 7.
13. Kirkwoodand Pattison v Brown (1877) 1 Guth Sh Cas 395. 397 per Sheriff Fraser.
14. Bankton, 1.17.3. Indeed, there might have been such an arrangement implied in KirkwocxJ. for a
harness was handed to the pledgee along with the horse.
15. (1869) 7 M 1016.
16. G Lubbe, LAWSA, vol 17, para 494; BGB, art 1213(1); Civil Code of Spain, art 1870; Civil
Code of Quebec, art 2736; Civil Code of Louisiana, art 3166. The American Law Institute,
Restatement of the Law ofSecurity, (1941), s 22 also prohibits use without the authorisation of the
pledger.
17. (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER 107. See also Anon (1693) 2 Salk 522; G W Paton, Bailment, pp
369-370.
18. Ibid.
19. Gloag and Irvine, p 213; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 24.
98. Fruits. In general the pledgee is not entitled to appropriate the fruits of the
pledged item for his own use.1 An exception is admitted in the case of fruits which
require to be extracted for the welfare of the property.2 Cattle must be milked to
keep them healthy. Similarly sheep require to be shorn every so often. The rule is
that the pledgee may keep such natural fruits unless there is an agreement to the
contrary. They are set off against the debt owed by the pledger. A similar ailc
applies in England.3 According to Hume they may be set off either against the cost
incurred in caring for the animal or the actual debt itself.4 It is submitted, however,
that the best way to set them off is firstly against the expenses incurred by the
pledgee, secondly against any interest due and then thirdly against the principal
debt.3 It is possible to have a conventional pactum antichresis in respect of the
fruits.6 These were common in Roman practice.'
1. Bankton, 1.17.3; Hume, Lectures, IV,2-4. See also the BGB, art 1213(1) and the Civil Code of
Louisiana, art 3168.
2. Hume, Lectures, IV,2-4. See too the BGB, art 1213(2).
3. Mores v Conham (1610) Owen 123; 74 ER 946; Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER
107.
4. Hume, op tit n 2, at p 4; Bell, Principles, s 1364.




99. Expense of looking after pledged property. The pledgee is entitled to
compensation in respect of money laid out upon the care of the pledged subject.1 As
has been seen, there are special rules governing where the property produces natural
fruits, so that these are set off against the cost of care.2 Erskinc, however, appears to
express the general rule more widely than just has been stated :
"The creditor is entitled to an action against the debtor for the recovery of the
expenses which he has disbursed profitably on the subject while in his
hands."3
A similar passage appears in Mackenzie's Institutions.4 The literal meaning - namely
that the cost of improvements is recoverable - is very difficult to reconcile with a
rule of unjustified enrichment, in particular recompense. That is that only bona fide
possessors are entitled to compensation for improvements.5 Grotius is certainly clear
that in Roman-Dutch law the pledgee can only recover necessary expenses.*1 This
appears to be the rule in most systems.7
1. Erskine, III. 1.33. The rule comes from Roman law : see D.13.7.8pr and R Zimmcrmann. The Law
ofObligations, (1990), p 227.
2. Sec the preceding paragraph.
3. Erskine, 111.1.33.
4. Sir G Mackenzie, Institutions of the Law ofScotland, III. 1.
5. Sec W M Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed, 1929), p 324.
6. Grotius, Inlcidinge, III.8.7. See too G Lubbe, LAWSA, para 494.
7. Sec the BGB, art 1216; Civil Code of Spain, art 1867; Civil Code of Quebec, art 2740. In terms of
the Civil Code of Louisiana, art 3167, however, the pledgee may recover "useful and necessary
expenses" made for the preservation of the property. The American Law Institute, Restatement of
the Law ofSecurity, (1941). s 25 allows recovery of "reasonable expenses".
100. Duty of care of pledgee. The ownership of the impignoratcd property
remains with the pledger. Consequently, the risk remains with him as well.1 Thus if
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the pledged sheep get struck by lightning and are killed, the pledger must suffer the
loss while remaining liable upon the obligation for which they were pledged as
security. However, the pledgee is expected to exercise a certain level of care in
respect of the property and if he fails in his duty he will become liable for the loss.2
In a very early case, we get an idea of the standard care which the pledgee must
exercise :
"Gif ony man Icndis to ane uther ane sowme of money, and ressavis a wad
thairfoir, to be kept be him, until his money be rcstorit to him, and it happin
the samin wad to be stollin be theivis, robberis or brigantis, or to be tint and
lost, be ony chance, force or violence, without any fault or negligence of the
keipar, to the quhik he could not resist, he sould not be compellit or haldin to
mak restitutioun thairof; and zit nevertheless he hes gude actioun for
repctitioun of his money, for the quhilk the samin pledge was gevin."3
The Reception of Roman law saw the adoption of the civilian rules on the matter,4
but in essence there is no real difference. Stair, wrote that the pledgee must exercise
such diligence as prudent men used in their affairs.5 The pledgee was not strictly
liable. By Bell's time, this had come to be expressed simply that the pledgee must
bestow ordinary care.9 In the only modern case on the matter a pledged watch had
been stolen from a pawnbroker's locked safe by a housebreaker.7 The pledger sought
to recover his loss from the broker. However it was held that having placed the
watch in the safe the broker could neither be regarded as negligent nor at fault and
he was therefore not liable to the pawnor.
In England, Coke wrote that the pledgee "ought to keepe [the pledged property] no
otherwise than his owne".8 This mortified Sir William Jones, for of course wc all
look after our own property to greater or lesser extents than others.9 He seems to
suggest that theft of the property, as opposed to robbery, indicates a lack of care in
the pledgee.10 However this will probably depend on the facts in question, as Chief
Justice Holt's opinion in Coggs v Bernard11 that the pledgee must exercise ordinary
care is accepted as being a correct statement of the law.12 Like Scots law, the root of
this is the law of Rome.
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In English law, the pledgee becomes strictly liable if he retains the property after
payment for the debt is tendered.13 There is analogous Scottish authority for the
second of these propositions in a case involving poinding of sheep.14
1. Bell, Principles, s 206; Hume, Lectures, IV,4.
2. Elliot e Conway (1915)31 Sh Ct Rep 79.
3. Foulis v Cogncrlic (1566) Balfour 195.
4. On the Roman law, sec R Zimmermann, The Law ofObligations, (1990), pp 225-227.
5. Stair, 1.13.12. See also Erskine, 111.1.33. In Spain today, the pledgee must exercise "the diligence
of a prudent adminstrator": Civil Code of Spain, art 1867.
6. Bell. Principles, s 206. The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Security,
(1941), s 17, imposes a "duty of reasonable care". Cf the BGB, art 1215.
7. Elliot v Conway (1915) 31 Sh Ct Rep 79.
8. Coke, Institutes, 1,89a.
9. Sir William Jones, An Essay on the Law ofBailments, p 75.
10. Ibid, pp 75-83; G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952). p 360.
11. (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER 107.
12. N E Palmer, Bailment, ( 2nd ed, 1991), p 1405.
13. Coggs v Bernard, op cit, n 10.
14. Frascr v Smith (1899) 1 F 487.
12. MAINTAINING POSSESSION
101. General. The real right which the pledgee enjoys in the pledged property
depends on his continuing possession.1 The rationale is that third parties should be
given notice that the property is burdened by a security : mobilia non habent
scquclam cx causa hypothccac? Thus if the pledgee gives the impignorated object
away to a third party his real right is extinguished.3 The same thing generally
happens if lie returns it to the pledgor.4 However, the law has admitted some very
limited exceptions, where a pledgee who has been in natural possession is permitted
to maintain possession civilly through another.
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1. Erskine, III.1.33; Bell, Commentaries, 11.22; Bell. Principles, ss 205 and 1364; Hume, Lectures,
IV,3; Hunter v Slack (I860) 22 D 1166; Tcxi and Son v Merchant Banking Co (1883) 10 R 1009.
2. Ibid, Bankton, 1.3.
3. Wolifson v Harrison 1977 SC 384.
4. See authorities cited in n 1 and W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11, para 771.
102. Release for necessary operations. The law allows the pledgee temporarily to
release the subject of the pledge where it requires to be repaired.1 Civil possession
through the repairer is sufficient here to maintain the real right of pledge.
I. Bell, Commentaries, 11,22. See too G Lubhe, LAWSA, vol 17, para 499 and the Civil Code of
Quebec, art 2704 and the American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law of Security. (1941). s
II.
103. Redelivery to pledger for purpose of sale. It would seem that where the
pledgee is invested with a power of sale, he may return the pledged property to the
pledger to act as his agent in carrying out that sale. The authority for this proposition
is the decision of the House of Lords in North Western Bank v Poyntcr, Sons and
Macdonalds.' There, an importer had been advanced money by the bank. In return
he agreed to pledge bills of lading to it. These were duly delivered. Eight days later
the bills were returned to the importer with the instruction that he was to sell the
goods which they represented on the bank's behalf. The importer then sold the goods
for which he received part-payment. A third party then arrested the balance in the
buyer's hands. It was held, by the House of Lords, reversing the Second Division
that by giving up possession of the bills in this manner the bank had retained its
right of pledge and was therefore preferred to the arrester.2
A number of points must be made. Firstly, the court states that the laws of Scotland
and England are the same upon the matter and certainly there is later English
authority following it.3 Secondly, the court is keen to help commerce. The Lord
Chancellor, referring to the Inner House judges' opinion that a pledged object may
not be returned for any purpose to the pledger without the right of pledge being
extinguished says :
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"If the mle exists, it is one which nins counter to cvcry-day commercial
practice, and 1 am satisfied, to cvcry-day commercial understanding of
business transactions."4
Thirdly, on the basis of Hamilton v Western Bank,3 the case is not one of pledge at
all. This is certainly Professor Gow's opinion.6 However, for reasons advanced
elsewhere as well as the express references to pledge which pervaded the Court of
Session and House of Lords judgements this argument may be dismissed.
Fourthly, an important point is the exact manner in which the bills of lading were
returned to the importer. They were redelivered under what has since become
known as a trust receipt.8 In it the bank stated : "we transfer to you as trustees for us
the bills of lading".9 The natural interpretation of this, as Professor Gretton points
out, is that the case is in reality one of commercial trust.10 Upon redelivery the
pledge is extinguished. However the pledger holds the property and its proceeds
upon sale in trust for the former pledgee. On the wording of the documentation in
Poynter this approach has its attractions. However, it runs contrary to the language
of the House of Lords, as well as a large mass of later English authority." Given the
fact that the law of England and Scotland is said to be the same on this matter the
latter is very persuasive.12 Here is Ellingcr:
"The trust receipt enables the bank to retain an adequate security against the
customer's insolvency. The release of the bill of lading to him . . . does not
destroy the pledge. . . The bank is, futher, protected in respect of the proceeds.
If the customer fails after the sale of the goods, the bank has priority over the
amount realised."13
The view that the pledge remains constituted over the goods and then a trust
attaches over the proceeds must be accepted as an accurate statement of the law.
However, there is the difficulty here that the trust is a truster-trustee trust and the
use of such trusts was not finally approved by the House of Lords till three quarters
of a century after Poynter,14 Incidentally, this problem applies a fortiori to Professor
Gretton's interpretation of the case, where both the goods and the proceeds would be
held under such a trust. There is the further difficulty that the trust is a commercial
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one and that on other occasions the courts have frowned upon such quasi-
sccuritics.'3
The problem with the commercial trust is that it allows security without publicity. It
is Poyntcr's acquiescncc with this state of affairs which concerns Lord Rodger the
most.16 The main practical difficulty is that the pledger might rcpledge the goods to
a bona fide third party. When the matter came up in England, the Factors Acts were
used by the courts to protect the third party, leaving the pledgee to bear the loss.1'
The advice to the pledgee in the light of this is to get the pledger to store the goods
in a warehouse under the pledgee's name so that his permission is required before
any transaction is carried out.18
Despite its policy objections the trust receipt has become too entrenched into
banking practice for Poynter to be overruled. Even in Louisiana a similar rule
applies.16 The best way forward would appear to be that suggested by Professor
Diamond. Pledges should require to be registered where the secured party ceases to
have possession for whatever purpose, however temporary.2"
1.(1894) 22 R (HL) 1.
2. The Inner House judgement is reported at (1894) 21 R 515. See generally, Lord Rodger. "Pledge
of Bills of Lading in Scots Law" 1971 JR 193.
3. Per the Lord Chancellor (Herschell) at 6 and Lord Watson at 12.
4. At 7-8.
5. (1856) 19 D 152. See above, para 92.
6. J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland. (1964), p 278, n 68. The view is
shared by Lord Maxwell in Wolifson v Harrison 1974 SLT (Notes) 55, 56-57.
7. Above, paras 92-94.
8. See G L Grctton, "Pledge, Bills of Lading, Trusts and Property Law", 1990 JR 23, 31-32; Chitty
on Contracts. (27th ed, 1994), vol 2, paras 33.400-33.402.
9.(1894) 22 R (HL) 1. at 5.
10. Gretton. ibid, at 32-33.
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11. Re David Allester Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 211; Llovds Bank Ltd v Bank of America National Trust
and Savings Association [1938] 2 KB 147: G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), p
357; Chitty, para 33.400; Paget's Law ofBanking, (11th cd, 1996), pp 563-564.
12. Op cit, n 3.
13. E P Ellinger, Mcxlern Banking Law, (1987), pp 572-573. Sec also L D Crerar, The Law of
Banking in Scotland, (1997), p 279.
14. Allan's Trs v Lord Advocate 1971 SC (HL) 45.
15. In particular in Clark Taylor & Co v Quality Site Development (Edinburgh) Ltd 1981 SLT
308. See generally G L Grctton, "Using Trusts as Commercial Securities" 1988 JLSS 53.
16. RcxJger, op cit at 207ff.
17. Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association [1938] 2 KB
147.
18. Ellinger, p 573.
19. See R Slovenko, "Of Pledge", (1958) 33 Tul LR 59, at pp 75-87 and V S Meincrs, "Formal
Requirements of Pledge under Louisiana Civil Code Article 3158 and Related Articles" (1987) 48 La
LR 129, 138.
20. Review ofSecurity Interests in Property, (DTI, 1989), para 11.5.7.
13. THE REAL RIGHT : ENFORCEMENT AND EXTINCTION
104. General. A pledgee has a real right in the moveable property which is the
subject matter of the pledge.1 The debtor retains ownership of the property.2 The
pledgee's subordinate real right covers the entire property pledged including its
fruits.3 Pledge is a type of real right in security and as such the pledgee is entitled to
enforce his right in the thing pledged against the world. If the pledger transfers his
title to the property, the right of pledge remains good against the singular successor.4
Further, in the event of the pledger's insolvency the pledge will be remain good as
against the trustee in sequestration or liquidator.5 A pledge will be good against a
receiver if the real right was constituted before the creation of the floating charge.6 If
created after that but before receivership its effect will be governed by the document
creating the floating charge.7 Insolvency processes apart, the real right of pledge will
be effective against any diligence executed posterior to its creation,8 in particular a
poinding or an arrestment.
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The pledgee has possession of the property and consequently he will have a good
action against anyone who wrongfully dispossesses him during the currency of this
right.4 It is suggested that this claim will he based upon spuilzie."1
In England it is said that the pledgee has a "special property",11 or at least a "special
interest"12 in the pledged property. According to Gloag and Irvine, the first of these
phrases, "though unknown to Scotch law, would appear conveniently to represent
the right, more than possession, though less than property, with which the pledgee is
invested in Scotland."13 This statement shows the malaise which Scots property law
was in at the time. It is submitted that the term real right is eminently preferable to
that which the learned authors suggest.
1. Stair, 1.13.11.
2. Bankton, 1.17.1; Erskinc, III.1.33; Bell, Principles, s 1364. It is therefore not a good idea to
define pledge as being the situation where property is "transferred in security", although the transfer
contemplated is that of possession. D M Walker, Principles of the Law of Scotland, (4th cd, 19.39),
vol III, p 394 is culpable of this.
3. D.20.1.13.pr; J Story, Bailments, (1829), s 292; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law
of Security, (1941), s 3. There is analogous Scottish authority concerning the landlord's hypothec ;
Lamb v Grant (1874) 11 SLR 672.
4. Hume, Lectures, IV,4; Moore v Glcddcn (1869) 7 M 1016.
5. H Goudy, Bankruptcy, (3rd ed, 1903), pp 573-575; Hamilton v Western Bank! 1856) 19 D 152.
6. Insolvency Act 1986 (c 65). s 60( l)(a).
7. See Companies Act 1985 (c 6), s 464.
8. Bridges v Ewingt 1836) 15 S 8; North Western Bank v Poynter( 1894) 22 R (HL) 1.
9. Hume, Lectures, IV,4.
10. On which sec K G C Reid, SME, vol 18, paras 161-166 and D L Carey Miller, Corporeal
Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), paras 10.23-10.28.
11. Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585.
12. The Odessa [ 1916] 1 AC 145, per Lord Mersey at 158-159.
13. Gloag and Irvine, p 200.
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105. Enforcing the real right. If the pledger fails to discharge the obligation which
the pledge secures, or if lie becomes insolvent, the pledgee may enforce his
security.1 In the later Roman law, the pledgee had an automatic right to sell the
subject matter of the pledge, unless this was excluded by the contract of pledge.2
However, this rule did not find its way into our law. Here is Stair :
"Our custom allows not the creditor to sell the pledge, but he may poind it, or
assign his debt, and cause arrest it in his hand, and pursue to make
forthcoming."3
The "custom" which does not admit a right to sale in the pledgee is surely Anglo
Norman custom, though it apparently recognised forfeiture as the remedy which the
court would award.4 However, the pledge of Stair's time is clearly a collateral
security and the remedy is diligence. This remedy remained in use in the days of
Bankton and Erskine, although it was becoming less popular.3 In particular if the
pledgee chooses to assign the debt to a trustee whom he then gets to arrest the
property in his hands, as Erskinc points out, he ains the risk that another creditor of
the pledger has executed a prior arrestment.'' Such an arrestment will prevail, as the
pledge has been extinguished due to the property not being in the possession of the
owner of the debt.
Instead, by Bankton and Erskine's time the preferred remedy was to apply to the
judge-ordinary ic the sheriff for permission to have the property sold at a public sale
or roup.7 The debtor had to be made a party to the sale. This procedure was still
going on in Hume's time, by which point the alternative route of executing diligence
had become unknown in practice.8 Bell, in discussing the pledgee's remedies, simply
writes that a summary application to the sheriff to sell the property must be made.1'
This remains the law today.10 Obviously if the sale raises more than the debt due,
the surplus is paid to the pledger. Conversely if the whole debt is not discharged by
it, the pledgee retains a personal right against the pledger in respect of the
shortfall.11 The title obtained by the buyer at the sale is derivative and not original.12
1. Bell. Principles, s 203.
2. See Erskinc, III. 1.33: R Zimmermann, The Law ofObligations, (1990), pp 224-225.
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3. Stair, 1.13.11.
4. Sec above, para 26.
5. Bankton, 1.17.4: Erskine, III.1.33.
6. Erskinc, ibid.
7. Op cit, n 5.
8. Hume, Lectures, IV,5.
9. Bell. Principles, s 207.
10. Sec. for example, W A Wilson, Debt, (2nd ed, 1991), p 92 and D L Carey Miller. Corporeal
Moveables in Scots Law, (1991). para 11.13. In Industrial and General Trust (1890) 27 SLR 991,
however, application was made to the Court of Session.
11. Elliot v Conway (1915) 31 Sh Ct Rep 79.
12. Hislop v Anderson (1919) 35 Sh Ct Rep 116.
106. Express power of sale. It is possible for the parties to the contract of pledge to
agree that in the event of the pledger's default the pledgee will have power to sell the
property without obtaining judicial authority.1 As Lord Ncaves says :
"Impignoration, with a power of sale, is an intelligible and well-known
contract."2
The technical name for this arrangement is parata cxecutio? The theoretical basis of
the agreement must be that the pledgee sells as the pledger's agent, for otherwise the
rule nemo plus would apply. Where the pledgee is indeed given such an express
power of sale, he must give the pledger a specific opportunity to discharge the
secured obligation before he goes ahead and exercises his right.4
By statute, the right to sale without judicial authority is conferred upon licensed
pawnbrokers if the pawn is not redeemed after six months.5 The pawner must be
given a fortnight's notice of the broker's intention to sell unless the advance was less
than £50. Within 21 working days after the sale, the pawner must be furnished with
information as to the sale, its proceeds and expenses. If the pawnbroker is
challenged, the onus is on him to prove that he used reasonable care to ensure that
the true market value was obtained and that the expenses of the sale were
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reasonable.6 There is Sheriff Court authority holding that a pawnbroker upon sale
does not warrant title but merely that the property is the subject matter of an
irredeemable pledge and that he was not aware of any defect in title at the time of
the sale.' This conflicts with the Sale of Goods Act and is surely wrong.x
1. See for example, North Western Bank v Poyntcr (1894) 22 R (HL) 1; Gloag and Irvine, p 213
and D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), para 11.13.
2. Moore v Gledden (1869) 7 M 1016, 1020. Cf W M Gordon, "Roman Influence on the Scots Law
of Real Security", in R Evans-Jones (ed). The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland. (1995). p 157, at pp
168-169.
3. See G Lubbe, LA WSA. vol 17, para 497.
4. Murray ofPhiliphauch v Cuninghame (1668) 1 BS 575.
5. Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c 39), s 121; Consumer Credit (Realisation of Pawn) Regulations 1983
(SI 1983 No 1568).
6. Ibid.
7. Hislop v Anderson (1919) 35 Sh Ct Rep 116.
8. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54) s 12 (warranty of title). At the time of Hislop the relevant statute
was the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (c 71).
107. Comparative authority. In South Africa, the remedy at common law for the
pledgee remains that of levying execution, that is executing diligence.1 However, the
parties may agree that the pledgee will have a power of sale.2 In this case the
property must be sold to the highest bidder at a public auction.
Under English law, a pledgee has an implied power of sale.3 If the pledge secures a
term loan, then the property may be sold on default at the term.4 If the loan is one
repayable on demand then the pledgee must give notice to the pledger that he is
about to sell.5 Ireland has similar rules.6
In Germany, the pledgee does not require judicial authority to sell the pledged
property. However, the BGB lays down specific ailcs about how such a sale must be
carried out.' In particular, there must be a public auction of which the pledger is
given notice.8 Analogous rules apply in Holland, where the pledgee must get
permission from the president of the district court if he intends to do anything other
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than sell at a public auction.4 In France, a distinction is made between the civil
pledge (gage civil) and the commercial pledge (gage commercial).10 In the latter, as
the name suggests, the parties involved arc transacting in the course of a business
and the pledgee is legally authorised to sell. With the civil pledge, the pledgee needs
to go to court to obtain the same right. In Spain, the pledgee may sell the property
under the supervision of a notary public."
Given that so many of these countries give the pledgee an inherent power of sale
one could be tempted into suggesting that Scots law goes down the same road.
However, with the pawnbroking provisions and the fact that a right of sale is in
practice universally stipulated for in commercial transactions, such a legislative
move would not be worth the effort.
1. G Lubbc, LA tVSVt, vol 17, para 497.
2. Ibid, para 495.
3. Pothonicr v Dawson (1816) Holt NP 383; The Odessa [1919] AC 145 at 159 per Lord Mersey.
4. Re Morritt, ex parte Official Receiver (1886) 18 QBD 222.
5. Martin v Rcid( 1862) 11 CBNS 730; 142 ER 982. See generally, N E Palmer. Bailment, (2nd cd.
1991),pp 1410-1412.
6. M G Diekson, W Roscner and P M Storm (cds), Security on Movable Property and Receivables
in Europe, (1988), pp 80-81.
7. BGB, arts 1233-1245.
8. Ibid, arts 1235-1237.
9. W M Kleijn. J P Jordaans, H B Krans, H D Ploeger and F A Steketce in J Chorus (ed).
Introduction to Dutch Law. (2nd cd. 1993), p 86.
10. Dickson, Roscner and Storm, pp 38-41.
11. Civil Code of Spain, art 1872.
108. Forfeiture of pledged property. As we have seen, in its earliest days pledge
was not a collateral security but one in which the property subject to the security
was forfeited to the creditor if the obligation secured was not discharged.1 This
indeed was the case in early Roman law.2 However, in later times it became the law
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that there was no forfeiture unless there was an express agreement to that effect.
Such an agreement was termed a pactum legis commissoriac. Later still, the
Emperor Constantino prohibited such an arrangement.3 Notwithstanding this, the
Anglo Norman law hundreds of years later still regarded forfeiture as the principal
pledge remedy.4
By Stair's time things had changed. An express clause was required. He states that
the rules governing the treatment of pactum legis commissoriac arc the same for
pledges and wadsets.3 This glosses over the fact that with wadset the debtor only has
a reversionary right whereas a pledger has ownership. Leaving this aside for now,
the rule is that a forfeiture clause is not effective unless there is a court declarator
giving it effect.6 The courts will do everything in their power to let the debtor purge
the clause. In Erskine's words :
"The pactum legis commissoriac in moveable pledges has no stronger effects
than in wadsets of land . . . and the same equity of redemption is indulged to
the debtor in both eases."7
Hume states the Rile in similar, but less anglicised terms.* There arc some dicta in a
couple of nineteenth century cases in broad agreement with the institutional writers.
However, little attention has been given to the subject since then.4
Gloag writes simply that a court would not enforce a forfeiture clause.10 He admits
that he can only rely on heritable security cases to support this statement, but argues
that the principle on which those cases were decided, that is that a forfeiture clause
is oppressive, applies equally to pledge. This seems fair. The effective rejection of
forfeiture by Scots law matches the position in a number of other systems.11
In one limited situation the legislature docs sanction forfeiture. Where property has
been pledged to a licensed pawnbroker for less than £25 and the pawn has not been
redeemed at the end of the redemption period of six months, title to the pawn passes
to the pawnbroker.12 There is obiter Sheriff Court authority to the effect that if the
item forfeited is worth less than the sum lent, the pawnbroker does not have a
personal action in respect of the deficit.13
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1. See above, para 6.
2. R Zimmcrmann, The Law ofObligations, (1990). p 223.
3. Sec above, para 17.
4. See above, para 26.
5. Stair, 1.13.14.
6. Ibid.
7. Erskinc, III. 1.33.
8. Hume, Lectures, IV,5.
9. Latta v Park and Co (1865) 3 \1 508: Ear! of Hopctoun v Hunter's Trs (1863) 1 M 1074 at
1095 per Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis.
10. W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 11, para 768.
11. For England, see Carter v Wake (1877) 4 Ch D 605, 606. For South Africa, sec G Lubbc,
LAWSA, para 495. Sec too the BGB. art 1229 and the Civil Code of Quebec, art 2748 and J B
Claxton, Security on Property and the Rights of Secured Creditors under the Civil Code of
Quebec, (1994), para 3.3.9.
12. Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c 39) s 120; Lundic v Buchanan (1862) 24 D 620.
13. McMillan v Conrad (1914) 30 Sh Ct Rep 275.
109. Extinction of pledge : discharge of obligation secured. The main way in
which a right of pledge is brought to an end is by the pledger fulfilling the obligation
which the pledge secures.1 Being parasitic upon this obligation, this result is none
other than would be expected.
1. Bell. Principles, s 203; Douglas v Mcnzcis (1569) Balfour 196. See too the Civil Code of
Louisiana, art 3164; the Civil Code of Spain, art 1871 and the BGB, art 1252; American Law
Institute, Restatement of the Law ofSecurity, (1941), s 37( 1).
110. Extinction of pledge : other causes. The following is a list of circumstances
in which the right of pledge will be extinguished. It should not be treated as
exhaustive.
(a) Destruction of the subject matter of the pledge. It is obviously not possible to
have a riglh in something which no longer exists. If the property is destroyed, the
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loss is borne by the pledger unless it is shown that the pledgee has not exercised
ordinary care of the subject.1
(b) Confusion. If the pledgee becomes owner of the subject matter, the pledge is
extinguished in this manner.2
(c) Relinquishment of possession of pledged property. If the pledgee voluntarily
gives up possession of the impignoratcd subject, other than for the most limited of
purposes, the right of pledge is brought to an end : mobilia non habcnt scquclain ex
causa hypothccae?
(d) Renunciation or novation. The pledgee may renounce his right or the pledge
agreement may be novated by another agreement between the parties.4
(e) Court order. The pledge may be set aside by a court, for example if a party was
fraudulently induced into impignorating his property or if the pledge amounts to an
unfair preference.3
1. On the pledgee's duty of care, see above para 100.
2. For example, if the pledgee buys the property. Sec the BGB, art 1256.
3. See above, para 101. Erskinc, III.1.33; North Western Bunk v Poynter (1894) 22 R (HL) 1. Sec
too, the BGB, art 1253.
4. Cf G Lubbc, LAWSA, vol 17, para 502; BGB, art 1255; French Civil Code, art 2071.
5. On unfair preferences, sec the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66) s 36 and Insolvency Act
1986 (c 65) s 243.
14. COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS
111. General. In this final section on pledge, it is proposed to compare the modern
law with both the Anglo-Norman rules and with the modern law from other
jurisdictions. From this it will be possible to gauge the state of development which
has been reached in the Scots law of pledge.
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112. Similarities between the Anglo-Norman law and the modern law. Our law
today is like the Anglo-Norman law in that it demands that the creditor has
possession of moveable property before it will confer on him a right in security.
Conventional hypothecs, which were very common in Roman law, have not found
their way into our legal system. When Stair says "our custom hath taken away
express hypothecations, of all or a part of the debtor's goods, without delivery" he
was surely referring to Anglo-Norman law and the fact that the medieval royal
courts would not allow security without possession. Glanvill's rationale was that the
hypothec, in allowing property to be subject to successive securities, created
situations too complex for royal justice to unravel. This reasoning is really not that
far removed from Stair, Erskine and Bell's statements that in disallowing the
hypothec commerce was made the more sure.1
A second similarity is with the creditor's remedy upon the debtor's default. Unlike
Roman law, the rule in Scotland from Anglo-Norman times has been that the
creditor must go to court to enforce his security, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise. The remedy has changed. In medieval times it was forfeiture. In
Stair's time it was diligence. Today it is sale by public auction. However, the courts
retain their role as they always have done. Our rule contrasts with the modern
English one where, as in classical Roman law, the creditor's power of sale is
implied.2
The final point to note is that the duty of care which the pledgee must exercise in
respect of the pledged property, although expressed in different ways, has not
changed over the years. The pledgee has never been strictly liable. To use the
modern language, he must exercise ordinary care.3
1. See above, paras 24. 36 and 88.
2. See above, paras 26 and 105-107.
3. See above, paras 25, 36 and 100.
113. Differences. The most important distinction between the modern law and the
Anglo-Norman law is that pledge is now regarded as a collateral security. Forfeiture
is no longer the remedy. The development in Scots law here mirrors that in most
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other legal systems. What is peculiar is that the Romans made the transition more
than a millenium before us. It may be noted, however, that the Leges Quatuor
Burgonim seems.to view wadset as a collateral security.1
In the second place, it is to be noted that the modern law of heritable security is
distinct from the modem law of moveable security. In Anglo-Norman times there
was far more overlap between the two, Regiani, for example, applying pledge to
both types of property.2
Thirdly, the modern law follows the civilian rule that a pledgee has no right to use
the pledged property. Under the Anglo-Norman law, like the modem English law,
he could use the property if the property would not be the worse for such use.-1
In the fourth place, under the modem law if the keeping of the pledged property
costs the pledgee expense he has a right against the pledger for reimbursement.
Under the Anglo-Norman law he has no such implied right.4
A final point is that there is an evidential presumption in favour of the pledgee under
the modem law, arising out of his possession of the pledged property. No such
presumption existed in the Anglo-Norman law, where indeed the onus was on the
creditor to prove that he possessed as pledgee.5
1. See above, paras 26, 29, and 105-108.
2. Sec above, paras 23, 29, 32, 36, 40 and 66.
3. See above, paras 25, 36 and 97.
4. See above, paras 25 and 99.
5. See above, paras 26 and 86.
114. Other jurisdictions. In this paragraph some general points will be made. The
first is that pledge is the most basic and original form of real security in most or all
legal systems, be they civilian, common law or otherwise.1 The second point is that
there arc certain common features in the way that the law has developed in different
countries. In particular, most jurisdictions have come to reject forfeiture and move
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away from a unitary system of security in respect of moveable and immoveable
property.2
As regards other systems, the Scots law of pledge is best placed within the civilian
rather than the common law grouping. This is best illustrated by the pledgee not
being entitled to make use of the property and also by the way he may recover
necessary expenses which he has incurred.3 However, it is fair to say that the
common law and civilian rules on pledge are generally very similar. In essence there
must be an agreement to pledge, followed by delivery of the pledged property. The
pledgee must keep possession or the pledge is extinguished.4
On a comparative analysis the Scots law of pledge is relatively underdeveloped.
Two clear examples of this may be given. In the first place, in the absence of
agreement the pledgee has to go to court to get permission to sell the pledged
property upon default.3 Many other jurisdictions do not require this, although they
often have detailed rules governing how the pledgee can realise his security.h In the
second place, leaving negotiable instruments aside, the Scots law of pledge is
restricted to corporeal moveables.' A considerable number of other systems permit
the pledging of incorporeal moveable property, in particular receivables.8
1. See above, paras 10-11.
2. See above, paras 35, 40 and 108.
3. See above, paras 97 and 99.
4. See the European comparative works of J G Sauveplanne (ed). Security over Corporeal
Movables, (1974) and M G Dickson, W Roscncr and P M Storm (eds). Security on Movable
Property and Receivables in Europe, (1988). For South African law, see G Lubbe, LAWSA, vol
17, paras 474-502. For Louisiana, see R Slovenko, "Of Pledge", (1958) 33 Tul LR 59.
5. Sec above, paras 105-106.
6. Sec above, para 107.
7. Sec above, paras 60-66.
8. Sec above, para 63.
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115. Conclusion. The Scots law of pledge is a mixture of civilian and Anglo
Norman law, with an emphasis on the former. If Stair were to come back today, he
would see an area of law which is virtually in the same state as it was when he wrote
his Institutions. The stagnancy in the area of express security over moveable
property in Scotland is something which has naturally attracted criticism.1 It will be
interesting to see whether the release of a consultation paper on the subject by the
Department of Trade and Industry 2 will lead to our law being changed.
1. See, for example, Gloag and Irvine, pp 187-188 and D O'Donncll and D L Carey Miller,
"Security over Moveables : A Longstanding Reform Agenda in Scots Law", (1997) 5 Zcitschrift t'iir
Europaisches Privatrccht 807.
2. See above, para 50.
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PART 3 : LIEN
1. INTRODUCTION
116. Definition. A lien' is a real right to retain property from its owner until that
owner discharges an obligation or obligations owed to the party retaining the
property, the property not having come into the retaining party's hands for the
purpose of security.2 Where the property may be lawfully retained until the
performance of a single obligation the right is known as one of "special lien".3
Where the law sanctions retention in respect of more than one obligation the right is
known as "general lien".4 The party with the lien may be referred to as the "lien-
holder".3 There appears to be no specific term for the party against whom the lien is
being enforced. The Anglo-American terminology of "licnce" and "lienor" used to
refer respectively to these parties docs not seem to have come into Scots law.6
1. In other languages : ius retentionis, (Latin); droit dc retention, (French); gcsetzliches
Pfandrecht, (German): rctentionsret, (Danish); rctenticrecht, (Dutch); privilegio, (Italian); direitio
dc retencao, (Portugese) and derecho dc retcncion, (Spanish). Source : M G Dickson. W Roscner
and P M Storm. Security on Movable Property and Receivables in Europe, (1988). p 218.
2. For alternative definitions, see Bell. Principles, s 1410; Lord McLaren in Gladstone v McCallum
(1896) 23 R 783, 785; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. sv "Lien"; J J Govv. The Mercantile and
Industrial Law of Scotland, (1964). p 292; D M Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law. (4th
ed, 1989), vol III. p 399; W A Wilson. The Scottish Law of Debt, (2nd cd, 1991). para 7.7: A J Sim,
SME, vol 20, para 66. For a standard English law definition, sec Grose J in Hammonds v Barclay
(1802) 2 East 227, 235; 102 ER 356 at 359.
3. See Bell. Commentaries. 11.87; Bell, Principles, s 1411 and ss 1419-1430; A J Sim. SME, vol 20.
paras 75-77 and below, paras 204-211.
4. Sec Bell, Commentaries, 11,87; Bell. Principles, s 1411 and ss 1431-1454: A J Sim, SME, vol 20.
para 75 and paras 78-100 and below, paras 236-243.
5. Sec for example, G L Grctton. "The Concept of Security" in D .1 Cusine (cd), A Scots
Conveyancing Miscellany, (1987), p 126. at p 144: A J Sim. SME, vol 20. paras 67 and 73.
6. Sec for example, A P Bell, p 136: M G Bridge, Personal Property Law, (2nd ed. 1996). p 142; 1
Davies, Textbook on Commercial Law. (1992). p 319.
117. Uses of the word lien. In the field of juridical consistency the word "lien" has
had rather a chequered history.1 It is therefore not surprising to sec it used in a
number of different ways. The following is a list of some examples :
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(1) Lien is used in the sense described above as a right to retain property owned by
another securing an obligation or obligations. The word will be used in this sense
here.
(2) Lien has been used to denote a right to retain of any nature, such as one based on
ownership or a right to retain debts.2 This is a wide use of the word and is best
avoided, failing as it docs to distinguish between retention based on ownership and
retention on some other basis, such as custody or possession. The failure to make
this distinction has caused great problems in the past.3
(3) Another wider interpretation of lien is using it to refer to retention not only of
corporeal property but also of incorporeal property.4 However, as retention of
incorporeal property would seem to be based on ownership and not a subordinate
real right, this use may also be avoided.
(4) At its widest, lien has been used to mean security.5 Such use is also made
abroad.6
(5) In the realm of maritime law, lien can be used to mean hypothec, that is security
without possession or custody.7
(6) In Scotland, lien, or more accurately real lien has been used in the context of
heritage as a synonym for the pecuniary real burden.x Indeed, the term has been used
generally to mean real burden, in other words a condition placed in the title to
heritable property regulating the owner's use thereof.4
1. In particular as regards its relationship with the term retention. See the comments of Lord Ivory in
Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152, 160; Gloug and Irvine, pp 303-304: A J Sim. SME,
vol 20, para 66.
2. For example, W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 461; Lord Currichill in Henderson v
Norrie (1866) 4 M 691.
3. See the discussion by Lord Justice-Clerk Hope in Brown v Sommcrville (1844) 6 D 1267 and
Melrose and Co v Hastie (1851) 13 D 880. Sec also Laurie v Denny 's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404.
4. See for example, Bell, Commentaries. 11,111 (factor's lien over price of goods) and the treatment
of the case of Dickson v Nicholson (1855) 17 D 1011 (retention by commercial traveller of money
in security of salary arrears) by Gloag and Irvine, p 344.
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5. For example, by Lord Drcgliorn in Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440.
464. Sec also the Payment of Creditors (Scotland) Act 1793 (c 74) ss 33 and 39 and the Payment of
Creditors (Scotland) Act 1814 (c 137) ss 42 and 30.
6. See for example, the American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law of Security, (1941). p 157;
J J White and R S Summers. Uniform Commercial Code, (3rd ed. 1988), (Student Edition), para 23-
3; S H Haimo, "A Practical Guide to Secured Transactions in France", (1983) 58 Tul LR 1163; C P
Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World, (1922), vol II. pp 194-195: P Ganc in his 1939
translation of U Huber, Heedcnsdaegsc Rechtsgeleerthcyt, III.10.11.
7. See The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 Moo PC 267; 13 ER 884; Curric v McKnight (1896) 24 R
(HL) 1; Mansfield, "Maritime Liens" (1888) 16 LQR 381 and D R Thomas. British Shipping Laws.
vol 14, (1980), chapter 1.
8. See Martin v Paterson 22 June 1808. FC: Brown v Miller (1820) 3 Ross LC 29; J P Wood,
Lectures in Conveyancing, (1903). p 487 and the Glasgow Streets. Sewers and Buildings
Consolidation Order Confirmation Act 1937 (1 F.dw VIII and 1 Geo VI c xliii). s 236( 1). discussed in
Pickard v Glasgow Corporation 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 63 and Sowman v City of Glasgow DC 1985
SLT65.
9. See K G C Reid, "What is a Real Burden ?" 1984 JLSS 9 and the deed of conditions in J VI
Halliday's Conveyancing Law and Practice. Vol II. (1986), at p 171.
118. Etymology. The term "lien" is used in a number of legal systems, in particular
those of Scotland, South Africa, England, Ireland, Quebec and the United States of
America.1 These jurisdictions have in common the use of the English language.2
The word lien, however, had its origins furth of England. It comes from the Latin
ligamcn, meaning bond and its connected verb, ligarc, to bind or tie.3 This Latin was
taken into French as lien and the word still means tic or bond in that language
today.4 On the other hand, if "lien" is looked up in an English-French dictionary it is
found that the French use the term droit dc retention to mean lien in the way Scots
law utilises the term.5
The Romans used the term rctcntio to mean lien,6 This comes straight into Scots law
as "retention". The Anglo-Norman words for the concept - reteign and dctcign -
surely come from the same Latin root.7 In Rome ins rctentionis meant the right
which rctentio gave.8 This terminology can be found in the occasional early Scots
case.9 The term "hypothec" meaning real right of security without possession by the
creditor has been far more used to denote that which would now more correctly be
seen as lien."1 This is particularly true in the case of the right of the solicitor to retain
his clients' papers till his account is paid, which even in this century has been
referred to as a right of "hypothec".11 The reasons for this use are examined
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elsewhere.12
1. For South Africa, see T J Scott. LAWSA. vol 15, paras AS-136. For Quebec, see J B Claxton.
Security on Property and the Rights of Secured Creditors under the Civil Code of Quebec,
(1994), para 7.2.3. For England and Ireland, see A PBell, chapter 6.
2. South Africa, of course, also uses Afrikaans to a considerable extent. Similarly, Quebec also uses
French.
3. See The Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd ed). vol viii. sv "lien"; Jowitt's Dictionary of English
Law sv "lien". See also the American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law of Security. (1941). p
157.
4. Collins English-French Dictionary sv "lien".
5. For a discussion of the droit dc retention, sec Georges Briere dc l isle in J G Sauvcplannc (ed).
Security over Corporeal Movables, (1974), p 115, at pp 120-121.
6. For example D.47.2.60; R Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, (3rd ed, trans R Lcdlic. 1907). p 2<S 1.
7. See the cases reported at Year-book, 5 Ed. IV. Pasch. pi. 20 (1466) and and 22 Ed. IV. Hil. pi. 15
per Brian CJ (1483), discussed by Sir William Holdsworth. History ofEnglish Law, vol 7. p 512.
8. Sec Thomas, pp 276 and 277: Buckland, pp 213-214. 473 and 490; R W Lcage. Roman Private
Law, (3rd cd, by A M Prichard, 1962). pp 182-184 and 328-330.
9. See Binning v Brothcrstones (1676) Vlor 9137: Cuthlxmts v Ross (1697) 4 BS 374: Creditors of
Stuart v Stuart (1709) Mor 2629. 2630. In Mitchel v McAdam (1712) Mor 11096 the term "jus
detinendi" was used.
10. Bankton, 1.17.2 and 1.17.15: Bell, Commentaries, 11,90.
11. See Begg, p 205; Robertson v Ross (1887) 15 R 67: Lire & Macrae v Davies (1917) 33 Sh Ct
Rep 109.
12. Sec below, paras 147 and 149.
2. HISTORY
(a) Roman law
119. General. Unlike pledge, where there is ample evidence of a very early
existence such as from the Bible,1 it is difficult to find any information on cither
retention or lien from before the time of the Romans. Further, whereas pledge was
treated in a reasonably coherent manner by the Roman texts and all the more so by
later writers on the civil law,2 the present writer for one is unaware of such a
treatment when it comes to retention. There is, however, no lack of primary material
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dispersed in the Institutes of Gains and the Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian. This
material may be divided broadly into two categories. Firstly, retention is seen to
arise within property law, in the context of accession. Secondly, it is seen to arise
within the law of contract. These categories may be examined in turn.
1. See, above, para 10 and for example. Genesis 3<S: 1 <S; Deuteronomy 24:6 and 24:10-13: V S
Mciners, "Formal Requirements of Pledge Under Louisiana Civil Code 3158 and Related Articles"
(1987) 48 La LR 129.
2. See, for example, Buckland, pp 470-478; Thomas, pp 329-334: R Sohm. Institutes of Roman
Law, (trans J C Ledlic, 3rd ed. 1907): F Sehulz. Classical Roman Law. (1951). pp 400-427.
(i) Retention in the context of accession
120. General. The Roman lien given by far the most juristic discussion was the
right of the bona fide possessor to retain property he had lost due to acccssio.' This
doctrine, which has been taken into Scots law as accession,2 holds that in certain
circumstances where two pieces of corporeal property become joined together one
(the accessory) is deemed to have become subsumed in the other (the principal).2
The factors dictating whether accessio have occurred include the degree of physical
attachment between the things.4 The effect of the doctrine is that the owner of the
principal becomes owner of the accessory as well by what is in modern law
considered as original acquisition.-"1 There docs not require to be any contract
between the owner of the principal and the owner of the accessory to facilitate this.
The circumstances in which retention arose in relation to acccssio may now be
considered.
1. This term is not used in a technical sense in the Roman law texts : see Thomas, p 169.
2. K G C Reid, SME, vol 18, para 570-596.
3. See Buckland, pp 208-215; Thomas, pp 169-174.
4. Thomas, p 169.
5. In other words he gets a new rather than a derivative title to the thing. See K G C Reid. SME, vol
18, para 539.
121. Acccssio : moveables to moveables. Four situations arc referred to in the
texts involving actcssio of moveable things to other moveable things.
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(a) Tcxtura. This was the situation where the thread of one individual was woven
into that of another.1 Justinian gives the example of the purple thread of one person
being woven into a garment belonging to somebody else.2 The garment is regarded
as the principal and its owner becomes owner of the thread too.
(b) Feruminatio. This was where the property of one person was welded to that of
another and the owner of the principal thing also became owner of the accessory.1
(c) Scriptura. Where one individual wrote upon the parchment or paper of another,
the writing became the property of the owner of that which it had been written
upon.4 This was the ease even where the lettering was of gold.3
(d) Pictura. Where one individual painted upon the cloth or tablet of another, the law
regarded the painting as the principal and the cloth or tablet as the accessory.'' Thus
the owner of the painting became the owner of the cloth or tablet.
In all these situations the former owner of the accessory has suffered a loss. Whether
that individual may obtain compensation depends on the circumstances. If it was he
who knowingly brought about the accessio then he is regarded as having donated the
thread to the owner of the principal.7 If, however, this was not the case then it seems
likely that the former owner of the accessory, when he was not in possession of the
whole property, was able to obtain compensation from the owner of the principal by
virtue of an actio in factum or actio utilis.8
Where the former owner of the accessory was still in possession of the whole
property having brought about the acccssio in the bona fide belief that the principal
was his own, lie had the right to retain the item (ius rctcntionis) until he was
compensated.1' In practice this worked by him meeting the rci vindicatio of the
owner of the principal for recovery of his property with the defence of cxccptio
doli.w The object of this defence in general in Roman law was to ameliorate the
severity of a pursuer's claim.11 In this case it was viewed as harsh to let the owner of
the principal simply get the property without first compensating the bona fide former
owner of the accessory. The availability of the cxccptio doli in this situation pre¬
dated the existence of the remedies of the actio in factum and actio utilis.12
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1. Inst 2.1.26; D H van Zyl, History and Principles ofRoman Private Law, (1983), p 160.
2. Inst 2.1.26.
3. D 6.1.23.5; D 41.1.27.2: van Zyl. pp 160-161: Buckland. p 209; M Kascr, Roman Private Law,
(2nd ed, trans R Danncnbring, 1968), p 112.
4. G 2.77; Inst 2.1.33; D 6.1.23.3; van Zyl. p 161; Buckland. pp 209-210; Kascr, ibid, at p 111.
5. G 2.77; Inst 2.1.33.
6. Inst 2.1.34; G 2.78. Paul viewed the cloth or tablet as the principal : D 6.1.23.3. See van Zyl. ibid.
at p 162; Buckland. p 210; Kascr. ibid.
7. Buckland. ibid; van Zyl, ibid.
8. D 6.1.23.5; D 10.4.3.14; van Zyl, at pp 160-162. If the accessory had been stolen by the owner of
the principal, its former owner had the actio furti or condictio furtiva : Inst 2.1.26.
9. Kascr, p 112; van Zyl, ibid.
10. G 2.76; Inst 2.1.33; Buckland, p 210.
11. Sec R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, (1990), at pp 667-668 and the judgement of
Joubert JA in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornalus 1988 (3) SA 580 A at pp 592-
601.
12. Buckland, p 210.
122. Acccssio : moveables to land. Two cases arc of note here. The first is
inaedificatio. This was where a building was constructed on the land of one person
with the moveable property of another.1 Acccssio operated with the land as the
principal and the moveables as the accessories. The remedies available here arc
similar to those discussed with regard to acccssio of moveables to moveables. Thus
if the builder used his own materials to build knowingly upon the land of another he
was regarded as having donated the materials to the landowner.2 If, however, he had
carried out the work bona fide, and was not in possession of the land, then he would
have an actio in factum or actio utilis.3 If still in possession he had a right of
retention (ius rctcntionis) by virtue of which he could refuse to remove himself from
the land until compensated for his materials and labours. As was the case with
acccssio of moveables to moveables, the right of retention was exercised by raising
the defence of the exccptio doli against the rci vindicatio of the landowner.4
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There existed also with regard to inacdificatio the possibility of a situation where
one party had attached some of a second party's property to a third party's land. The
rules which would apply here, in particular for our purposes where rights of
retention would operate, have been subject to academic discussion."' There is,
however, no primary authority on the matter.
The second ease involving acccssio of moveables to land concerns plants and trees.
Where an individual planted one of these organisms into the land of another
(implantatio) or sowed seed into the same (satio) the planted or sown property was
regarded to have acceded to the land upon it taking root and growing.'1 A person
who bona fide had carried out the planting or sowing was, according to Ulpian,
entitled to an utilis actio in rem by which he could claim compensation against the
landowner.- Once again, however, retention could be pled by virtue of the cxccptio
doli if the bona fide planter or sower retained possession of the land/
1. G 2.73; Inst 2.1.29; van Zyl. pp 162-164. For a full account of the law in this area, see Buck/arid.
at pp 212-215; and Kaser, pill.
2. Inst 2.1.30; Buckland, p 214. However, some texts do confer a right of action upon a main fide
builder : see D 6.1.37; C 3.32.5.1: D 5.3.3S and van Zyl, p 164. In Roman-Dutch law the mala fide
builder may recover necesary expenses : Voet. 6.1.36. Note also Bankton, 1.9.42.
3. van Zyl, p 164. There also existed in certain circumstances a /us tollendi or right to remove the
materials, but the texts on it are notoriously unclear; see Buckland, p 213 and also van Zyl, p 164.
4. D 41.1.7.12; D 44.4.14; G 2.76; Inst 2.1.30; R W Leage, Roman Private Law, (3rd ed. by A M
Prichard, 1961), pp 182-183; F Schulz, Classical Roman Law, (1951), p 365.
5. Buckland, pp 214-215; Leage, p 184.
6. G 2.74-75; Inst 2.1.31-32; van Zyl, p 165.
7. D 6.1.5.3.
8. G 2.76; Inst 2.1.32.
123. Conclusions upon retention in the context of acccssio. In the first place, a
ius rctcntionis will only arise where the person who brought about the acccssio was
in good faith and in possession. In the second place the right is not predicated upon
any pre-existing relationship between the possessor of the property and its owner.
Thirdly, the right is always founded in the defence of the cxceptio doli. Fourthly, the
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right may be exercised not only in respect of moveables, but in respect of land too.
Fifthly, the right is available against the owner of the property whoever lie might be
at the time. Whether this made the right a real one is a matter that upon which the
the texts arc silent.1
Finally, whilst the ins rctcntionis arises here in the context of the property law
doctrine of acccssio it may also be analysed as arising in terms of unjustified
enrichment. In other words, the fact that a party has bona fide brought about the
acccssio has led to the owner of the principal having become unjustly enriched.2 He
must therefore give that bona fide party recompense. Such an interpretation is
consistent with the views of Buckland, who submits that in any situation where a
party makes ameliorations to property under the mistaken belief it was his own, the
law then gives him the ius rctcntionis?
1. The analogous right in modern South African law is real : see T J Scott, LAWSA. vol 15. paras
103-116; H S Silherherg and J Schocman. The Law of Property, (3rd ed. 1992), pp 465-466;
Wilie's Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa, (3rd ed. ed Scott and Scott. 1987), p 87-92;
J A Van der Walt and G J Picnaar. Introduction to the Law ofProperty. (1996), pp 371 -374.
2. Sec, for example, van Zyl, p 164.
3. Buckland, p 538. It must he noted, however, that the measure of recovery was the loss to the
former owner of the accessory rather than the gain hy the owner of the principal : see G 2.77-78 and
Inst 2.1.33-34. Butcf Leage, pp 182-183 and 185.
(ii) Retention in the context of the law of contract
124. Right of depositary to retain for expenses. Depositum in Roman law was a
contract whereby a piece of moveable property was entrusted by one person, usually
its owner, to another, the depositary, for safekeeping.1 The contract was a gratuitous
one. The depositee was given mere detention (dctcntio) of the subject not
possession. Depositum is one of the contracts in Roman law described as being
imperfectly bilateral; others included loan for use and pledge.2 Such contracts
involved a principal claim which was for the return of the property and a
counterclaim, for example for the restorer's expenses. The counterclaim was a
contingent one, for example contingent on expenses having been incurred; thus the
terminology imperfectly bilateral. The action to enforce the principal claim was
called the actio dirccta\ the one for the counterclaim called the actio contraria?
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Now, dcpositum often involved the depositary being put to expense, for example if
Julius went off to Britannia on holiday leaving his slave in the custody of Brutus, the
latter would have to feed the slave and so forth. In this situation Brutus would have
the actio depositi contraria for his expenses (impcnsac)? But, if Brutus was still
detaining the slave the prc-Justinianic law gave him a separate quite distinct remedy
of rctcntio, which could be pled by means of the cxccptio doli when Julius raised his
actio depositi dirccta to get his slave back.3 Indeed it is the ease that this ius
rctcntionis existed before the law recognised the actio contraria? Justinian, however,
appears to have abolished this right, leaving the actio depositi contraria as the sole
remedy in this situation.7
Two points need be made here on the ius rctcntionis which existed until Justinian.
Firstly, it was based on mere detention rather than possession. Secondly, it was
limited solely to expenses. Extrinsic debts were not secured.
1. D. 16.3: C.4.34: Buck/and, pp 467-470: Thomas, p 276; Lcagc. p 329.
2. Kascr, p 166; Lcagc, p 323.
3. D.16.3.5.pr; Thomas, p 277.
4. Ibid: Lcagc, p 329.
5. D.47.2.60; Buckland, p 468; Kascr. p 166; van Zyl, p 281.
6. Buckland. p 411.
7. C 4.34.11; Buckland, p 468; Lcagc. p 330. However, the right is recognised in modern civilian
systems. See for example, the Civil Code of Louisiana, art 1948, the Civil Code of Quebec, art 2293
and the Civil Code of Spain, art 1780.
125. Right under contract of commodatum to retain for expenses. Commodatum
was the contract in Roman law where a piece of property was lent by one party to
another, for the latter's use.1 Like dcpositum, commodatum was an imperfectly
bilateral contract, in which mere detention not possession was given. The actio
dirccta (actio commodati dirccta) and the actio contraria (actio commodati contraria)
were similarly available.2 Further, the party to whom the loan had been made also
had the ius rctcntionis for expenses, a right which once again pre-datcd the actio
contraria? However, like retention in the ease of dcpositum the right was not
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available in the later law, having been removed by the Emperors Diocletian and
Maximian.4
1. D.13.6; C.4.23: Buckkmd, pp 471-473; Thomas, pp 274-276: Lcagc. pp 326-329.
2. Ibid.
3. D 13.6.18.4; Buckland, pp 411 and 473; Thomas, p 276; Lcagc. p 328: Kascr, p 166; R
Zimmcrmann, The Law ofObligations. (1990), p 201.
4. V(x?t, 13.6.10. Once again, the right exists nonetheless in modern civilian systems. Sec the Civil
Code of Louisiana, arts 1890 and 1891 and the Civil Code of Quebec, art 2324. However, it does not
exist in Spain : Civil Code of Spain, art 1747.
126. Retention under contract of pignus. Pignus was the Roman contract of
pledge, in which property was delivered by one party to another in order to secure a
debt.1 Originally the property could only be retained until that debt was paid.
However, the Emperor Gordian extended this right into a right to retain for all sums
owed by debtor to creditor.2
1. Sec D. 13.7: D. 13.20; C.4.24; Buckland, pp 473-481: Thomas, pp 330-332.
2. C.8.26(27). 1.2 (Gordian, A.D. 239); Thomas, pp 333-334; Zimmcrmann, pp 227-229: D H van
Zyl. History and Principles ofRoman Private Law, (1983), p 283.
127. Right of husband to retain part of dowry on divorce. In the event of divorce
the Roman wife had the actio rci uxoriac to reclaim her dos (dowry) from her
husband.1 However, the husband had certain rights of retention (rctcntio), for
example one sixth of the dowry if the divorce was caused by the wife's adultery.2
However, these rights were permanent ones not simply being to secure the payment
of debt. Thus they are better classified as rights of deduction and need not concern
us further here.3
1. Kascr, pp 253-255.
2. Ulp.Reg.6.8; Kascr, p 253. See also van Zvl. p 108.
3. Thomas, pp 430-431. Justinian eventually abolished them : C.5.13.1.5.
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128. Retention in Roman contracts - a universal right ? While the textual
evidence seems limited to deposition and commodatum, there is academic opinion
in favour of construing retention as a general contractual doctrine. Thus Kascr states
that under any imperfectly bilateral contract:
"Instead of bringing a counter-action, the debtor who had a due counterclaim
arising from the same obligation, could exercise a right of retention (rctcntio),
that is, he could refuse to make his performance until the counter-performance
was tendered to him. This he did by means of the cxccptio doli."]
Further, Kaser applies his thesis to perfectly bilateral contracts, that is those
contracts in which each party was simultaneously creditor and debtor in respect of a
principal claim.2 The main examples are cmptio ct venditio (sale) and locatio ct
conductio (hire).3 To give an example of retention operating here, a party hiring out
his slave could refuse to deliver the slave until paid the amount due under the
contract of hire. Zimmermann makes express mention of retention of cargo by a
ship's master for an average contribution under the lex Rhodia dc iactu, in his
discussion of locatio ct conduction
Kaser's thesis seems to be in line with that of Sohm, whose discussion focuses on
the cxccptio doli, the practical means by which retention was pled as a defence to an
action for delivery or performance.3 According to Sohm, the cxccptio doli could be
pled in any situation where the pursuer in an action was ipsa res in sc dolum Iiabct,
that is wherever the raising of the action objectively constituted a breach of good
faith.6 Thus it was clearly such a breach to raise an action against someone to
perform his obligations under a contract he had made with you, if you were not
prepared to meet your obligations to him under that same contract. As Sohm writes,
the cxccptio doli was :
". . . employed for giving effect to counter-claims either by means of a lien
('rctcntio') - where claim and counter-claim arc not cjusdcm generis (as eg
where a defendant is called upon to deliver up some object, but claims
compensation for moneys expended on such object) - or by means of a set-off
('compensatio'), where claim and counter-claim arc ejusdem generis. Thus the
exccptio doli came to be the exceptio of all cxceptiones, which in the hands of
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the Roman jurists became a weapon that enabled the jus acquum to defeat the
old jus strictum at every point."
However, in the specific case of a contract of sale, Sohm writes that the right of the
seller to defend an action for delivery by the buyer, on the ground that the price has
not been paid, is technically termed the cxccptio non adimpleti contractus*
Moreover, it is the view of D H van Zyl that in the later law in any action upon a
contract the defence that the other side has not yet made performance may be
referred to in those terms.4 Hence it may well have been the case that as Roman
contract law evolved the cxccptio doli became refined into the cxccptio non
adimplcti contractusThis terminology is certainly familiar in modern civilian
systems."
Kaser, Sohm and van Zyl may slightly differ in their use of terminology.
Nevertheless the substance of what they say is much the same leading to the
conclusion that retention was a part of general contractual doctrine in the later
Roman law. However, it must be noted that what was being admitted was, to use the
modem terminology, special retention; that is retention until reciprocal obligations
under the same contract were performed. Other than in the particular ease of pledge
there is little evidence for general retention.12
1. Knscr, p 166.
2. Ibid, p 167.
3. Ibid.
4. R Zimmcrmann, The Law ofObligations. (1990), p 408 n 1413.
5. R Sohm, Institutes ofRoman Law, (3rd cd, trans J C Ledlic, 1907), pp 279-281.
6. Ibid, p 280.
7. Ibid, p 281.
8. Ibid, p 397.
9. van Zyl, p 254. He cites D 19.1.13.8 and D 21.1.31.8, both which involve contracts of sale. In
many ways this supports Sohm's apparent view that the exceptio non adimplcti contractus only
concerned sale, rather than his own wider one.
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10. That is, in respect of perfectly bilateral contracts. With imperfectly bilateral contracts, it would
always be the c.xceptio doli which was the relevant defence.
11. G H Trcitel, Remedies for Breach ofContract. (198<S). p 299 et sec/.
12. That is. retention for claims other than those due under the specific contract in terms of which the
property in question is being retained.
129. Effect of retention in Roman law. The preceding paragraphs show that
retention existed widely in Roman law. Two broad categories were recognised.
Firstly, there was retention arising in the context of acccssio. This as we saw could
be rcanalyscd as retention based upon enrichment, although it must be stressed that
the primary texts simply deal with acccssio. Secondly, there was retention based on
contract. Whether the ius rctcntionis in either or both of these cases could be viewed
as amounting to more than a personal right is a matter upon which it is difficult to
draw any definite conclusions. It is interesting to note, for example, that the
passages in the Digest stating that in a contract of sale the seller may retain the
goods until he is paid refer to this right as a sort of pledge.1 Thus the right to retain
is being analysed as a security.
A matter of further interest is the way in which the law protects a party exercising a
right of retention against theft. Any right of retention was dependent upon
possession, or at least detention, of the subject in question. Where such possession
or detention ceased, so did the right of retention. Hence, theft of the property, even
by the owner himself, would bring an end to the right. However, in this situation the
law provided a remedy. To be able to sue for theft, that is furtum, the party
instituting the action had to show that he had an interest, that is intcrcssc, in the
stolen item.2
There are a number of situations where the texts tell us that the intcrcssc was
conferred. In the first place, it was given to a bona fide possessor, hence the holder
of a right of retention based on enrichment was protected.3 Pledgees likewise had
such an intcrcssc,4 A borrower under the contract of commodatum who was
retaining for expenses was treated in the same way.5 So too was a depositary under
depositum, until of course Justinian removed his right of retention.*1 Buckland is of
the view that anyone with a right of retention for expenses had the intcrcssc, at least
when it came to furtum by the owner.
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It is very tempting to take everything one step further in the light of the Kaser/Sohm
thesis and argue that anyone with a right of retention had the intcrcssc.* In many
situations of mutual contract an intcrcssc based specifically on the ius rctcntionis did
not need to be utilised. For example if Claudius had contracted to sell his horse to
Cicero and the animal was subsequently stolen, Claudius could sue the thief for
furtum because he was the owner of the horse. Returning to the main line of
argument, the lack of textual evidence makes it impossible to draw any definite
conclusion on whether anybody with a right of retention was deemed to have an
intcrcssc. The key point is that it is certain that many did. Thus Roman law clearly
regarded the ius rctcntionis as a valuable interest and that action could be taken
against thieves who interfered with it.
1. Thus at D. 19.1.13.8 it is stated that until the buyer pays the price "the seller can keep the object of
sale as a sort of pledge", that is "venditor cnim quasi pignus rctincrc potest earn rem quam venditit."
Sec also D.21.1.31.8. Of course in a Roman contract of sale dominium remained with the seller
until delivery, so the right of retention here is based on ownership, although validly analysed in
terms of the cxccptio non adimplcti contractus. Note also that D.47.2.15.2 which refers to the ius
rctcntionis of a borrower under commodatum refers to it as "quasi pignoris".
2. See generally. B Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law. (1962), pp 214-215: Buck/and. pp
576-581.
3. D 47.2.12.1; Buckland, p 580.
4. There exist a number of conflicting texts on the basis of this interesse, such as D 47.2.14.16 and D
13.7.22.pr. See Buckland, p 580.
5. D.47.2.15; D.47.2.60; Buckland, ibid.
6. D.47.8.23.
7. Buckland. p 580. He bases his statement on D.47.2.15.2, D.47.2.60, D.47.8.2.23 and C.4.34.11.
However, his assertion that there is only evidence for an action against the owner does not seem
borne out by a reading of D.47.2.15.2 and D.47.8.2.23.
8. On that thesis, see above para 128. Zimmermann writes in The Law of Obligations. (1990). at pp
935-936 that an interest was conferred to "a bona fidei possessor or a person entitled to a ius
retcntionis." See also G.3.203 : "Furti autem actio ei competit, cuius interest rem salvam esse,
licet dominus non sit" ("The actio furti is available to the person in whose interest it is that the
thing is maintained, even if he is not the owner thereof.")
(b) The Medieval Period
130. Early Scots law. As far as can be seen there is no evidence of retention in
either Regiam Majestatcm, Balfour's Practicks, or any of the other Scots legal works
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prior to Stair.1 Even in the very Romanist sections of these works dealing with
deposit and loan for use (commodatum) there is no reference to such a thing as a
right of retention for expenses.2 Professor Walker, who has researched this period of
Scottish legal history in detail, apparently is unable to find anything either. '
1. Sec Rcgiam Majestatcm. (Stair See vol 11, 1947, cd Lord Cooper); Balfour. Practicks. (Stair Soe,
vols 21 and 22, 1962-63, ed P G B McNeill); Hope, Major Practicks. (Stair Soc vols 3 and 4. 1937-
38, ed Lord Clyde).
2. See Rcgiam Majestatcm. III.9; Balfour, Practicks. pp 197-199 and Hope. Major Practicks. II.5
and 11.10
3. D M Walker, ,4 Legal History ofScotland, vol 2. (1990) and vol 3. (1995).
131. English law. It is possible to find retention in medieval English law. The
earliest case identified is one of 1371.' There existed in England at that time in the
context of animals, a concept known as the franchise of waif and stray.2 A person
with such a franchise was obliged to keep the stray animal and to return it to its
owner if he claimed it within a year and a day. However, in this situation the law
allowed retention against the owner, until the franchisee had been given a sufficient
sum for the animal's keep.3 Prima facie this right seems very similar to the ius
rctcntionis for expenses conferred by Roman law on a borrower or depositary.4
Nevertheless, there is a key difference which is that there is no pre-existing contract
between the parties here. Likewise, it is difficult to equate the franchisee's right with
that of the Roman bona fide improver, for the franchisee here is under no delusion
that he owns the animal.
It would seem that one must look elsewhere for the rationale behind this right of
retention. The view of Sir William Holdsworth is that it arises in the context of the
specific duties which the common law imposed upon a person with the franchise of
waif and stray.5 For properly discharging these duties the franchisee was entitled to
compensation for his expenses. Holdsworth's explanation may be tested by
examining the manner in which retention of possession (later to become known as
lien) developed thereafter in the common law.
By 1466 at the latest it was the law in England that an innkeeper could retain his
guest's property in security of his account.5 Like the franchisee, the law imposed
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certain duties upon the innkeeper : in particular, lie was obliged if lie had the room
to receive any traveller who wished to stay at his inn.7 A common carrier, who was
bound to carry goods if asked, was later given a similar right of retention for the
debt owed to him.8
The idea of retention having arisen out of legal duty seems therefore to be a
reasonable one.0 However, as Holdsworth himself points out, the principle of
retention was quickly extended beyond its original parameters.10 At the same time,
in 1466, when the courts were upholding the innkeeper's right of retention, they
were giving a similar right to individuals such as tailors who had carried out work
on a piece of property. Such individuals were held entitled to retain the chattel - to
use the English terminology - until paid." The courts asserted this principle again in
148312 and its broadness became accepted by the sixteenth century judge, Chief
Justice Brooke :
"Vide libro Rastel, que stuffc, mise al taylor, fuller, shcreman, weever, miller
et hujusmodi, nc scront distreinc, car ccux artificers sont pur lc commun
weale. Et eadent lex alibi dc equo in communi hospitio, mes tiels artificers
pocnt rctcigncr lc stuffc pur lour wages pur lour labour".'3
From this the term for retention in the old Anglo-Norman law can be seen to be
"retcign(cr)". "Deteign(er)" is also used.14 There is no sign of the term "lien".
There is one more area in which the early English law sanctioned retention and this
was in the context of sale. By 1466 it seems to have been accepted that in absence
of a special agreement providing for credit the unpaid seller of goods could retain
possession of the chattels until he was paid the price.15 This may be seen very much
as the medieval forerunner of s 41 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54).
1. Year-Book 45 Ed. III. Pasch. pi. 30. It is of course the case that English law goes back well before
1371.
2. The concept is discussed in Constable s Case (1601) 5 Co Rep at f 107b: 77 ER 21X at 221-222.
3. See Sir William Holdsworth. History of English Law. vol 7, (1937), p 511.
4. Sec above, paras 124 and 125.
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5. Holdsworth, op cit. n 2.
6. Y.BB. 5 Ed. IV. Pasch. pi. 20: 22 Ed. IV. Hil. pi.5 per Brian CJ. The property involved in these
eases was the guest's horse.
7. Holdsworth. pp 511-512. This remains the rule today : sec Halsbury, vol 28, para 536.
8. Holdsworth, ibid: Skinner v (Jpshaw (1702) 2 Ld Raym 752: 92 ER 3: Yorke v Greenhaugh
(1703) 2 Ld Raym 867; 92 ER 79 per Holt CJ with Powell J dissenting.
9. The thesis is accepted by ,4 P Bell, pp 138-139.
10. Ibid, at p 512.
11. Y.B. 5 Ed. IV. Pasch. pi. 20: Holdsworth. ibid. The case is cited by Glong and Irvine, p 351.
12. Y.B. 22 Ed. IV. Hil.pl. 15 per Brian CJ.
13. Brooke, Abridgment of the Year-Books, (1568). sv "Distressc" pi. 70, quoted by Holdsworth.
p 512 n 6.
14. See Y.B. 5 Ed. IV. Pasch. pi. 20.
15. "Et memc lc ley est si jeo achate de vous un cheval pur XXs vous rctcigncrcz le chcval tanquc
vous estes pay de les XXs. mes que jeo paiera a vous a Michaelmas prochein ensuant, icy vous ne
detcignercz le chival tanque vous estcs pay etc," per Haydon arg. Y.B. 5 Ed. IV. Pasch. pi. 20. This is
translated by Lord Ellenborough CJ in Chase v Wcstmore (1816) 5 M and S 180, at 187; 105 ER
1016 at 1019 : "Note, also, by Haydon. . . And the same law is. if I buy of you a horse for 20s. you
may keep the horse until I pay you the 20s.. but if I am to pay you at Michaelmas next ensuing, here
you shall not keep the horse until you are paid."
132. Conclusions on the early English law. In summary, therefore, early English
law conferred retention upon three classes of person :
(1) persons under certain public duties, in particular carriers and innkeepers;
(2) persons who have performed work on a particular chattel;
and (3) unpaid sellers.
To gain the benefit of a right of retention all of these individuals naturally had to be
in possession of the subject which they were seeking to retain. Beyond that, there is
no particular linkage between the three categories, other than perhaps that contract is
usually involved. However, in class (1) the retention seems to arise out of the public
duty involved, for example the duty on the carrier to carry, rather than the contract,
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for example of carriage, formed thereafter. Indeed, as has been seen, in the ease of
waif and stray there was no contract at all.
Finding any similarities between these rights and the rights of retention in Roman
law is also a difficult task, if simply looking at the primary Roman sources.
Accepting the view of Kascr, on the other hand, that retention became a general
contractual doctrine in the later Roman law would provide some common ground
between it and classes (2) and (3).1 However, the opinion of Sir William Holdsworth
that class (2) grew out of class (!) would seem to negative the idea of Roman
influence here.2 Further, with regard to class (3), the English law of sale from the
middle of the fifteenth century onwards was fundamentally different from the
Roman cmptio venditio. In the latter dominium, that is ownership, could not pass
until the subject was delivered from seller to buyer. Thus a right of retention based
merely on possession was an impossibility.3 In English law it has been the rule that
ownership could pass without delivery since at least 1442.4
1. See above, para 128.
2. See the preceding paragraph.
3. See B Nicholas, Introduction to Roman Law, (1962), pp 178-179.
4. Doige's Case (1442) YB. 21 Hen. VI. f. 55 pi. 12. Previously the rule was the same as Roman law
: see Bracton, Dc Legibus ct Consuetudinibus Angliac, (c 1230), (trans Thome), Vol II. p 181.
which cites C.2.3.20 (traditionihus et usucapionihus dominia rcrum non nudis pactis
transferentur). For an account of how the law developed and changed, sec CHS Filfoot. History
and Sources of the Common Law, (1949), pp 226-229.
(c) The Seventeenth Century Civilian Writers of Europe.
133. General. The seventeenth century in Europe saw the publication of a number
of important civilian treatises.1 Pre-dating our own institutional works, they are of
considerable relevance, as it is beyond doubt that they had an influence on Scots
law. The connections between Scotland and the continent were very strong at the
time. For example, Scottish law students were spending periods abroad in
universities such as Bologna and Leiden.2 Stair himself had a period of exile of
seven years in Holland.3 A study of the work of the continental jurists of that era is
clearly required.4
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1. See O F Robinson, T D Fergus and W VI Gordon. European Legal History, (2nd ed. 1994).
chapter 7.
2. Ibid, pp 225-226.
3. Ibid, p 229. Admittedly this came after the first edition of his Institutions had been published in
1681.
4. This is more the case with lien than with pledge, where a systemised body of rules has existed
since Roman times and been taken into most civilian jurisdictions with little variance. See above,
para 114.
134. Grotius and Hubcr. Grotius lived from 1583 to 1645.1 His treatise Inlcidingc
tot dc Hollandschc Rcchtsgclccrdhcid, (Introduction to the Jurisprudence of
Holland), was first published in 1631. It is surprising to find in such a broadly based
work that there is no mention of retention, particularly in the context of accession,
commodatum and deposit, with which it deals in a very Romanist manner.2 A very
similar finding is made on the examination of Ulric Huber's Hccdcnsdacgsc
Rcchtsgclccrthcyt, (1686).3 Huber (1636-1694) was a prominent Dutch jurist,
following in the footsteps of Grotius.
1. See O F Robinson, T D Fergus and W M Gordon. European Legal History. (2nd ed, 1994), pp
212-214: M Stolleis (ed), Juristcn : Ein hiographisches Lexikon, (1995). pp 257-260.
2. H Grotius, Inleidingc totde Hollandschc Rcchtsgclccrdhcid, (trans R W Lee), 111.9 and 111.7.
3. U Huber, Heedcndaegsc Rcchtsgclcerthcyt, (trans P Gane, 1939), II.6.15-16, III.17 and III.18.
See too Stolleis. pp 300-301.
135. Domat. Proceeding to the French jurist Jean Domat (1625-96) and his Lcs loix
civilcs dans leur ordrc naturel, (The Civil Law in its Natural Order), (3 volumes,
1689-94) some interesting material may be found under the heading "Of the
Privileges of Creditors".1 This section clearly is a development from the tacit
hypothecs which Roman law granted to an increasingly wide range of creditors as
the Empire progressed.2 Domat states that those with a privilege rank above any
other creditor.3 This ranking will be in respect of all the debtor's assets if the
privilege is a general one, or in respect of a particular asset if the law so restricts it.
The privileges which seem relevant here are all restricted to particular assets, such
as that of the carrier :
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"Carriers have a privilege on the goods which they have carried, for the
carriage of them, and for the duties of toll, customs, or others, which they
shall have paid on account of the said goods. And the same privilege have all
those whose money has been laid out in expenses of the like necessity, such
as for the keeping and feeding of cattle, and others of the like kind."4
Indeed, as regards the second sentence, there is another privilege specially given to
those who have laid out money to preserve some property.3 Another privilege which
is of note is the one in favour of architects, workmen and artificers "who bestow
their labour on buildings or other works, and who furnish materials".'1 The privilege
is over the property which has work done on it. The final privilege which seems of
relevance is, however, a general one over the debtor's estate. It secures law charges
where a debtor has died :
"The expenses of proving the will, or taking administration, of making
inventories, of sales, orders of court, and discussions of movables or
immovables, and all other necessary law charges are preferable to all other
debts."7
As a matter of general discussion, it is not very difficult to find parallels elsewhere.
The carrier's privilege is like the carrier's right of retention in the old English law
and the modem carrier's lien.8 The privilege of the artificer also has its parallels in
earlier English law and modern law.4 The salvor's lien of today's law is like the
privilege of the preserver.10 Lastly, the privilege for law charges is not far removed
from the modern solicitor's hypothec and solicitor's lien.11 Despite all these parallels,
there is one great difference between the privileges of Domat and the rights of
retention of English and Scots law. The privileges do not require cither possession
or custody on behalf of the privileged creditor. In contrast, one with a right of
retention necessarily must retain the subject to keep his right in it.12
1. Domat. Les loix civile* dans lour ordrc nature/. (Paris, 1689), translated by W Strahan as The
Civil Law in its Natural Order. (1850), part 1. 111.5 (ss 1732-1769). See too VI Stolleis ted).
Juristen : Ein hiographisches Lcxikon, (1995), pp 173-175.
2. See C P Sherman. Roman Law in the Modern World. (1922). vol 11, pp 194-195. As can be seen
by the inclusion of what we know as the landlord's hypothec : s 1749.
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3. Above, n 1 at s 1736.
4. At s 1746. In later French law the carrier's privilege became dependent upon possession : see M
Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law. s 2521 and the French Civil Code, art 2102(6).
5. At s 1741. See now the French Civil Code, art 2102(3).
6. At s 1744.
7. At s 1760. Note that in the modern French law the privilege seems confined to court costs alone :
French Civil code, art 2101(1).
X. See above, para 132 and below, paras 212-221.
9. See above, para 132 and below, para 207.
10. See Bell, Principles, s 1427. For the sake of clarity it should be noted that Scots law also
recognises a hypothec for salvage : see W Guthrie's addendum to Bell. Principles, s 1397: Hatton v
A/s Durban Hansen 1919 SC 154.
11. See Gloag and Irvine, pp 407-416 and pp 384-395.
12. Of course, this is not the case with the solicitor's hypothec.
136. Pufcndorf. Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94), an influential German jurist, is best
remembered for his textbook De Jure Naturae ct Gentium, (On the Law of Nature
and Nations), first published in 1672.1 It does not contain many references to
retention, but Pufcndorf docs seem to admit it impliedly in the case of accession
brought about by a bona fide possessor, writing "if the builder be in possession, the
owner of the land shall pay for the wages and the value of the material."2
The one express mention of retention comes very briefly in the context of
compensation.3 Known as compensatio in Roman law, this is the doctrine where
obligations owed between two parties may be set off aginst each other and thus
extinguished. The doctrine generally is limited to liquid debts, for example if A
owes B £5 and B owes A £10, compensation means if B pays A £5 both obligations
are thereby discharged. Pufendorf points out that compensation can take place with
consumable commodities which are the same. On the other hand different kinds of
things or simply different things do not admit of compensation, writes Pufendorf,
giving respectively the examples of "a jar of Rhine wine for a jar of Spanish" and
that of "Bucephalus for an ordinary nag".4 He then comes to write the following :
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"Although it often happens, even in reciprocal debts, that an obligation is not
so much removed, as suspended by retention, whereby I keep to myself what I
should have given another, until he has paid what he first owed me."5
This passage is an interesting one and suggests a right of retention based on mutual
obligations in a contract, much like the interpretation of the later Roman law by
Kaser and Sohm, discussed above.5 Such a right does not seem to be limited to
certain categories of contract as in the old English law.
1. See Robinson. Fergus and Gordon, pp 214-216: M Stolleis (cd), Juristen : Ein biographischcs
Lcxikon. (1945). pp 506-507.
2. De Jure Naturae ct Gentium 1V.7.6.
3. At V. 11.6.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. See above, para 128.
137. Voct. Johannes Voct (1647-1713) was a Roman-Dutch lawyer who achieved
distinction with his major commentary on the Digest of Justinian, the Commcntarius
ad Pandectas, (1698-1704).' It remains to this day a highly influential work in South
Africa.2 Of all the works which have been examined, it contains by far the most on
the subject of retention, with discussion in various places on the matter.
In the first place, Voet discusses the right of retention of a bona fide possessor who
has made improvements.3 The discussion is a detailed one and every aspect of it will
not be examined here. Voet begins with the general Roman principle that a
possessor has only a right of retention for expenses and no separate action to recover
them. The general rule is that the possessor recovers his expenses to the extent the
property is enhanced in value. However, there arc exceptions : in particular
voluptuous expenses are not recoverable.4 By way of a contrast with Roman law,
Voct states that possessors in bad faith may also retain under the modern law, unless
they stole the property.3 This has been accepted into South African law.6
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Next, reference may be made to some places where Voct simply reiterates the later
Roman law. Thus in his discussion of deposit, he states that the depositary has no
right to retain for expenses, a rule introduced by Justinian.' In examining
commodatum, he states that there is also no right of retention, following the
enactments of Diocletian and Maximian.8 Likewise, discussing pledge, he states that
when the debt which a pledge is securing has been extinguished, the creditor may
retain the pledged property for another debt which is owed to him by the debtor."
This rule was first enacted by the Emperor Gordian.10
The most valuable part of Voct's work, for present purposes, would seem to be his
general discussion of retention in the context of compensation." It is described by
Ganc as having become a "locus classicus".12 Treating retention along with
compensation as defences to actions is to adopt the same pattern as Pufendorf.
However, Voct's work is more detailed. He begins by distinguishing the concepts :
"The right of retention is not to be confused with set-off, although it is in
some things by no means unlike set-off, and on the analogy of set-off can be
raised even in execution. . . Retention applies even to individual things which
do not allow of set-off, and is allowed even as to debts which are not liquid.
And it does not destroy an obligation ipso jure, as happens indeed by set¬
off."13
As a preliminary point, this is the translation of Gane who translates compensatio as
set-off, the English law term for compensation. More importantly, retention is seen
as a defence mechanism generally available in the context of reciprocal obligations.
However, one cannot retain for any debt, regardless of origin. In the words of Voet's
near contemporary, Vinnius : "Non posse crcditorem, cui sine pignorc pecunia
debitur, rem debitoris pro co quod sibi debitur rctinerc",14 There may only be
retention for that "quod eontrario judicio consigni potest" j3 in other words, "quod
occasionc quodem contractus, cis abest ct vcl maxime impensas nccessarias".16
Voct goes on to state that "retention finds employment in a number of causes."1.
One of the causes he mentions concerns dowry and may be passed over.18 Another
two concern maritime law : the right of a ship's master to retain merchandise for a
contribution for jettison and, secondly, for freight.1" Next, there is the right of a
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seller to retain the goods until the price is paid by the buyer. After that, comes the
right of a factor to hold back merchandise entrusted to him by his principal until the
principal pays the factor what he owes him. Finally, Voet writes :
"Especially is there room for retention on account of what is owed in
connection with the thing retained, for instance, for expenses incurred upon it
or for workmanship or craftmanship bestowed about it. On those lines fullers,
tailors, and possessors in good and in bad faith correctly safeguard themselves
by holding back cloth, garments or to things possessed in order to procure
wages or expenses incurred."20
Various things may be said about Voct's list. Firstly, it is not intended to be an
exhaustive one.21 Secondly, it is not limited to retention in the context of contract, as
can be seen from the shipmaster's right to retain for general average and the similar
right of possessors in good or bad faith for expenses. Thirdly, given the inclusion of
the seller's right of retention, Voet docs not differentiate between retention based on
ownership and retention based on possession or custody.22 Fourthly, while his work
has a Roman foundation, the rights of retention found in early English law are not
far removed from some of those rights which lie discusses.23
1. Sec Robinson. Fergus and Gordon, p 218: M Stollcis (ed). Juristcn : Ein biographisches
Lexikon. (1995), p 641.
2. Ibid. Note how often it is cited in works such as Willc's Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South
Africa. (3rd ed, ed T J Scott and S Scott. 1987) and H S Silberberg and J Schoeman, The Law of
Property, (3rd ed, 1992).
3. Commcntarius ad Pandectas, 6.1.36.
4. That, is luxurious outlays, impensae voluptuariac, which are unnecessary and undertaken
because of caprice.
5. Above, n 3.
6. To a certain extent at least: sec T J Scott. LA WSA. vol 15, para 106.




10. See above, para 126 and R Zimmermann. The Law ofObligations. < 1000). p 220.
11. Voct. 16.2.20.
12. Above, n 3. vol 3, p 14".
13. Voct. 16.2.20.
14. A Vinnius, Sclectarum juris quacstionum. (1653). Lib. 1. e. 41, referred to in Harper's
Creditors v Faulds (1701) Bell's Octavo Cases 440. at 455. A creditor may not retain the property of
the debtor for money owed unless he has a right of pledge. My thanks to Mr Grant McLcixl for his
help with translating the Latin.
15. Ibid. He may retain for that which a court could award under a counterclaim.
16. Ibid. He may retain for that due under the contract, or for necessary expenses.
17. Voct. 16.2.20.
18. The right of a wife to hold back the property of her husband until her dowry and the rest of her
woman's belongings arc restored.
19. Ganc translates the first right as applicable to any sailor. However, the right is usually stated to be
that of the ship's master. This right goes back to Roman law as the lex Rhodia de iactu and is known
in civilian systems now as general average. See Robinson. Fergus and Gordon, pp 91-92;
Zimmcrmann. pp 406-412 and Bell, Principles, s 1426.
20. Voeh 16.2.20. He also goes on to state that retention passes to heirs and the matter of whether a
tender of security will end the right of a retention, both showing retention to be a fairly well
developed doctrine.
21. This is clear from the context of the discussion of retention as a defence to an action.
22. For, in the Roman law. the seller retained ownership until the property was delivered to the buyer
: traditionibus et usucapionibus dominia rcrum non nudis pactis transfercntur (C.2.3.20
(Diocletian, 293)).
23. For example the English carrier's right of retention has parallels with the ship master's right to
retain for freight.
138. Conclusions. In the writings which have been examined here it is possible to
sec a general rcassertion of the Justinianic treatment of retention. What is also clear,
from Pufendorf and Voet at least, is the perception of retention as a general legal
doctrine functioning within the sphere of mutual obligations.1 The silence of Grotius
and Huber upon retention is interesting and suggests that until Voct there was little
discussion on the matter in Roman-Dutch law.2 Domat's allocation of non-
possessory privileges to creditors in many of the situations in which comparative
systems demanded custody or possession in order to secure a preference is
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fascinating.3 His fundamental principles arc, however, clearly taken once again from
the law of ancient Rome.4
1. Sec above, paras 136 and 137.
2. Sec above, para 134.
3. See above, para 135.
4. In particular, from the tacit hypothcca : sec C P Sherman. Roman Law in the Modem World.
(1922), vol II. pp 194-195.
(d) The Later English Law
139. General. The English law of retention continued to develop after the medieval
period, although the great writers Coke and Blackstonc appear to be silent upon the
matter.' In many ways the law remained consistent with its history in that, leaving
the special case of the unpaid seller's lien aside, it recognised a sub-category of
rights of retention based upon public duty as distinct from a sub-category based
upon work done on a particular chattel.2 Indeed there was a clear difference between
the two in that the carrier and the innkeeper could validly plead their right against
the owner of the property, even where they had no contractual relationship with
him.3 Thus if A took B's horse to an inn without B's permission, the innkeeper could
still effectually plead his right of retention, even against B, until A's bill was paid.
With the other type of retention, the owner of the property was only bound if he or
his agent had ordered the work to be done. The law remains the same today.4
1. Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, (1628-1641); Sir William Blackstonc,
Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland. (1791).
2. See above, para 132 and Sir William Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol 7, p 511; A P
Bell, pp 138-141.
3. Holdsworth, ibid, Robinson v Walter (1617) 3 Bulstr 269; 81 ER 227 (innkeeper); Yorkc v
Grccnhaugh (1703) 2 Ld Raym 866 at 867; 92 ER 79 at 80 per Holt CJ (carrier).
4. Robins & Co v Gray [1895] 2 QB 501; Halsbury, vol 28, para 535; G W Paton, Bailment in the
Common Law, (1952). pp 219-221 and 273; M G Bridge. Personal Property Law, (2nd cd. 1996).
pp 144-146; N E Palmer. Bailment. (2nd ed, 1991), pp 1013 and 1499-1501.
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140. Terminology : the arrival of the word lien. Up until the eighteenth century
any eases involving retention used the term retention, or its old Anglo-Norman
equivalents, to label the right involved.1 One ease also had the reporter viewing the
innkeeper's right of retention in terms of a pledge of the relevant property.-1
However, by 1734 at the latest a new word had come into English law which was
used as a synonym for retention. That word was lien. The earliest case involves the
right of retention of a solicitor, of which more will be said below.3 Here is what the
Lord Chancellor has to say in it:
"The Attorney hath a Lien upon [his client's] Papers . . . and tho' this doth not
arise by any express Contract or Agreement, yet it is as effectual being an
implied Contract by Law."4
Lien soon became completely embedded in English law as an alternative for
retention, with Lord Mansfield amongst others making great use of it.3 In passing it
may be noted that the term did not make such an instant impression upon everyday
English language, for Dr Johnson in his famous dictionary of 1755 only lists it as the
past participle of the verb "to lie".'1
The etymology of lien has been looked at elsewhere and it seems clear that the word
came from France.7 What is curious though is that at that point in French law, lien
was not looked upon as a right in respect of some property, but simply to mean
obligation or warranty. For example, Pothicr has a section in his Traitc des
Obligations of 1761 entitled "Du defaut dc lien dans la pcrsonnc qui promet."'s This
translates as "Of want of obligation in the person promising" and deals with the
situation where an obligation by someone to do something is regarded as void where
its terms are that the person has an absolute liberty whether or not to perform the
obligation.
What is particularly intriguing is that the word lien was also being used by the
English lawyers of the seventeenth century, and indeed perhaps before, to mean
obligation or warranty.4 Why lien was to take an altogether different meaning in the
following century is unclear.
150
The truth perhaps lies in the natural meaning of lien in French as a bond or tic.10
Lien came into English law not simply to mean the right of someone to detain a
chattel, but as a term for a nexus upon a particular piece of property. A completely
separate species of rights, where a person had a right over some property without
cither possession or custody, existed in English law. These rights in the eighteenth
century also became labelled as liens and today they are known as "equitable
liens".11 Liens which arc synonymous with rights of retention are referred to strictly
as "possessory liens".12 Other than the possession/lack of possession distinction
another important difference is that it is possible to have an equitable lien upon land,
or real property to use the English law term.13 The possessory lien is confined to
chattels.
By way of further proof that lien means nexus, reference may also be made to
maritime law. In this legal area there exists a species of rights known as "maritime
liens".14 These arise by operation of law in favour of certain individuals in respect of
a ship. For example there is a maritime lien for salvage and a person whose property
has been damaged by the ship, say in a collision, has the same right for the cost of
the repairs.15 Maritime liens arc not dependent on possession of the vessel.16 In
civilian terms they may correctly be defined as hypothecs.17 The idea of "lien" being
used to mean nexus comes out in one of the standard definitions of maritime lien :
"A Maritime lien must be something which adheres to the ship from the time
that the fact happens which gave the Maritime lien, and then continues
binding the ship until it is discharged".1X
The lien created is good against the world, with English judges having used civilian
terminology such as jus in re aliena to make clear this fact.16
1. For example, Y.BB. 5 Ed. IV. Pasch. pi. 20; 22 Ed. IV. Hil. pi. 15 per Brian CJ: Robinson v
Walter (1617) 3 Bulstr 269; 81 ER 227; Chapman v Allen (1632) Cro Car 271; 79 ER 836; Jones v
Pcarle (1723) 1 Stra 556; 93 ER 698.
2. Robinson v Walter, above.
3. See below, paras 141 and 147.
4. Ex parte Bush (1734) 2 Eq Cas Ab 109 pi 4; 22 ER 93.
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5. See Lord Mansfield in Green v Farmer (1768) 4 Burr 2214 at 2218: 98 ER 154 and Drinkwater v
Goodwin (1775) 1 Cowp 251 at 255: 58 ER 1070 at 1072. The word lien was also used in Ex parte
Shank (1745) 1 Atk 234; 26 ER 151: Ex parte Decze (1748) 1 Atk 228; 26 ER 146; Turwin v
Gibson (1749) 3 Atk 720; 26 ER 1212: Re Matthews ex parte Ockenden (1754) 1 Atk 235; 26 ER
151; Kruger v Wilcox (1755) Amb 252; 77 ER 168 and Kirkman v Shawcross (1794) 6 TR 17;
101 ER 410.
6. Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language, (1755), sv "lien". He cites Genesis 26:10
(King James Version). As a matter of interest, Psalms 68:13 and Jeremiah 3:2 also use "lien" this
way, in the King James Version.
7. See above, para 118.
8. R Pothicr, Traite des Obligations, (1761). 1.1.1.3.7 (s 47) translated by W D Evans as Treatise on
Obligations, (1806), vol 1, p 28.
9. See W Rastell, La Termes dc hi Ley, (1624), which is used by Jowitt, Dictionary of English
Law sv "lien" as authority for the proposition that lien "formerly denoted obligatio. generally, a
warranty."
10. Sec above, para 118.
11. For an early equitable lien case in which the term "lien" is used, see Burgess v Whcate (1759) 1
Eden 177; 28 ER 652 (purchaser's lien). For equitable liens in general, see Halsbury, vol 28, paras
551-582; R M Goode, Commercial Law, (2nd ed, 1995), pp 669-670; A H Silvertown, Law of
Lien, (1988), pp 8-11: R Bradgate and F White, Commercial Law, (3rd ed, 1996), p 270.
12. See Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, sv "lien": I Davies, Textbook on Commercial Law,
(1992), p 320. They arc alternatively known as legal or common law liens : sec Halsbury, vol 28,
para 502; R M Goode, ibid, pp 668-669; Silvcrtown, pp 5-7; Bradgatc and White, p 269.
13. See Halsbury, above, n 12.
14. See D R Thomas in British Shipping Laws, vol 14, (1980), chapter 1; American Law Institute,
Restatement of the Law of Security, (1941), pp 161-162; SME, vol 20. paras 274-286; A H
Silvertown, Law of Lien, (1988),chapter 5. It appears that the term "maritime lien" was probably
first coined in English law by Sir John Jcrvis in The Bold Buccleugh (1851) Moo PC 267; 13 ER
884 : see D R Thomas at p 2.
15. D R Thomas, p 13.
16. This is why these rights are discussed by Gloag and Irvine, pp 437-439 as "maritime
hypothecs". See too D R Thomas, p 3; The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 Moo PC 267; 13 ER 884; The
Tervaetc [1922] P 259; The St Mcrriel[ 1963] P 247.
17. As discussed under this heading in Bell, Principles, ss 1397-1401: Gloag and Irvine, ibid and J
J Gow. The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, (1964). p 298. See too D M Walker,
Principles ofScottish Private Law, (4th ed, 1989), vol 111. p 412.
18. The Two Ellens (1872) LR 4 PC 161 per Mellish LJ at 169. This was approved by Lord
Macnaghten in The Sara (1889) 14 App Cas 209, 225. Sec D R Thomas, p 10.
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19. See, for example, The Ripon City [ 1897] P 226 per Gorcll Barnes J at 242; The Tervaetc [1922]
P 259.
141. Particular liens and general liens. The possessory liens which the common
law had originally recognised were always particular ones.1 In other words the
person had the right to retain a particular item for a service performed in connection
with it, such as repairing it or carrying it. A new development in the eighteenth
century was the recognition of the general lien, where the relevant item could be
retained for a general balance of accounts between the two parties in respect of like
dealings between them.2 General liens proved advantageous to the parties involved.
For, in a series of contracts the knowledge that he had a general lien would make the
lien-holder feel safe to hand back property held under earlier contracts, knowing that
the property which he held under later contracts could serve as security for the total
debt outstanding under them all.3
General liens arose initially from express contractual provision.4 However, it soon
became established that certain professions were entitled to general liens as a matter
of usage. Bankers, factors, insurance brokers, solicitors and stockbrokers appear on
this list.3 In the latter part of the eighteenth century the English courts were keen to
add to this list at every available opportunity. "The convenience of commerce and
natural justice arc on the side of liens" trumpeted Lord Mansfield.6 "It has been the
universal wish of the Courts at all times to extend the lien as far as possible",'
declared Lord Kenyon CJ.
This great enthusiasm, however, was to come to an abrupt halt less than ten years
after Lord Kenyon made that statement. Whilst the value of the general lien between
the contracting parties was readily accepted, it also came to the attention of the
courts the damage it could to do to the interests of other creditors of the customer if
he became insolvent'.8 As Le Blanc J put it in 1805 :
"All these general liens infringe upon the system of the bankrupt laws, the
object of which is to distribute the debtor's estate proportionally amongst all
the creditors and they ought not to be encouraged."9
Rooke J was more blunt :
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"I shall never unless bound by authority assent to the doctrine that these
general liens are to affect the rights of third persons".10
The effect of this is that the movement to recognise general liens based on usage as
widely as possible came to an end at the same time Nelson was winning the Battle
of Trafalgar. Further, when it came to accepting that a general lien had been created
the courts resolved to place a heavy burden of proof on a person seeking to establish
the existence of such a right.11 The development of the law of lien in England thus
could never be said to follow any pre-ordained pattern.
1. See A P Bell, p 142. There is, however, some dispute about whether the innkeeper's lien is in fact
a general lien. Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law sv "lien", for example, classifies it as such.
Whether this lien is special or general is a matter which has been discussed in Scotland : sec A J Sim
in SME, vol 20, para 90. Sec below, para 227.
2. A PBell, p 142. See generally, N E Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), pp 955-958.
3. 1 Davies, Textbook on Commercial Law, (1992), p 321; R Bradgate and F White, Commercial
Law, (3rd cd, 1996), p 270; A P Bell, ibid: US Steel Products Co v Great Western Ry Co [1916]
1 AC 189 per Lord Parmoor at 211.
4. Halsbury, vol 28, para 516.
5. A P Bell, p 142; Halsbury, para 525; Davics, p 321; VI G Bridge, Personal Property Law, (2nd
cd, 1996), p 143; R M Goodc, Commercial Law. (2nd ed, 1995), p 668.
6. Green v Farmer (1768) 4 Burr 2214 at 2221; 98 ER 154 at 158.
7. Kirkman v Shawcross (1794) 6 TR 14 at 17; 101 ER 410 at 412.
8. See A P Bell, pp 142-143; Davies, p 321; Halsbury, para 516.
9. Rushforth v Hadfield( 1805) 6 East 519 at 528; 102 ER 1386 at 1390.
10. Richardson v Goss (1802) 3 Bos & Pul 119 at 126; 127 ER 65 at 69.
11. Rushforth v Hadfield (1805) 6 East 519; 102 ER 1386; (1806) 7 East 224; 103 ER 86; Palmer,
above, n 2, p 956.
142. Summary of the scope of the possessory lien in English law. The events at
the turn of the nineteenth century very much set the scene for the crystallisation of
the law of lien in England into the state in which it has existed ever since. There is
still the accepted division between particular liens and general liens.
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The law will imply a particular lien in favour of certain individuals who have a
public duty, for example the innkeeper and the carrier.1 It will also imply one in
favour of an individual in respect of a particular chattel where that individual has
done work on that chattel.2 That much has remained the same for hundreds of years,
the law having "ossified" as one commentator puts it.3 This means and this point
must be stressed, that English law does not imply a particular lien in every contract
where one party has possession of the property of another, based upon the idea of
mutuality of contract.4 It is, however, open to the parties to a contract to convince a
court that the creation of such a lien has been intended. This may be done by
pointing to an express term in the contract or by proving that such a term is implied,
for example by usage.5
The law will imply a general lien in the situations where usage has been accepted to
confer such a right. Prominent examples arc the general liens of the banker, factor
and solicitor." A general lien may also be created expressly or impliedly by a
particular contract.7 It also may be created by public advertisement.8 Given,
however, the unfair effect that a general lien is seen to give in the event of the
customer's insolvency, the courts require a lot of persuasion to accept that such a
right has been validly established.4
In certain situations, statute may confer a lien.10 The most prominent example is the
lien of the unpaid seller under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which in actual fact is
merely declaratory of the English common law, which was discussed above.11
1. See above, para 139.
2. Ibid.
3. A P Bell, p 139.
4. See for example, Halsbury, vol 28, paras 534 and 539. Compare Scots law : see A J Sim, SME.
vol 20. paras 75-77.
5. A P Bell. p 142.
6. See above, para 141 and Brandao v Burnett {1846) 12 CI & F 787; 8 ER 1622 (banker); Kruger v
Wilcox (1755) Amb 252; 27 ER 168 (factor) and Wilkins v Carmichacl (1779) 1 Doug KB 101; 99
ER 70 (solicitor). Usage may also be local: see Halsbury. vol 28, para 528.
7. Halsbury. vol 28, para 529; N E Palmer. Bailment. (2nd cd. 1991), p 955.
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8. Halshury, vol 28, para 530: Kirkmnn v Shawcross (1794) 6 TR 14: 101 ER 410.
9. See above, para 141.
10. Halsbury, vol 28, para 506; ,4 P Bell, p 141: A H Silvertown. Law of Lien, (1988). chapter 12;
R M Goode, Commercial Law. (2nd cd, 1995), p 670: R Bradgate and F White, Commercial Law,
(3rd ed, 1996), p 270.
11. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (e 54), s 41. On the common law unpaid seller's lien, sec above, para 131
and Lickbarrow v Mason (1793) 6 East 20n; 102 ER 1191: Bloxam v Sanders (1825) 4 B & C 941;
107 ER 1309; Miles v Gorton (1834) 2 Cr & M 504; 149 ER 860.
(c) Scots law from 1650-1800
143. Pre Stair case law. Prior to 1681 it is possible to isolate only a very small
number of cases dealing with retention. One clear example, however, is Binning v
Brothcrstonesj in which it was held that a bona fide possessor had a right to retain
land which he had improved until reimbursed by the true owner. The law set down
in this case can be seen to be pure Roman law : any doubts on that matter arc
removed when it is seen that the right of retention is referred to as a jus retcntionis.
Another early case, Earl of Bedford v Lord Balmcrino,2 also involves land. There
the court allowed a trustee to retain the property against an adjudgcr of the
beneficiary's right, until his expenses were met.3
Two further early cases deal with the right of retention of what the reports refer to as
"factors". One concerns a gentleman who was in fact a chamberlain and it was held
that he was a servant and not truly a factor, thus had no right of retention.4 In the
other the factory concerned was set up by a person going abroad.3 The factor he
appointed was left to look after his property, inter alia being responsible for uplifting
the rents. It was held that this factory could be revoked. Nevertheless, the court said
that in this situation the factor had to be "refunded of what he profitably expended"
before lie had to give up possession. The rationale here seems Romanist too, with
echoes of depositaries having the right to be refunded for such expenses.6
1. (1676) Mor 13401.
2.(1662) Mor 9135.
3. The right of retention is based on the trustee's ownership here. It was not until the nineteenth
century that the difference between retention based on ownership and retention based on possession
was finally settled. See, below, para 161.
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4. Pearson v Crichton (1672) Vlor 2625.
5. Chalmers v Bassily (1666) Mor 9137.
6. See above, para 124.
144. Stair (1). It may be stated at the outset that the treatment of retention by Stair
in his Institutions of 1681 is very much in a civilian mould. There arc three
passages, all in Book 1, which arc of particular interest. The first one comes in the
context of Stair's discussion of commodatum, in other words loan for use.1 He writes
that where the borrower has laid out necessary or profitable expenses upon the
subject, that lie either may recover these by action or by retaining it until the lender
satisfies his claim. The action the borrower has is described as "contrary" to the
"direct" action of the lender to reclaim his property. The law enunciated by Stair is
identical to the later Roman law of commodatum and indeed Stair cites the Digest of
Justinian.2 The only change is that lie has anglicised the Latin terminology of actio
dirccta, actio contraria, and retcntio/ius rctentionis?
The next passage is found as part of Stair's treatment of deposition (deposit).4 He
addresses the question of whether a depositary has a right of retention for expenses
knowing that Justinian had abolished this right, a position accepted elsewhere in the
ius commune:
"Though law and most interpreters favour the negative, upon the same ground
that compensation is excluded; yet the affirmative is to be preferred, because
as the contrary action is competent for the melioration, so much more the
exception, it being part of the same contract."5
This passage is set against the background of Stair's discussion in the preceding
paragraph of whether compensation was competent in the ease of deposit.6 Justinian
was credited with disallowing such an exception. Thus if A owed B 30 sheaves of
corn and he had already deposited 50 with him under a separate contract, B could
not appropriate 30 of those and thereby extinguish A's obligation. Stair writes that
the rationale for the rule was that the very nature of the contract of deposit was that
the property deposited must be capable of being restored on demand. Allowing
compensation would prevent this. However, in Stair's considered opinion the
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"convincing reason" why compensation is barred is because it concerns "tilings of
the same nature and liquid", whereas :
"ff]n depositation, the dominion and possession of the thing rcmaincth in the
depositor, though it be numerate money consigned, and to meddle with it is
unwarrantable, and accounted in law theft".
Applying this reasoning, there is no reason why retention should be barred.
Retention docs not amount to meddling, for the depositor will get his particular
piece of property back, immediately upon defraying the depositary's expenses. Stair
therefore admitted the right of retention for a depositary. Indeed he cites the 1662
ease of Earl of Bedford v Lord Balmcrino* as discussed above, to support his
account of the law. Since this concerns the right of a trustee to retain heritage until
his expenses arc met, the case can only be considered to be of persuasive authority,
for deposit in Scots law as in Roman law is confined to moveables.g Moreover, the
retention there was based on ownership rather than possession.
Before finishing his discussion of retention in the context of deposit, Stair writes in
further justification of his position :
"And in all cases in the law where action is competent, exception is also
competent, and so with us, if instantly verified."10
Thus for Stair, in Scots law exception is a remedy available in any situation in which
it is clear that there is a right of action. Retention is a form of exception so is subject
to that rule. It is not limited to particular forms of contract as under English law."
Indeed it is not limited to contract at all. It is a part of the general law of obligations.
1. Stair, 1.11.12.
2. Ibid.
3. On which, see above, para 125.
4. Stair, 1.13.9.




8. (1662) Mor 9135, discussed in the preceding paragraph.
9. On the Roman law, see Thomas, p 276. On the Scots law, sec J A K Huntley, SME, vol 8, para 4.
10. Stair, 1.13.9. It is not clear what "instantly verified" means.
11. See above, para 142.
145. Stair (2). Now it may be argued that the conclusions made at the end of the
last paragraph are somewhat sweeping, given the fact that they arc based upon one
sentence. It is therefore appropriate to turn now to the third and most general
passage in the Institutions on the subject of retention, which may be quoted in full :
"Retention is not an absolute extinction of the obligation of repayment or
restitution, but rather a suspension thereof, till satisfaction be made to the
retainer; and therefore it is rather a dilatory than a peremptory exception,
though sometimes, when that which is due to the retainer, is equivalent to the
value of what is demanded, if either become liquid, it may turn into a
compensation. Such is the right of mandatars, impledgcrs, and the like, who
have interest to retain the things possessed by them, until the necessary and
profitable expenses wared out by them thereupon be satisfied."1
This passage appears within the title "Liberation from Obligations" and like the
passage on retention in deposit, immediately follows a discussion on compensation.2
Stair's treatment is remarkably similar to that of Voet.3 It seems accepted that Voet
being a slightly later writer could not have influenced Stair.4 However, Stair may
possibly have influenced Voet.
There is no doubt from the passage above and its context that Stair sees retention as
a defence which is generally available within the law of obligations. The only matter
in doubt is whether it is limited to obligations involving "necessary" or "profitable"
expenses upon a piece of property. If there is such a limitation, then many situations
where retention could potentially operated arc excluded. So, for example, leaving
express contract aside, an innkeeper under such a rule could not retain his guest's
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luggage for his bill, unless for some peculiar reason he had laid out expenses upon
that luggage.
Various reasons may be offered against such an interpretation. In the first place, if
Stair recognised such a limitation he would have said so much more clearly. The use
of the phrase "Such is the right" suggests that he is merely giving an example rather
than stating that retention is so limited. Further, there is the fact that he says that
retention may turn into compensation. Here he is obviously thinking of the retention
of liquid debts and of course necessary or profitable expenses cannot be made in
respect of a debt, as it is incorporeal. Viewing retention in a wide sense is also
supported by the sentence from his title on deposit quoted above where he says that
exception is available wherever action is competent.3 Finally, although retention had
its origins in Roman law in claims for expenses laid out upon property, it seems very
clear that both there later on and in the ins commune it was seen as a defence




4. Sec G M Hutton, "Purpose and Pattern of the Institutions" in Stair Tercentenary Studies, (Stair
Soe. vol 33), p 79, at p 80. Voet's work was first published between 1698 and 1704. Stair had died in
1695.
5. Stair, 1.13.9.
6. Sec above, paras 128, 136 and 137.
146. Conclusions on Stair's treatment of retention. Whilst the Roman basis of
Stair's work is clear, it is interesting to note that he is silent upon one of the main
rights of retention of the civil law, that of the bona fide possessor for
improvements.1 This sharply contrasts with the detailed treatment by Voet2 of the
matter and is indeed somewhat surprising given the ease of Binning v
Brothcrstoncs* of 1676 which deals with the matter.
As has been seen Stair views retention as a right available as a defence within the
law of obligations as a whole. When he states that retention is pled by way of
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exception, he does not enter into the question of whether the exception is the
cxccptio doli or the cxccptio non adimplcti contractus.4 He seems to be unconcerned
about differentiating between types of exception.
Stair can be shown always to treat retention as a matter concerned with the
particular obligation in question and not other obligations between the two parties.
In other words, there is nothing in the Institutions to suggest that Scots law in 1681
recognised anything akin to the general lien of today. As a matter of note, Stair docs
not say that a pledgee has a right of retention for all sums, a right which the Emperor
Gordian gave to the Roman pledgee.5
A final point about Stair's work is that it does not make any distinction between
retention based upon ownership and retention based upon merely custody or
possession. This matter will be returned to.6
1. See above, paras 120-123.
2. Voct, 6.1.36.
3. (1676) Mor 13401. See above, para 143.
4. Sec above, para 128
5. See above, para 126.
6. See below, paras 161 and 199.
147. Scottish case law : 1681-1750. There is a gap of over sixty years between
Stair and Bankton, the next institutional writer to deal with retention.1 The period
sees some notable developments in the ease law. Just one year after Stair's
Institutions were published, came what is probably the first Scots case on retention
in the context of maritime law. The report of that case reads as follows :
"Found that though mariners and seamen had not a hypothecation upon the
ship for their wages of their last voyage, yet they had jus insistendi and
retinendi, while in possession of the ship, even against a person who had
bought her after the voyage.2
161
Two points may be made about the right of seamen to retain a ship against its owner
for their wages. Firstly, it is dependent on possession.' Secondly, it is a real right
enforceable against the owner's singular successor.
Another important case from the period in question is that of Stephens v Creditors of
the York Building Company,4 decided in 1735. There the court held that a factor
may retain the subjects of his constituent until he gets his salary and has his
disbursements refunded. However, it is stated that his right is neither based upon
compensation or retention, but is "upon a stronger footing". It is said to be "implied
in the mutual contract betwixt them, and in all cases the actio contraria must meet
the actio dirccta? Further, it is stated, that the right also attaches to money received
by the factor when selling the constituent's goods.
While the decision in this ease - that a factor has such a right - is beyond challenge,
the reasoning is somewhat difficult to follow. The right is clearly one of retention.
When it is stated that the right is "stronger" than retention what can only be meant is
that the right is stronger than a normal right of retention because unlike such a right
it also attaches to the proceeds of the subject matter if it is sold. But then this is
simply a consequence of a factor's right to sell his principal's property.6 The other
peculiarity here is the use of the terms actio contraria and actio dirccta. In Roman
law these terms only appeared to have been used with regard to imperfectly bilateral
contracts such as depositum and commodatum? These contracts were gratuitous : a
contract of factory is not.8 Scots law appears therefore to be taking a more relaxed
approach to the use of such terminology.
Most of the cases from this period concern the right of a solicitor to retain his
client's papers until his account is settled. The earliest dates from 1697. It refers to
the right in question as a "jus rctcntionis ct hypothecae" 9 Intriguingly, all the
subsequent cases call the right a "tacit hypothec"10 or simply a "hypothec".11 What
is strange about this terminology is that the hypothec, as defined by Stair upon the
basis of Roman law, is a non-possessory right of security.12 The right of the law
agent as set out in these cases depends on him physically holding the client's papers.
Now, certainly at that time in France, Domat had based his privilege for law charges
upon the tacit hypothecs of Roman law.13 Indeed at least one of the cases also refers
to the right as a "privilege".14 However, there is no evidence of French law requiring
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physical detention to enforce the right. The Scottish adoption of this terminology
also caused some puzzlement among the judiciary, for in one case :
"Some thought that the right competent to agents was improperly called a
hypothec, as it is no pledge or real right, but only a personal right of retention
of the writs while they arc in his hands".'3
The rest of the judges disagreed and said it was not a mere personal right. While
they stated that the agent's right "was a creature of the Court introduced for the
agent's security, who othcrways would not undertake the affairs of a person of
doubted circumstances",16 no comment was offered on the use of the term
"hypothec". Further analysis of the issue is required.
The law agent's right of retention wili be discussed in detail elsewhere,1' but for the
moment two further points arising out of the early case law will be made. Firstly, in
one of the oldest cases it was suggested that the right was available only where the
agent had no written proof of his client's indebtedness.18 The court rejected the
suggestion, holding that it was not so limited. Secondly, the cases indicate that a
client's papers may be detained until his entire account is settled.1V Thus this right of
retention, to use the English terminology, is a general one.20
Before concluding upon this matter, it is of interest to note that the right of retention
of a solicitor seems to have come into English law at about the same time as it was
recognised in Scots law.21 It is the view of Lord Cuninghame that "our hypothec, if
not originally borrowed from English practice, is in many respects the same"22 as the
English attorney's right of retention. There is no direct evidence of the Scots right
having such an origin. Flowever, it is beyond doubt that English law was to prove of
great influence in this area as time went on.23
1. See the next paragraph. Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, appears to say nothing on retention
in his Institutions of the Law ofScotland. (1684).
2. Seamen of "Golden Star" v Xfiln (1682) Mor 6259. The case of Sands v Scott (1708) Mor 6259
has a similar ratio.
3. The law v. ..s to change at a later date. See Bell, Commentaries, 1,562 and Gloag and Ir.ine, p
438.
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4. (1735) Mor 9140. This case is also discussed below in para 260.
5. Ibid.
6. See Brough ton v Stewart. Primrose and Co 17 Dec 1814, FC.
7. See above, paras 124 and 125.
8. Factors are due a salary. A gratuitous factor is known as a mandatory, or formerly a "mandatar" as
in Stair, 1.18.7.
9. Cuthbcrts v Ross (1697) 4 BS 374.
1 (). Cochran v Houston (1708) 4 BS 721.
11. For example, Ayton v Colville (1705) Mor 6247: Earl of Sutherland v Coupar (1738) Mor
6247 and Stewart (1742) Mor 6248.
12. Stair, 1.13.14.
13. Sec above, para 135.
14. Cochran v Houston (1708) 4 BS 721.
15. Lidderdalc's Creditors v Nasmyth (1749 Mor 6248, 6249.
16. Ibid.
17. Sec below, paras 265-271.
18. Ayton v Colvillc (1705) Mor 6247. Similar arguments have been made about the foundation of
the lien in English law : see J B Ames, Lectures in Legal History, (1913), pp 157-158 and G W
Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), p 187.
19. For example, Liddcrdale's Creditors v Nasmyth (1749) Mor 6248 at 6250, where it was held
that the Writer to the Signet there had a "right to retain the writs, till paid of his account due to him as
a writer".
20. Or the post Bell Scots terminology. See, for example. Bell, Commentaries, 11.107.
21. According to Sir William Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol 12, p 60, the solicitor's lien
was first recognised in English law in 1688. In 1779 in Wilkins v Carmichacl (1779) 1 Dougl KB
104; 99 ER 70 at 72 Lord Mansfield stated that the right "was not very ancient".
22. Kemp v Youngs (1838) 16 S 500, 503.
23. See Bell, Commentaries, 11,107-109; Bcgg, chapter 15; Gloag and Irvine, pp 384-395.
148. Bankton (1) ; retention in general. Bankton's An Institute of the Laws of
Scotland (1751-53) contains much valuable detail on retention. It is of particular
164
interest for its "Observations on the Law of England". Leaving these aside for the
moment, Bankton's discussion of Scots law, like Stair's, has clear roots in Roman
law. This can be seen firstly in the ease of the right of a bona tide possessor to retain
property until the expenses lie has laid out arc met by the true owner.1 An area
which Stair is silent upon, Bankton deals with it in no less than three different places
in his Institute.2 In his most detailed discussion of the matter, within his title on
recompense, he firstly sets out the Roman law before turning to the law of
Scotland.3 The basic rule is that the bona tide possessor may retain for necessary
and profitable expenses, but not voluptuary ones "laid out only for decorement".4
This rule is exactly the same as the one in Roman-Dutch law.5
The rationale behind this right of retention is given by Bankton when he is
discussing it as a defence to an action of removing :
"This is founded on the rule of law and justice, Nemo debet locupletior fieri
cum altcrius jactura, None ought to enrich himself by the spoils of another."h
Thus Scots law recognises a right of retention founded upon unjustified enrichment,
as developed out of Roman law.
Looking for the other traditional areas in which retention is likely to appear, it is
surprising to note that when discussing deposit, Bankton merely states that a
depositary has a contrary action for expenses when the depositor reclaims his
property.7 There is no mention of a right of retention. However, the matter does
feature in his discussion of "Commodate". He states that in the earlier Roman law a
borrower had the right.8 However, he goes on to note that the later constitutions
removed it.Q Bankton opines that Scots law allows a right of retention here, which of
course was the view of Stair:
"By our law (and the modem law of other countries) the possessor, in all such
eases, has an hypothec or right of retention of the thing, till his damages and
expences are refunded".10
The vocabulary here is interesting. "Hypothec" is being used synonymously with
right of retention. Certainly there is precedent for this in the ease law, as we have
seen, with the law agent's right of retention." Leaving this aside temporarily, the
substance of the passage also merits comment. His authority for the foreign law is
Voet.12 The width of the statement made suggests in hindsight that Bankton would
allow a depositary retention. Indeed it is suggestive of him allowing any possessor
the right.
Whether this was actually what Bankton meant may be more accurately ascertained
by examining his general discussion of retention. Just like Pufendorf, Stair and Voct,
this comes immediately in the wake of a discussion of compensation.13 Bankton
begins by saying that although retention resembles compensation the two arc quite
different. Then comes a very important statement giving his understanding of
retention :
"It is granted for one's security till he is paid or relieved, in respect to counter
claims he has against the party whose effects are retained"14
Therefore it would seem clear that Bankton like Stair sees retention as a remedy
generally available within the law of obligations. Further, Bankton expressly views
retention as a form of security, something which Stair did not. He gives specific
examples of the right operating : a subject may be retained for expenses laid out
upon it, a cautioner in a liquid bond may retain any debt due by him to the principal
debtor and a factor may retain his constituent's property until relieved of all debts
due to him, a right which prevails over diligence.15 It will be immediately noticed
from this list that Bankton docs not confine retention to corporeal moveables. Nor
docs he worry about any distinction between special retention, as in the case of
expenses upon property, and general retention, as in the case of the cautioner and
factor. The conclusion is that matters are not as juridically clear as they could be.
1. On the Roman law, see above, paras 120-123.
2. Bankton. 1.8.13,1.9.42 and II.9.68.
3. Bankton. 1.9.42. Perhaps, more correctly, he discusses the civil law in the light of the ius
commune, for he mentions the right of the male fide possessor to detain for expenses, a matter
found in Voet rather than the work of Justinian. See Voct, 6.1.36.
4. Bankton. 1.9.42.
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5. Voef, 6.1.36; A J Van der Walt and G J Pienaar. Introduction to the Law of Property. (1996), pp
371-373.
6. Bankton. II.9.68. The rule was first expressed in this form by Pomponius : "Nam hoc natura
acquum est neminem cum alterius detrimcnto fieri loeuplctiorcm" (D. 12.6.14). Bankton cites
Binning v Brotherstones (1676) Mor 13401.
7. Bankton, 1.15.3.
8. Bankton. 1.14.6.
9. Sec above, para 125.
10. Bankton, 1.14.6.
11. See above, para 147.
12. Bankton, 1.14.6, note e.
13. Bankton. 1.24.23-33. He entitles section 4 of 1.24 "Compensation, and Retention".
14. Bankton, 1.24.34.
15. Ibid.
149. Bankton (2) : retention in the particular context of security. As was seen
above, in his discussion on "Commodate" Bankton equated right of retention with
hypothec. Why he does this becomes apparent if his general treatment of hypothec
within his title on "Pledge" is examined. Stating that "hypothec" in Roman law
meant non-possessory security, he adds ;
"But, with us, in the proper sense, Hypothec is applied to the creditor's
security, introduced by the provision of law".1
As "hypothec" was viewed as meaning tacit security in 1749, by Bankton at least, it
is very straightforward to see why retention in turn is viewed as a hypothec. Further,
this knowledge goes a long way to explaining why the case law refers to the law
agent's right to retain his client's papers as one of hypothec.2
Bankton further expounds "hypothec" later in the title by saying that it only applies
to corporeal moveables.3 Thus the right of retention of a cautioner cannot be referred
to as a cautioner's hypothec. In a small way, then, Bankton docs eventually
distinguish retention in terms of different types of property. Also within his title on
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"Pledge", he expressly mentions the "tacit hypothec or right of retention"4 of the
lawful possessor. He gives two examples of this : the right of the law agent to retain
his client's papers and the right of a tradesman to detain the subject he has worked
upon."' It is interesting that he did not give these examples in his general discussion
of retention. The conclusion could be drawn that Bankton more readily associates
these rights with the law of security rather than the law of obligations, although of
course they are part of both.
In his "Observations on the Law of England" on the subject of pledge, Bankton
mentions three rights of retention : that of the innkeeper in respect of his guest's
horse, that of the tailor over clothes made and that of the agent or attorney over his
client's papers.6 This is correct in so far as it goes, but is certainly not a
comprehensive account of the English law of the time.7 Bankton also argues that it
is more accurate to view these rights as ones of retention and not hypothec.N
However, this seems to amount to a deferral to the English terminology, for these
rights clearly fall under "hypothec" in the sense he uses the word.
1. Bankton, 1.17.2.
2. For example, Ayton v Colville (1705) Mor 6247: Earl of Sutherland v Coupar (1738) Mor 6247




6. Bankton, "Observations on the Law of England", 1.17.10. citing Coke's Institute.
7. For example, the right of retention of the carrier is missing. The English law of the time is
discussed above, paras 139-140 and 141.
8. Bankton, "Observations on the Law of England", 1.17.10.
150. Bankton (3) : use of "lien". A final important point about Bankton's work is
that it appears to have the earliest example of the word "lien" being used in
Scotland. Intriguingly, the word is not to be found in the context of retention, nor
indeed that of corporeal moveables. It is to be found in his treatment of heritable
security, within his discussion of the pecuniary real burden. Bankton writes :
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"To explain a little farther real debts or burthens, termed Dcbita fundi, the
ground is properly debtor in those, it being therewith affected, and such debts
a real Lien thereon, to use the term in English law".1
He goes on in his subsequent "Observations on the Law of England", to use the
expression "real Lien" in the context of security over land south of the border.2
Therefore it is not in doubt that the word "lien" came to Scots law from English law.
The way in which the term is being used is curious. As has been shown, "lien" first
appeared in English law round about twenty years before Bankton wrote.3 It was
used in the sense of nexus, in accordance with its literal French meaning of tie or
bond. Now whilst the term was clearly used in English land law at the time when
Bankton wrote, there is far more evidence of it being used in the context of movable
property, in particular with regard to rights of retention.4 The mystery, then, is why
Bankton imported the term when discussing security over land and not when
discussing security over moveables. As of yet it is a mystery which is unsolved.
Two further points must be made about the term "real Lien". Firstly, there is the
issue of "lien" being spelt with a capital "L". This can be traced to the early English
cases which use the term.3 Secondly, there is the issue of the word "real". Now, it
may be thought that this means real as in jus in re, as in "real burden". But it does
not. It means real as in "real property", the English term for heritage.h This is quite
clear from the context.7 In other words "real lien" means "heritable lien", a fact
which is easily overlooked.8
1. Bankton, 11.5.18.
2. Bankton, "Observations on the Laws of England", It.5.3.
3. See above, para 140.
4. Ibid.
5. For example. Ex parte Bush (1734) 2 Eq Cas Ab 109 pi 4; 22 ER 93.
6. See. for example A P Bell, p I: K E Digby, History of the Law of Real Property, (5th ed. 1897);
R Vlcgarry and H W R Wade, The Law of Real Property. (6th ed. 1996); G C Cheshire and E H
Burn, Mcxicrn Law ofReal Property, (14th cd, 1988).
7. That is. the direct lifting of an English law term into Scots law.
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8. For example. Lord Cuninghamc in Wilmot v Wilson (1841 i 3 D 815, at <818.
151. Bankton (4) : summary. Whilst also based fundamentally upon Roman law,
Bankton's work differs from Stair's in that he expressly views a right of retention as
a right in security.1 Unlike Stair, too, lie gives a detailed discourse of the bona fide
possessor's right to retain for improvements.2 Further, he makes reference as to
specific examples of retention operating in places where there is no Roman
authority, such as the law agent's right in respect of his client's papers.3 However, he
does not really distinguish between retention based upon ownership and retention
based upon custody or possession, nor retention in respect of different types of
property.4 Finally, it is in Bankton's Institute that the word "lien" appears for the first
time in Scots law, although admittedly not in the context of retention.3
1. See above, paras 148 and 149.
2. See above, para 148.
3. Sec above, para 149.
4. Except in that he says that a cautioner's right of retention cannot lie a hypothec, within his
definition of that term. Sec above, paras 148 and 149.
5. Sec above, para 150.
152. Karnes. In his Principles of Equity, Lord Karnes discusses retention in the
same way as earlier writers, by comparing it to compensation.1 He describes the
right as "an equitable exception" available to a "defendant" allowing him "to with¬
hold performance from the pursuer, till the pursuer simul et semel perform to him".2
Thus once again retention is seen as a generally available remedy.
Kamcs goes on to say that "retention is founded solely on utility",3 being admitted
purely to reduce the number of law-suits. There is certainly a truth here, in that a
plea of retention allows a party to assert his rights without having to raise a separate
action against the party he wishes to assert his rights against. And according to
Kamcs :
"The utility of retention has gained it admittance in all civilised nations."4
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This bald statement takes no account of, for example, the great differences between
the relevant English and Scots law at the time. Further his statement that retention is
solely based upon utility whereas compensation is based upon both equity and
utility, is difficult to square with his earlier utterance that retention is an equitable
exception. Karnes finishes his discussion of retention in his Principles of Equity by
considering retention under an English mortgage and a wadset, matters which will
be passed over here.3
Another of Karnes' works, his Historical Law Tracts, first published in 1758, merits
our attention in that he uses the word "lien" in it." Like Bankton, lie refers to the
term "real lien" in his chapter on heritable securities.7 However, unlike the earlier
writer, he uses "lien" in the context of moveables. He writes :
"The nexus, or lien, of property was greatly strengthened, when it was now
become law, that no man could be deprived of his property without his own
consent; except singly in the ease of a purchase bona fide in open market."s
Leaving aside the fact that this seems to be an account of English than Scots law," it
is seen that Karnes expressly views "lien" as a nexus. Nevertheless, the use is
peculiar in that the English authorities of the time as well as Bankton use it to mean
the nexus of a security holder, not that of the owner of property.10 What is important
for present purposes is that "lien" has yet to be used in Scotland to mean right of
retention. On a more general front, the conclusion upon the work of Karnes is that it
is somewhat esoteric.
1. Lord Kames, Principles ofEquity, (3rd cd, 1778), vol 2, p KM).
2. Ibid, pp 100-101.
3. Ibid, p 101. He repeats the statement that retention depends entirely on the utility of abridging law¬
suits at p 130, but adds in respect of his discussion of justice there : "But if it have no support from
justice, it meets on the other hand with no opposition from it."
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, pp 101-105.
6. The work went to four editions, the last being published in 1792.
7. Lord Karnes. Historical Law Tracts, (1758), p 233; (4th ed, 1792), p 165.
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8. Ibid, p 141; (4th ed, 1817). p 101. He also writes at p 142 (4th ed, p 101) : "The nexus, or lien, of
property being originally slight, it was not thought unjust to deprive a man of his property by means
of a bona fide purchase, even where the subject was sold by a robber."
9. The rule in Scotland always having been a direct application of nemo plus juris ad alium
transferee potest quam ipse habcret.
10. In Bankton's case, the nexus of the creditor who can enforce a pecuniary real burden : see, above,
para 150. On the English law, see para 140.
153. Erskinc. Sir John Erskinc's .4/? Institute of the Law of Scotland is firmly
founded on Roman law. Nevertheless, like Stair he makes no reference to the bona
fide possessor's right of retention.1 Also missing is any discussion of retention in
commodate, although Erskinc makes express reference to the actio directa
commodati and the actio contraria.2 As regards deposit, he states the later Roman
rule that retention is not permissible.3 However, Erskinc opines that this rule was
only introduced to prevent retention for debts unrelated to the contract of deposit
and that, given this, Scots law will allow the depositary to retain for expenses.4 This
of course was Stair's view of the law too.5
Erskinc's main discussion of retention, like previous writers, follows upon his
discourse on compensation.6 He does not seek to differentiate between retention in
respect of different types of property and begins with the right of a cautioner to
retain debts owed to him by the principal debtor.7 Then he focuses on retention as a
whole, writing :
"This right is most frequently pleaded by those who have bestowed either
their money or their labour upon the subject sought to be retained; and it
commonly arises in that case, from the mutual obligations which naturally lie
upon the contractor."8
Once more, then, there is the idea of retention as a general doctrine of the law of
obligations. Erskinc sets out some practical examples." Firstly, there is the right of a
law agent to retain his client's papers "till his bill of accounts be paid." Secondly, a
tradesman may retain the item he has made until paid. Thirdly, a factor may retain
the balance of his intromissions, until refunded of all his expenses.
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The examples are similar to those of Bankton.1" Unlike that writer though, Erskine
docs not discuss retention in the context of security. He does not view retention of
corporeal moveables as a hypothec, because for him a hypothec is where "the debtor
himself retains the possession of the subject impignorated".11 For writers who lived
in the same era, it is striking that their definitions of hypothec arc so different. It is
of course Erskine's definition which is to prevail, being in line with that of Stair.12
On the other hand the view of retention as a form of security, very much Bankton's
standpoint, was in the future to become widely accepted.13
The last matter to refer to in Erskine's work is that like Bankton he refers to "lien"
only in the context of a particular form of heritable security, the pecuniary real
burden :
"The conditions and qualities with which a proprietor intends to burden his
grant, ought to be expressed in the deed itself in such words as arc proper to
constitute a real charge or burden upon the lands; or, as it is called of late, a
lien, a vocable borrowed from the French, signifying a tic or bond."14
Thus, it would seem beyond doubt that "lien" comes from the French language.
Likewise the use of the word in this sense comes from English law. However,
English law was also using it at the time to mean retention.13 Why there is no
reference to this made by Erskine, as with Bankton remains a mystery.
1. Although he discusses the right to recompense here : III. 1.11.
2. Erskine, 111. 1.24.
3. Erskine, III. 1.27.
4. No authority has been found to support Erskine's conclusion, but, see Voef, 13.6.10 on the subject
of retention in commodatum, where interesting parallels may be drawn.
5. See above, para 144.





10. See above, para 148.
11. Erskine. III. 1.34.
12. Stair, 1.13.14. And that of L'lpian : D 13.7.9.2.
13. For example, Gloag and Irvine, chapters 10 and 11.
14. Erskine, 11.3.49.
15. See above, para 140.
154. Casclaw : 1750-1800. With the exception of the seminal Harper's Creditors v
Fan Ids,1 it is not proposed to discuss the twenty or so relevant cases in any detail
here. Most concent the law agent's so-called hypothec and will be considered
elsewhere.2 The key issue which will be examined is the penetration of the term
"lien" into Scots law. It will be recalled that along with Bankton and Erskine, Karnes
used the term "lien" or indeed "real lien" to mean pecuniary real burden.3 However,
Karnes used "lien" also as a general term for nexus, in much the same way as the
English lawyer of the time.4 Unlike south of the border, nobody in Scotland had yet
used "lien" in the sense of the nexus conferred by a right of retention.3
With the scene set, the case law can now be considered. As far as can be seen the
first Scots case in which "lien" may be found is in the House of Lords' decision in
McDowal and Gray v Annand and Colquhoun's Assigneein 1776. In truth the
word docs not appear in the judgements but in the plea of the respondents who argue
that a pledge without possession amounts to a "secret lien".7 Thus the word here is
being used to mean a security.
"Lien" makes its Court of Session debut in 1779 in Dunlop v Speirsi^ in the context
of a trust deed for creditors. The defenders here argued that as the bankrupt's effects
were vested in the trustees "no lien was created over the subjects"9 in favour of the
creditors equivalent to that created by real diligence. The pursuers in contrast
argued that a "trust right creates a real lien over the subjects of the debtor in favour
of his creditors, equivalent to attachment by legal diligence".10 They lost the case.
Leaving the merits of the decision aside, it can be seen that "lien" is being used here
to mean nexus, indeed in the context of both heritable and moveable property.
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In the 1780 ease of Tait v Cockburn,11 the pleadings refer to an adjudication creating
a "lien" or "real lien"12 upon the heritage it is granted over. The next case of Bank of
Scotland v Bank of England12 a year later, sees pleadings which use "real lien" in
the sense of pecuniary real burden. In that same year comes Ranking ofHamilton of
Provcnhall's Creditors.u It concerns a competition between the "lien" of a solicitor
by "virtue of his right of hypothec" and the "real lien" of a heritable creditor in
respect of the title deeds to some land. The final ease for present consideration is
Hamilton c Wood,15 decided in 1788. It concerned a ship and the pleadings refer to
"the lien created by bonds of bottomry".16
The first thing to note about all these eases is that apart from the right of the solicitor
in Provenhall's Creditors the cases do not concern rights of retention. The second is
that most of them use "lien" in italics, which in eases from Morison's Dictionary is a
good sign that a word is cither Latin or some other foreign language. Thirdly, the
eases concern both heritable and moveable property, although there is a definite bias
towards corporeals rather than incorporcals.17 Fourthly, leaving McDowal aside,
"lien" is being used as a synonym for nexus. Fifthly, it appears clear from the eases
that the nexus which a "lien" confers is a real right upon the property in question,
either a real right in security or a real right by diligence.18 Given that, McDowal
docs not really contradict the other cases. Further, if one takes the view that
diligence can amount to judicial security, there is the option to bracket all the eases
under a "security" heading.16 Whether this is a good option to pursue or not, it still
leaves us some distance away from "lien" as right of retention.
1. (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440. Discussed in the next paragraph.
2. See the discussion of the solicitor's lien, below.
3. See above, paras 150, 152 and 153.
4. See above, para 152.
5. See above, para 140.
6. (1776) 2 Pat 387.
7. (1776) 2 Pat 387, 392.










17. In fact none of the cases refer directly to incorporeal property, although Dunlop deals with a
debtor's entire estate.
18. For example a bond of bottomry, as referred to in Hamilton creates a real right : see Glong and
Irvine, p 297. This is also why the term "real lien" is used, when "real" in connection with property
in English law actually is equivalent to "heritable".
19. See G L Grctton, "The Concept of Security", in D J Cusinc (cd), A Scots Conveyancing
Miscellany, (1987), p 126.
155. Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440. The
decision of the Whole Court in this case is undoubtedly one of the most important in
this entire area of law. The facts of the case are straightforward. Faulds was a
bleacher. Harper regularly sent him linen to be bleached. The account between the
two was settled annually at Candlemas. However, Harper became bankrupt. Faulds
sought to retain the linen which lie had presently in his hands for the entire balance
of the account. Harper's trustee in sequestration argued that he could only retain it
for the amount due for bleaching that particular linen itself.
The comprehensive report of the case allows the arguments to be examined in detail.
The basic argument for the bleacher is that Scots law following Roman law
recognised a general right of retention in favour of one person possessing the
property of another, that is a right of retention good for all sums owed by the other
to him.1 Retention operates in the same way as compensation, the argument
continues, in that it may be competently pled against all debts due, although
compensation itself is naturally restricted to all liquid debts.
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Counsel for the bleacher makes extensive use of Voct as an account of the civil law,
using him as authority for the proposition that only in special cases, such as in
deposit and commodate was the right of retention denied.2 Heavy reliance is placed
on the fact that a Roman pledgee could retain for all sums.3 Karnes, Stair, Bankton,
and Erskinc arc cited, the basic proposition being that they say nothing which is
contrary to Scots law admitting a general right of retention.4 The cases of cautioners,
law agents and factors arc also made reference to.5 Finally, it is stated that the
general right of retention is good against a trustee in sequestration.6
The trustee in sequestration considers the bleacher's arguments for general retention
and retorts :
"On examining our law, no doctrine of such evil tendency is to be found.
Faulds pretends to resort to the first principles of our law; but disquisitions on
the state of law, in rude and barbarous times, must depend greatly on fancy
and conjecture."7
He begins by citing Stair's point that Scots law is against latent securities.8 He goes
on to show that Roman law did not admit general retention and goes through our
institutional writers, concluding that "nothing 1 there] countenances the general right
contended for."Q Going through the Scottish cases, he argues that they show that the
right of retention is restricted unless there is implied consent by the parties to the
contrary, such as in the case of the factor."1











156. Harper's Creditors v Faulds : the judgements. Three of the judges agree with
the bleacher on the basis that retention operates in as wide as fashion as
compensation. In the words of Lord Swinton :
"Compensation and retention are the same; with this variation, that
compensation can be proponed only in liquid claims, retention takes place
whether the claims be illiquid or not."1
The Lord Justice-Clerk also finds for the bleacher, but only on the basis that Harper,
the owner of the linen, had become bankrupt:
"Retention, and a general count and reckoning, would be a bar to the proper
conducting of business; but it is a rule of natural justice, that where
bankruptcy happens, this plea must be received : the expediency that denied it
in the former case has then no existence."2
The majority of the court, however, disagree and find for the trustee in
sequestration.3 A highly erudite judgement is delivered by the Lord President, Sir
Ilay Campbell. He states that retention comes from the civil law and defines it as :
"A right of refusing delivery of a subject, till the counter-obligation under
which the subject was lodged, be performed."4
He finds no authority in the civil law for general retention and states that the
principles which regulate the retention of the factor and the cautioner do not apply to
other contracts.5 He disagrees with the view of the Lord Justice-Clerk.6 Further, he
shows that there are clear policy reasons for not allowing general retention :
"Retention is a more extensive and dangerous right than compensation, where
bankruptcy occurs. Compensation operates retro, and a balance is struck, for
which alone the creditor can rank. Retention, is different, it docs not
extinguish pro tan to, leaving the creditor to rank merely for the balance, but
178
lie retains the subjects, and, instead of ranking for the balance, ranks for the
whole debt until he is paid up, cither by his dividend, or by that joined with
the produce of his collateral security."-
The reason here seems convincing. As regards the decision in Harper v Faulds, on a
wider level, it is one which coheres with our own examination of the civil law and
institutional sources. What was found there was that the right of retention was a
defence generally available within the law of obligations and not limited to a fixed
list of contracts as in English law.8
However, the retention allowed was retention until the performance of a reciprocal
obligation. For example, under a contract of commodate the subject could be
retained until the borrower's expenses in respect of that subject were met. There was
no general retention for all sums due by lender to borrower. Certain exceptions
existed, of course such as the Roman pledgee under the pignus Gordianuin? Scots
law also has certain exceptions, such as the retention of the factor.10 However, these
arc very much exceptions and consequently the decision of the majority in Harper
must be viewed as correct.
1. (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440 at 467.
2. At 471.
3. The judges are Lords Stonefield, Hailes. Gardenston, Ankcrvillc, Dunsinnan and Drcghorn, and
the Lord President.
4. (1791) Bell's Octavo Case 440 at 471.
5. At 474.
6. At 473 he states : "Bankruptcy can make no difference, the case is the same after bankruptcy as
before it, the property is in the creditors, so far as not excluded by a lien."
7. At 474.
8. See above paras 136, 137, 144, 148, 152 and 153.
9. See above, para 126.
10. Sec Bankton, 1.24.34; Erskine, III.4.21.
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157. Harper's Creditors v Faulds: use of "lien". It is important to make note of how
"lien" is used in this very important case. Where the word is found in the pleadings
and the judgements it is used to mean the nexus created by a real security on a piece
of property.1 Thus the use is consonant with the use made in earlier Scots case law.2
In fact the form often used here is "real lien", which underlines the idea of real right,
but is probably in fact a mistake for "real lien" was a contemporaneous term of
English law for security over land.3
The way in which "lien" relates to right of retention sees a difference of opinion
between the two judges who use the word, the Lord President and Lord Dreghorn,
both of whom found for the trustec-in-scqucstration. Lord Drcghorn opines :
"Retention is not a pledge, nor a lien, but the mere result of possession : since,
if an artificer loses possesion, he loses his right of retention, even for
expenses; nor can he recover possession as in a lien, where he has an actio in
rem."4
In sharp contrast, Sir Hay Campbell states :
"Lor the expense of bleaching he [the bleacher] has a real right, a lien, which
entitles him to refuse delivery to the owner, or to any one in his name, till paid
his cxpencc."3
Lor the reasons discussed fully elsewhere it is felt that the Lord President is correct.6
The point to take away from here, however, is that this appears to be only the
second time in Scotland that a right of retention is referred to as being a lien.' It is
none the less clear that it is not being said that "lien" and "right of retention" are
interchangeable terms. Rather, and this is clear also in another part of the Lord
President's judgement, a right of retention is an example of a lien.8 Thus he and Lord
Dreghorn are at one on the meaning of "lien", but they disagree on whether a right
of retention counts as such. In 1791 therefore, as in 1749 with Bankton, "lien" in
Scotland meant something different from what it means today.
1. (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440 at 437. 438.447, 463, 464, 464, 465, 472 and 473.
2. See above, para 154.
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3. See Bunkum, as diseusscd in para 150 above.
4. Above, note 1 at 464-465.
5. Ibid, at 472.
6. See, below, paras 193-197.
7. The only previous time being in the pleadings of Ranking of Hamilton of Provcnhall's
Creditors (1781) Mor 6253. in respect of the right conferred by the law agent's hypothec, as then
called.
8. At 473 he states : "It would be singular, that what was not in any view a lien before bankruptcy,
should, at the moment of bankruptcy, be converted into one."
(f) Scots law from 1800 to the present
158. George Joseph Bell. It is with a sense of anticipation that the works of Bell
are approached, for he is the man who is widely credited with, and sometimes
criticised for, the introduction of lien into Scots law.1 The earliest of Bell's works
relevant here is his A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy in Scotland. The first
volume was published in 1800 and the second in 1804. The work was to appear in
six subsequent editions, but under the new name of Commentaries on the Law of
Scotland and on the Principles ofMercantile Jurisprudence} It is fair to say that his
treatment of retention/lien follows the same plan in all these editions, but it is of
course the earliest one which is of primary interest. In the second volume Bell
discusses the various types of security effective in bankruptcy. One of his headings
is :
"Of securities of the nature of real right resulting from possession."3
Under that heading lie writes:
"The securities includable under this class correspond with the set-off and
equitable liens of the English law; the terms used in this country arc
compensation and retention."
Once again, we have an institutional writer dealing with compensation and retention
in the same part of his work. But there arc differences here. Bell discusses retention
before compensation. More importantly, he deals with these doctrines in terms of
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securities rather than in terms of liberation from obligations. Only Bankton came
anywhere near to such an approach.4 A further key thing here is Bell's direct
equation of our doctrines with those of English law. In some ways this is not a
happy equation, for even at the time when he wrote there existed a category of rights
in English law, now universally referred to as "equitable liens", which cannot be
equated with retention for they are non-possessory.3
Under the sub-heading "Of the doctrine of retention or lien", Bell states that liens or
rights of retention arc cither special or general. A special lien secures only the debt
under a particular contract whereas a general lien secures the whole balance of debts
due by the proprietor to the possessor of the goods. He goes on to say that in both
the case of special and general retention "the security and real right depends entirely
on the fact of possession". Once again the point that retention or synonymously lien
is a security is driven home, here in very much civilian terminology. There follows
further discussion on the type of possession needed to found a lien.
Under a further sub-heading "Of Specific Liens", Bell states that in any contract a
special lien can arise through the doctrine of mutuality of obligations. Thus for
example, a bleacher may detain cloth he has whitened and a carrier a commodity he
has delivered until paid. Under the sub-heading "Of General Liens", Bell enters into
a discourse upon the relevant English law on the matter, including the matter of how
general liens can be created expressly. In terms of Scots law, lie discusses the
"Writer's retention", the "Factor's lien", the "Broker's lien", the "Lien to trustees"
and the "Cautioner's lien". He then goes on to look at compensation.6
1. See. for example, G L Grctton in "The Concept of Security" in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots
Conveyancing Miscellany, (1987), p 126 at p 144: E Marshall. Scots Mercantile Law. (2nd cd,
1993) at para 7-120.
2. Sec D M Walker, The Scottish Jurists, (1985), pp 338-345.
3. G J Bell. A Treatise on the Law ofBankruptcy in Scotland, vol 2, (1804), p 362.
4. Sec above, para 149.
5. Sec above, para 140.
6. Op cit n 3 at p 365.
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159. Analysis. Some comments have already been made as Bell's work has been
reviewed, but a fuller analysis will now be attempted. An appropriate place to start
is Bell's use of "lien". He uses it as a direct synonym for possessory retention. This
indeed was the principal use of the word in English law at the time, within the
general context of nexus.1 However, with only a couple of exceptions,2 Bell is the
first Scottish authority to use the word in terms of retention. It is very much a novel
approach, for it goes against the grain of contemporary Scots usage. The Scots
lawyer of the time was using "lien" as a general term for nexus.3 So too were
statutes applying to Scotland.4 If there was a more specialised use of the word, it
came in the shape of "real lien", a term used by David Hume, Walter Ross and
conveyancers at large for the heritable pecuniary real burden.-"'
In fact Bell pointedly moves away from the Scottish usage of the time. He docs not
refer to "real liens" when discussing real burdens, unlike Bankton, Kamcs, Erskinc,
Hume and Ross.6 Only on one occasion in his works docs he use "lien" simply to
mean nexus, when he writes in his section on diligence that "Arrestment in
execution was a lien created by attachment."7 Rather when Bell uses "lien" he
means pure and simply retention based on possession. In this light, it is right to say
that Bell anglicised the Scots terminology of retention. To be fair, he uses
"retention" as many times as he does "lien", but over the coming decades the latter
term gained ascendancy in Scotland.8
We turn now to the matter of "special liens" and "general liens". Such a distinction
had never previously been made by a Scottish writer and the way in which Bell sets
the matter out leaves little doubt that he has been studying the contemporary English
law. Nevertheless, it would seem that there is a certain validity in applying the
distinction in Scots law. For whilst special retention is the normal rule, it seems that
our common law recognises general retention in the cases of the cautioner, factor
and law agent.9
Bell's discussion of the possession requisite to found a lien is clearly based on
English law.10 However, his discussion of special liens is in contrast very much
Scottish. Special retention is seen as a right which is not confined to specific
contracts, but as something founded on the doctrine of mutuality of obligations.
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As regards general retention, there is much reference to English law here. But with
the exception of the broker's lien, Bell cannot be accused of having no relevant
Scottish authority to show that the examples of the general liens which he gives arc
in fact recognised by Scots law. There arc, however, clear conceptual difficulties
with his last two examples, the lien to trustees and the cautioner's lien. Trustees own
trust property and thus their right of retention is based upon ownership and not
possession, which Bell has said is the foundation of lien.11 As regards cautioners, all
the case law involves the retention of debts and debts being incorporeal cannot be
possessed. The cautioner's lien therefore is a different species of retention from the
right of a law agent to detain his client's papers.
A general verdict on Bell's treatise of 1804 is that in the writing of it he is not in fact
guilty of the wholesale introduction of an alien concept (lien) into Scots law. Rather,
what he can be accused of is taking the comparable English law and using it to
embellish the Scots law of retention already existing. Unsurprisingly this
methodology works better in some places than it docs in others. For example his
realisation that Scots law recognises general retention in certain places, like English
law, is perceptive and accurate. The way in which he uses "lien", on the other hand,
conflicts with contemporary Scots case law.12
Bell's emphasis on retention or lien as a form of security is important as this view is
now generally accepted, although the importance of the doctrine within the law of
obligations as recognised by Stair ct al is still appreciated.13 In reality Bell's
treatment of lien is no less than the foundation of the modern law in this area.14 By
way of criticism, the principal things lacking from it are a conception of the
particular types of property over which retention may be exercised and more
crucially a differentiation between retention based upon ownership and that based
on a lesser title.
1. See above, para 140.
2. Ranking of Hamilton of Provenhall's Creditors (1781) Mor 6253; Lord President Campbell in
Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440 at 472.
3. See the cases cited in para 154.
4. Sec the Payment of Creditors (Scotland) Act 1793 (c 74) ss 33 and 39 and the Payment of
Creditors (Scotland) Act 1814 (c 137), ss 42 and 50.
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5. See Hume. Lectures, vol IV, chapter 9: Walter Ross. Lectures on the History and Practice of
the Law of Scotland relative to Conveyancing and Legal Diligence, vol 2. (1792) and (2nd cd,
1822), at p 414 etscq; Martin v Paterson 1808. June 22 FC: Brown v Miller(1820) 3 Ross LC 23.
6. Bell, Commentaries, (7th cd), 1.726-732.
7. Bell, Commentaries. (7th cd), 1.6.
8. Sec Gloag and Irvine, chapter 10.
9. See Erskinc, 1II.4.20-21. However, the cautioner's right is in respect of debts and rests on
dominium.
10. He relies on English authority, for example, Kinheh v Craig 11789) 3 TR 119: 100 ER 487.
11. Although, there is confusion liable to arise here as trust was formerly seen as mere deposit : sec
Stair. 1.13.8.
12. See above, para 154.
13. See, for example. W M Gloag, Contract, (2nd cd. 1929), chapter 35.
14. Being relied upon by later writers, for example A J Sim, SME, vol 20. paras 36 etscq.
160. Bell's later works. As previously stated, Bell's Treatise on Bankruptcy, in the
revised form of his Commentaries went to seven editions. The later editions mainly
contain new developments in the law. There are, however, some areas of
retention/lien where Scots law is showing no sign of development so Bell does in
fact carry out a wholesale importation of some English law. Two cases are
particularly important. In the second edition of his Commentaries he introduces the
banker's lien to Scotland.' He states it to be a general lien. There is no Scots
authority cited, but simply a sheepish statement that "bankers arc in the nature of
money-factors".2 Thus the reader is asked to perform a deductive syllogism. Factors
have a general lien in Scotland. Bankers are money-factors. Thus bankers have a
general lien in Scotland. And indeed nobody has dissented from the conclusion.3
The other instance comes in the third edition of his Commentaries, where the
innkeeper's lien is introduced into Scots law. It is found in his section "Of special
liens". Bell's strategy here is to set out the relevant English law and then end with :
"In Scotland, I think lien would be given on the broad principle, that it is the
resulting security for the actio contraria in all cases."4
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This approach is liable to engender problems for it throws together the gcncralist
civilian doctrine of retention arising out of mutual obligations with the
idiosyncracics of the English innkeeper's lien. The matter is addressed fully
elsewhere.3
Bell's other great work was his Principles of the Law ofScotland, first published in
1829, which went to ten editions.6 It contains a chapter entitled "Of retention or
lien", following upon a chapter on pledge and hypothec." Compensation is treated in
a completely different part of the work,x lien being seen squarely as a form of
security. His detailed treatment of the matter follows the same pattern as in his
Commentaries and nothing therefore needs to be commented upon it further here."
1. Bell, Commentaries, (2nd ed, 1X10), p 4XX.
2. Ibid.
3. The proposition that Scots law recognises a general lien in favour of hankers was roundly
endorsed in Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank ofScotland (1X90) IX R 12. See below, para 245.
4. Bell, Commentaries, (3rd ed), (vol 2, 1X19), p 147.
5. See below, paras 223-226.
6. The last edition in Bell's personal hands was the 4th edition of 1X39. Bell died in 1X43.
7. The chapter is found at sections 1410-1454 in the 10th edition.
X. Bell, Principles, (4th and later editions), ss 572-575. At para 1410 he docs, however, distinguish
retention from it.
9. In essence he deals with the requisite possession followed by special then general retention.
161. Other nineteenth century developments In the same way, as the law of
pledge post-1681 can be said to be a unified body of rules, it is fair to say that the
law of lien after the work of George Joseph Bell falls into the same category. Thus
only a brief overview of the development of the area is needed.
Dealing firstly with terminology, the word lien as used by Bell slowly but surely
embeds itself into Scots law.1 This may seen in the particular context of bankruptcy
legislation, where "lien" had formerly been used as a synonym for security in
general.2 In the specific area of the law agent's right of retention the word
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"hypothec" docs continue to be much used.- Further, "real lien" remains widely used
in the context of the pecuniary real burden upon land.4
In terms of legal writings, the earliest of significance is David Hume's Lectures. His
discussion of retention is heavily reliant on Bell, but in some ways retrograde in that
it falls within his treatment of obligations in a chapter entitled "Extinction By
Compensation and Retention".3 In the middle of the century there comes Professor
More's famous note on retention in his edition of Stair's Institutions,6 as well as a
useful chapter on the solicitor's right of retention in Begg on Law Agents.' There is,
unsurprisingly, a very full treatment in Gloag and Irvine's magisterial Law ofRights
in Security (1897) in two chapters, entitled "Retention or Lien" and "Particular
Liens".8 Written by Gloag, they show the clear way in which retention operates as a
security.
As regards the development of the law, the middle part of the century sees the courts
setting out firmly the distinction between retention based on ownership and retention
based on mere possession or custody, otherwise known as lien.9 This is an area on
which Bell himself could have been much clearer.1" Further, the distinction is one
which David Hume and Professor More both miss."
The century also sees the appearance of eases in areas where Bell said that Scots
law recognised a lien, but in fact there previously had been no judicial authority.
Examples include cases on the banker's and broker's lien.12 Also seen is judicial
approval of express general liens, an area which Bell discussed upon the basis of
English law, but on which the law of Scotland had previously been silent.13 This all
raises the interesting "what if?" question in regard to how the law would have
developed if Bell had never taken to legal writing.
1. See, for example. Skinner v Paterson (1X23) 2 S 554; Laurie v Black (1X31) 10 S 1 and Paton v
Wvllic (1X33) 11 S 703. Not everybody was happy about this : for example. Lord Ivory in Hamilton
v Western Bank (1X56) 19 D 152. 156 said : "In this [area] there has been a good deal of contusion
introduced into our practice from a loose and not correctly discriminating use of the phraseology and
doctrines of English law."
2. Compare the Payment of Creditors (Scotland) Act 1793 (c 74). ss 33 and 39 and the Payment of
Creditors (Scotland) Act 1X14 (c 137). ss 42 and 50 with the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1X39 (c 41) s
3 and the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1X56 (c 79), s 4.
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3. Even late in the century : see Morrison v Watson (1883) 2 Guth Sh Cas 502.
4. For example : Brown v Miller (1820) 3 Ross LC 29: Wilson v Frascr (1824) 3 Ross LC 23 and
Tailors ofAberdeen v Coutts (1840) 1 Rob 296.
5. Hume, Lectures, vol III, (Stair Soc vol 16, ed GCH Paton), pp 46-59.
6. Notes to Stair. Insitutions, exxxi.
7. Begg, chapter 15.
8. Chapters 10 and 11.
9. See below, para 199; Brown v Sommcrville (1844) 6 D 1267: Melrose and Co v Hastic (1851)
13 D 880; Laurie & Co v Denny 's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404 and Wypers v Harveys (1861) 23 D 606.
10. The treatment of the trustee's and cautioner's lien in the same context as the other lien makes
matters confusing. However, in his discussion of the trustee's lien over the heritable estate he states
that it is good for all sums, but that this "is only part of the more comprehensive doctrine [of retention
based on ownership] already alluded to in treating of securities by absolute disposition" : Bell.
Commentaries, II, 117-118. More generally, see Bell. Principles, s 1431 : "It has sometimes been
contended that in Scotland the [general] right of retention goes further than the English lien, so as to
comprehend all cases where there is legitimate possession and a debt due to the possessor. . . But
there is no ground for this distinction."
11. Sec Hume, Lectures, 111,56-57. On More, sec Gloag and Irvine., pp 329 and 354.
12. Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank of Scotland (1890) 18 R 12 (banker's lien); Wilmot v Wilson
(1841) 3 D 815 (broker's lien).
13. Anderson's Trs v Fleming (1871) 9 M 718.
162. The twentieth century. This century has seen a consolidation of the
developments of the last. There has been little fundamental academic writing, with
most of those who have written on the subject setting out broadly similar statements
of the law.1 Bell remains very influential.2 However, the term "real lien" has made a
consistent indeed successful struggle for survival. It remains used as an alternative
expression for the pecuniary real burden, even in an Act of Parliament3. This is
despite the fact that being an importation from England the "real" refers to land and
not a jus in re.4
The case law has come steadily, unlike pledge where it has somewhat dried up. This
is a result perhaps of lien being of greater commercial importance.3 Despite having
more decisions to be able to consider and throw light on apparent lacunae and
inconsistencies, it remains fair to say in Professor Grctton's words of 1987 that the
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law of lien is still in a "chaotic state".'1
1. Sec W VI Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. sv "Lien": A J Sim. SME. vol 2(1, paras 66-100: D VI
Walker. Principles of Scottish Private Law, (4th ed. 1989). vol 3. pp 399-405: W A Wilson. The
Scottish Law of Debt, (2nd cd, 1991), pp 94-97; D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in Scots
Law, (1991), paras 11.15-11.16 and 11.20-11.21: E A Marshall. Scots Mercantile Law. (2nd cd.
1992), p 475-488.
2. Being much cited by the writers in note 1.
3. See the Glasgow Streets. Sewers and Buildings Consolidation Order Confirmation Act 1937 (1
Edw VIII & Geo VI o xliii), s 236(1). discussed in Pickard v Glasgow Corporation 1970 SLT (Sh
Ct) 63 and Sowman v City of Glasgow DC 1985 SLT 65. See also Anderson v Dickie 1915 SC."
(HL) 79: KGC Reid. "What is a Real Burden 7" 1984 JLSS 9 and the deed of conditions in J M
Haliiday's Conveyancing Law and Practice, Vol II. (1986), at p 171.
4. See above, para 150.
5. See the next paragraph. Pledge is seldom used commercially, for it means that the debtor is
denied possession of his assets, making it difficult to run a business. See above, para 50. Many of
the lien cases involve insolvency : for example. Liquidator of Grand Empire Theatres v Snodgrass
1932 SC (HL) 73: Garden Haig-Scott & Wallace v White 1962 SLT 78 and Sational Homccarc Ltd
v Belling & Co 1994 SLT 50.
6. In "The Concept of Security" in D J Cusinc (cd), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany, p 126 at p
144.
3. THE ECONOMICS OF LIEN
163. Value of lien. In the first place, lien acts as an effective security because of its
frustrating effect on the party whose goods arc subject to this right.1 As Bell states :
"The effect of lien is to deprive the owner, or those in his right, of the use and
benefit of the subject till the debt be paid for which it is retained."2
For example, B puts his car into the garage to be repaired. The work is carried out. If
the garage simply let B take the car away he may take weeks to pay. If on the other
hand they refuse to release the vehicle until they arc paid, B will most likely
promptly discharge his debt. Otherwise, he is left with the nuisance of not having
the facility of his car.
The value of a lien to its holder is enhanced by the fact that it is a right which is
good in insolvency.3 To continue the example from above, if B should be
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sequestrated the garage will have a far greater ehance of recovering the entire debt
he owes, provided they have retained the car. If they have released the car they have
no security and consequently will rank as an unsecured creditor. But if they arc
detaining it, B's trustee in sequestration will have to make good the debt before lie
can get his hands on the vehicle. The general approach of the courts to liens in
insolvency has at times proved rather benevolent. In one important case, a bleacher
who had an express general lien over each parcel of goods sent to him, was held
entitled to retain goods delivered within sixty days of the sequestration of his
customer.4 The rationale of the court was that the goods were sent in the ordinary
course of business therefore the lien did not amount to an unfair preference.
Leaving insolvency aside, a lien will also prevail over diligence.3 Thus if another of
B's creditors was to arrest the car in the garage's hands, his right would be subject to
that of the garage. Liens which arc implied by the law have the further advantage
that they prevail over any floating charge attaching to the property.b
Lien is a security which is very much alive in terms of modern commerce.
Businesses arc still using carriers, bankers, brokers, solicitors and accountants as
much as they did in the last century. Questions regarding the efficacy of these and
other individuals' liens still require regular resolution by the courts both north and
south of the Scottish border.7
1. For example, of the law agent's lien Sheriff Johnston in Duffy's Trs v A B & Co (1907) 23 Sh Ct
Rep 94. 99 states : "It is often said that the value of that lien consists in the inconvenience which
want of the papers may cause". This is particularly true of this lien as the papers never may he sold
to realise the security : see Lord Curriehill in Ferguson & Stuart v Grant (1856) 18 D 536 and
below, para 271.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,91.
3. Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66), s 73( 1).
4. Anderson's Tr v Fleming (1871) 9 M 718. The sixty day rule was set down by the Bankruptcy
Act 1696 (c 5). It was extended to six months by the Companies Act 1947 (c 47). s 115(3). This
remains the period under the present legislation : Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66). s 36.
5. See Bell, Commentaries, (2nd cd), p 474: (7th cd), 11,60.
6. Companies Act 1985 (c 6), s 464(2).
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7. Some recent cases include Bon Accord Removals v Hainsworth 1993 GWD 28-1785; National
Homecare Ltd v Belting & Co Ltd 1994 SLT 50: DTC (C\C> Ltd v Gary Sargent & Co [1996] 2
All F.R 369 and Ismail v Richards Butler (a Firm) [ 1996] 2 All ER 506.
164. Kquitablc control of lien by the courts. A lien is a right the exercise of which
may be subject to the intervention of the courts.' Take this example. C puts his
surfboard in for repair to an outfit carrying out such work. The charge is not
discussed. C returns three days later to find that the outfit has charged him £10,000
for the job and will not release the board until he pays up. C is likely to feel
aggrieved and will rightly explore the possibilty of a judicial remedy.
The approach of the courts in such circumstances was set out in a ease on the
solicitor's lien over his client's papers.2 Lord President McNeill stated ;
"[The] question arises, whether the right to retain the papers is not subject to
the equitable control of the Court - whether the Court can prevent the abuse of
that right of hypothec. I think the court has the power to do that, and has
frequently exercised that power."3
In the words of Lord Deas, the right of retention must not be used "unfairly and
oppressively".4 A good example of the courts exercising their power is that of
Garscaddcrt v Ardrossan Dry Dock Co Ltd.5 There a shipbuilding company was
exercising its lien over a vessel for repairs. A dispute, however, arose with the
owner over the amount due and in the meantime he raised an action for delivery of
the ship. The court ordered the shipbuilders to release it on him consigning the
balance of the account due in the Sheriff Court. Lord Ardwall stated that it was
"plainly undesirable that this ship should be detained longer in the dock than is
necessary".6
In limited circumstances the court will order the lifting of the lien if the debtor
simply finds caution for the debt.7 If the lien-holder has no valid claim he will be
ordered to return the property forthwith/
Returning to the example of the surfboard the court would not allow the repairing
outfit to act so oppressively. They would probably order the board's release on C
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making payment for the work done assessed at quantum meruit.
1. In the words of W VI Gloag. Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 462 : "Lien is an equitable right, to
which the Court, in special circumstances, may refuse to give effect". See also Shepherd's Trs v
Macdonald. Eraser & Co (1898) 5 SLT 296.
2. Ferguson and Stuart v Grant (1856) 18 D 536.
3. At 538.
4. At 539.
5. 1910 SC 178.
6. At 180. Sec also Mackenzie v Steam Herring Fleet Ltd (1903) 10 SLT 734: Bell. Commentaries.
11.93. On a lien being removed on consignation of the amount due in a non maritime case, see Fyt'e
v Weir & Robertson (1902) 18 Sh Ct Rep 9 (law agent's lien).
7. McCulIoch v Pattison (1794) unreported, (sec Bell. Commentaries. 11,105: Ferguson <£ Stuart v
Grant, at 538 per Lord President McNeill and Lord Currichill and 539 per Lord Deas. Compare
Wilmot v Wilson (1841) 3 D 815.
8. In Garscaddcn. above, the shipbuilders also claimed a right of lien in respect of possible future
expenses. The court held that they had no such right.
4. THE OBLIGATION SECURED
165. A valid obligation. A lien, like any other security, will only exist so long as
the obligation which it secures is valid and outstanding.1 If there is no obligation
owed by the owner of the property in question to the party detaining it, there can be
no lien.2 The position is the same if the detaining party considers that an obligation
is owed but in fact that obligation is invalid or unlawful. In this situation, he will be
liable in damages.3 The criminal law may also punish him, because in certain
exceptional circumstances an intention to deprive a person temporarily of his
property will constitute the mens rca for theft.4 A charge of extortion is also a
possibility.5
In the well known recent case of Black v Carmichaclfl cars parked on a piece of
private land were being clamped. The owners were made to pay a fee before their
vehicles were released. The matter attracted the attention of the local procurator
fiscal and the individuals doing the clamping were prosecuted for theft and
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extortion. They were found guilty and the Court of Criminal Appeal subsequently
upheld the convictions. Lord Justice-General Hope stated :
"The only means which the law regards as legitimate to force a debtor to
make payment of his debt are those provided by due legal process. To use due
legal process, such as . . . a right of lien or retention available under contract .
. . is no doubt legitimate. . . But it is illegitimate to use other means, such as. .
. the unauthorised detention of the debtor's person or his property, and it is
extortion if the purpose in doing so is to obtain payment of the debt."
As there was no pre-existing contract between the clampers and the car owners, in
the eyes of the court there obviously was going to be no valid lien here. An earlier
case illustrates the same point.8 The owner of a television set gave it to another party
for a free estimate in respect of repairs. Without any instructions, that party repaired
the set and sought to retain it until his bill was met. He was charged with and
convicted of theft in the Sheriff Court. The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the
conviction, agreeing with the sheriff that the accused was "indeed holding the
television set to ransom".u
1. See Gloag and Irvine, p 340; Ogilvie and Son v Taylor (1X44) 12 D 266.
2. Walker v Phin (1X31) 9 S 691; Ridley v Sloan {1X37) 15 S 469; Stephen Sons v Swaync and
Bovill (1X61) 24 D 15X; Garscadden v Ardrossan Dry Dock Co Ltd 1910 SC 17X; Lamonhy v
Foulds Ltd 192X SC 89; McNair & Co v Don (1932) 48 Sh Ct Rep 99; Carntyne Motors v Curran
1958 SLT (Sh Ct) 6.
3. McNair & Co v Don (1932) 48 Sh Ct Rep 99.
4. Milne v Tudhope 1981 JC 53; Kidston v Annan 1984 SLT 279: 1984 SCCR 20. Cf Hcrron v
Best 1976 SLT (Sh Ct) 80. This is not the law in England where a permanent intention to deprive is
required ; Arthur v Anker [ 1996] 3 All ER 783.
5. Black v CarmichacI 1992 SLT 897.
6. 1992 SLT 897.
7. At 900.
8.Kidston v Annan 1984 SLT 279.
9. At 280.
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166. Type of obligation. Liens invariably secure the payment of a monetary debt,
for example a hotel bill, the account of a solicitor or carriage charges. There seems
no reason why in specific circumstances the performance of an obligation ad factum
pracstandum should not be secured. Erskine seems to admit this when he says that
there may be retention until "he who pleads it obtains payment or satisfaction for his
counter claim".1 Bell's widely accepted definition of retention based on possession
ic lien is also supportive :
"Retention may be described as a right to retain a subject legitimately in one's
possession until a debt shall be paid, or an engagement performed, the jus
cxigcndi of which is in the possessor."2
Thc case of Kerr v Dundee Gas Light Company3 might perhaps be further authority
here, although the judges do not make express reference to lien. There, a builder
entered into a contract to erect a gas-holder tank on the ground of his employers. He
commenced the work bringing materials and tools on to the site, but subsequently
became bankrupt and the contract was abandoned. It was held that the employers
could retain the materials in order to complete the work subject to a claim for the
value of them. Further, by a majority, it was held that the tools could be retained for
use in the execution of the contract, subject to a claim for their return on the
completion of the work, and reasonable remuneration for their use.
Now, the right to retain and use the materials can not be a lien, for the essence of a
lien is that the property is returned on performance of the obligation secured. The
materials were being permanently attached to the employers' ground.4 However, it is
arguable that the right over the tools is a lien securing the performance of the
contract. In the words of Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis, the tools were to be "returned . . .
as soon as the works were executed, and the contract obligation fulfilled by their
means."3
The peculiarity here is that a lien docs not normally confer a right of use in respect
of the property being retained.11 If the judgement had been that the property could be
retained until the builder's trustee in sequestration performed the contract, then there
would be no conceptual difficulty. But rather the fact that it was the retaining party
who could go ahead and complete the work makes the right of retention a sui
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generis one, perhaps better analysed in terms of an equitable right arising on
bankruptcy. Further, the dissenting view of Lord Cowan that the possession of the
tools was with the bankrupt, and not his employers, commends itself to the present
writer."
1. Erskinc, III.4.20.
2. Bell, Principles, s 1410. Adopted by J Graham Stewart, Diligence. (1898). p 173.
3. (1861) 23 D 343. I am grateful to Mr W James Wolffe for his thoughts upon this case.
4. See particularly Lord Benholmc at 350.
5. At 349. Certainly it is appears to he the view of Graham Stewart, p 173 that the ease concerns
lien.
6. It confers merely a right to detain.
7. See Lord Cowan at 349-350. However, his Lordship somewhat changes his mind in the subsequent
case of Moore v Gledden (1869) 7 M 1016 as to what constitutes possession.
167. Basis of the secured obligation : a heresy exposed. The established view is
that a lien secures only contractual obligations. Here are Gloag and Irvine :
"A right to retain any subject which is the property of another must be
founded on possession, and must rest on contract, express or implied".1 (my
emphasis)
According to Lord Young, lien is "just a contract of pledge collateral to another
contract of which it is an incident."2 In the view of Professor McBrydc, special lien
is purely "an instance of the mutuality principle" of the Scots law of contract.'
General lien too is widely acknowledged to exist only in the context of contract.
Professor Walker writes :
"In exceptional cases, however, a general right of lien is recognised, that is, a
right to withhold a thing possessed under a contract in security ... of the
whole balance due under all transactions between the parties."4 (my
emphasis).
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Support for all these statements can be found in the works of George Joseph Bell.3
However, only the last of them is correct. For whilst a general lien is only
recognised as arising exceptionally in certain cases of contract," special lien can not
be confined to situations where there has been a pre-existing agreement between the
parties in question. This much may be gleaned by looking down Bell's list of
examples of special lien, which is found in both his Commentaries and Principles.
On Bell's list appears a lien for salvage,7 which lie describes as "a most natural and
equitable right to those who, having saved the ship, cannot be compelled to deliver it
up till salvage be paid".8 The right applies to the vessel's cargo too.9
Whilst it is possible to have a salvage contract10 - for example, the owner of a
sunken ship contracts with a salvor to recover it - a salvage claim arises in the
absence of agreement by operation of law, as does the salvor's real right of lien.11 To
repeat the point, no pre-existing agreement between the parties is required.12
According to Gloag, the right of the salvor is an "exceptional" case of lien, which
rests on custom of trade rather than contract.13 This seems flawed, as Bell docs not
restrict the right to professional salvors. According to McBrydc, the lien is in fact
sui generis and therefore not an exception to the mutuality principle of contract.14
This is all very well, but the truth of the matter is that the salvor's right of retention
fits squarely within the accepted definition of lien as a right to retain possession of
another's property until he discharges an obligation.
Scots law recognises another right to retain possession independent of contract,
which none of our writers including Bell, seem to have noticed. This is the lien of a
bona fide possessor for improvements lie has made to a piece of property in the
mistaken belief that it is his own.13 This right comes from Roman law. Hence the
absence of a contract cannot be said to rest on custom, nor should the right be
simply dismissed as sui generis. The truth of the matter is that the identification of
this right of retention, along with that of the salvor, disproves the myth that lien is
merely part and parcel of the exccptio non adimplcti contractus.
1. Gloag and Irvine, p 341.
2. Miller v Hutchcson and Dixon (1881) 8 R 4X9. 492.
3. W W McBryde, Contract, p 311.
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4.DV1 Walker. Contract. (3rd ed. 14)95), p 535.
5. Support for Gloag and Irvine's statement may he found in his Principles at ss 1411 and 1412.
Support for Lord Young's statement may be found in his Commentaries, at 11.87. when he states that
retention "operates as a pledge constituted by tacit or implied consent". Support for McBryde and
Walker's statements may be found in the Principles at ss 1411. 1419 and 1431.
6. Sec below, paras 236-243.
7. Bell, Commentaries. 11,99: Principles, s 1427.
8. Bell. Principles, s 1427.
9. Bell, Commentaries, 11,99.
10. Sec for example, Otis v Kidston (1862) 24 D 419 and Mackenzie v Steam Herring Fleer Ltd
(1903) 10SLT 734.
11. Ibid, where Bell states : "There is in such a case a personal action also; but the first and most
proper remedy is in rem." It is now accepted that the salvor also has a maritime lien or hypothec
which does not require possession : sec W Guthrie's addendum to Bell. Principles, s 1397; Hatton v
A/S Durban Hansen 1919 SC 154: A R G McMillan, Scottish Maritime Practice. (1926). p 218.
but cf Gloag and Irvine, p 438.
12. According to Lowe in SME, vol 20, para 278 the maritime salvage lien is based on contract even
where there is no agreement between the shipowner and the salvor. This cannot be accepted. As D R
Thomas writes in his excellent contribution to British Shipping Laws, vol 14. "Maritime Liens", at
para 571 : "The right to salvage may arise under the general maritime law or under a salvage
agreement."
13. W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 481.
14. W W McBryde, Contract, p 316 fn 63.
15. Sec below, para 170.
168. Special lien ; a doctrine of the law of obligations. The thesis being
submitted here is that special lien is part of the law of obligations as a whole and not
just the law of contract. Its pedigree is a good one. Stair treats retention within his
title "Liberation from Obligations", as docs Bankton.1 Erskinc's treatment is similar.2
They all define retention in similar terms : a right to suspend performance of an
obligation until a counter claim is satisfied. Whilst counter claims are most readily
associated with rights under a contract, no where is it said within these institutional
writings that retention is confined to contractual obligations.
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It is submitted here tentatively that a special lien arises in Scots law if the following
three criteria arc met:
(1)A holds possession or custody of the property of B;3
(2) A has an obligation to return that property to B; and
(3) A has a counterclaim against B which is connected to the property.
The first of these criteria is discussed in detail elsewhere.3 The basis of the second
lies in the ownership of the property held. As it belongs to B, A has a duty to return
it to him if B requires his property back. If, however, the third criterion is satisfied
and A has a valid claim against B connected to the property, then A may exercise a
lien. The submission of this thesis is that the claim is capable of arising from any-
class of obligation which B owes to A. In other words it may rest in contract,
unjustified enrichment or delict.
1. Stair, 1.18.7; Bankton, 1.24.34.
2. Erskinc. III.4.20-21, within the title "Of the Dissolution of Obligations".
3. See below, paras 177-187.
169. Lien in the context of contract. As stated before, general liens only arise in a
contractual situation.1 Contract is also the most familiar area where special lien is
encountered. For example, A sends his car to the garage for repair. The garage
carries out the work and becomes entitled to detain the car until A pays his bill. A
special lien will only arise in a contractual situation where there arc synallgamatic
obligations between the parties.2 To be more precise, the obligation of the lien-
holder to return the property must be reciprocal to the obligation which he is
demanding that the other party perform. Thus in our example, the duty of the garage
to give A his car and the duty of A to pay his bill arc mutual obligations. The
theoretical basis of the lien here lies in the cxccptio non adimplcti contractus. ''
It must be noted here that a lien will not be validly constituted where detention of
the property amounts to a breach of the contract under which it is claimed to arise.4
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Thus, where a bill was sent to a banker for discount and he refused to discount it, the
court held that he could not exercise a lien over the bill.5 Likewise, a solicitor to
whom a client has given papers specifically so they will be produced in court, may
not claim a lien over them.h
A lien will not arise under a contract if that contract excludes the possibility of a lien
arising.' For example, where title deeds are handed to a solicitor with an obligation
to return them on demand, he may not assert a lien over them.8
1. See above, para 167.
2. See W W McBryde, Contract (19X7), p 311 and below, paras 236-243.
3. See above, para 128 and G H Treitel, Remedies for Breach ofContract. (19X8), pp 313-314.
4. Bell, Principles, s 1414; Gloag and Irvine, p 348; A J Sim, SMC. vol 20, para 71. The same
principle applies to retention of monetary sums : Stewart v Bisset (1770) Mor App Compensation
No 2; Middlcmas v Gibson 1910 SC 577.
5. Borthwick v Brcmncr (1833) 12 S 121.
6. Callman v Bell (1793) Mor 6255; Begg. p 211; Gloag and Irvine, p 348.
7. Bell, Commentaries. 11,91; Bell, Principles, s 1418; Gloag and Irvine, p 360; Bell. Principles, s
1421 (ship repairer's lien): J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland. (1964). p 293
(repairer's lien); Gilfillan v Henderson (1828) 6 S 880 (solicitor's lien); Robertson's Tr v Royal
Bank of Scotland (1890) 18 R 12, at 20 per Lord McLaren (banker's lien); Holmes v Stirling
(1892) 8 Sh Ct Rep 276 (solicitor's lien).
8. Crawfurd v Hodge (1831) 10 S 11.
170. Special lien in the context of unjustified enrichment. It would seem that
there arc two clear examples of enrichment liens in Scots law ; that of the bona fide
possessor for improvements and that of the salvor. Both may be viewed as special
liens, for they respectively secure the claim for recompense and the claim for
salvage, and nothing else.
Take first the lien of the bona fide possessor for improvements which comes from
Roman law.1 It is clearly an enrichment lien, for, as Bankton says, it is based upon
the rule nemo debet locuplctior fieri cum altcrius jactura.1 It secures the claim in
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recompense of the bona fide possessor for necessary and profitable expenses laid
out upon the property. However, voluptuary expenses are not secured.3
Unlike in Roman law, the Scottish courts have not upheld the right of retention at all
times. In two cases where the lien was pled against an heir of entail and in a ease
where the claimant had no written title, the claimant was told to remove himself and
seek recompense for his improvements thereafter in separate proceedings.4
However, these types of scenario would be uncommon today. Nevertheless, where a
purportedly bona fide possessor may more likely encounter difficulty now is with
the doctrine of constructive notice of the register, which the courts have developed
this century.3 If this doctrine is strictly adhered to here, then it becomes rather
difficult for a possessor to prove that he is bona fide.
Mr N R Whitty is sceptical about the existence of the bona fide possessor's lien in
Scots law at allh and cites the ease of Bcattic v Lord Napier in his support. There a
schoolhousc was erected on a piece of land which was known by all not to be owned
by the builders. The true owner sold on. Those who had done the building sought
recompense and pled retention when the singular successor tried to evict them. The
court found against them on both grounds. The truth, however, about Beattie as
Professor Rcid points out is that the issue of right of retention was clouded by the
fact that the possessors appear to have been in bad faith.8 For it is settled in Scots
law that mala fide possessors have no claim in recompense for meliorations and
consequently no right of retention.9
The main problem here is remembering the distinction between the claim in
recompense which is personal and the lien which is real. Of course it is highly
arguable that the policy grounds which restrict the claim in recompense should also
restrict the operation of any lien.10.
The salvor's lien must be viewed too as an enrichment lien, because but for the
salvor's actions the owner of the property in question would have suffered the loss of
his property to the sea.11 He is thus enriched by having his goods saved.
Where else docs Scots law recognise enrichment liens ? In the absence of authority
what must be looked for is situations within the context of unjustified enrichment
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where one party's property is in the possession of another who has an obligation to
return that property but also has a counterclaim in relation to the property.12
Ncgotiorum gestio is something which comes to mind. This is where someone steps
in to look after the affairs of another who at the time of intervention is unable to
manage them himself.13 It is not difficult to imagine a situation where a lien would
arise in favour of a ncgotiorum gestor.
For example,14 J owns a refrigerated warehouse in which he stores foodstuffs. J is
out of the country, when the power cables serving his warehouse arc blown down by
a storm. K, a friend of J, who has a refrigerated warehouse elsewhere acts as a
ncgotiorum gestor by removing the foodstuffs to his warehouse. In this situation, K
will be allowed to retain the goods until his expenses are met by J. For here we have
counter obligations : the obligation of K to return J's property and the obligation of J
to meet K's expenses.
As a matter of authority, Roman law gave the ncgotiorum gestor a ius retentionis.
Further, in South Africa the law is very similar. A ncgotiorum gestor, being a person
who has laid out necessary expenses upon a piece of property, is entitled to a
salvage lien.16 Being an enrichment lien, this gives him a real right in the property in
question.17 However, it must be noted that Mr Whitty, who considers the Roman and
South African authority, is of the clear opinion that no such lien is recognised by
Scots law.18 It may also be noted here that the laws of France and Louisiana give
non-possessory privileges in respect of expenses laid out on conserving a thing.14
In Scotland, as has been seen, there is clear authority recognising a lien in favour of
a bona fide possessor of land for improvements. It is submitted, that our law must
also recognise a similar right in respect of bona fide meliorations to corporeal
moveables. Indeed this is Professor Reid's view.20 The right is clearly recognised in
Roman law, South African law and in the law of Quebec.21
No doubt other examples may be found in the law of unjustified enrichment where a
special lien may arise. This is an area where Scots law is open to extension.
1. On the Roman law see above, para 122. On the Scots law, see Bankton, 1.8.15, 1.9.42 and II.9.68;
Binning v Brothers tones (1676) Mor 13401; York Buildings Co v Mackenzie (1797) 3 Pat 618;
Barbour v Halliday (1840) 2 D 1279; J Rankine, The Law of Land-ownership in Scotland, (4th
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cd. 1909), pp 89-90; W VI Gordon, Scottish Lund Law, (1989). p 418; K G C Rcid, SME, vol 18,
para 173.
2. Bankton, 11.9.68.
3. Bankton, 1.9.42. They are not secured because there is no claim in recompense for improvements
"of a fanciful sort, or such as arc suited only to the particular taste and humour of the late possessor" :
Hume, Lectures, 111,171.
4. Duke of Gordon v Innes (1824) 3 S 10; Vans Agnew v Earl of Stair (1824) 3 S 229; Sinclair v
Sinclair (1829) 7 S 342. There appears to have been a lack of good faith on behalf of the builder in
the last of these.
5. See Aberdeen Trades Council v Shipconstructors' etc Association 1949 SC (HL) 45; Trade
Development Bank v Warriner and Mason (Scotland) Ltd 1980 SLT 49, affd 1980 SC 74. 1980
SLT 223.
6. I am grateful to Mr Whitty for his comments. Note also his article "Indirect Enrichment in Scots
Law" 1994 JR 200, 206.
7. (1832) 9 S 639.
8. SME, vol 18, para 173, fn 11.
9. Erskine, III.1.11; Barbour v HaJIiday (1840) 2 D 1279; Duke of Hamilton v Johnston (1877)
14 SLR 298. All of these rejected Stair's opinion that mala fide possessors did have a claim : 1.8.6.
10. There are arguments on both sides. See N R Whitty, above, n 6.
11. Unless of course there is a salvage contract. See the preceding paragraph and Otis v Kidston
(1862) 24 D 419 and Mackenzie v Steam Herring Fleet Ltd (1903) 10 SLT 734.
12. See above, para 168.
13. See W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, (10th ed. 1995), para
22.31; N R Whitty, SME, vol 15, paras 87-143.
14. The example is very loosely based on Kolbin & Sons v Kinnear & United Shipping Co 1931
SC (HL) 128.
15. D 12.6.33; Buckland, p 538.
16. Hochmetals Africa (Pty) Ltd v Otavi Mining Co (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 571 (SA); H S
Silberberg and J Schoeman, The Law of Property, (3rd ed, 1992), pp 464-465; A J Van der Walt
and G J Pienaar, Introduction to the Law of Property, (1996), p 373; T J Scott, LAWSA, vol 15,
para 110; Wille's Law ofMortgage and Pledge in South Africa, (3rd ed. ed Scott and Scott, 1987).
p 87; D H van Zyl, Negotiorum Gestio in South African Law, (1985), pp 78-80.
17. Ibid', Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetzc and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A).
18. N R Whitty, SME, vol 15, para 128. He points out that there exists no Scottish authority
recognising a lien here. This is correct. He adds that "probably a new species of subordinate real right
can only be created by the legislature." This is also correct, but the point here is that Scots law is
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capable of recognising an enrichment lien in favour of a gestor on general principles of the law of
retention, thus it is not a question of creating a new subordinate real right.
19. French Civil Code, art 2103(3); Civil Code of Louisiana, art 3217(6).
20. KGC Reid, SME, vol 18. para 173.
21. On the Roman law, sec above para 121. On the South African law see Savory v Baklochi 1907
TS 524: New Club Garage v Millborrow & Son 1931 GWL 86; LAWSA, vol 15, para 112:
Wille's Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa, p 88. For Quebec, sec the Civil Code of
Quebec, art 974.
171. Lien in the context of delict. Delict is a less obvious place to find
retention or lien operating, for it is an area which generally sees only one of the
involved parties having obligations, not both of them. For example, Stevenson owed
Mrs Donoghue a duty of care when producing his ginger beer.1 She, on the other
hand, had no obligation to him. Thus the key ingredients of counter obligations and
one party in possession of the property of another, do not regularly present
themselves in the context of delict.
It is nonetheless possible to produce a couple of statutory examples of delictual
liens. Under the Winter Herding Act 1686 (c 11) the owner of "horses, nolt, sheep,
swine or goats" straying on another's land is made liable, in addition to his liability
for any damage done, in a penalty of half a merk for each beast, and the beasts could
be retained until this and the expenses of keeping them are met.2 This Act may or
may have not been declaratory of the common law. Certainly the situation is ripe for
the creation of a lien. On the one hand the owner of the animals has a right to get his
property back. On the other hand his neighbour has a claim for damages. As he
holds the animals, he may detain them until his counterclaim is met.
The Winter Herding Act has been repealed in recent years and the replacement
legislation only confers a right of retention in order to prevent damage.3 It is a nice
question whether a right of retention exists at common law until damages are paid
for damage already caused, although obviously there is no right in respect of the
fixed penalty now abolished. The new legislation of course may be seen as a
complete statutory code, thus excluding such a claim.
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The other statutory example is still in force and concerns ports. The provisions of
most private Acts of Parliament relating to harbour authorities incorporate the terms
of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 which allow the detention by a
harbour authority of any vessel causing damage to harbour works in any
circumstances and the retention of vessel until security for repairs is given.4
In terms of hypothetical examples of where lien may arise in terms of delict, one
which springs to mind is if a car crashes through a fence and lands in someone's
garden. The owner of the garden arguably has a lien until he is reimbursed for the
damage. No doubt there may be other examples.3 It is certainly the case in German
law, that an individual has a lien in personam (Zuriickbehaltungsrccht) where he has
a claim in respect of any damage caused to him by an object which he is holding.'1
One matter which may be considered is the fact that a delictual lien will secure a
claim for damages, rather than a fixed amount of money already set down in a
contract. However, the courts arc happy for a lien to be exercised in order to secure
the payment of damages due for breach of contract.' Hence there cannot be a
problem in allowing a similar exercise in respect of damages due for a liability in
delict.
1. Donoghuc v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31.
2. See Fraser v Smith (1899) 1 F 487; W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of
Scotland, (8th ed, 1980), p 517; J Rankine, Landownership, (4th ed, 1909), p 611. Sec also the
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Security, (1941), s 61(i), which provides a
similar right.
3. Animals (Scotland) Act 1987 (c 9), s 3.
4. Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 (c 27) s 74. See JAG Lowe, SME, vol 20, para 298.
5. It is arguable that the cars in Black v Carmichael 1992 SLT 897 could lawfully be detained until
damages for trespass were received. However, such damages would be minimal given that all which
was involved was a few hours parking, with no damage caused to the property. The levelling of a
hefty fee (£45) for the wheel clamps to be removed, as was done there, would consequently still
amount to extortion.
6. BGB. art 273(2).
7. See below, para 211; Moore's Carving Machine Co v Austin (1890) 33 SLR 613; Marshall v




172. General. According to Bell, it may be said of retention or lien that:
"Strictly speaking, it is applicable to corporeal subjects only, but is extended
to debts."1
This section examines precisely what sorts of property it is competent to have a lien
upon.
1. Bell, Principles, s 1410. This comes within the context of the major heading "Real Rights ot
Property and Possession in Moveables".
173. Corporeal moveables. It is universally accepted that it is competent to have a
lien over corporeal moveable property.1 This is very much the type of property most
readily associated with lien. The case law contains many examples, including : title
deeds;2 papers in general;3 ships;4 horses;5 engines;6 bleached goods;' grain;3
potatoes;9 electrical appliances;10 household goods;11 a refreshment trailer;12; cars;1-'
and luggage.14 A lien, however, may not be exercised where this would frustrate the
provisions of a statute.13 Hence a register of shareholders of a company which must
be kept open for inspection at the company's registered office cannot be made the
subject matter of a lien.16 It would seem clear that a company's seal and charter may
not be retained either.17
1. Sec D M Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974), p 64; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 475.
Bell treats lien in his Commentaries in a chapter entitled "Of Securities over Moveables in the
Nature of Real Right resulting from Possession": 11,86.
2. Ormc v Barclay (1778) Mor 6251; Creditors of Newlands v Mackenzie (1793) Mor 6255;
Mcnzies v Murdoch (1841) 4 D 257; Garden Haig Scott & Wallace v Stevenson's Tr 1962 SLT
78.
3. Ayton v Colvillc (1705) Mor 6247; Meikle & Wilson v Pollard (1880) 8 R 69; Rcid v
Galbraith (1893) 1 SLT 273.
4. Ban and Shearer v Cooper (1873) 11 M 651; (1875) 2 R (HL) 14; Ross & Duncan v Baxter &
Co (1885) 13 R 185; Garscadden v Ardrossan Dry Dock Co Ltd 1910 SC 178.
5. Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon (1881) 8 R 489.
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6. Republic of the Sudan v Sagax Aviation Ltd 1990 GWD 29-1681.
7. Lcsly v Hunter (1752) Mor 2660: Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440;
Anderson's Tr v Fleming (1871) 9 VI ft 18.
8. Laurie & Co v Denny 's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404.
9. Paton's Trs v Finlayson 1923 SC 872.
10. National Homecarc Ltd v Belling & Co Ltd 1994 SL.T 50.
11. Bon Accord Removals v Hainsworth 1993 GWD 28-1785.
12. Hostess Mobile Catering v Archibald Scott Ltd 1981 SC 185.
13. Camtvne Motors v Curran 1958 SLT (Sh Ct) ft.
14. Bcrmans and Nathans Ltd v Weibvc 1983 SLT 299.
15. A J Sim, SME. vol 20, para 96; DTC(CNC) Ltd v Gary Sargent & Co [ 1996] 2 All ER 369.
16. Liquidator of Garpcl Haematite Co Ltd v Garpe! (1866) 4 VI 617: In re Capital Fire
Insurance Association (1883) 24 Ch D 408.
17. York Buildings Co v Robertson (1805) Mor App Hypothec No 2.
174. Incorporeal moveables. It is not very difficult to find examples of a lien being
said to be conferred upon incorporeal moveable property. For example, at common
law and usually also by its Articles of Association a company has a lien over shares
in security of debts owed by the shareholder to the company.1 In truth the lien here
is the right to retain the money which the shares represent.2 Another example is a
factor being said to have a lien over the price of goods he has sold on behalf of his
principal.3 Many instances of the judiciary using "lien" in the context of incorporeal
moveable property may be found in our law reports.4
The background to such usage lies in the fact that "lien" originally came into Scots
law as a term for nexus which was equally applicable to all types of property."1
Conceptually, however, there is a clear difference between retention of possession
of corporeal moveables and retention of incorporcals such as debts. The former rests
on a subordinate real right, whereas the latter rests upon dominium. When a person
buys shares in a company they in effect transfer their money to it in return for the
shares. When a factor is paid by a buyer of the goods of his principal, the price
becomes the factor's. He must of course account to his principal and it is in this
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process of accounting that he may retain the money until obligations owed by the
principal to him are discharged.
It is felt important that the conceptual distinction be recognised by referring to eases
involving retention of incorporeal property in terms of "retention" and not "lien". In
many eases this usage has already been adopted. For example, the right of a tenant
to retain rent until his landlord discharges his obligations in terms of the lease has
always been referred to as a right of retention and not as a lien.6
An exception to the general rule is admitted in the case of negotiable instruments,
over which it is possible to have a lien. If one takes the argument that a holder of a
bill of exchange is its owner then in most cases any right of retention must be
considered to be based on that ownership and therefore not to be a lien/ However, a
person in possession of an order bill not endorsed to them cannot be a holder and in
relevant circumstances may have a lien. It must be said that the ease law on
negotiable instruments tends to avoid these conceptual niceties and adopts a wide
usage of lien."
1. Hotchkis v Royal Bank (1797) 3 Pat 61<S; Burns v Lawric's Trs (1840) 2 D 1348: Stark v Fife
and Kinross Coal Company (1899) 1 F 1173.
2. D M Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974), p 64.
3. Bell, Commentaries, II. 111; Levitt v Cleasby (1823) 2 S 184; Miller v McNair (1852) 14 D 955
at 961 per Lord Mcdwyn.
4. For example Lord Ivory in Dickson v Nicholson (1855) 17 D 1011; Brown v Smith (1893) 1
SLT 158 ("lien" of auctioneer on price of goods sold).
5. See above, para 154.
6. See W VI Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed, 1929), pp 628-630; W W McBrydc, Contract, (1987), pp 310-
311.
7. Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (c 61), s 27(3); Byles on Bills of Exchange, (26th ed), pp 226-227.
For the effect of a banker's lien in relation to negotiable instruments, see Bell, Principles, s 1451;
Gloag and Irvine, pp 372ff; Robertson's Trustee v Royal Bank of Scotland (1890) 18 R 12 at p
20 per Lord McLaren.
8. This is the view of Professor Gretton expressed in "The Concept of Security" in D J Cusinc (cd).
A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany, (1987). p 126. at p 144.
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9. For example, Brandao v Burnett (1846) 12 CI & Fin "87: 8 ER 1622: London Chartered Bank
of Australia v White (1879) 4 App C'as 413: Rolvrtson's Tr v Royal Bank of Scotland (1890) 18
R 12; Barclays Bank Ltd v Astley Industrial Trust f 1970] 2 QB 527. See further Shaw, p 66.
175. Land. According to Professor Walker:
"The right of retention or lien can be exercised in respect of corporeal
moveables only, not of heritage."1
Certainly it is the orthodox view that lien is a moveable security, no more, no less.2
However, this ignores the existence of the lien of the bona fide possessor for
improvements made to land. An enrichment lien, rather a lien resting on contract, its
nature has been discussed elsewhere.3 It is quite clear therefore that lien is not
restricted to corporeal moveables.
There remains the question of whether there can be a lien upon land arising by
agreement. On this issue Gloag writes :
"The doctrine of lien founded on possession under a contract of employment
has no application to heritable property."4
He cites two cases to support this proposition. One concerns a tenant retaining
possession after the reduction of his lease till refunded for improvements.- The court
held he had no right to retain. However the basis of the decision has nothing to do
with the fact that land is involved, but rather that a tenant has no claim in these
circumstances and consequently no right of retention either.6 In the other ease
railway contractors tried to retain possession of a railway until certain claims were
met by their employer.7 In the opinion of the court they could not do this, as in the
words of Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis their possession could only be retained "so long
and to such an extent as is necessary for the performance of the contract."6 This can
be read as being a condition peculiar to the contract in question. However, the
judgements contain some dicta which seem to deny the possibility of a lien upon
land.9
Professor McBrydc, on the other hand, sees no reason why there cannui be a
heritable lien based on the mutuality principle of the Scots law of contract.10 His
208
dismissal of the two eases above is not entirely convincing." Of greater concern is
his statement that :
"The possible objection [to the recognition of such a lien] that it is
inconvenient to have latent rights affecting heritage can be met by pointing
out that retention is not effective against third parties."12
His point is not correct. Lien is a real right and will be effective against third
parties.13 However, the right is in fact not a latent one as it depends on possession.
An unregistered servitude is arguably more latent as it only requires occasional
exercise to prevent it from negatively prescribing.14 In the Land Register there exist
a considerable number of rights known as "overriding interests" which do not
require to be registered, and it would seem that a lien could quite easily be one of
these rights.15 Registration is not the be all and end all of land law. Given this, there
seems no reason why a lien should not be exercised in respect of heritable
property.16 This certainly is the position in France and South Africa."Logically, the
cxccptio non adimplcti contractus should apply as much to immoveables as to
moveables.
1.DM Walker. Civil Remedies, (1974), p 64.
2. Thus Bell treats lien within a chapter entitled "Of Securities over Moveables in the Nature of Real
Right resulting from Possession" in his Commentaries, 11,86. In his Principles the treatment falls
within a section entitled "Real Rights of Property and Possession in Moveables".
3. See above, para 170.
4. W M Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed, 1929), p 632. See also his contribution to the Encyclopaedia, vol
9, para 475.
5. Turner v Turner (1811) Hume 854.
6. Bankton, II.9.68: Erskinc, III. 1.33: J Rankine, The Law of Leases in Scotland, p 260.
7. Castle-Douglas and Dumfries Ry Co v Lee (1859) 22 D 18.
8. At 23.
9. The Lord Ordinary (Jcrviswoode) states at 21 : "The respondents maintain, in the first place, that
they are in possession of the line, and have a right of lien or of retention over it. as in security of their
claims ... No authority in the law of Scotland has been referred to in support of the proposition as
applied to an heritable subject as that in question". At 23, Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis states : "Any
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notion of a lien or right of retention in heritable subjects of this kind is totally out of the question, and
was not contended for."
10. W W McBryde, Contract, (1987), pp 315-316,
11. As regards Turner v Turner he states that there was no right of retention because the lease had
been reduced. But the law still allows a claim for recompense when a title has ben reduced, in cases
not involving a tenant : Binning v Brotherstoncs (1676) Mor 13401; K G C Rcid, S.VIE. vol 18,
para 173. As regards the Castle-Douglas Ry Co case, he states that the contractors never had
possession. What Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis in fact says is that both the contractors and the
landowners have possession, but the former's title is inferior to the hitter's.
12. Op citn 10 at p 315.
13. See below, paras 193-197.
14. After the servitude is constituted either by possession on the basis of a writ, or by 20 years
positive prescription under s 3 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 (c 52). it need
only be exercised every 20 years to stop it from negatively prescribing under s 8 of the 1973 Act.
15. Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 (c 33), s 28(1). A lien fits within the definition of (j) : a
right or interest of any person, being a right which has been made real, otherwise by the recording of
a deed in the Register of Sasines or by registration.
16. As stated, this is also Professor McBryde's view, but for quite different reasons : Contract, pp
315-316.
17. See M Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, vol 2, (1959), s 2521 for France. Sec T J Scott, LAWSA. vol
15, para 119 for South Africa.
6. THE PRE REQUISITES OF LIEN
176. General. Being a right in security a lien requires for its foundation a debt or
obligation ad factum pracstandum, the performance of which it secures.' The
categories of obligation which may be secured by a lien have already been
discussed.2 The second requirement for the constitution is that the creditor in the
obligation holds the property over which the lien is being claimed, in order that he
may with-hold it from the debtor and thereby enforce his security. This pre-rcquisitc
is examined in detail below.3
An interesting matter which has never been the subject of previous examination in
Scotland is the question of when the right in security actually comes into existence.
The answer hen; must be that the real right arises when both pre-requisitcs are
present. With special lien, the property normally will have come into the creditor's
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hands before the debt becomes exigible. For example, goods arc sent to be repaired.
Only on the repairer carrying out the work does the repair bill become chargeable.
Only at this point docs the lien arise. In general lien, the debt will often pre-date the
delivery of the property. For example, a document sent to a solicitor in September
may validly be held to secure conveyancing charges incurred in August.
The question of when a lien comes into existence is particularly important in the
case of an insolvency. It is settled beyond doubt that a lien will not be effectual
unless the property came into the creditor's hands prior to the debtor being
sequestrated, or in the ease of a company, liquidated.4 Provided that the property
was delivered in the ordinary course of business a lien is unlikely to be struck down
as an unfair preference.5 It is difficult to find authority as regards the situation where
the property came into the lien-holder's hands before the debtor was sequestrated but
the debt only arose after the sequestration. Applying general principles, there can be
no valid lien here, because the law docs not permit the creation of real securities
after a sequestration.6
1. Gloag and Irvine, p 341; A J Sim. SMIL vol 20. para 66.
2. See above, paras 165 -17 i.
3. See below, paras 177-184.
4. Bell. Commentaries. 11,89; Gloag and Irvine, pp 344-346; H Goudy, Bankruptcy, (4th cd, 1914).
p 543; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 470; D M Walker, Civil Remedies. (1974), p 67; A J
Sim, SME. vol 20, para 69; Jackson v Fenwick's 7r(1899) 6 SLT 319. The same principle applies
to retention of money : Meldrum's Trs v Clark (1826) 5 S 122; Dickson v Nicholson (1855) 17 D
1011; Stevenson, Lauder & Gilchrist v Macbrayne (1896) 23 R 496 and Scottish Union and
National Insurance Co v Fairley (1900) 8 SLT 154.
5. Anderson's Tr v Fleming (1871) 9 M 718. See also Crockhart's Tr v Hay & Co Ltd 1913 SC
509.
6. See, for example, Gloag and Irvine, pp 4 and 8-9.
177. The need for possession. It is a truth universally acknowledged that a
man who is not in possession of a piece of property will be in want of a lien upon it.'
Thus the very first thing which Bell says about retention in his Principles is : "This
right results from possession."2 In the view of Goudy, "Lien is the child of
possession."3 Similarly Sim writes that;
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"[A] lien demands possession of the security subjects by the person asserting
the lien."4
Statements such as these resound down the last two centuries.3 They are usually
followed by other statements making it clear that it is possession which is required
and that mere custody will not suffice.6 A whole train of cases is regularly cited to
prove this point. For the Scottish courts have held that following parties do not have
a lien : a clerk or servant with regard to his employer's horses;' persons employed to
cut wood under the supervision of the estate manager with regard to that wood;8 a
branch manager with regard to a liquor licence;4 and a company secretary with
regard to the books of the company.10
1. With apologies to Jane Austen and the first line of Pride and Prejudice.
2. Bell, Principles, s 1410.
3. H Goudy, Bankruptcy, (4th ed, 1914), p 543. Lien is similarly described in the pleadings in
Malcolm v Bannatyne 15 Nov LSI3. FC.
4. A J Sim, SME, vol 20. para 68.
5. See Bell, Commentaries, 11,87; Hume, Lectures, 111.57: Gloag and Irvine, p 341; W M Gloag,
Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 464; D M Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974), p 66; W A Wilson. Debt.
(2nd ed, 1991), para 7.7; Lev/'ff v Cleasby (1823) 2 S 184 per the Lord Ordinary.
6. For example, Gloag and Irvine, pp 342-343; D M Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974), p 66: D J
Cusine and ADM Forte. Scottish Cases and Materials in Commercial Law, (1987), p 159; A J
Sim, SME, vol 20, para 70.
7. Burns v Bruce & Baxter (1799) Hume 29.
8. Callum v Ferriert1822) 2 S 102; affd (1825) 1 W & S 399.
9. Clift v Portobello Pier Co (1877) 4 R 462.
10. Gladstone v McCallum (1896) 23 R 783; Barnton Hotel Co Ltd v Cook (1899) I F 1190. Sec
also the comparative authority of Dickson v Nicholson (1855) 17 D 1011 where it was held that a
commercial traveller could not retain money in security of his salary being paid.
178. The difference between custody and possession. To work on the basis that
possession will found a lien whereas custody will not, requires that the difference
between the two be known. With custody, the property in question is held
exclusively for another. A custodier has no animus to hold the property for his own
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use.1 Conversely, a possessor has such an animus. He holds for his own rights and
interests.2 The distinction has often been blurred. Here is Lord Ivory from 1856 :
"[TJhere have, in our own law, arisen sometimes considerable difficulties as
to the distinction between custody and possession. Questions may arise as to
goods, which, in a certain sense, arc in custody, if in the hands of a workman
who gets them for the special purpose of performing operations upon them, -
which being performed, the article has been changed in shape, and is, in its
changed state, restored to the owner. The workman has the custody, but the
possession is still in the proprietor. Again, a carrier has a limited custody, but
not possession. A manufacturer has, perhaps, a higher right, but still he has
not possession. He is merely the hand which holds the goods for a certain
purpose, and his custody is the possession of the proprietor."3
As Professor Rcid writes, this is a useful passage.4 It gives us the information that
workmen, carriers and manufacturers only have custody. However, the absorption of
this information leads to the recognition of a major problem. Those who have done
work upon goods, those who have carried goods and those who have manufactured
goods may only have custody of those goods. Nevertheless the law is clearly settled
that these individuals arc entitled to a lien.5 Further, it is not very difficult to think of
another clear example of a lien based on mere custody. That is the lien of the
warehouseman or storekeeper, which Gloag and Irvine openly accept to be founded
on mere custody and not possession.6 Indeed there have been other times when the
judiciary have referred to lien being based on custody rather than possession.
1. Stair, 11.1.17; K G C Rcid, SME. vol 18. para 125; D M Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974). p 66; W
M Gordon, Scottish Land Law. (19X9), paras 14.03-14.06; D L Carey Miller, Corporeal
Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), paras 1.13-1.14.
2. Ibid.
3. Hamilton v Western Bank (1X56) 19 D 152, at 161.
4. SME. vol IX, para 125. n 7.
5. Bell, Commentaries. 11,94-97; 11.100; and 11.104: Gloag and Irvine, pp 349-352 and 400-403;
Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440: Stevenson v Likly (1X24) 3 S 291:
Peebles & Son v Caledonian Railway Co( 1X75) 2 R 346.
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6. Reid v Watson (1836) 14 S 223: Laurie & Co v Denny's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404: Gloag and Irvine,
p 342. See also A J Sim, SME. vol 20. para 70.
7. For example. York Buildings Co v Robertson (1805) VIor App Hypothec No 2 (lien of Governor
of a company based on custody of papers).
179. Lien based upon custody. The thesis to be advanced tcnatively here is that a
lien need only be based on custody rather than possession.1 One exception must be
immediately admitted and that is the lien of the bona fide possessor for
improvements.2 It goes without saying that this right depends on possession because
a person cannot be a bona fide possessor unless he believes the property in question
is his and therefore has the animus to possess. As regards the other cases of lien, it
has already been seen that those who perform operations to a subject,
manufacturers, carriers and storekeepers all have mere custody.' They do not have
an animus to hold the property in their own interest as they carry out their jobs. They
merely hold property for its owner while they carry out some function with respect
to it.
The same logic may be applied to other traditional instances of lien. Solicitors do
not hold title deeds for their own benefit. They hold them because they arc acting for
their clients.4 Factors do not hold their principals' property for their own use. They
hold it because their principals have given them a job to do in respect of that
property. A banker no more possesses negotiable instruments deposited with him by
his customer than a storekeeper possesses goods deposited with him by his.3 It
seems quite clear therefore that the majority of liens are based on custody and not
possession. If exceptions to this rule arc sought, then in addition to the lien of the
bona fide possessor, one might point to the lien of the unpaid seller for according to
statute it rests on possession.6 However, it in many ways is no ordinary lien.7
1. It is not the first time that a writer has recognised that a lien may be founded upon custody. Most
previous accounts, however, arc very confusing. For example. J J Gow, The Mercantile and
Industrial Law of Scotland, writes at p 292 that lien "is the right of the custodier of the property of
another to retain it . . ." But at p 293 he writes that lien "arises from and continues with possession."
See also Gloag and Irvine, pp 342-343 and A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 70.
2. See above, para 170.
3. See the preceding paragraph.
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4. Thus in the early ease of Mitchcl v McAdam 11712) Mor 11096, reference was made to papers
subject to a law agent's lien being in his "custody". See further. Stevenson v Robertson-Durham
(1904) 20 Sh Ct Rep 319. at 322 per Sheriff Maeonochie.
5. On the tricky issue of liens upon negotiable instruments, see above, para 174.
6. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54). ss 39 and 41-43. In fact the lien can be asserted when the seller is
acting as "custodier" for the buyer: s 41(2).
7. See A P Bell, p 137. For example, the lien-holder unlike most others has an automatic right of sale
: 1979 Acts 39(1 Me).
180. Lien based upon custody : criticism. The proposition that lien may rest on
custody is not late twentieth century iconoclasm. Authority for it may be found in
the judgement of Sir Hay Campbell, the Lord President in the important 1791
decision of Harper's Creditors v Faulds.1 Speaking in the context of the lien of a
person who has performed work upon a subject he says :
"But the goods arc delivered for a precise and special purpose, and for no
other; there is no idea of transferring the property, nor of giving it in pledge,
nor of transferring even the possession in a legal sense : the artificer has the
mere naked custody of the goods; the civil possession is with the owner : the
actual possession or custody may be with him too."2
Therefore, just to stress the point, the lien here rests not on possession but on mere
naked custody. The workman could not have a barer title. Professor More criticises
the Lord President's reasoning.3 He sees retention as the equivalent of arrestment. In
other words if another creditor can arrest the property in the hands of the holder,
then the holder too has right : he may retain the property for what he is owed. More
argues that if the holder has only custody and not possession then the property
cannot be arrested in his hands and that consequently no right of retention is
competent cither.
This argument, however, docs not find support in the law of arrestment. The fact of
the matter is that where property is in the hands of a person other than the owner in
terms of a contract involving mutual obligations, possession is regarded as not being
with the owner so an arrestment is competent.4 Bell gives the examples of carriers,
shipmasters, factors and depositaries."' On the other hand where property is held by
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persons with no right to prevent the owner demanding his goods, for example,
servants, clerks or stewards, arrestment is incompetent."
A more convincing argument is that while liens regularly arise in situations where
the creditor has mere custody, the actual creation of the real right transmutes the
creditor's holding from custody into possscssion. For example, a carrier transports
goods. While transporting them he has custody. When he has completed his job, he
has a lien in respect of his charges. The existence of such a lien means that the
carrier is holding the property for his own use, that is until he is paid. He therefore
arguably has the necessary animus for possession.
The present writer is reluctant to come to a definite conclusion here. Certainly such
an argument conflicts with the high authority of Lord President Campbell. On the
other hand, civilian and mixed systems elsewhere accept that lien-holders have
possession.7 The problem is that the Scots law of possession is badly in need of
research and analysis. All that may be concluded here is that the traditional thesis
stating that possession will found a lien and custody will not is of doubtful validity.
1. (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440.
2. At p 472. Note also Bogle v Dunmore & Co (1787) Mor 14216, where the court accepted that a
shipowner as carrier was regarded as not having possession of the goods. Sec Gloag and Irvine, p
283.
3. More, iVotes to Stair's Institutions, exxxi, at exxxv.
4. Bell, Commentaries, (2nd cd), p 470; (7th ed), 11.70.
5. Ibid: Appin's Creditors (1760) Mor 749: Matthew v Fawns (1842) 4 D 1242; Kellas v Brown
(1856) 18 D 1089.
6. Bell, Commentaries, 11,70, citing Cunningham v Home (1760) Mor 747.
7. For Germany, sec F Baur, Lehrbuch des Sachenrcchts, (13th ed, 1985), p 540. For Quebec, see J
B Claxton, Security on Property and the Rights of Secured Creditors under the Civil Code of
Quebec, (1994). para 7.2.3. For South Africa, see T J Scott. LA WSA, vol 15. paras 100-102.
181. Custody and servants. In the last paragraph it was seen that the law of
arrestment makes a distinction between property being held by parties other than the
owner in general and property being held by the owner's servants. However, this
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dichotomy is not restricted to arrestment, it is found in the law of lien too. For it
appears to be the ease that the traditional statement that possession will found a lien
whereas custody will not, should be replaced with the statement that mere custody
will not found a lien in the case of servants. This proposition is borne out by looking
at the cases referred to above, which have traditionally been used to say that there
can be no lien based only on custody.
In the 1799 ease of Bums v Bruce and Baxter,1 Mr Burns was employed by Messrs
Marshall and Company of Berwick as a clerk at Edinburgh in charge of the
company's horses. When the company discontinued trading, lie sought to retain the
animals until his wages and disbursements were met. At the same time other
creditors of the company arrested the horses in his hands. In terms of a
multiplcpoinding :
"The Court were of opinion, that Burns had possession of the horses in the
capacity of clerk or servant to Messrs Marshall and Co, and that arrestment
for their debt was hcrcfore not competent in his hands, - as also, that, for the
like reason, Burns had no right of retention of the horses for any debt due by
the company to himself."2
In Callum v Fcrricr a person employed to cut wood was under the superintendence
of the manager of the employer.3 The employee was held to have no right of
retention. In Clift v Portobcllo Pier Co a manager on a written contract of service
who was summarily dismissed was decreed to return a liquor licence forthwith.4
Finally, in the cases of Gladstone v McCallunf and Bamton Hotel Co Ltd v Cook" it
was held that a company secretary has no lien over the books of the company. In
both of these the judges pointed out that the secretary was the employee or servant
of the company.' However, they went on to say that this fact meant that he did not
have the possession necessary to constitute a lien.8 The matter is better analysed
simply in terms of as lie was a servant the secretary had no lien.4
1.(1799) Hume 29.
2. At 30.
3. (1822) 2 S 102; affd (1825) 1 W & S 399.
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4. (1877) 4 R 462.
5. (1896) 23 R 783.
6. (1899) 1 F 1190.
7. Gladstone v \lcCallum (1896) 23 R 783, at 784 per Lord President Robertson; Bnrnton Hotel
Co Ltd v Cook (1899) 1 F 1190, at 1193 per Lords Kinncar and McLaren.
8. Ibid. Lord McLaren in Gladstone, at 785 makes a comparison with a solicitor "who is lawfully in
possession of his client's papers under a contract of agency."
9. Note here also the case of Dickson v Nicholson (1855) 17 D 1011 where a travelling salesman
was not allowed to retain money in security of his salary. Lord Ivory at 1014 referred to him as a
"mere traveller".
182. English influence. It can be seen that there is some coherence between the
cases to the effect that servants arc not entitled to a lien under Scots law. The
question of how this rule originated is an interesting one. Professor McBryde, for
one, docs not see it as a good rule, being of the view that contracts of employment
should be treated no differently from other contracts and that servants should be
entitled to liens.1 It would appear to be the case that in fact there is English influence
here.
In English law there exists a concept called bailment which refers to the owner of
movable property placing it in the possession of another party.- That other party is
referred to as a "bailee". The long established position is that an employee or
servant cannot be a bailee.3 Here is Palmer, the leading authority on bailment :
"It has been stated on innumerable occasions that a servant who, as a
concomitant of his employment, acquires custody of his master's goods does
not in ordinary circumstances become a bailee. Possession is deemed to
remain in the master in such circumstances".4
Most bailees in English law have liens, for example, carriers, repairers and
storekeepers.3 Servants, on the other hand, have no such rights. This is all very
resonant of the opinions expressed in the Gladstone and Barnton Hotel cases
referred to above that an employee docs not have the possession to found a lien.13
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The mix up in the Scottish law of lien between custody and possession would
appear to have its foundations in Bell paying too much heed to English authority. He
seems to have overlooked the fact that the element of intention in possession is
different north and south of the border. In England the requisite animus is an
intention to exclude others.7 In Scotland it is an intention to hold for one's own usc.x
A lien-holder does have an intention to exclude others, for example thieves.
However, whether he intends to hold for his own use is far more questionable, a
matter which has been discussed above." One only has to look at Bell's section on
possession in the context of lien in his Commentaries to see that it is almost wholly
based on English law.10
Accepting that there has been considerable English influence here enables
conclusions to be drawn. In the first place, the fact that an individual only has
custody of property docs not prevent a lien from arising." This is a minimum
requirement, hence holders with the additional animus necessary for possession may
also have a lien. In the second place, employees or servants cannot have a lien
simply because they only hold as employees or servants and therefore cannot detain
their masters' goods.
1. W W MeBrydc, Contract, (1987), pp 313-314.
2. See Sir William Jones. .4/1 Essay on the Law of Bailments. (1781); G W Paton, Bailment in the
Common Law. (1952); Halsbury. vol 2. para 1801-1892; 4 P Bell, chapter 5; N E Palmer.
Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991).
3. G W Paton. Bailment in the Common Law. (1952), p 4. adopting the definition of bailment in Sir
Frederick Pollock and R S Wright. Possession. (1888), p 163.
4. N E Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), p 456.
5. Paton. pp 184-195 and pp 273-277; Halsbury, vol 28. paras 534-541: I Davies, Textbook on
Commercial Law. (1992). pp 321-323.
6. See the preceding paragraph.
7. Paton, above, p 9.
8. Stair, 11.1.17; KGC Reid, SME, vol 18, para 125.
9. Sec above, para 180.
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10. Bell, Commentaries, 11,87-91. Most of the eases he relies upon are English, for example,
Heywood v Waring (1815) 4 Camp 291: Kinloeli v Craig (1789) 3 TR 119: 100 ER 487 and
Krugcr v Wilcox (1755) Amh 252: 77 ER 168.
11. As much seems to have been accepted by Gloag in the Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 464. Under
the title "Lien is dependent on possession", he writes "Possession, in this particular, involves both
physical custody and a right to possess." He does not substantiate what he means by "right to
possess".
183. Types of holding which may found lien. Bell was of the opinion that only
actual possession of the property in question was capable of establishing a lien upon
it. He wrote :
"It is not sufficient that goods or money have been sent, with orders to be
delivered to the person claiming the lien, if they have not actually come into
his custody."1
As we have seen, mere custody rather than actual possession may well be enough.2
The question of whether the property is being held in a manner effective to create a
lien is one of fact.3 Thus in one case,4 shipbuilders contracted with a firm of
engineers to place engines in a ship. The vessel was towed to the public harbour of
Lcith for the engines to be fitted. This work was duly carried out. At all times one of
the shipbuilders' men remained aboard the ship and, further, the contract provided
that the vessel was "throughout in charge of the shipbuilders". It was held that these
facts meant that the engineers never obtained possession of the ship and therefore
could not assert a lien over it.5
The courts have been of the opinion that, contrary to Bell, civil possession too may
form the basis of a lien. Thus in Gairdncr v Milne & Cob a factor was held entitled
to retain an insurance policy belonging to his principal when in fact the policy was
held for the factor by a policy broker and had never been in the factor's custody.'
There appears to be no cases which sanction the possibility of a lien by symbolical
possession.8
1. Bell. Commentaries, 11,87. He cites Kinloch v Craig (1789) 3 TR 119: 100 ER 487 and Young v
Stein's Tr( 1789) Mor 14218 in support of his proposition. Both cases involve bills of lading.
2. Sec the preceding paragraph.
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3. Glong and Irvine, pp 341-342: W A Wilson. Debt, (2nd cd. 1991), para 7.7: Burr & Shearer v
Cooper( 1X75) 2 R (HL) 14: Pa ton'* Trs v Finlayson 1923 SC «X72.
4. Ross <& Duncan v Baxter& Co (18X5) 13 R 1X5.
5. It is submitted that for the same reasons that they did not obtain custody cither.
6.(1858) 20 D 565.
7. See also Wilmot v Wilson (1X41) 3 D 815. Cf Levitt v Cleasby (1823) 2 S 184. Further, sec
Rennv v Rutherford (1840) 2 D 676: Renny v Kemp (1841) 3 D 1134. discussed, below, para 72.
X. Indeed, the cases cited in note 1 point to the opposite.
184. Custody must have been legitimately obtained. A lien must be founded upon
custody which is legitimate.1 Custody acquired by fraud or by a void contract will
not do.2 Similarly where the custody has been obtained by mistake a lien cannot be
established.3
More specific examples of illegitimate custody have also been recognised. Thus a
law agent was not allowed to plead a lien in regard to the rental book of an estate
against a judicial factor where the latter was considered to be the natural custodier of
the property.4 In another case a horse had been sold and was delivered to the buyer.3
He thereupon rejected the animal and tried to return it to the seller, who refused to
take it. When he eventually changed his mind, the buyer pled a right of retention in
respect of his expenses in caring for the horse. The court held that upon rejecting the
animal the buyer no longer had legitimate possession of it and therefore had no lien.
It was noted that his proper course should have been to deliver the horse into neutral
custody upon rejecting it.6
In one old case where a creditor had obtained possession of some of his debtor's
property by way of an irregular poinding it was held that despite the irregularity he
had a right to retain the goods until paid.7 This decision is universally accepted as
being wrong.8 Lord Justice-Clerk Braxfield commented on the Lord President who
gave the leading opinion in that ease, in the following terms:
"Arniston, though a great man, was wrong : aliquando bonus dormitat
Homerus'9
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1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,88-89; Bell, Principles, s 1413: Hume. Lectures, vol III, p 58: Gloag and
Irvine, pp 343-344: A J Sim. SME. vol 2d. para 69: Shepherd's Trs v MacDonald. Eraser & Co
(1898) 5 SLT 296 per Lord Stormonth Darling: Barclay v Guthrie (1887) 3 Sh Ct Rep 103 per
Sheriff Hall.
2. Bell. Principles, s 1413: Hume. Lectures. 111.58.
3. Bell, Principles, s 1413; Louson v Craik (1842) 4 D 1452. A similar rule applies in England :
Lucas v Dorrien (1817) 7 Taunt 278: 129 ER 112. Hume's statement that possession obtained in "an
accidental way may he sufficient" (Lectures. 111.58) must he regarded as wrong. See the comments
of G C H Paton. the editor of Hume's Lectures, at 111.58. note 172.
4. Mackay (1867) 3 SLR .329.
5. Barclay v Guthrie (1887) 3 Sh Ct Rep 103.
6. Sec McBev v Gardiner (1858) 20 D 1151.
7. Cilcndinning's Creditors v Montgomery (1745) Mor 2573.
8. Bell, Commentaries. 11.89; Bell. Principles, ahovc; Hume, Lectures, ahove; Gloag and Irvine, p
343; Hastie & Jamieson v Arthur (1764) per Lord Pitfour (see Bell. Commentaries. 11,89);
Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440; Patten v Royal Bank (1853) 15 D
617; Laurie v Denny's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404. at 409 per Lord Ivory.
9. Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Case 440, at 471.
185. Loss of custody. The general rule is thai if the lien-holder loses custody
of the property then this will extinguish his lien upon it.1 Thus Bell writes :
"A person possessed of property, and entitled to a lien, loses it the moment lie
quits his possession."2
Thus where tyres were sold by a dealer to a buyer it was held that the lien of the
dealer was lost upon delivery of the goods.3 Likewise a factor loses his lien upon
property when he delivers it to his principal.4 Where, however, a number of items
are subject to a lien and custody is lost of some of them, the rest remain burdened by
the lien to the extent of the whole debt due.3 Thus where goods had been carried by
sea and some had been delivered on arrival in port, the lien of the shipowner for
carriage remained over the rest." Similarly, where a law agent abandoned his lien
over the titles of a portion of his client's property his right of retention over the titles
of the remainder of the property for the whole balance was not affected.'
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Bell writes that a lien will not be lost if the property is "taken 'away' by undue
means."8 This would seem to be a fair statement, cohering with the Roman law
which allowed a party with a ins rctcntionis to sue for theft.4 It also finds support in
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which provides that the unpaid seller loses his lien
where "the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods" (my
emphasis).10 Under the Civil Code of Quebec an individual with a lien does not lose
it if he is involuntarily dispossessed and has the right to have the property returned
to him." By way of contrast, under South African law the lien is lost even although
the dispossession is involuntary.12 However, the erstwhile lien-holder has the
mandament van spolic in order to get the thing back and re-acquire his lien. In
Scotland the counterpart to this remedy, spuilzic, would arguably be similarly
available.13
Bell is also of the view that the lien will subsist if the property is released in error.'4
More controversial is his statement that a lien "may be reserved by agreement"
between debtor and creditor.13 This creates the possibility of liens which arc dc facto
hypothecs and which violate the principle of no security without publicity.
In fact this position seems already to have been reached, for in some eighteenth
century cases it has been held that a solicitor retains his lien over title deeds which
he has lent to another solicitor employed by his client.10 The reasoning of Lord
Gillies of why this is the case is as follows :
"In my opinion [the lien] remained as secure as ever. He parted with the actual
custody of the titles, but not with their legal custody. Legally and civilly
speaking, he remained custodier through the medium of [the second solicitor]
holding them from him on loan."17
This is somewhat perplexing. Whilst it is well known that there are different sorts of
possession such as actual, civil and symbolical, it is generally thought that custody
denotes physical holding only.18 Thus the opinion of Lord Gillies docs not seem
convincing. Even the fact which he highlights,19 that the second solicitor had to
return the deeds on demand, docs not remove the basic truth that by parting with
them he lost the custody thereof.
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Similar logic to that of Lord Gillies was applied in the 1953 case of John Penman
Ltd e Macdonald.2t} There a gentleman who was not a professional accountant was
employed by a firm to write up their business books. He had given up custody of the
books for a time to the firm's auditor, but had later recovered it and then sought to
retain the items until he was paid. The firm argued that the lien was confined to the
value of the services performed after the date he recovered the books. The Sheriff-
Substitute disagreed. He held that giving the books to the auditor was not "a
relinquishing of possession".21 Further :
"The defender's contract of employment was still running and he remained in
constructive possession. In any event the handing of the books to the auditor .
. . was not a restoration of these articles to the pursuers."22
The fact is that the matter of to whom the property is relinquished is irrelevant.2j
Moreover, a lien by constructive possession amounts to no less than a secret lien
and has little to commend it.
1. Bell, Principles, s 1415: Hume, Lectures, 111.58; Gloag and Irvine, p 360: D Vt Walker. Civil
Remedies, (1974), p 72; A J Sim. SME, vol 20. para 74: Petrie v Geddes (1823) 2 S 485: Morrison
v Fulwell's Tr(1901) 9 SLT 34.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,89.
3. London Scottish Transport Ltd v Tyres (ScotlandJ Ltd 1957 SLT (Sh Ct) 48.
4. Kruger v Wilcox (1755) Amb 252; 27 ER 168. Although an English case, the same would hold in
Scotland : see Bell. Principles. 11.89-90.
5. Gloag and Irvine, pp 360-361; A J Sim, SME, vol 20. para 74. See too the American Law
Institute, Restatement of the Law ofSecurity, (1941). s 80(2).
6. Malcolm v Bannatync 15 Nov 1814, FC.
7. Gray v Wardrops 7r.s(1851) 13D 963; revd(1855) 18 D(HL)52.
8. Bell, Principles, s 1415. "Away" is SheriffGuthrie's addition.
9. See above, para 129.
10. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54), s 43( 1 Mb).
11. Civil Code of Quebec, art 1593.
12. T J Scott, LA WSA, vol 15, para 102.
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13. See K G C Rcid. SML. vol IX. paras 161-166. The problem here is that a lien-holder arguably
may only have custody. See above, paras 179-1X0.
14. Bell. Principles, s 1413.
15. Ibid.
16. Campbell v Montgomerie (1X39) 1 D 1147: Rcnny v Rutherford (1X40) 2 D 676: Renny v
Kemp (1841) 3 D 1134. See also i re & Macrae v Davies (1917) 33 Sh Ct Rep 109.
17. Rcnny v Rutherford (1X40) 2 D 676, at 6X3.
IX. Sec K G C Reid, SME. vol IX, para 125.
19. Op cit n 17.
20. 1953 SLT (Sh Ct) XI.
21. At 82.
22. Ibid.
23. Sec Bell. Principles, s 1415. All that matters is that the erstwhile lien-holder parts with the
property.
186. Einglish authority. It is worth noting that most commentators on English law
accept that a lien will continue if the property in question is delivered to the owner
or another party merely for a limited purpose with the intention that the lien will
subsist.1 However, there is really only one case to support this point. There, a
repairer's lien over a taxi was held not to be extinguished by the owner temporarily
removing the vehicle in order to ply for hire.2 Nevertheless, the general rule is clear
that where a lien-holder parts with the property he will normally forfeit his lien. '
1. See G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law. (1952), pp 184-1X5; Halsbury. vol 28, para 523;
A P Bell, p 145.
2. Abcrmarle Supply Co Ltd v Hind & Co Ltd[ 1928] 1 KB 307.
3. See the works cited in note 1 and Forth v Simpson (1849) 13 QB 680; 116 ER 1423: Jackson v
Cummins (1839) 5 M&W 342; 151 ER 145 and Scarfe v Morgan (1X3X) 4 M & W 270 at 283:
150 ER 1430.
187. Effect of recovery of custody. Bell wrote that, with the exception of the liens
of a factor and a policy broker, where a lien had been lost by the property being
parted with, it did not revive on possession being recovered.1 Factors and policy
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brokers both have general liens- and it is submitted that in fact the same rule applies
to all holders of general liens.3 As a general lien is good for all sums owed in a
course of trading or employment, obtaining custody of the property once more will
create a lien which secures the same debts that were secured prior to relinquishing
the custody. If one wishes to be very precise, then what actually happens is that the
old general lien is replaced by a new general lien. In practice this is of course
exactly the same as the original lien reviving.
As regards special liens, Bell's rule means that once the property is parted with "the
lien seems to be extinct beyond revival".4 The case of London Scottish Transport
Ltd v Tyres (Scotland) Ltd 3 illustrates this principle. There, some goods were
delivered under a contract of sale. The sellers subsequently suspected that the buyer
was ncaring insolvency and instructed an agent to uplift most of the goods. This he
was able to do. The buyer duly went into liquidation and the seller claimed a lien
over the goods under the Sale of Goods Act. It was held that the seller had no such
right, his lien having being lost on the goods being delivered. The recovery of the
goods did not revive the lien. In a subsequent case it was held that an unpaid seller's
lien may revive if the buyer returns the goods to the unpaid seller with the intention
that the lien should be revived.6 It may be doubted whether this situation will be
encountered very often.
1. Sec Bell. Commentaries, 11.90; Principles, s 1449 and Gloag and Irvine, p 360.
2. See, for example. Bell, Commentaries. II. 109-112 and 115-117.
3. On this matter, see Gloag and Irvine, p 360.
4. Bell. Commentaries. 11,91.
5. 1957 SLT (Sh Ct) 48.
6. Hostess Mobile Catering v Archibald Scott Ltd 1981 SC 185. This view had also been
expressed by the Sheriff in London Scottish Transport Ltd. at 49. Sec too D L Carey Miller,
Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (1991), para 11.2Id.
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7. OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY
188. General. The basic rule is that a contractual lien may only be exercised over a
piece of property where the obligation the lien secures is owed by the owner of the
property to the lien-holder.1 In other words A's property cannot be detained for an
obligation owed by B without A's authorisation. Thus in one case the burgh of
Auchtcrmuchty had become insolvent and some of the councillors employed a
solicitor to act for them.2 He claimed a lien over the title deeds of the burgh for his
account. It was held that he had no such right, for he had not been employed by the
Magistrates and Council of Auchtcrmuchty as a whole. In another ease a bank was
held not entitled to retain a bill of exchange deposited by someone, in security of his
debts, where it was found that that person did not own the bill.3
The rule as regards enrichment and delictual liens is less certain, because of the
nascent state of the law. Clearly the bona fide possessor's lien is enforceable against
the true owner of the property.4 Thus the rule which applies to contractual liens
would seem to apply to enrichment liens. With respect to delictual liens, a ease
could arise where A takes B's car and drives it into C's wall. Can C detain the car
from B in respect of the damage caused by A ? There is sadly no ready answer here.
1. Gloag and Irvine, p 349; W VI Gloag. Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 474; D M Walker. Civil
Remedies. (1974). pp 65-66; A J Sim, SME. vol 20, para 72. The exception to the rule is the
innkeeper's lien which will attach to any goods brought into the inn, no matter who owns them :
Bermans and Nathans Ltd v Wcibyc 1983 SC 67. The reasons for this are discussed elsewhere. See
below, para 229.
The brief report of the ease of Lesly v Hunter (1752) Mor 2660 suggests that a bleacher may retain
cloth he has bleached even although the true owner did not authorise the bleaching. However, the
Session Papers disclose that the owner agreed to pay for the cost of the bleaching in that case. The
dispute was over the entire balance due from the third party who had sent the cloth for bleaching and
the bleacher. The court held rightly that the true owner did not not have to pay that balance before he
could get his cloth back. I wish to record my thanks to the Keeper of the Advocates Library and
Catherine A Smith, the Senior Librarian for permitting me access to the Session Papers.
2. Walker v Phin (1831) 9 S 691.
3. Farrarand Rooth v North British Banking Co (1850) 12 D 1190.
4. See above, para 170.
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189. Authorised persons. A person who has either the express, implied or
ostensible authority of the owner to subject his property to a lien may effectually
allow a lien to be created over that property.1 A mercantile agent within the meaning
of the Factors Acts is given that right in terms of that set of statutes.2
The question of authorisation was the subject of the recent ease of Republic of the
Sudan v Sagax Aviation Ltd? There A contracted with B for the overhaul of 5
helicopter engines, knowing that the work would be sub-contracted to C. C, in fact
sub-contracted to a subsidiary, D, who stopped work on the insolvency of 13 and
demanded payment, in the meantime claiming a lien on the engines. A argued that D
had no lien, being an unauthorised sub-contractor. D, in reply, argued that B had
implied authority to sub-contract the work to any company in C's group and, further,
that A had become aware of what was going on and not objected. The court held
that there was nothing in the contract which allowed a further sub-contract.
However, the case was sent to proof before answer on the issue of whether A had
knowledge of the matter and did nothing about it.4
1.WM Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 472; A J Sim. SME, vol 20, para 72.
2. Factors Act 1889 (c 45) applied to Scotland hy the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890 (c 40). s 1. See in
particular the 1889 Act ss 1(1). 1(5) and 2.
3. 1990 GWD 29-1681.
4. If A's knowledge was proven, then he would arguably be personally barred from denying the lien.
Sec below, para 192.
190. Where the owner has voluntarily allowed another to hold his property.
Situations may arise where the owner of property has placed it in the hands of
another, for example in terms of a contract of hire or hire purchase. The question
arises whether the person who has received possession may allow a lien to be
created over the property which will be valid against the owner. It appears that the
law here is quite settled. The first Lord President Clyde set it out in the following
terms in Lamonby v Foulds Ltd:
"[I]n both pledge and lien the principle that the possessor of a moveable can
give no better right therein or thereto to a third party than he has himself
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acquired from the owner applies, unless the owner has personally barred
himself, by some actings of his own, from founding on the limited character
of the title he actually gave to the possessor.";
The facts of the ease in which Lord Clyde gave his judgement were as follows. A
motor lorry was the subject of a hire purchase agreement, which expressly provided
that the hirer was not "to create any lien thereon for repairs". The hirer handed the
vehicle to a firm of engineers for repairs. When he subsequently failed to meet his
hire purchase payments, the owner sought to recover the lorry from the engineers
who pled a lien for their repairs. It was held that no lien was created in respect that
the hirer had no title to allow such a creation. The fact that the repairers did not
know that the title was so limited was held to be irrelevant.
In a similar ease a hirer of a sewing machine under a hire purchase contract was
obliged to keep it in her own custody.2 In breach of this contract, she stored the
machine with a broker. The broker claimed a lien for storage dues when the owner
tried to recover his property. It was held that no lien had been validly constituted. In
the words of the Sheriff Substitute, the hirer could not "give any title of lien to a
storekeeper, because, she had, by the terms of her contract, no title to store." '
Universal commercial practice in contracts of hire following eases such as those
described is to have an express clause barring the creation of a lien over the
property. For example, the standard form contract of hire for a photocopier which
featured in a recent case, contained the following provision:
"8(a) The user agrees not without the written consent of the supplier ... (b) to
remove the copier from the installation address or (c) create or permit to be
created any lien or encumbrance in respect of the copier."4
1. 1928 SC 89. Republic of the Sudan v Sagax Aviation Ltd 1990 GWD 29-1681. discussed in the
preceding paragraph, is a case where personal bar is arguably relevant.
2. Glasgow Corporation v Singer Sewing Machine Co (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 177.
3. At 178.
4. Eurocopy (Scotland) pic v Lothian Health Board 1995 SCLR 892. Sec also the hire purchase
contract in Lions Ltd v Gosford Furnishing Co Ltd 1962 SC 78.
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191. Assessing the law. The traditional approach outlined in these eases has been
subject to criticism.1 The truth is that lien, or at least special lien, is a security which
usually arises by operation of law.2 Given this, the question of whether the person
who placed the property in a position whereby it became the subject of a lien had the
requisite title to do so may be viewed as irrelevant. This must particularly be the
ease where the would-be lien-holder has no knowledge of the title possessed, as in
Lamonby v Foulds Ltd?
However, as it is the ease that the rule nemo plus juris ad alicnum transfcrrc potest,
quam ipse habcrct effectively applies to lien, the irresistible conclusion would seem
to be that lien to some extent is a consensual security. Such a proposition coheres
with the rule explored previously that lien must be founded on a legitimate holding
of the property and not one obtained by fraud or mistake.4 However, lien cannot be
regarded as a consensual security in the same way as pledge, where debtor and
creditor require the animus to create the real right.5 For a special lien will arise by
operation of law without any need for animus.6 The answer to the conundrum
probably has more to do with policy than anything else.
The key point is that lien is a species of real right in security. It seems manifestly
unjust that simply because it arises by operation of law it should be capable of
overruling the rule nemo plus. Dire results would follow if this was the case. Thus A
could take B's car which lie is hiring and contract with C to have it painted pink with
yellow spots. B would be unable to recover his car from C until he has paid for work
which he would never have authorised in his right mind. To stop this from
happening, Scots law has in essence applied the rule nemo plus to an involuntary
security.
It is valuable to look at other systems here. The law of Quebec is the same as our
own in that an effective lien will only arise under a contract where the debtor has the
property with the consent of its owner.7 German law would appear to take a similar
approach.8 Dutch law is the same.4 However, in the specific ease of hire purchase an
exception is made in favour of the lien-holder who in good faith believed the hirer to
be owner.1" In English law a workman or bailee claiming a lien may infer the
owner's authority from a hirer's use of a piece of property and is not bound by any
contractual limitation unless he has knowledge of it.11 In South African law a
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contractual lien cannot be enforced against the true owner unless he authorised it.12
However, where work has been done on a piece of property the workman has an
enrichment lien which is good against the world.1' This is the law no matter whether
or not the owner authorised the work. 4
It may be argued that the South African model should be followed in Scotland so
that there would be an enrichment lien, which would secure necessary and useful
expenses but not voluptuary ones as in this case.15 However, the idea that the
repairer could have a lien enforceable against the true owner in addition to his
contractual claim against the person who had instructed the work is frowned upon
by a number of Scottish lawyers.16
The root of the problem is that if the hirer or other party in possession absconds or
becomes insolvent the cost of the work must be met either by the repairer or by the
true owner. The current Scottish position is that it falls to the repairer, unless of
course the work was authorised by the owner.17 This seems correct in terms of the
fact that the hirer had no title to subject the property to a contractual lien. However,
this leaves the question of whether the repairer could have a claim against the owner
in unjustified enrichment. This possibility has never been canvassed in the ease law
and it is felt that this is not the appropriate place to have a substantive discussion of
the matter.18
If however an enrichment claim was felt to be merited here, then the general thrust
of this thesis would point to a lien also being admitted. On the other hand, the fact of
the repairer having two concurrent claims - that is, against the hirer in contract and
against the owner in unjustified enrichment - severely complicates the issue and
prevents the easy resolution of the matter.19
1. For example. Professor Wilson considers Lamonby v Foulds Ltd to he wrong : The Law of
Scotland on Debt. (2nd ed, 1991), para 7.8. Sec also J J Gow. Law of Hire Purchase. (2nd ed). p
164.
2. See below, para 204.
3. 1928 SC 89. Discussed in the preceding paragraph.
4. See above, para 184.
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5. See above, para 83.
6. See below, para 204
7. Civil Code of Quebec, art 1542.
8. Good faith on the part of the lien-holder is to no avail : F Lent, Sachcnrccht: Ein Studienbuch,
(14th ed, by K H Schwab, 1974). p 264: F Baur. Lchrhuch das Sachenrechts, (13th ed. 1985). p
541.
9. J G Sauveplannc. "Security over Corporeal Movables according to Dutch Law", in J G
Sauveplanne (ed). Security over Corporeal Movables. (1974). p 163. at p 170.
10. Ibid, at p 179, n 5.
11. Halsbury. vol 28. para 538; Green v All Motors Ltd[1917] 1 KB 625.
12. Wille's Law ofMortgage and Pledge in South Africa. (3rd ed. cd T J Scott and S Scott. 1987).
pp 92-93; A J Van der Walt and G J Picnaar, Introduction to the Law of Property. (1996). pp 370-
371; H Silbcrberg and J Schoeman, The Law of Property. (3rd ed, 1992), pp 464-465: T J Scott,
LA WSA. vol 15, para 99 and paras 117-121.
13. Wille. pp 86-92; Van dcr Walt and Pienaar. pp 371-373; Silberbcrg and Schoeman. ibid, pp
464-466: T J Scott. LAWSA. vol 15, paras 104-114.
14. Unless the property was stolen. See H S Silbcrberg and J Schoeman, ibid, pp 469-471: Van der
Walt and Pienaar, ibid, pp 375-377; T J Scott. LAWSA. vol 15, para 111: Brooklyn House
Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 (A). Further, see S Eisclen and G J
Pienaar. Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook. (1993). pp 314-321.
15. See the authorities cited in note 13 above.
16. At a University of Edinburgh Department of Private Law Seminar held on 17 June 1996 and
addressed by Professor Sieg Eiselen, consternation was expressed at the idea of Scots law ever
adopting the South African position.
17. See the preceding paragraph.
18. Given the fact that it is essentially a matter for the law of unjustified enrichment rather than the
law of lien. See, however, W D H Sellar, SME. vol 15. para 49.
19. South African writers have appreciated the problems. See Silberbcrg and Schoeman. and Van
dcr Walt and Picnaar at the pages given in note 14 above.
192. Personal bar. In certain limited circumstances the true owner will be
personally barred from denying that a third party has permitted a lien to be validly
created upon his property.1 For this to happen the true owner must have acted in a
manner calculated to mislead the would-be lien-holder and the latter must have been
misled by reliance on the owner's actings.2 Merely placing one's property in the
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hands of another without taking precautions to inform third parties that one is in fact
the true owner docs not amount to conduct calculated to mislead.3 The rules
regarding personal bar are said to be the same for pledge and lien.4
1. Gloag and Irvine, pp 203-209 and 349; D M Walker, Civil Remedies. (1974), pp 65-66; A J Sim,
SME. vol 20, para 72.
2. See Gloag and Irvine, ibid and the judgement of Lord Kinncar in Mitchell v Hcys & Sons
(1894) 21 R 600.
3. See above, para 190; Mitchell v Hcys & Sons (1894) 21 R 600; Glasgow Corporation v Singer
Sewing Machine Co (1918) 34 Sh Ct Rep 177; Lamonhy v Foulds Ltd 1928 SC 89.
4. See authorities cited in n 2 and above, para 71.
8. LIEN AS A REAL RIGHT
193. General. As Professor Gretton wrote in his article "The Concept of Security"
in 1987,the "most serious difficulty arising from the lack of conceptual foundations
in the law of lien is the question of whether a lien-holder has a real right."1 It is
submitted here that there is little doubt that lien is a jus in rc aliens, in particular for
four reasons. Firstly, many authorities until now not brought together state that this
is the case. Secondly, lien has always been treated along with pledge and hypothec
as a right in security. Thirdly, a lien will prevail over subsequent diligence. Fourthly,
a lien holder, because he has a real security, is generally not required to give it up in
return for being given some personal security, in other words a cautionary
obligation.
1. G L Grctton, "The Concept of Security", in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany,
(1987), p 126, at p 144.
194. The authorities. A considerable number of authorities consider lien to be a
real right. The foremost writer on the whole subject of lien, Bell, is chief amongst
them. He deals with lien in a section of his Commentaries entitled "Of Securities
over Moveables in the Nature of Real Right resulting from Possession."' Within that
section he writes of the various ways in which a lien may be created, for example
expressly or by usage of trade and notes :
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"In all these cases the real right depends entirely on the fact of possession : it
begins with possession, and with the loss of it expires."2
The following writers have also referred to lien expressly as a real right : Carey
Miller;3 Gloag and Irvine;4 Graham Stewart;5 GoudyC Sim;7 Grctton;8 and WhittyT
T B Smith may be added to the list, for he treats it under the heading of "Jura In Re
Aliena" in his Short Commentary on the Law ofScotland.™
Lien has also been described as a real right from the bench. In the landmark 1791
decision of Harper's Creditors v Fanlds, the Lord President, Sir Ilay Campbell did
just that." One of his distinguished successors, Lord President McNeill expressed a
similar opinion seventy years later.12 Likewise at the start of this century, Lord
Trayner put the matter in layman's terms when he said that the solicitor's lien was,
subject to a certain equitable exception, "good against the world."13
Case law generally has treated lien as a real right. Thus where goods were put on a
train by a person who failed to pay the carriage, it was held that the railway
company could enforce its carrier's lien against the person to whom the goods were
sent.14 Where a solicitor had lien over his client's title deeds in respect of a piece of
land, it was held that the lien was good against the client's singular successor.15 In
fact the issue of whether the solicitor's lien is a real right was settled as early as
1749 in the case of Liddcrdalc's Creditors v Nasmyth.lh In that ease some of the
judges thought that the right was "no pledge or real right, but only a personal right of
retention of the writs".17 However, the majority held that if the lien "was only good
against the employer, it would in most cases be good for nothing",18 for the law
agent's right would be otiose against creditors and singular successors.
It is also possible to point to a statute recognising that lien is a real right. The Sale of
Goods Act 1979 (c 54) expressly provides that the unpaid seller's lien "is not
affected by any sale or other disposition of the goods which the buyer may have
made, unless the seller has assented to it."19
The authorities in favour of lien being a personal right are not numerous. Professor
McBrydc writes that :
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"[Retention is not effective against third parties. It is no more than a remedy
for A if 13 is in breach of his contract with A."20
He does not justify the statement. Begg, who wrote a treatise on law agents, refers to
the fact that the solicitor's lien is often inaccurately called a hypothec.21 He states
that the right is "merely a general lien or right of retention, not amounting to a real
right cither of hypothec or of pledge."22 The statement is ambiguous. However, in
the light of the authorities considered in the previous paragraph, it is best read as
saying that the law agent's lien is not a real right of pledge or hypothec, but a real
right of lien. There arc also some stray judicial dicta inferring that lien is a personal
right,23 but as far as can be seen no definitive statements to that effect. It is therefore
beyond doubt that the vast majority of authorities consider lien to be real.
1. Bell, Commentaries. 11,86 et scq.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,87.
3. D L Carey Miller. Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law. (1991), para 11.15.
4. Gloag and Irvine, pp 8 and 359.
5. J Graham Stewart, Law ofDiligence, (1897), p 165.
6. H Goudy, Law ofBankruptcy, (4th ed, 1914). p 543.
7. A J Sim. SME. vol 20, para 74.
8. G L Gretton, "The Concept of Security" in D J Cusine (cd), .4 Scots Conveyancing Miscellany,
p 126 at p 145.
9. N R Whitty, SME, vol 15, para 128.
10. T B Smith. A Short Commentary on the Law ofScotland. (1962), p 477.
11. Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440, at 472.
12. Wyper v Harveys (1861) 23 D 606, at 620.
13. Drummond v Muirhead and Guthrie Smith (1900) 2 F 585. at 589. The exception is where the
solicitor as well as acting for the owner of the heritable property, is acting for a heritable creditor of
the owner. In that case he cannot plead his lien against that creditor : sec Begg, p 229: Wilson v
Lumsdainc (1837) 15 S 1211: Gray v Graham (1855) 18 D(HL)52.
14. Scottish Central Railway Co v Ferguson, Rennie and Co (1864) 2 VI 781. It was held also that
no general lien could be exercised here as the requirements set down by the Railway and Canal
Traffic Act 1854 (17 and 18 Vict c 31). s 7 had not been met. See also Morris v Whytc & Mackay
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(1889) 5 Sh Ct Rep 163 (lien of storekeeper valid against purchasers of his customer) and Tyne
Dock Engineering Co Ltd v Rovnl Bank ofScotland 1974 SL.T 57 (lien of ship repairer valid against
mortgagee).
15. Palmer v Lee (1880) 7 R 651.
16. (1749) Mor 6248. See above, para 147.
17. At 6249.
18. Ibid. In terms of the solicitor's lien is arguably not real, for papers must be handed over to the
trustee in sequestration or liquidator. See the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66). s 38(4); the
Insolvency (Scotland) Rules 1986, r 4.22(4) and A J Sim, SME, vol 20. paras 98 and 100. But as
the preference which the solicitor has over the estate is preserved the practical result is no different.
19. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (e 54). s 47(1). See D L Carey Miller. Corporeal Moveables in Scots
Law. (1991), para 11.25.
20. W W McBrydc, Contract, (1987), p 315.
21. Begg. p 205.
22. Ibid.
23. See Laurie v Black (1831) 10 S 1.
195. Lien treated along with other securities. The writers who do not expressly
state lien to be a real right in security nevertheless treat the matter in the context of
real rights in security. This invariably means considering lien at the same time as
pledge and hypothec. The following writers fall into this category : Bankton;1 Gloag
and Henderson;2 Gow;3 Lillie;4 Walker;5, Cusine and Forte;9 Wilson;7 and
Marshall.8
A similar treatment can be found in our statutes. Thus lien is recognised to be a
"security" which prevails in a sequestration by the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985
and its predecessors.9 Likewise when Neville Chamberlain was rushing legislation
through Parliament to help show Hitler that he had no lien over Poland, the fact that
a lien amounts to a real right in security was not forgotten. The Compensation
(Defence) Act 1939 enacted :
"Where any sum by way of compensation is paid in accordance with any
provisions of this Act requiring compensation to be paid to the owner of any
property, then, if at the time when the compensation accrues due, the property
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is subject to any mortgage, pledge, lien or other similar obligation, the sum
paid shall be deemed to be comprised in that mortgage, pledge, lien or other
obligation."111
As well as being treated along with other securities, lien at times has been
assimilated into other securities. This is due to the lack of conceptual foundations in
the law of retention and lien. Thus Bankton saw retention as a type of hypothec."
The solicitor's lien originally was universally called the solicitor's hypothec.12 Lord
Young described lien as "just a contract of pledge collateral to another contract of
which it is an incident".13 Similarly Gow writes that lien is a "legal pledge".14 There
arc innumerable other examples of such statements.15 Whilst they are open to
criticism for not recognising lien as a distinct right, they clearly illustrate that lien is
regarded by Scots law as real.
1. Bankton, 1.17.15-16.
2. W M Gloag and R C Henderson, Introduction to the Law of Scotland, (10th ed. 1995), chapter
19.
3. J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law ofScotland. (1964), chapter 4.
4. J Lillie, The Mercantile Law ofScotland, (6th ed, 1970), chapter 3.
5. D M Walker, Principles ofScottish Private Law, (4th ed), chapter 5.30.
6. D J Cusinc and ADM Forte, Scottish Cases and Materials in Commercial Law, (1987), pp
122-172.
7. W A Wilson, The Scottish Law ofDebt, (2nd ed, 1991), chapter 7.
8. E A Marshall. Scots Mercantile Law, (2nd ed. 1993), chapter 7.
9. Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66). s 73(1); Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c
79), s 4; Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1839 (2 & 3 Vict, c 41), s 3. Further, a lien is also good against
the trustees under a trust deed for creditors : Mciklc and Wilson v Pollard (1880) 8 R 69; Robertson
v Ross 11887) 15 R 67.
10. Compensation (Defence) Act 1939 (2 & 3 Geo VI c 75). s 14. The case of Liquidator of




12. See Bell. Commentaries. 11.90: Begg. p 205: Cuthbert.s v Ross (1697) 4 BS 374: Ayton v
Colvillei. 1705) Vlor 6247. Even late in the nineteenth century this terminology was still being used :
Morrison v Watson (1883) 2 Guth Sli Gas 502.
13. Miller v Hutchcson & Dixon (1 <S<S I > 8 R 4<S9. at 492.
14. J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law ofScotland. (1964), p 292.
15. For example, the Factors Act 1889 (52 & 53 Victc 45), s 1(5).
196. Lien prevails over subsequent diligence. The fact that a lien will prevail over
the later diligence of unsecured creditors also reveals that it is a real right. Bell
writes :
"Where the possessor of goods has a hypothec or lien over them, he is not to
be deprived of it by poinding ... So, wherever a factor has lien for his general
balance, an artificer for the value of the labour bestowed, a carrier or
shipmaster for the carriage and freight, they will be safe from invasion by a
poinding creditor."1
In a similar vein when dealing with the ranking of creditors in a bankruptcy, Bell
states that creditors who have "real securities over moveables"2 by inter alia
retention prevail over creditors who have done diligence.
Graham Stewart and Profesor Grctton also recognise that a lien will prevail over
creditors subsequently carrying out diligence and indeed both expressly state that
lien is a real right.3
1. Bell. Commentaries. 11,60.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,406.
3. J Graham Stewart. Law of Diligence. (1897), p 165: G L Gretton, "The Concept of Security", in D
J Cusinc (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany. (1987). p 126, at p 145.
197. Lien-holder not bound to give up lien in return for caution. As a person
with a lien is considered to have a real security he will not normally have to release
his lien on caution being given for the debt which the lien is securing.1 In a case
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involving the right of an agent to retain an insurance policy from his principal, Lord
Ordinary (Cuninghamc) pronounced :
"[AJssuming that the agent has a real lien on the policy founded on . . . the
Lord Ordinary apprehends that it would be contrary to every principle and
analogy in the law to compel him to give up that real security on personal
caution for his ultimate claims."2
Given the fact that a lien is subject to the equitable control of the courts, the
replacement of it by caution is not an impossibility.3 However, the general rule is
very much as stated, reinforcing the point once more that lien is accepted to be a real
right.
1. Gloag and Irvine, p 359; A J Sim. SME. vol 20, para 74; McCulloch v Pattison & Co (1794).
unreported, see Bell, Commentaries, 11,105.
2. Wilmot v Wilson (1841) 3 D 815, at 818.
3. Ferguson and Stuart v Grants 1856) 18 D 536. See above, para 164.
197. Comparative authority. Other jurisdictions take varying approaches to the
question of whether lien is real right. In English law it is said to be a personal right.1
Unlike an English pledgee, a lienee has no assignable interest in the property and no
right of sale.2 Further, unlike pledge, execution cannot be levied against the property
he is holding, for his debts.3 Nevertheless, it has always been the ease that lien has
been good in the debtor's insolvency.4 The question of effectiveness against singular
successors does not seem to have attracted discussion, but one modern writer begins
his treatment of possessory in security in England, by writing that "the pledge and
the lien both . . . give the creditor a legal interest which runs with the goods."3
Further, older authority stating that a pledgee has a special property in the security
subjects but a lienee does not, has been questioned in the House of Lords.6 From the
Scottish perspective, the English lien appears to be real rather than personal.
In Quebec lien seems to be real, because the Civil Code provides that the right "may
be set up against anyone".' In Dutch law, lien is enforceable against the debtor's
creditors and singular successors, but not other third parties.3 French law is to the
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same effect. Planiol states that lien "is not an exception purely personal",g being
valid against creditors and successors. However, he refuses to accept that it is a real
right. He compares it to the exception rci venditae ct (raditac in Roman law, where a
buyer could stop the seller getting the thing back from him after the sale.111 The
exception was good against the seller and all those who had acquired rights from
him in the property since the sale. However, to the present writer, the right of the
buyer here stems from the fact that he has dominium.
South African law makes a distinction between enrichment liens which are real and
debtor and creditor liens which arc personal." Both types are effective in the
debtor's insolvency.12 A debtor and creditor lien, however, is only good against a
singular successor who is aware of its existence.13 German law has a fixed list of
real liens (gcsetzliche Pfandrcchtcn) including those of the carrier, factor and
storekeeper.14 Additionally, a personal lien (Zuriickbchaltungsrccht) exists in any
situation where a debtor has a claim against the creditor which is due and arises out
of the same legal relationship from which the creditor's claim comes.15
1. Halsbury, vol 28. para 519: A P Bell, p 136.
2. Ibid: Donald v Suckling (1866) LR 1 QB 585; Halliday v Holgatc (1868) LR 3 Ex 299.
3. Lcgg v Evans (1840) 6 M & W 36: 151 ER 311.
4. See, for example, Rushforth v Hadficld( 1805) 6 East 519; 102 ER 1386.
5. A P Bell, p 136.
6. The Odessa [1916] 1 AC 145, at 158-159 per Lord Mersey.
7. Civil Code of Quebec, art 1593.
8. J G Sauveplanne, "Security over Corporeal Movables according to Dutch Law", in J G
Sauveplannc (ed), Security over Corporeal Movables (1974), p 163. at pp 170-171.
9. M Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, vol 2, (1959), s 2536.
10. Ibid: D.21.3.3.1.
11. T J Scott, LA VLSVL vol 15, paras 98-136.
12. Ibid, paras 132-133.
13. Ibid, para 121.
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14. F Lent. Sachenrccht : Ein Studienbuch. (14th cd. by K H Schwab, 1974), p 261: F Baur,
Lchrbuch des Sachcnrcchts. (13th ed. 1985). pp 539-540.
15. BGB. art 273: E J Cohn. Manual of German Law. vol 1, para 210: G H Trcitcl. Remedies for
Breach ofContract. (1988). pp 313-31".
199. Lien and retention. The distinction between retention and lien was not finally
settled until the middle of the last century.' Both are forms of security. The
difference is that a creditor with a right of retention has ownership of the security
subjects.2 In lien, ownership lies with the debtor. To reiterate, in the words of Lord
President McNeill :
"A lien is a security held by a person over effects, the real right of property or
jus dominij of which belongs to another property ... a right of retention is a
security held by a person over effects, the real right of property or jus dominij
of which is vested in himself."3
Thus only lien is a subordinate real right.4 As a creditor with a right of retention has
dominium he is entitled to withhold the property from the debtor until all sums owed
to him are paid.5 A creditor with a lien only has security to the extent of his special
or general lien.5
1. See Brown v Sommcrville (1844) 6 D 1267; Melrose and Co v Hastic (1851) 13 D 880 and
Laurie & Co v Denny's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404.
2. Gloag and Irvine, chapter 10, especially p 340; D L Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables in
Scots Law. (1991), para 11.16: Gladstone v McCallum (1896) 23 R 783, 785 per Lord McLaren.
3. Wyper v Harveys (1861) 23 D 606.620.
4. See generally, G L Gretton, "The Concept of Security" in D J Cusine (cd), .4 Scots Conveyancing
Miscellany. (1987). p 126.
5. See the authorities cited in n 1 and Carey Miller, para 11.17.
6. See generally, below paras 204-211 and 236-243.
200. Transfer of the real right. The real right of lien docs not appear to be
generally assignable. English law is clear that this is the case.1 In Scotland, although
there is no definitive authority, that which docs exist points to a similar conclusion.
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In one ease, it was held that an individual who pays the expenses of a judicial remit
to an accountant does not have transferred to him the accountant's lien over the
report.2 In another decision, it was held that the hotelier's lien was not transferred to
an individual who had paid a guest's bill and collected property which the guest had
left at the hotel.3 As regards the banker's lien, Shaw writes :
"The right of lien competent to a banker being a contract arising from the
contract of agency in which there is delectus pcrsonac cannot be transferred
by the lien-holder. He may assign the debt, but is not entitled to deliver the
subject of the lien to the assignee. He holds such subject as agent for the
customer, and the contract of agency cannot be transferred without the
consent of the customer."4
Thus the only person that the lien may be assigned to is another banker, if the
customer agrees that the contract of agency be transferred. A similar rule is accepted
by Begg and Gloag and Irvine as applying to the lien of the solicitor.3 Thus the
circumstances in which an individual may assign his lien in Scots law arc very
limited, being only where the assignee is to act in the same capacity for the debtor as
the assigner did prior to the assignation.
In contrast, it would seem settled that the lien may be transferred by judicial
assignation, upon the death or sequestration of the lien-holdcrT
LAP Belt, pp 136-137: Legg v Evans (1 840) 6 VI & W 36; 151 ER 311.
2. McQueen v Dickie (1851) 13 D 502.
3. Garden v Shaw (1874) 1 Guth Sh Cas 505.
4. Shaw, p 69.
5. Begg, p 207; Gloag and Irvine, p 393. See also Lord Cuninghamc in Renny v Kemp (1<S41) 3 D
1134 at 1140 and Lord Balgray in Ingtis v Renny (1825) 4 S 113 at 114.
6. Wilson v Lumsdaine (1837) 15 S 1211. Paul v Meiklc (1868) 7 M 235 (death); Paul v Dickson
(1839) 1 D 867, Inglis v Moncreiffi 1851) 13 D 622 (sequestration).
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9. ENFORCEMENT AND EXTINCTION
201. Enforcement in general. As has been made clear elsewhere, the main way in
which lien acts as a security is by preventing the debtor from recovering his property
until he has discharged the debt he owes to the lien-holder.1 However, there remains
the matter of what can be done if the debtor seems unlikely ever to make payment.
At common law a factor has power to sell his principal's goods in order to satisfy the
debt which his lien secures.2 By statute an innkeeper has a right to sell any goods
subject to his lien to meet his guest's bill.3 An unpaid seller also has a right of
resale.4 In all other cases a lien-holder has no automatic right of sale, unless lie
holds under a contract giving him such a right.5
With regard to marketable commodities it seems accepted that the lien-holder may
apply to court for a warrant of sale.6 If the subject of the lien will become valueless
if it is not converted into money expeditiously then the court may order it to be sold
on the application of the owner, even where the lien-holder objects.' In that ease the
lien-holder will have reserved to him a preference over the price.x
With regard to documents such as title deeds and the accounts of a business, it is
widely accepted that a court will not authorise a sale.4 The reason for this is usually
said to be that such things arc of no commercial value.10 This may be accepted as
correct, but it is felt that a further ground is because many documents, for example
wills (prior to the testator's death) are confidential and it would not be reasonable to
place them on the public market. It is universally agreed that a solicitor may not sell
his client's papers in order to discharge his account.11
1. See above, para 163.
2. Bell. Commentaries, 11,91; Bell. Principles, s 1417; Broughton v Stewart, Primrose & Co, 17
Dec 1814, FC.
3. Innkeepers Act 1878 (c 38). Sec Gloag and lr\'ine, p 399 and below, para 233.
4. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54), s 39( 1 He) and s 48.
5. Bell. Commentaries, 11.91: W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 487; A J Sim. S.VIE. vol 20.
para 73.
6. Bell, op cil, a 2; Gibson and Stewart v Brown v, p;() (1876) 3 R 328.
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7. Parker v Brown & Co (1878) 5 R 979.
8. Ibid.
9. Bell. Principles. s 1417: Gloag and Irvine, p 359: A J Sim. SME. vol 20, para 73.
10. Ibid.
11. See for example, Ferguson and Stuart v Grant (1856) 18 D 536; Duffy's Trs v A B & Co
(1907) 23 Sh Ct Rep 94. See below, para 271.
202. Enforcement in insolvency. A lien-holder is regarded as a secured creditor in
the event of the debtor's insolvency.1 Such an occurrence will not really affect a
person who has a lien over marketable commodities. He may apply for a warrant of
sale as before, but instead of making over any surplus which the sale realises to the
debtor, he will give it to the trustee in sequestration or liquidator.
With respect to documents, the position is slightly different. The trustce-in-
sequestration or liquidator may order the lien-holder to deliver up any document.2
However, in that situation his preference over the debtor's estate is preserved.3 The
cases on this area of law invariably involve the solicitor's lien, but the provisions of
the relevant statute arc general and not specific to solicitors.
The person releasing a document docs not require expressly to reserve his
preference.4 On the other hand the preference docs not arise merely by surrendering
the documents : the erstwhile custodier must prove that his lien was a valid one.4
The preference extends over the whole estate, making its inter-relation with other
preferential debts a complicated matter which it is not proposed to enter into here.6
If the trustee in sequestration or liquidator decides that he does not want the
documents in question, then the lien-holder will not get a preference.' The fact that
extracts of title deeds from Register House are now regarded to be equivalent to the
originals means that solicitors no longer arc likely to secure a preference because the
trustee or liquidator requires the title deeds to go about his task.*
1. Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66), s 73( 1).




4. Adam and Winchester v White's 7> (1<S<S4) 11 R 863. at 865 per Lord President Inglis: Garden
Haig-Scott and Wallace v Stevenson's Tr 1962 SC" 51.
5. Rorie v Stevenson 1908 SC 559.
6. Paul v Mathie (1826) 4 S 420: Miln's JF v Spence's Trs 1927 SLT 425. See A J Sim. SME. vol
20. paras 98-99.
7. Ure & Macrae v Davies (1917) 33 Sh Ct Rep 109.
8. Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 (c 35), s 45. The matter is discussed at para
267.
203. Extinction. The following is a list of circumstances in which a lien will be
extinguished. It is not intended to be exhaustive.
(a) Discharge of the obligation secured. As a lien is parasitic upon the obligation
which it secures, the discharge of that obligation will extinguish the lien.1
(b) Destruction of the subject matter of the lien.
(c) Confusion. If the lien-holder becomes owner of the subject matter, then the lien
will no longer exist.
(d) Renunciation. The lien will be extinguished if the lien-holder renounces his right
of retention.
(e) Loss of custody of subject matter. Lien generally depends on the continuous
detention of the property or the right will be lost. This subject has been examined in
depth elsewhere.2
(f) Taking another security or a bill. Depending on the circumstances the lien may
be extinguished by the lien-holder being given another security.3 In exceptional
circumstances the taking of a bill from the debtor will indicate that the lien-holder
has waived his right.4
(g) Court order. Lien is subject to the equitable jurisdiction of the courts and can
consequently be extinguished by court order.5
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1. Gloag and Irvine, p 360. For South Africa, see T J Scott. LAWSA, vol 15, para 134. See also the
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law ofSecurity. < 1941), s 78.
2. See above, paras 185-187.
3. Gloag and Irvine, pp 361-362: W VI Gloag. Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 489: Ayton v Colville
(1705) Mor 6710. English law is to the same effect: see G VV Paton. Bailment in the Common Law.
(1952), p 194. For South African law. see T J Scott. LA VESA, vol 15, para 135.
4. Gloag and Irvine, p 361. Normally the lien will remain : Gairdner v .Vfilnc & Co (1858) 20 D
565: Palmer v Lee (1880) 7 R 651.
5. Sec above, para 164.
10. SPECIAL LIEN
204. General. The traditional approach since Bell has been to view special lien as
arising out of the principle of the mutuality of contractual obligations.1 To put it
another way, a special lien may be seen in terms of the cxccptio non adimplcti
contractus.2 This is true in the sense that in Scots law a special lien may, if the
circumstances arc right, arise under any contract rather than being confined to
certain categories of contract as in England.' However, for two very important
reasons, this only gives a partial picture.
Firstly, special lien is a doctrine of the law of obligations and not merely part of the
law of contract.4 The exact obligational circumstances in which a special lien will
arise have been examined previously.3 What has been shown as required is one
party holding the property of another under an obligation to return it. Where the
other party in turn owes an obligation to the holder which is connected to the
property, the holder has a lien until that obligation is performed. For example, a
storekeeper has a duty to return goods to their owner when requested. However, if
the owner has not- yet paid the storage charges in respect of the goods, the
storekeeper may retain the property until he docs so.6
Secondly, special lien being a real right, is also part of the law of property. It is a
right which may be enforced not only against the debtor, but against his creditors
and singular successors.
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In this section, special lien will be examined. This will be followed by a study of
two specific types of special lien : that of the carrier and the hotelier/
1. Bell. Commentaries, 11.92-93: Bell. Principles, ss 1411 and 1419; Clang and Irvine, pp 349-351;
Shaw, pp 55-57: W M Gloag. Contract. (2nd ed. 1929). p 630; W W McBrydc, Contract. (1987).
paras 14.46-14.47; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, paras 75-76.
2. For an excellent analysis of the exceptio, see G H Treitei, Remedies tor Breach of Contract,
(1988). pp 299-317.
3. On the English law, see Halshury, vol 28, para 534-541. The term for "special lien" in English law
is "particular lien".
4. See above, para 168.
5. See above, paras 169-171. In the case of enrichment liens, the basis of the right is the exccptio
doli of Roman law : see above, paras 120-123 and 128.
6. Laurie v Denny's 7r(1853) 15 D 504.
7. Sec Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440. at 472 per Lord President
Campbell and, above, paras 193-197.
205. The meaning of "special". A special lien is said to be "special" because the
security which it gives is special to the obligation which gives rise to the lien.' For
example, the lien of a garage for repairs to a car may be invoked until the customer
pays the repair bill. It may, however, not be invoked in order to secure the payment
of any other debt owed by the customer, such as for petrol bought the previous
week.2 If the lien-holder does retain the property in respect of such an extrinsic debt,
he will be liable in damages to the owner of the property/
It was at one time submitted in Scots law, most notably by Professor More, that in
any situation where one party was legitimately in possession of the property of
another that he had a right of retention for all sums due to him by that party.4 To
accept such is to regard special lien as not being part of Scots law and this was
indeed Professor More's contention :
". . . the original principle of retention, as held in our law, has been thrown
into a state of embarrassment and confusion, by an attempt to assimilate it to
the English doctrine of lien".5
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This statement has a measure of truth in it.6 However, as regards the substance of
the matter, Professor Mores account of the law is not correct because it fails to
distinguish between retention based on ownership and retention based on
custody/possession (lien). The former permits retention for all sums/ The latter
docs not." This point has been made on a number of occasions by the courts and the
matter may be regarded as beyond doubt.10
A special lien is so closely viewed as merely securing the obligation in terms of
which it arises, that it does not extend to the cost of storing the property being
detained." This rule, of course, may be varied by express contract.12 Similarly, the
lien docs not extend to the costs of recovering the debt which it secures.13
1. Bel! was responsible for intnxlucing the terminology to Scotland. Sec. above, paras 158-159.
2. Carntync Motors v Curran 1958 SLT (Sh Ct) 6.
3. McNair v Don (1932) 48 Sh Ct Rep 99.
4. More. Notes to Stair's Institutions, exxxi. See too the arguments of the losing sides in Harper's
Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440: Stuarts and Fletcher v McGregor and Co
(1829) 7 S 622: Reid v Watson (1836) 14 S 223; Brown v Sommcrville (1844) 6 D 1267 and
Laurie v Denny's Tr{ 1853) 15 D 404.
5. More, ibid, at exxxiv.
6. Thus not all the law which Bell sets out in his Commentaries and Principles is in fact justified in
terms of Scottish principle, for example, his account of the innkeeper's lien.
7. Gloag and Irvine, pp 353-354; W M Gloag. Contract, (2nd ed. 1929), p 633; W M Gloag.
Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 462.
8. Gloag and Irvine, p 330; Dougal v Gordon (1795) Mor 851 and 2067; Ballcny v Racburn
(1808) Mor App voce Compensation, No 5: Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152: Nelson v
Gordon (1874) 1 R 1093. But cf Moor v Atwal 1995 SCLR 1119.
9. See above, para 199 and the cases cited in note 4.
10. See the authorities referred to in the previous two notes and Gladstone v McCallum (1896) 23 R
785, at 785, per Lord McLaren. In Laurie v Denny's Tr (1853) 15 D 404. at 410, Lord Ivory said ot
the distinction : "I hope this will be the last time we will have to travel over the authorities to affirm a
principle which has now taken deep root in our system, whatever may have been the law formerly."
11. Stephen & Sons v Swayne & Bovill (1861) 24 D 158: Carntync Motors v Curran 1958 SLT
(Sh Ct) 6. But cf W A Wilson, The Law ofScotland on Debt, (2nd ed. 1991). para 7.8.
12. Bon Accord Removals v Hainsworth 1993 GWD 28-1785.
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13. W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 48(1: Garscadden v Ardrossan Dry Docks Co 1910 SC
178.
206. Circumstances in which the lien arises : the orthodoxy. Historically, a
distinction has often been made in respect of the property over which a special lien
may extend.1 That distinction is a two-fold one and is set out by Gloag and Irvine.2
Firstly, there is property which has been improved by the work of the lien-holder.
Secondly, there is property which has not been worked upon but which is in the
hands of the lien-holder in terms of the obligation which gave rise to the lien.
1. Gloag and Irvine, pp 350-352: A J Sim. SUE. vol 20. paras 76-77: Brown v Sommervillc
(1844) 6 D 1267, discussed below.
2. Gloag and Irvine, ibid.
207. Category one. There has never been any doubt that a lien will arise in the first
category. This much was made clear by both Bankton1 and Erskinc,2 not to mention
Bell.3 Such a right has been held to exist in respect of the following : bleached
cloth;4 repaired cars;5 repaired ships;"; repaired aircraft;7 plans drawn up by an
architect;8 and land which has been improved.4 Gow gives his own colourful
example :
"The television set, with its beguiling sagas, must languish in [the] shop until
the price of the new picture tube has been paid."10
1. Bankton, 1.17.15.
2. Erskinc, III.4.21. See also Voct. 16.2.20.
3. Bell, Commentaries, 11,100; Bell, Principles, s 1430.
4. Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440. It now seems accepted that
bleachers have a general lien upon usage of trade for the year's account : Anderson's Tr v Fleming
(1871) 9 M 718.
5. Carntync Motors v Curran 1958 SLT (Sh Ct) 6.
6. Barr&Cooper v Shearer( 1875) 2 R (HL) 14; Ross & Duncan v Baxter& Co( 1885) 13 R 185.
7. Sun-Air of Scandinavia A/S v Caledonian Airborne Engineering 8 August 1995, (OH),
unreported.
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8. Lindsay v Mackenzie (1883) 2 Guth Sh Cas 498.
9. Binning v Brotherstones (1676) Mor 13401.
10. J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law ofScotland. (1964). p 293.
208. Category two : (a) the dceision in Brown v Sommcrvillc. This category has
proved more problematic. It was held in the important case of Brown v
Sommervillc,' that a special lien will only come into existence where work has been
done to the property in question, as in the first category above. There, a printer had
been given stereotype plates in order that he could print a periodical work entitled
Wilson's Talcs of the Borders. He sought subsequently to retain the plates until his
account was paid. The majority of the court, reversing the Lord Ordinary, denied
him a lien on the ground that no work had been done on the plates themselves. In the
words of Lord Justice-Clerk Hope :
"[The printer's] workmanship - the product of his skill and labour as an
artificer, is the printed work - producing on paper that which is to be sold.
That, it is admitted, he is entitled to retain until paid for. But on the plates he
has bestowed no labour. They are not improved in value by his work - quite
the reverse."2
This is a very succinct statement of the law. What is unfortunate, is that it is a
statement of the law of England and not Scotland. The majority of the court were in
fact influenced by English law when making their decision.3 In that jurisdiction
since the Middle Ages it has been accepted that special, or more correctly, particular
lien, has been limited to three main categories.4 Firstly, the law confers a lien upon
an unpaid seller.3 This lien is of course now statutory.6 Secondly, a lien may arise
out of public duty, as in the case of the liens of the common carrier and hotelier.'
Thirdly, a lien arising in respect of property upon which work has been done and
which has been improved by that work.8 Thus, leaving the common carrier, hotelier
and unpaid seller aside, English law does not countenance a lien except in respect of
property improved by the lien-holder. The application of the rule leads to results
which arc difficult to justify. For example, a trainer of horses but not a livery stable
keeper is entitled to lien, because only the former is regarded as making the horse
more valuable.4
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Scots law docs not and never did follow the English rule. In Stewart v Stevenson,10 a
case decided sixteen years before Brown it was held that an accountant had a right
to retain documents placed in his hands for the purpose of drawing up a report, until
paid his fee. The fact that the accountant did not work on the papers themselves was
irrelevant. As Lord Moncreiff, who dissented in Brown, pointed out, our law "has
been established on principles perfectly distinct"11 from the law in England. The
relevant principles arc civilian and to make the point, Lord Moncreiff makes
reference to the following passage from the judgement of the Lord President in
Harper's Creditors v Faulds :
"I conceive [retention] to mean a right of refusing delivery of a subject, till the
counter obligation under which the subject was lodged be performed. It is
acknowledged by all our authors and decisions, mutual obligations must be
performed hinc indc".n
On this sound basis, the printer had every right to retain the plates until paid in terms
of the contract under which he received them.
1.(1844) 6 D 1267.
2. Ibid, at 1278.
3. See Gloag and Irvine, p 352, note 2. The English case in question was Bleadon v Hancock
(1829) 4 Car & P 152; 172 ER 648, a decision of Chief Justice Tindal.
4. See above, paras 132 and 139. The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Security,
(1941), s 61, also contains a fixed list of special liens.
5. See above, para 131.
6. Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c 54), ss 39(1 )(a) and 41.
7. See Halsbury, vol 28, paras 535-536.
8. Ibid, paras 537-541. The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Security, (1941), s
61(a) confers a lien where work has been done or materials added to the property. It is not necessary
that the thing be actually improved.
9. Cf Bevan v Waters (1828) 3 Car & P 520; 172 ER 529 and Forth v Simpson (1849) 13 QB 680;
116 ER 1423 with Jackson v Cummins (1839) 5 M & W 342; 151 ER 145.
10. (1828) 6 S 591.
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11 .Op cit n 1 at 1281 -1285.
12. Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440, at 471.
209. Category two : (b) authority subsequent to Brown. The majority decision in
Brown must be regarded as wrong in principle. At any rate, the decision is now
regarded as being consigned to history by a consistent series of later cases.1 The first
of these was Meiklc and Wilson v Pollard,2 decided in 1880. There a merchant had
placed certain documents in the hands of a firm of accountants to enable them to
collect debts for him. It was held that the firm had a right to retain the documents
until its bill was paid for this service. The fact that no work was done on the papers
themselves was irrelevant. As Lord Young stated :
"There is a counterpart in every contract, and here it is that the man of
business is not entitled to get his money until he gives up the books, and his
employer is not entitled to get his books till he pays the money. These are
obligations hinc indc prestable by both parties."3
The decision in Mciklc and Wilson was recognised as being valid in two Sheriff
Court cases decided shortly afterwards.4 Further, it was heavily relied upon in the
case of Robertson v Ross,5 decided in 1887. There an estates factor had handed to
him by a landed proprietor documents which the factor required to carry out his
factorial duties. It was held that the factor had a lien over the papers until paid. Lord
Young gave a similar judgement in this case.6 Lord Rutherfurd Clark concurred, but
not without expressing some doubt. He said he was "bound"7 to follow the previous
case, adding :
"1 think it right, however, to say that, so far as I can judge, the decision in
Mciklc's case was an entirely new departure. If the law laid down there is
sound, we should never have heard of the law-agent's hypothec as an
exceptional right."8
To this statement, two things may be said. Firstly, there was more of a return than a
departure, with the law returning to its civilian roots after dallying with English
principle. Secondly, the law-agent's hypothec, or as it is now known, the solicitor's
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lien is an exceptional right when compared with the liens in Mciklc and Wilson and
Robertson. It is a general lien, whereas they arc special liens.''
Later years have seen further contract cases enunciating the principle that special
lien arises out of mutual obligations.10 The latest relevant decision is National
Homccarc Ltd v Belling & Co Ltd.11 There the defender had entered into an
agreement with the pursuer whereby the latter was to deliver and install the former's
equipment. The defender went into receivership. The pursuer sought declarator as to
its entitlement to exercise a special lien over the equipment it held, until paid under
the contract. Lord Penrose in the Outer House engaged in a comprehensive review
of the previous cases in this area, noting in particular that Brown v Sommerville was
now considered as wrong.12 He agreed with the submission of counsel for the
pursuer that "special lien depends upon and is part of the law of mutual contract".13
Thus the equipment could be retained by the pursuer in security of payment.
1. See Gloag and Irvine, pp 351-352; Sheriff Guthrie in Bell's Principles, s 1430, note (d); W VI
Gloag, Contract, (2nd cd, 1929), p 631; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 461; W W
McBryde, Contract. (1987), para 14.46.
2. (1880) 8 R 69.
3. Ibid, at 72. The other judges in the ease, Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff and Lord Gifford, use the
term "lien" to mean only "general lien". Thus, Lord Gifford states at 71 : "this is not a case of lien. It
is simply a case of the retention of a subject . . . under a contract." See too Lord Justice-Clerk
Moncreiff in Robertson v Ross (1887) 15 R 67, at 70. This approach has not been taken
subsequently ; see Gow, p 294.
4. Lindsay v Mackenzie (1883) 2 Guth Sh Cas 498; Morrison v Watson (1883) 2 Guth Sh Cas 502.
5.(1887) 15 R67.
6. Ibid, at 71-72.
7. Ibid, at 72.
8. Ibid.
9. On the solicitor's lien, sec Gloag and Irvine, pp 384-395 and below, paras 265-271.
10. Moore's Carving Machine Co v Austin (1896) 33 SLR 613; Findlay v Waddell 1910 SC 670;
Paton's Trs v Finlayson 1923 SC 872.
11. 1994 SLT 50.
12. Ibid, at 53.
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13.Ibid, at 52.
210. Gloag and Irvine's categorisation rcanalyscd. The result of the line of
authority beginning with Mciklc and Wilson is that it cannot be doubted that a
special lien will arise in Gloag and Irvine's second category, i.e. where work has not
been actually done on the property being detained. The more fundamental point is
whether there is any value in making a distinction between special liens in respect
of, firstly, property worked upon and, secondly, property which the lien-holder
required to fulfil his obligations, but did not actually improve. There may be some
merit at a factual level. Beyond that, however, the division has little to commend it,
particularly if one returns and looks at Gloag and Irvine's categorisation more
closely.
The first category is defined as "where the subject retained is actually enhanced in
value by the work bestowed upon it".1 Tailors, watchmakers and ship carpenters
who have carried out repairs, millers and bleachers are placed in this category.2
Their inclusion cannot be questioned. However, Gloag and Irvine thereafter "on the
same principle"3 proceed to add carriers, storekeepers, wharfingers and salvors.
Their list is completed through "perhaps a slight extension of [the] rule"4 with
innkeepers. With the arguable exception of salvors,3 none of these further
individuals can be said to "enhance" the value of the property by "work bestowed
upon it". Carriers carry. Storekeepers store, as do wharfingers. Innkeepers provide
accommodation.
What Gloag and Irvine try to do is unfortunately not possible. They try to fit liens
into an English classification which do not and cannot belong there. Under English
law the common carrier and innkeeper/hotelier have a particular lien arising out of
their public duties. It is in this category of particular lien where they belong.6
Storekeepers and wharfingers have nothing akin to a special lien in English law,
although they may have possibly a general lien based on usage of trade.' The
English case which Gloag and Irvine cite to justify the proposition that wharfingers
have a special lien makes precisely this point.8 In Scotland it has never been doubted
that storekeepers have a special lien.4
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The conclusion from this is that carriers, hoteliers, storekeepers and wharfingers
should have been placed in Gloag and Irvine's second category, that is where the
property subject to the lien "was delivered and received only as a means to the
performance of the contract".10 A more radical approach would be to depart from the
author's categorisation completely. There is much to be said for such a departure. To
recognise a distinct category of special lien where the subject has been improved is
to give an account of English rather Scots law. In our jurisdiction such special liens
are treated in the same way as any special lien in contract as arising out of the
mutuality of contractual obligations." In other words the licn-holdcr's duty to return
the property is the counterpart to the obligation which the lien secures. The matter of
whether property has been improved under a contract is irrelevant.12
1. Gloag and Irvine, pp 350-351.
2. Ibid. Authority is cited in support, although in the case of tailors, watchmakers and millers the
authority is English.
3. Gloag and Irvine, above, note 1.
4. Ibid.
5. In South African law, the salvor's lien is treated as an enrichment lien : sec T J Scott, LA WSA. vol
15, para 106 and Brooklyn House Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Knoetze and Sons 1970 3 SA 264 at 271
per Botha JA.
6. See above, para 132.
7. Halsbury, vol 28, para 525.
8. Moct v Pickering (1878) 8 Ch D 372.
9. Laurie v Denny's 7'r( 1853) 15 D 504.
10. Gloag and Irvine, p 351.
11. See, for example, W M Gloag and R C Henderson. The Law of Scotland, (10th ed, 1995), at
para 19.21 : "It is immaterial that no work has actually been done on the article over which the lien
is claimed". But cf Lord McLaren in Gladstone v McCallum (1896) 23 R 783, at 785. In South
African law, a distinction is made. Where work has been done, an enrichment lien will arise. This is
a real right. In other relevant cases, a debtor-creditor lien will arise. This is a mere personal right.
See T J Scott, LAWSA, vol 15, paras 98-136.
12. This certainly is the position under the Civil Code of Quebec (art 1592), where a party holding
the property of another under a contract has a lien in respect of a claim which is "exigible and is
directly related to the property of which he has detention". See too French law : M Planiol, Civil
Law Treatise, vol 2, (1959), ss 2520-2521.
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211. Special lien for damages. An exceptional instance of special lien is a right to
retain property in security of a claim for damages.' The principal case in this area is
Moore's Carving Machine Co v Austinr There a commission agent was appointed
by a company to sell carving machines. He was given a show machine which was
fitted up in his premises. The company ran into difficulties and was unable to supply
the agent with the machines. It was held that the company was in breach of contract
and that the agent could retain the show machine until lie received damages. The
quantum was the expense which the contract had cost the agent. This amount
consisted of costs in relation to the machine and travelling expenses.
In a subsequent Sheriff Court case, involving another agent, it was held that samples
belonging to his employer could be retained in security of a claim for damages for
wrongful dismissal.3 As Gloag and Irvine point out, allowing a special lien for
damages coheres with the long established rule that a contracting party may
withhold payment of a debt due by him under a contract until he receives damages
for breach of that contract.4
It has been held in two cases that where a buyer under a contract for the sale of
goods rejects the goods because they are disconform to the contract, that he has no
right to retain them until he receives damages.5 Padgett & Co v McNair & Brand1
was decided in 1852. Lupton & Co v Schulze & Co' was decided in 1900, after the
Sale of Goods Act 1893 had come into force but similar principles were applied. It
is felt that these decisions are open to question. Padgett was decided well before the
line of cases beginning with Mciklc and Wilson v Pollard which established that
special liens arise out of mutual obligations under contract.* It also prc-datcd the
case of Moore's Carving Machine Co which admitted a special lien in security of a
claim for damages. Further, the judges in Padgett took cognisance of English
authority.9
The judicial concern intimated in Padgett that allowing retention would be "unfair"
to the seller docs not seem justified, given that lien is an equitable right with which a
court can interfere in extreme cases.10 The seller after all is no innocent : he is in
breach of contract. It is interesting to note that in Lupton that Lord Moncrciff says :
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"There may perhaps be exceptional eases in which, after a purchaser has
rejected goods as not being conform to contract, he may be entitled to retain
and use them, claiming damages in respect of defects in quality. As to such
eases, 1 reserve my opinion."'1
This statement begins to go a little along the road towards what the law should be
regarded as. We await future decisions.
1. Sec Gloag and Irvine, p 353; W VI Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed, 1929), p 632; W M Gloag.
Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 479; W W McBrydc. Contract, (1985). para 14-47; A J Sim, SME, vol
20, para 77.
2. (1896) 3 SLR 613.
3. Marshall v Boyle (1890) 2 Guth Sh Cas 401.
4. Gloag and Irvine, pp 353 and 306-307; Kilmarnock. Gas Light Co v Smith (1872) 11 M 58;
Turnbull v McLean & Co (1874) 1 R 730.
5. See W M Gloag, Contract, (2nd ed, 1929), p 632.
6.(1852) 15 D 76.
7. (1900) 2 F 1118.
8. See the preceding paragraphs.
9. See Lord Justice-Clerk Hope at (1852) 15 D 76, at 80 and Lord Wood at 83.
10. See in particular Lord Justice-Clerk Hope at 81-82. On lien as an equitable right, see above, para
164.
11.(1900) 2 F 1118, at 1123.
11. CARRIER'S LIEN
212. General. It is possible to treat the carrier's lien as a unitary subject.1
Nevertheless, it is the case that there arc some specialities depending on the manner
of carriage, for example by sea, and these will be given due examination also.2 The
carrier's lien is a relatively undeveloped subject in Scotland, leading to reliance
often being placed upon English authority.3 It is fair to say, however, that the
borrowing of authority here has not caused the trouble that was brought about when
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the same thing was done in relation to the hotelier's lien.
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,94; Bell, Principles, s 1422; Gloag and Irvine, p 400.
2. See below, paras 219-221. The accounts cited in note 1 consider in detail the particular rules
relating to carriage by sea and by land.
3. See, for example, Gloag and Irvine, pp 400-403.
213. History. In England, the common carrier was one of the earliest individuals to
be given a lien by the law.1 Like the innkeeper, he was given it because of his public
duty to accept goods for carriage and his strict liability if any harm became of them.
Scots law developed somewhat differently. In the late seventeenth century it was
recognised that a shipowner had a hypothec over the cargo for freight.2 Being a
hypothec, the right was not dependent on possession.3 Bankton, however, viewed
the hypothec in limited terms conferred by the law in favour of the owners and
masters of ships.4 He stated that it could only be enforced up to 15 days after
delivery of the goods and, at least in terms of the maritime law of France, was
defeated by a third party acquiring for value. Further, he opined :
"I doubt if [the master]3 has any other privilege by our law, than that of
retention, while the goods are in the ship, in lighters, or on the key".6
Thus the right in question can be analysed as a lien, which is replaced by a hypothec
on delivery, which lasts for 15 days. Erskine, on the other hand, baldly asserts that
the right is one of hypothec.7 Equally simply, but quite differently, Voct recognised
the right in terms of retention.8
In the case of Bogle v Dunmorc & Co,6 decided in 1787, there was no reference to
hypothec but only to the right of a maritime carrier to detain for freight. Similarly, in
the 1814 case of Malcolm v Bannatync,U) the carrier was only found to have a
security over that property which he had not delivered. Thus the ease law moved
away from sanctioning a hypothec in respect of freight, recognising instead a lien.
When Bell came to deal with the matter in his Commentaries, he began by noting
that Roman law conferred a right to retain in respect of carriage in terms of the actio
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contraria of the contract locatio opens mercium vchcndarum.u He then pointed out
that English law gave common carriers a lien because of their public duty to accept
goods for carriage without enquiring into who owns them, the lien being enforceable
against the owner. Bell concludes:
"In the Scottish jurisprudence, both principles may be held to combine in
favour of a lien for the price of carriage."12
The statement may be seen as fair. As might be expected, there is far more English
authority to rely on than authority from anywhere else. It is certainly beyond doubt
that the right in question is one of lien. Referring to carriage by sea, Bell states :
"Delivery of the goods divests the shipmaster of his lien, for it subsists only
by possession."13
Bell's treatment is accepted by other writers, for example Hume.14 Other than by
Gloag and Irvine, the carrier's lien has not been subject to detailed treatment by
Scottish writers.15 The ease law on the subject cannot be said to be large in amount
either.16 Nevertheless, the lien is an important one, with similar rights being
recognised in other jurisdictions, such as France,17, Germany,18, Italy,16,
Louisiana,20, Quebec,21 and South Africa.22
1. See above, paras 131-132; Sir William Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol 7, pp 511-512;
A P Bell, p 138. See too the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Security, (1941),
pp 168-169.
2. Muirc v Lord Lyon (1683) Mor 6260.
3. On hypothec, see Stair, 1.13.14; Erskine, III. 1.34; Bell, Commentaries, 11,24-40; Gloag and
Irvine, chapter 12.
4. Bankton, 1.17.16. He cites the case of Lawry, November 14, 1676.
5. Presumably as agent for the shipowner.
6. Bankton, above, note 4.
7. Erskine, III.1.34, citing Muire v Lord Lyon, above, note 2. But see Nicolson's note (number 30)
where he writes that the right is "more properly a right of lien or retention over the cargo while yet




9. (1787) Mor 14216.
10. 15 Nov 1814, FC.
11. Bell, Commentaries, 11,94.
12. Ibid.
13. Bell, Commentaries, 11,97.
14. Hume, Lectures, 111,47; D M Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, (4th cd. 1989), vol 3,
pp 400-401.
15. Gloag and Irvine, pp 400-403.
16. There are in the region of twenty relevant cases, dating from the unreported decision of Lawry,
November 14, 1676 (Bankton, 1.17.16) to Bon Accord Removals v Hainsworth 1993 GWD 28-
1785.
17. In France there exists a priority in favour of a carrier under the Civil Code. Article 2102(6). This
is dependent on the carrier continuing to hold the goods ; M Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, vol 2.
(1959), s 2521.
18. In Germany, the carrier has a lien under the HGB, art 440 (das Pfandrecht des Frachtfiihrers).
19. Italian Civil Code, art 2761.
20. Civil Code of Louisiana, art 3217(9).
21. Civil Code of Quebec, art 2058.
22. The South African carrier's lien is not a real right : see T J Scott, LAWSA, vol 15, para 119;
Standard Bank v Wilman Spilliaus & Co 1888 (6) SC 15.
214. The lien in practice. Contact has been made with some carriers to ascertain
the frequency with which the lien is used today. DHL International's terms and
conditions of business contain a clause stating that the company has a lien for the
charge of shipping the goods and for any related duties arising out of the
transportation. However, their Customer Care Department advise that "this lien is
rarely, if ever, relied upon",1 the normal practice being to recover outstanding debts
"through the usual legal channels",2 which presumably means raising an action for
payment and executing diligence. This would fit in with the rather small body of
case law on the subject, as noted in the preceding paragraph.
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1. Letter from DHL International (UK) Ltd to the writer, dated 14 November 1996.
2. Ibid.
215. Nature of right. The carrier's lien is a special lien.1 If the matter ever was in
any doubt, which it surely was not, then it was settled in 1824 by the case of
Stevenson v Likly} There, a shipping company was employed to convey goods.
During the course of the employment a balance became owed by the shipper to the
company. In order to secure the balance the company detained goods consigned to
the shipper. It was held by the Court of Session that the company had no right to do
this. A carrier could only retain a parcel for the carriage charge in respect of that
parcel and not for a general balance. The rule applies equally to land carriage, as
Lord President Inglis makes clear in a case which involved a lien under statute :
"At common law the railway company, as carriers, would have been entitled
to retain the goods till the carriage or toll applicable to these goods was
paid."3
The common law may be clear, but the question remains whether a carrier may
obtain a general lien expressly or through usage. Bell, at least in the case of land
carriage, appears to accept as much.4 On the other hand, Gloag and Irvine were
highly sceptical in respect of both types of carriage known in 1897.5
The issue may be traced back to English case law of the early nineteenth century.6
This was the time at which the English courts were repudiating previous decisions,
from judges such as Lord Mansfield, which were in favour of introducing general
liens in as many situations as possible. The watershed case, Rushforth v Hadficld,'
in fact involved a common carrier who claimed a general lien. The Court stated that
allowing carriers to have general liens undermined the rules of the common law
whereby they were granted a particular8 lien in return for their public duties.
Accordingly, it was held that in order to establish a general lien, a heavy burden of
proof had to be discharged. Nevertheless, the task is not an impossible one.9
In Scotland the weight of authority points to the possibility of creating a general lien
by agreement with a customer. In the first place, there would have been no need for
the nineteenth century legislation restricting the rights of railway companies to
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create express general liens, if this was not the ease.10 In the second place, it has
been held by the House of Lords that a shipping company can extend its lien to
cover dead freight, by agreement with its customer." In the third place, in a very
recent ease it was held by Sheriff Principal Risk that a removal company could
create a general lien through express contract.12
The problem with the general lien is its prejudicial effect on third parties. The issue
was close to the Court's heart in Rushforth v Hadfield.13 Indeed in the later cases in
England where carriers were able to establish general liens, these liens were only
admitted on a contractual basis between carrier and customer and were not allowed
to affect third parties.14 In Scotland, Lord Young has seriously doubted whether it is
possible for a carrier to create a general lien through either usage or expressly,
which can prejudice third parties.15 If one examines more closely what Gloag and
Irvine say in respect of a shipowner contracting for an express lien for freight, it can
be seen that what they doubt is that such a lien "would be upheld in a question with
the creditors of the shipper".16 And further, in that recent case, the Sheriff Principal
distinguished a previous decision in which a general lien was not upheld against a
third party, because there were no third parties involved in the ease in hand.17
The conclusion from the above is that a general lien created in favour of a carrier
will only operate effectually at a contractual level between him and his customer.
Given this, and given further that the term "lien" is consonant with that of "real
right", it is felt that the terminology being used is somewhat misleading. Instead of
making reference to "general lien", some other label such as "contractual retention
for a general balance" should be used. For the sake of clarity, it may be underlined
that the special lien which arises by operation of law in favour of a carrier is a real
right.1S
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,94-97; Bell, Principles, ss 1422-1425; Gloag and Irvine, p 400; A
Mackenzie Stuart, Encyclopaedia, vol 3, para 44 (carrier by land) and W G Normand and J G
Mclntyre in the same work at para 84 (carrier by sea); D M Walker, SME, vol 3. para 629 (carrier by
land); A J Sim, SME vol 20, para 77: C Mackenzie, SME, vol 21, para 660 (carrier by sea).
2. (1824) 3 S 291 (NE 204).
3. North British Railway Co v Carter (1870) 8 M 998, at 1000. See also Lord Young in Peebles &
Son v Caledonian Railway Co (1875) 2 R 346, at 348 and Sheriff Berry in North British Railway
Co v Russell (i h95) 11 Sh Ct Rep 241, at 246.
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4. Bell, Commentaries, 11,97.
5. Gloag and Irvine, pp 400 and 402.
6. On which, see A P Bell, pp 142-143.
7. (1805) 6 East 519; 102 ER 1386; (1806) 7 East 224.
8. "Particular" is the equivalent term to "special" when discussing liens in English law. See, tor
example, N E Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), pp 943-955.
9. Oppenheim v Russell (1802) 3 B & P 42; 127 ER 24; Rushforth v Hadficld, above note 7;
Wright v Snell (1822) 5 B & Aid 350; 106 ER 1219; Halsbury, vol 5(1), para 586.
10. Railway and Canal Traffic Act (17 & 18 Vict c 31), s 7, on which, see Scottish Central Railway
Co v Ferguson (1864) 2 M 781 and Peebles & Son v Caledonian Railway Co (1875) 2 R 346.
11. McLean & Hope v Fleming (1871) 9 M (HL) 38; Lamb v Kaselack, Alsen & Co (1882) 9 R
482.
12. Bon Accord Removals v Hainsworth 1993 GWD 28-1785.
13. See (1805) 6 East 519 at p 528; 102 ER 1386 at 1390 per Le Blanc J.
14. See the cases cited in note 9 and G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), p 274.
15. Peebles & Son v Caledonian Railway Co (1875) 2 R 346, at 348.
16. Gloag and Irvine, p 400.
17. Bon Accord Removals v Hainsworth, above, n 12. The case distinguished was Peebles & Son,
above, note 15, where Lord Young had made his views plain on the matter of carriers contracting for
general liens.
18. Malcolm v Bannatyne, 15 Nov 1814, FC (lien prevailed over general creditors in customer's
bankruptcy); Stevenson v Likly (1824) 3 S 291 (NE 204); Scottish Central Railway Co v
Ferguson (1864) 2 M 781 (in these cases lien good against consignee); Mossgiel SS Co v Stewart
(1900) 16 Sh Ct Rep 289 (lien prevailed over hypothec of landlord). The rule may be different as
regards indorsees of bills of lading, see below, para 221.
216. Property covered by the lien. In general, the carrier's lien extends over all the
property which he is carrying upon his customer's behalf under the contract between
them.1 It was held in an English case that the lien does not permit the detention of
the customer, nor the clothes he is wearing, if he is travelling as a passenger along
with his property.2 There would seem no doubt that the same rule applies in
Scotland.3
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There exists the interesting question as to whether the lien extends to property which
the customer does in fact not own. In England it is the law that the lien docs so
extend in respect of common carriers.4 The rationale is the same rationale which
applies to the innkeeper down south. The lien is seen as a counterpart to the public
duties imposed upon the common carrier.-"'
As regards the position in Scotland, it is possible to read certain statements of Bell
and Lord Young to the effect that the law is the same here as in England.6 In
addition there is the Sheriff Court decision of Mossgicl SS Co v Stewart' in which
the sheriff takes this view expressly. There, part of the cargo which a shipping
company was exercising their lien over turned out to be furniture which had been
obtained on hire purchase by the shipper. The company did not know this when they
accepted it for transportation. The sheriff followed English authority to hold that the
lien was nonetheless effectual.8 He dismissed an American case in which the
opposite conclusion was reached upon "the settled and universal principle"9 that any
individual dealing with property without its owner's consent has no claim against the
owner for his expenses. The rule was recognised by the sheriff to apply to
pawnbrokers and purchasers. However, the difference, he pointed out with regard to
common carriers, was their public duty to receive goods with "no opportunity of
making inquiry as to ownership".10
The present writer prefers the American decision. To say that a common carrier has
an absolute duty to receive all goods is to exaggerate. The English texts contain a
number of examples of situations where he may refuse to do so." It is surely
arguable that in a case where he was suspicious as to the ownership of the property
and in doubt as to whether lie would be paid, he could also refrain from carrying.
Further, one is not conscious of a significant body of case law relating to carriers
being sued for not fulfilling their duty to carry.12 The view consequently taken here
is that the true owner should prevail. There seems to be no convincing reason why a
carrier should be given a privilege which other lien-holders arc not.13 Further,
following the English rule means allowing the carrier not only to prevail over the
true owner, but also over any third parties with a subordinate real right in the
property.14 More generally, the notion of a lien arising out of public duty resulting in
only common carriers being given a lien and not private carriers is not part of Scots
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law.15
1. Bell. Principles, s 1424: Gloag and Irvine, p 400; Lamb v Kaselack, Alscn & Co (1882) 9 R
482.
2. Wolf v Summers (1811)2 Camp 631; I70ER 1275.
3. That the rule is the same in Scotland is accepted by Bell, Commentaries, 11,96; Gloag and Irvine,
p 400; D M Walker, SME, vol 3, para 672.
4. Skinner v Upshaw (1702) 2 Ld Raym 752; 93 ER 3; Yorkc v Greenhaugh (1703) 2 Ld Raym 866
at 867 per Holt CJ; 92 ER 79 at 80; G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952). p 273;
Crossley Vaines, Personal Property, (5th ed. 1973), pp 142-143; N E Palmer, Bailment. (2nd ed,
1991), p 1013; Halsbury, vol 5(1), para 586. However, it has been held in the common law system
of Australia that the lien may not be effectual if the carrier knew that the true owner gave no
authority for the goods to be sent for transport : Kilner's Ltd v The John Dawson Investment Trust
Ltd( 1935) 35 SR (NSW) 274, per Jordan CJ at 278.
5. Sir William Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol 7, pp 511-512; G W Paton. ibid: Halsbury,
vol 28, para 536.
6. Bell in his Commentaries, 11,94 refers to the English rule in his statement that the English law
upon the carrier's lien and the Roman law are combined to create the "Scottish Jurisprudence" on the
matter. In Peebles v Caledonian Railway Company (1875) 2 R 346, Lord Young at p 348 refers to
the common carrier's public duty to receive goods and to him having "a particular lien on every
parcel of goods for the carriage thereof". The passage, with phrases such as "common carrier" and
"particular lien" has a dccidcly English law tone.
7.(1900) 16 Sh Ct Rep 289.
8. In particular Lord Holt in Yorke v Greenhaugh. See above note 4.
9. (1900) 16 Sh Ct Rep 289, at 298. The American decision is Robinson v Baker 51 American
Decisions, page 54.
10. Ibid.
11. Halsbury, vol 5(1), para 442; Palmer, above, n 4, at pp 973-975. In particular, the common
carrier may refuse to carry until paid the full and proper price of carriage : Wyld v Pickford (1841)
8M&W443; 151 ER 1113.
12. See Halsbury, vol 5(1), para 441, where the most recent case cited is Belfast Ropcwork Co Ltd
v Bushell [1918] 1 KB 210. Palmer, ibid, at p 973, notes that the common carrier used to be liable
to indictment for refusal to carry, but that this is no longer the law.
13. Other than perhaps their strict liability under the edict nautae caupones stabularii. For an
interesting study of how the edict became applicable to carriage by land in Scotland, see an early
article by the current Lord President : A F Rodger, "The Praetor's Edict and Carriage by Land in
Scots Law", (1968) 3 Ir Jur (NS) 175. However, the Carriers Act 1830 (11 Geo IV & 1 Will IV c
68) (as amended) has reduced the extent of this liability. The carrier may contract out of it provided
he takes reasonable care to inform his customer. Further his liability in respect of specified goods.
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for example jewellery and watches, is excluded unless the customer declares their nature and value,
if over £10, on handing them over. On the operation of the Act. sec D M Walker, SME, vol 3, para
609.
14. As happened in the Mossgiel case (above, note 7) where the lien was held to prevail over the
landlord's hypothec.
15. In England, the accepted view is that private carriers have no lien as they have no public duty to
carry : see G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law. (1952), pp 227-233: Crossley Vaines,
Personal Property, (5th ed, 1973), p 143; Halshury, vol 5(1), para 586. This is definitively the case
as against third parties : N E Palmer. Bailment. (2nd ed. 1991), pp 1013-1014; Electric Supply
Stores v Gaywood (1909) 100 LT 855. In Scotland, any carrier has a special lien arising out of their
contract with their customer : W M Gloag. Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para 478; A J Sim. SME. vol 20.
paras 76-77.
217. Enforcement. As regards enforcement of the lien, the view has been expressed
that the right is one of detention with no automatic right to go to court and ask for a
power to sell. In a case involving a railway company's lien for carriage, Sheriff
Berry stated this opinion.1 He then proceeded to examine Bell's Principles which
refers to various situations, regarded by the sheriff as "exceptions", where a power
of sale can be applied for, including where there arc "goods prepared for the market,
and useful only as commodities in trade."2 It is submitted, however, that the Sheriff
has got matters the wrong way round and that in general, a lien-holder may apply for
a power to sell, apart from recognised exceptions, such as an author's unpublished
compositions and items which are perse not marketable.3
The leading case of Stevenson v Likly,4 which Sheriff Berry refers to, coheres with
the conclusion reached. There the court opined that the carrier should notify his
exercise of his lien to the consignee "and in the event of not being paid, to bring [the
property] to judicial sale without delay".5 It must be noted that Sheriff Berry also
cites the opinion of Lord President Inglis in another railway case as authority for his
view.6 However, all Lord Inglis said was that the carrier's right to retain goods was a
"passive security" when compared with a pledge with an express power of sale.'
1. North British Railway Co v Russell (1895) 11 Sh Ct Rep 241, at 245-246.
2. Bell, Principles, s 1417.
3. See Bell, ibid. For example, title deeds subject to a solicitor's lien cannot be sold : Ferguson and
Stuart v Grant (1856) 18 D 536.
4. (1824) 3 S 291.
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5. Ibid, at 293.
6. North British Railway Co v Carter (1870) 8 VI 998.
7. Ibid, at 1000.
218. Extinction. Like any other lien, the carrier's right is extinguished if he releases
the goods from his custody.1 Releasing some of the goods, however, leaves the lien
intact in respect of the remaining goods for the entire sum due under the same
contract of carriage.2 It has been held in English sea carriage cases that the lien is
waived if the contract in question provides that the freight is payable at a particular
date after the landing of the goods.3 The logic seems clear enough.
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,97: Gloag and Irvine, p 402; D M Walker, SMC, vol 3, para 629.
2. Malcolm v Bannatyne. 15 Nov 1814, FC.
3. Foster v Colby {1858 ) 28 LJ Ex 81: Kirehner v Venus (1859) 12 Moo PCC 361: 14 ER 948. See
Gloag and Irvine, p 402. The lien will also not operate if the carrier has agreed to give credit : Raitt
v Mitchell (1815)4 Camp 146: 171 ER 47.
219. Carriage by air specialities. It is difficult to find any Scottish material on
this subject.1 When Gloag and Irvine's Law of Rights in Security was published in
1897, the world's first powered flight by the Wright brothers was still six years
ahead and Bleriot's journey across the channel was not to come for a further six
years beyond that. As carriage of air became more common it was felt that there was
much to be gained from nations adhering to the same rules. To this end, in Warsaw
in 1929, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International
Carriage by Air was signed.2 This was brought into United Kingdom law by the
Carriage By Air Act 1932 and subsequent legislation.3 The Warsaw Convention,
however, is silent on the issue of the carrier's lien.4
In England, it appears to be the case that the air carrier has no lien unless he
expressly provides for one when contracting with his customer.5 Two reasons are
given for this. Firstly, the Warsaw Convention docs not give him a lien. Secondly,
air carriers arc private rather than common carriers and private carriers in English
law have no lien.6 As regards Scotland, it is submitted that where goods arc being
carried by air internally, for example from Aberdeen to Turnhouse, the air company
267
will have a special lien arising out of the contract of carriage.' Our law of course
does not deny private carriers a lien.8
With regard to goods carried from Scotland to England or beyond the issue becomes
more complicated and international private law becomes relevant.9 In summary, it
would seem that because of the fact that a lien is a real right, it is the law of the situs
which will be important.10 The carriage debt will normally arise when the aeroplane
lands as the goods will then have been duly carried." Consequently, if the law of the
country to which the goods are being transported automatically confers a lien on
carriers, then a lien will duly arise.12 If that country docs not recognise such a right,
then the carrier will have no lien. The validity of any express contractual right of
retention as between carrier and customer will be subject to governance by the
proper law of the contract.13
1. On the subject of carriage by air in general, sec J A K Huntley, SME, vol 3, paras 736-759.
2. J Ridley, The Law of the Carriage of Gotxls by Land, Sea and Air, (5th ed. 1978. by G
Whitehead), p 223.
3. Carriage By Air Act 1932 (c 36). On the later legislation, see Huntley, above, n 1, paras 737-739.
4. Ridley, p 235.
5. Ridley, ibid. The right to provide for a lien seems implicit in the Warsaw Convention : see C N
Shawcross and K M Beaumont. Air Law, ( 3rd ed, 1966), pp 492-493.
6. See above, para 215.
7. The duty of the air company to hand over the goods and the duty of the customer to pay arc
reciprocal and the carrier is thus entitled to a lien. See, generally, Bell, Principles, s 1419.
8. See above, para 215.
9. International private law will be equally relevant to transportation beyond Scotland by land or sea.
For an excellent account of the remedies of a sea carrier in different jurisdictions, see H Tiberg, The
Law ofDemurrage, (3rd ed, 1979), pp 617-635.
10. R D Leslie, SME, vol 17, paras 313-318.
11. Lien like all securities is parasitic upon a debt.
12. For example, Germany : HGB, art 440.
13. Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 (c 36). implementing the Convention on the Law
applicable to International Obligations (Rome, 19 June 1980). Cm 8489. See R D Leslie, SME, vol
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17, paras 278-282 (as updated in the SME 1996 Cumulative Supplement); A E Anton with P R
Beaumont, Private International Law, (2nd ed. 1990), chapter 11; G C Cheshire and P M North,
Private International Law. (12th cd. 1992), chapter 18. Under article 5 of the Convention,
consumers arc entitled to the protection of the mandatory rules of their country of habitual residence
when contracting. It is expressly provided, however, by article 5(4)(a) that a carriage contract is not a
consumer contract for the purposes of article 5.
220. Carriage by land specialities. The majority of decisions involving the land
carrier's lien concern the operation of nineteenth century railway legislation.1 In the
first place, under s 90 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845
railway companies were given the right to detain and sell goods and carriages for
arrears of "tolls due by the owner of the same, in respect of any carriage of goods".2
Lord President Inglis described this as "a very important privilege"3, noting that a
lien normally amounted to a mere right to detain.
The statutory provision was to be construed narrowly.4 The right being valid for
"tolls" amounted to a general right to retain. However, as the "tolls" had to be owed
by the owner of the goods, the right did not amount to a general lien valid against
third parties. Thus in one case A in Leith sold Hour to B in Dundee, to be forwarded
to Dundee at A's expense. The railway company sought to detain the flour in terms
of s 90 of the 1845 Act for unpaid tolls for the carriage of other goods due by A. It
was held that B became owner of the flour on delivery to the railway company as
carriers and that consequently they could not retain it under s 90.3 It was also held in
a later case that the statutory right applied only in respect of charges for the use of
lines where the goods were being transported by individuals using their own
carriages and not in respect of charges for goods carried by the railway company as
common carriers.6
The other notable statutory provision is s 7 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act
1854.7 This statute has now been repealed.7 Nevertheless, a brief analysis is merited
on policy grounds. The provision makes conditions in contracts of carriage with
railway companies unenforceable if they arc not "just or reasonable".8 In two cases
clauses giving companies a general lien in respect of goods carried by them were
held to be invalid in terms of s 7.9 The policy here again is to avoid sanctioning
general liens in favour of carriers which would prejudice third parties.
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Leaving s 7 aside, serious doubts have been expressed as to whether railway
companies as common carriers would be allowed to create general liens, because of
their duty to receive all goods brought to them by the public.1" However, the General
Conditions of Carriage of Goods of the British Railways Board did provide for such
a lien, fortified with a power of sale.11 The lien was stated to be without prejudice to
the right of stoppage in transit of an unpaid seller, which accorded with an important
English House of Lords decision from the beginning of this century.12 Given the
prevailing policy on this issue, it may be doubted in Scotland whether the BRB
condition was enforceable against third parties. The matter is now academic, as the
British Railways Board no longer exists.13
1. The amount of case law on the lien of the land carrier this century is negligible, but sec Bon
Accord Removals v Hainsworth 1993 GWD 28-1785.
2. Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c 33) s 90. Applied by the Transport Act
1962 (c 46), s 32; Sch 3, Part IV.
3. North British Railway Co v Carter (1870) 8 M 998, at 1000.
4. Sec Lord President Inglis, ibid.
5. Dcnholm v North British Railway Co (1867) 1 Guth Sh Cas 120.
6. Highland Railway Co v Jackson (1876) 3 R 850, overruling Caledonian Railway Co v Guild
(1873) 1 R 198.
7. By the Transport Act 1962 (c 46), s 95( 1), Sch 2, part 1.
8. Railway and Canal Traffic Act 1854 (17 and 18 Vict c 31), s 7.
9. Scottish Central Railway Co v Ferguson (1861) 2 VI 781; Peebles & Son v Caledonian
Railway Co (1875) 2 R 346.
10. Peebles and Son v Caledonian Railway Co, ibid, per Lord Young at 348; Gloag and Irvine, p
402; A Mackenzie Stuart, Encyclopaedia, vol 3, para 44.
11. See D M Walker, SME, vol 3, para 700.
12. United States Steel Products Co v South Western Railway Co [1916] 1 AC 189.
13. Due to rail privatisation. It has not proved possible to find out whether the new rail companies are
using such a condition of carriage.
221. Carriage by sea specialities. The special lien of the shipowner for freight,
may by express contract be extended to ^over dead freight, in other words damages
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for the situation where a charterer in breach of his contractual obligation, fails to
load a full and complete cargo.1 It has been accepted in England that the lien may
also be extended in order to secure demurrage or port charges.2 In Scotland, it is
settled that a shipowner has a separate lien for general average.3 As regards a
general lien created expressly, the prevailing view is clearly that such a provision
would not be enforceable against third parties.4
It is common in the transportation of goods by sea for bills of lading to be used, so
that ownership of the property may pass by symbolical delivery.5 The rule here is
that the shipowner's lien is only enforceable against an indorsee of the bill of lading
for the rate of freight expressed in the bill.6 Thus the shipowner is unable to detain
the goods from an indorsee in respect of a general balance owed by the shipper.'
It is what is specified in the bill of lading which is crucial. In one English case,'5 the
rate of freight was fixed in a charter party, but only a nominal rate was referred to in
the bill. It was held that the shipowner could not retain against the indorsee for the
amount in the charter party. Where, however, no rate of freight is given on the bill
but reference is made to the charter party, the shipowner has a lien for the amount in
the charter party.9 In a modem case,10 the bill of lading was in a "short" form and
stated that it incorporated conditions as to lien in a "long" form of bill "on file with
the Federal Maritime Commission". It transpired that the relevant document was not
filed with the Commission and accordingly the shipowner did not have the lien
which it purported to give him.
The shipowner may retain the property carried for the entire freight specified in the
bill of lading, even where the shipper has already paid some of it to the charterer.11
Like all other liens the shipowner's depends on him having custody of the goods.12
Where the ship has been hired out to another party on time - the formal name for
this contract is locatio navis - the captain and the crew become the employees of the
charterer.13 In this situation, the shipowner has no custody and no lien.14 Where
shipowners release the cargo in return for a bond for the sum they arc demanding
from the shippers, the terms of the bond must be closely examined.15 Hence where a
bond provided that, firstly, the lien had been released but that, secondly, the right of
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the shipper to challenge its validity had been preserved, it was unsurprisingly held
that the first provision rendered the second meaningless.10
Under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, the shipowner may at any British port
discharge the cargo into a warehouse and preserve his lien by giving notice to the
warehouseman.17 The notice must be given at the date fixed for landing the goods,
or if no date is fixed, on the passing of seventy two hours, excluding Sundays and
public holidays, after the report of the ship.18 If the expiry of ninety days from the
date the goods are warehoused, or earlier if the goods are perishable, the freight has
still not been paid, the shipowner may authorise the warehouseman to sell part or all
of the goods by public auction.14 The money raised by the sale, after being used to
discharge all exigible duties, the sale expenses and the warehouse bill, is to be used
to pay the shipowner.20 Any residue must be paid to the owner of the goods.21
1. McLean & Hope v Fleming (1871) 9 M (HL) 38; Lamb v Kasclack, A/sen & Co (1882) 9 R
482; C Mackenzie, SME, vol 21. para 660.
2. Gloag and Irvine, p 400. See also T E Scrutton, Charterparties and Bills of Lading, (19th cd.
1984), pp 391-392; H Tiberg, The Law ofDemurrage. (3rd cd. 1979), p 611.
3. Bell, Commentaries, 11.95 and 99; Bell, Principles, s 1426; Gloag and Irvine, p 400: W G
Normand and J G Mclntyrc, Encyclopaedia, vol 3. para 84; D M Walker, Principles of Scottish
Private Law. (4th cd, 1989), vol III, p 401.
4. Sheriff Guthrie in Bell. Principles, s 1424; Gloag and Irvine, ibid.
5. On symbolical delivery, see W M Gordon, SME, vol 18, para 621.
6. Bell, Commentaries, 11,96; Sheriff Guthrie in Bell. Principles, s 1424; Gloag and Irvine, p 401:
Scrutton. pp 388-389; Tibcrg, pp 624-625.
7. Bogle & Co v Dunmore (1787) Mor 14216.
8. Foster v Colby (1858) 28 LJ Ex 81.
9. Smith v Sieveking (1855) 5 El & Bl 589; 119 ER 600; 24 LJ QB 257.
10. Georgia Pacific Corporation v EvalcndShipping Co SA 1988 SLT 683 (OH).
11. Youle v Cochrane (1868) 6 M 427.
12. Bell, Principles, s 1424; Gloag and Irvine, pp 400-401; C Mackenzie, SME, vol 21, para 665.
See too the recent English case of China Pacific SA v Food Corporation of India [1982] AC 939.
13. Gloag and Irvine, ibid.
272
14. Bell, Commentaries, 11,94-95; Bell, Principles, above; Gloag and Irvine, ibid. Sec the English
case of Hutton v Bragg (1816) 7 Taunt 14; 129 ER 6.
15. W A Wilson, The Law ofScotland on Debt, (2nd cd, 1991), para 7.7.
16. Georgia Pacific Corporation v Evalcnd Shipping Co SA 1988 SLT 683.
17. Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (c 60), ss 493-494. For an annotated copy of the relevant provisions
of the Act. see T E Scrutton. dinnerparties and Bills of Lading, (19th ed, 1984), pp 476-479. See
also, Tibcrg, above, n 2, p 629.
18. 1894 Act, s 493.
19. 1894 Act, s 497.
20. 1894 Act, s 498.
21. 1894 Act. s 498.
12. HOTELIER'S LIEN
222. General. In this section will be considered the right of the owner of a hotel to
retain property brought to it by his guests until their bills are paid. A similar right is
recognised in many jurisdictions.1
In Scotland the traditional terminology used has been that of the "innkeeper's lien".2
However, "innkeeper" is a term with a somewhat archaic flavour, conjuring up for
him the image of Mary and Joseph being offered room in a stable.3 Likewise, "inn"
has connotations of the opening scene from Treasure Island or the places where
Sherlock Holmes stayed whilst investigating cases.4 It seems time that the
terminology was updated.3 Consequently this paper, other than in a historical
context, will refer to the right in question as the "hotelier's lien".
1. See, for example, the French Civil Code, art 2102(5); the BGB, art 704; the Hotel Proprietors Act
1963 (c 7), s 8(2) (Eire); the Italian Civil Code, art 2760; the Civil Code of Louisiana, art 3217(8) and
the Civil Code of Quebec, art 2302. Note too the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law
ofSecurity, (1941). ss 61(c) and 63.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,99-100; Bell. Principles, s 1428; Gloag and Irvine, pp 397-400; D M
Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, (4th ed. 1989), vol 111, p 401; A J Sim, SME, vol 20.
paras 90-93; W M Gloag and R C Henderson. The Law ofScotland. (10th cd. 1995), para 19.28.
3. Luke 2:7.
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4. R L Stevenson, Treasure Island. (1X82): Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes : The
Complete Illustrated Short Stories. (1985).
5. In the Hotels and Tourism section of the S.VIE. J J Downes attempts to update matters by
referring to the right as the "hotelkeepcr's lien" : vol 11. para 1757. This terminology was also used
by the Sheriff-Substitute in Ferguson v Peterkin 1953 SLT (Sh Ct) 91.
223. Background. The first Scottish writer to refer to what then could accurately be
referred to as the right of retention of an innkeeper was Bankton in his Institute. The
reference docs not come within his discussion of Scots law, but rather at two
different points within his "Observations on the Laws of England". One of these is
found, as might be expected, in his discourse on the rights of retention recognised by
English law.1 The other falls within his discussion of the strict liability of English
innkeepers and ship masters for goods damaged within their inns and ships.2 This
liability derives from the Roman edict, nautac, caupones, stabularii. Bankton writes
here :
"For the security and protection of travellers, inns are allowed certain
privileges : thus, the horse and goods of a guest . . . may be detained by the
inn-keeper, as likewise the guest himself, until the reckoning is paid, and that
even against the owner, where it was a stolen horse."3
With a couple of caveats, this may be accepted as a correct statement of English law
from the fifteenth century to the present.4 The innkeeper or hotelier has the duty to
receive guests and the duty to ensure the safety of any goods which they bring into
his property. As a counterpart to these duties he has the right to detain the goods (if
there arc any) until the guests' bills are paid. Further, as his duty to look after his
guests' goods applies to all goods which they bring across his threshold, irrespective
of who owns them, his right to retain likewise applies to all these goods. Thus, as
Bankton says, the innkeeper may retain a stolen horse from its owner until the
account of the person who brought it to the hotel is discharged.5 This feature marks
the lien out from others recognised by English law. It arises very much from the fact
that the lien is seen as a counterpart to the public duties of the innkeeper, rather than
something arising out of the agreement between him and his guest.6 To put it
another way, the right to retain is viewed as resting upon custom rather than, as is
usual with liens, contract.
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What becomes interesting now is Bankton's discussion of Scots law. He docs not
mention a right to retain in favour of an innkeeper when treating retention.'
Moreover, lie docs not recognise any such right in his detailed discourse upon the
reception of the edict nautac, cauponcs, stabularii into Scots law.8 The conclusion
would seem very clear. Scots common law docs not give a right of retention to an
innkeeper as a counterpart to his obligation to look after the property of his guests.
The Roman edict was received differently into the laws of Scotland and England.4
As has been previously shown, English law as it developed conferred liens upon
distinct professions.10 The original individuals to be granted the right were those
holding a position which entailed certain duties. Thus, the right was granted to
innkeepers who were bound to receive guests and look after their property and to
common carriers who were bound to carry goods.1' In Scots law, lien developed
totally differently, out of the all-embracing defence mechanism of retention
recognised by the civil law. Therefore, the Scottish innkeeper never had a lien based
upon his public duties. Any lien lie had, it being admitted that there appears to be no
pre-1800 authority, could only arise out of the contract which he made with his
guest.
1. Bankton, "Observations on the Law of England". 1.17.10.
2. Bunkton, "Observations on the Law of England", 1.16.
3.1hid, at 1.16.10.
4. The caveats are : (1) the right seems as much for the security and protection of the innkeeper as for
travellers: and (2) it is now clear that an innkeeper may not detain his guest for any reason : Sunholt
v A/ford (L338) 3 M & W 248; 150 ER 1135. For modern accounts of the law, see G W Paton.
Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), pp 217-224; Halsbury, vol 28, para 536: A P Bell, p 140.
5. Bankton cites Bacon's Abridgement as his authority. See now, Paton, at pp 219-221 and Robins
& Co v Gray [1885] 2QB501.
6. See Sir William Holdsworth, History ofEnglish Law, vol 7, pp 511 -512; ,4 P Bell, pp 138-140.
7. Bankton, 1.17.15-18.
8. Bankton, 1.16.
9. The point being strongly illustrated that livery stable keepers have strict liability derived from the
edict in Scots law, but not English law ; see Mustard v Paterson 1923 SC 142 and below, para 11.
10. Sec above, paras 131-132.
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11. Ibid.
224. The role of Bell. The first Scottish authority to make reference to the lien of
an innkeeper is the third edition of Bell's Commentaries, published in 1819.1 The
previous editions are silent upon the matter. Bell treats the lien as an example of one
of the special liens recognised by Scots law.2 Bar the final sentence, his account is
an undiluted statement of English law, backed up by English authority.3 Indeed it
begins with the words "In England . . ,".4 What follows in summary is a passage
stating that an innkeeper has a lien upon his guest's luggage for his bill and upon his
horse for its stabling and keep. Bell notes that if a horse is brought to the inn which
turns out to be stolen, the innkeeper's lien operates nonetheless.3 He states that in
England the keeper of a livery stable has no lien, because he has no public duty to
receive horses. Finally, he offers his opinion on how Scots law would operate here :
"In Scotland, it would seem that lien would be given on the broad principle
that it is the resulting security for the actio contraria in all cases."6
The whole passage is repeated very similarly in the fourth and subsequent editions
of the Commentaries,7 However, in these later works it is prefixed with a statement
outlining the public duties of an innkeeper to receive travellers and be responsible
for the safety of their luggage. This too is backed up by English authority.8 The way
in which Bell has positioned this additional passage makes it clear that he sees the
lien arising as a counterpart to the innkeeper's public duties. This much has been
pointed out from the bench.9
The relevant passage in Bell's Principles treats the lien purely and simply in terms ot
English rules, justified by English cases.10 Further, the editor of the later editions,
Sheriff Guthrie, remains true to Bell's treatment, by adding further English principles
set out in later English cases.11
1. The first ease to deal with the matter was still thirty years in the future : McKichen v Muir( 1849)
J Shaw 223.
2. Bell, Commentaries. (3rd cd, 1819), 11,147.
3. The authorities cited are Whitaker on Lien: Jones v Pcarlc 1 Stra 556; 93 ER 689 and Hunter v
Barklcyt 1792) 2 Espinassc, NP 283.
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5. The rule is a general one, applying not just to horses: Robins & Co v Gray [ 1895] 2 QB 501.
6. Bell, opcitn 2.
7. Bell, Commentaries, (4th cd, 1821). 11,109-110: (5th ed. 1826), 11,103-104 and in the 7th cd.
(1870), at 11,99-100. One point of difference is that in the 3rd and 4th editions it is stated that there is
a right to detain the guest himself. This docs not appear in later editions. See below, para 7.
8. The case of Thompson v Lacyi 1820) 3 B and Aid 283; 106 ER 667.
9. Skirving v Skirving (1869) 1 Guth Sh Cas 508, at p 509 per Sheriff Shand (later Lord Shand).
10. Bell. Principles, s 1428.
11. Ibid. For example, Guthrie cites Mulliner v Florence (1878) 3 QBD 484 to justify the
proposition that in one sense the lien is general because it extends "over all the guest s property".
225. Later authorities. The authorities subsequent to Bell generally view the
hotelier's lien from the standpoint of English principle. Gloag and Irvine writing in
1897 state ;
"[The lien] is held to be allowed as a counterpart of the obligation of the
innkeeper to receive the guest and his luggage, and of his liability should that
luggage be stolen."1
Their authority is the important English ease of 1895, Robins v Gray,2 in which the
Court of Appeal extensively examined the basis of the lien in England. Writing
some years later, Gloag makes the same point in another way, by stating that the lien
is an "exceptional" one, resting "rather on custom of trade than on any implied
contract."3 A more modern writer, Sim, reverts to the older formulation, by stating
that the lien is the "counter-balance" to the obligation of the hotelier to receive
guests and their luggage.4
Similar expressions have been made in the case law.3 Lord President Emslic, in the
only Court of Session case which saw an examination of the basis of the lien, noted
that the views expressed in Bell's Principles, as edited by Guthrie, and Gloag and
Irvine had not been challenged since their publication "upwards of 80 years" ago.'1
He stated :
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"Now the lien which the law of Scotland allows to an innkeeper is intended to
be the counterpart of the obligations and strict liability of his calling".'
What is the "strict liabilty" to which Lord Emslie is referring ? As discussed in an
earlier part of his judgement, it is the liability which originated in the Roman edict
nautae, cauponcs, stabularii. Lord Emslie refers to Bankton, Erskinc and the Scottish
eases which discuss the reception of that edict into Scots law.* He then says this of
the innkeeper/hotelier :
"His liability is of the strictest. It may only be avoided if loss or damage is
attributable to an act of God, or the king's enemies, or the negligence of the
guest himself. This is trite law. All that I have said so far finds echo in the law
of England and I need do no more than to refer to the case of Robins v Gray"A
1. Gloag and Irvine, p 397.
2. [1895] 2 QB 591.
3. W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 4X1.
4. A J Sim, SME. vol 20, para 90.
5. Skirving v Skirving (1869) 1 Guth Sh Cas 508; Macbeth v Hutton (1892) 8 Sh Ct Rep 25;
Lorrain v Fulton (1903) 19 Sh Ct Rep 283: Gilhooly v Gilrain (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 164.
6. Bcrmans and Nathans Ltd v Weibyc 1983 SLT 299, at 302. The statement is similar to that of
Sheriff Henderson in Lorrain v Fulton (1903) 19 Sh Ct Rep 283 who noted that "Professor Bell's
view ... has never been called into question". Lord Emslie cites the statement of Lord Ormidale in
Rothfield v North British Railway Co (1920) 2 SLT 269. at 282 in his support ; "There is little, if
any difference, between the views taken in the Courts of [Scotland and England] as to the rights and
obligations of the keeper of an inn."
7. Bcrmans and Nathans Ltd v Weibyc 1983 SLT 299, at 302.
8. Bankton, 1.16.1-2; Erskinc, III. 1.28; Mustard v Paterson 1923 SLT 21; Rothfield v North
British Railway Co 1920 2 SLT 269.
9. Op cit, n 7.
226. The basis of the lien explored. Given the authorities examined it can be seen
that the accepted view of Scots law is that the hotelier's lien is the counterpart of his
duty to receive guests and his strict liability in respect of their goods derived from
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Roman law. It follows that the lien cannot be regarded as based upon the contract
between hotelier and guest. This conclusion, perhaps unsurprisingly, causes
Professor McBrydc some problems. He sees no reason why the hotelier should not
have a lien arising out of the mutuality principle of the law of contract.1 In other
words, because there is an agreement between hotelier and guest, the hotelier may
have a lien over the guest's property if docs not fulfil his obligation under that
agreement to pay his bill. For reasons which will be set out, it is felt that Professor
McBryde's view is justified.
The fact of the matter is that the hotelier's lien recognised by today's Scots law is
based upon English authority. Much of the responsibilty for this state of affairs lies
with Bell. At the time when he wrote there was no previous Scottish authority on the
subject.2 Instead of trying to develop the law in terms of the general principles of
retention recognised by the civil law, lie, as we saw above, dealt with the matter
more or less entirely by adopting English rules.3 All later Scottish authorities except
Professor McBryde have accepted Bell's treatment, seeing Scots and English law as
the same here.4
To take this view is surely to be misguided, for as our examination of Bankton
showed the laws in the two countries, before Scots law was influenced by Bell, were
distinct.5 The edict nautae, caupones, stabularii, contrary to Lord Emslie's expressed
view, was received differently north and south of the border. The liability imposed
was similar. In England, however, the innkeeper as early as the 15th century, in
return for bearing that liability as well as the duty to receive guests, was given a lien
over their luggage.6 The same thing did not happen in Scotland. If it had, Bankton
would have told us about it. As for why this was the case, the answer seems clear. In
civilian Scotland, retention exists as a generally available defence.7 It is as open to
innkeepers as much as to any other party holding another's property where that other
is in debt to him. In England, no such general doctrine was or is recognised.8 The
law merely conferred specific liens in specific situations. This was one such
situation, where the law felt it had to compensate innkeepers for the onerous
obligations it had imposed upon them. The law of Scotland here was clear, that is
until Bell published the third edition of his Commentaries and the rest, as may be
said, is history.
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This all leaves us in a rather difficult situation. We have the choice of either leaving
the law in its post-Bell anglicised state or instead of reverting to its civilian roots.
The latter choice means recognising the hotelier's lien as arising out of his contract
with his guests, an option which coheres with the approach of Professor McBrydc. It
is proposed to examine the operation of the hotelier's lien in depth, before drawing
any conclusion.
1. W W McBrydc, Contract, (1987), p 316.
2. Which probably explains why lie waited until the 3rd edition of his Commentaries before
examining the subject.
3. See above, para 224.
4. See the preceding paragraph.
5. See above, para 223.
6. Ibid.
7. Stair, 1.18.7; Bankton, 1.24.34; Erskinc, III.4.20.
8. Sir William Holdsworth. History of English Law. vol 7, pp 511-512; ,4 P Bell, pp 138-141; A H
Silvcrtown. Law of Lien. (1988).
227. Special lien or general lien ? There has existed some confusion over the
years as regards the matter of how the hotelier's lien should be viewed. Gloag and
Irvine opine that it "presents special features which make it difficult to classify it as
a special or as a general lien".1 This is not very helpful, as we arc not told what the
special features are. Sim echoes the statement.2 He adds that the hotelier's right is
"more akin"1 to a special lien. At face value this is fine. However, the reader is left
perplexed because Sim treats the hotelier's lien in his section on general liens.4
Gloag and Henderson perform a somewhat similar feat, treating the lien in their
section on general liens, but stating that it is a special lien.5 Graham Stewart and
Professor Walker, on the other hand are quite clear, that the lien is a special onc.A
The present writer takes the view that the matter is a straightforward one. The lien is
special. It secures the debt which arises out of the contract between hotelier and
guest whereby the latter is given accommodation for a price. Now certainly the debt
may be composed of a large number of individual charges, for example the bill for
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the mini bar; the cost of dinner; the price of the daily newspaper delivered; and so
forth. However, all these charges arc leviable in terms of the original contract. If the
lien was general a guest arriving at his hotel in 1996 could have his luggage
detained for the debt outstanding from his visit in 1993. No where is such a
proposition suggested. Rather, it is universally rejected.'
The view that the hotelier's lien is nothing other than special is supported by the
ease of Ferguson v Pctcrkin,8 There, a wardrobe door in the bedroom of two guests
had fallen off, breaking the mirror on it. The hoteliers refused to accept payment of
the guests' bill for board, without payment for the door. They detained the guests'
luggage for 48 days in security of the bill. The matter came to court, where the
Sheriff-Substitute held that the hotelier's lien is a special lien, merely securing
payment for board and entertainment.4 Consequently, it cannot secure a claim for
damages in respect of a broken door.1"
It is suggested that the person responsible for today's unnecessary confusion is
Sheriff Guthrie, the editor of the later editions of Bell's Principles. In a passage
which first appeared in the 8th edition in 1883, he accepts that the lien is not general
because it does not revive on a guest returning to the hotel at a later date."
Nevertheless, he adds that "in another sense" the lien is general because it extends
to all the guest's property brought to the hotel, as well as to his horses and carriages,
for the guest's own expenses. The idea seems to be that there arc two contracts - one
for accommodating the guest and one for accommodating his horse and carriage -
and further that the latter property may be detained till the debt due under the former
contract is satisfied.
Sheriff Guthrie's idea comes from the English case of Mulliner v Florence,12 where
an innkeeper claimed a lien on horses brought to his inn. The guest claimed that the
lien did not cover the cost of his own board, but only that of the horses. The court
had none of it, holding that the lien was general applying to all the guest's property
for his entire debt owed to the innkeeper. This is all very well, but to try and isolate
two separate contracts between hotelier and guest is to defy economic reality. The
hotelier receives the guest's luggage and his means of transport in terms of a single
agreement for the guest to be provided with accommodation. To describe the lien as
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general is to use the term "general lien" in a distinct and not the usual sense. Indeed,
it might be said that it is using the term in a special and not its general sense.
Today, it is not possible to entertain the notion that the lien is general even in the
sense the court in Mullincr v Florence viewed it to be. For, in terms of the Hotel
Proprietors Act 1956, the lien does not attach to "any vehicle or any property left
therein, or any horse or other live animal or its harness or other equipment".13 Thus
the guest's means of transport cannot be detained. The lien applies only to the rest of
the guest's inanimate property. It is undoubtedly a special lien, a view shared by
none other than Bell himself.14
1. Gloag and Irvine, p 397.
2. A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 90.
3. Ibid.
4. A J Sim, SME, vol 20. paras 78-100.
5. W M Gloag and R C Henderson. The Law ofScotland, (10th ed, 1995), para 19.28, fn 55.
6. J Graham Stewart, Law of Diligence, (1897), p 173: D M Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974), p 68;
and Principles ofScottish Private Law, (4th ed. 1989), vol III, p 401.
7. Sheriff Guthrie in Bell, Principles, (8th cd onwards), s 1428; Gloag and Irvine, p 399; A J Sim.
SME vol 20, para 92; Harp v Minto (1870) 1 Guth Sh Cas 508; the English case of Jones v
Thurlowe (1723) 8 Mod Rep 172.
8. 1953 SLT (Sh Ct) 91.
9. He relied on Bell, Principles, ss 1411, 1419 and 1428 and Graham Stewart, above n 6.
10. The hoteliers were held liable in damages for wrongful detention. Sec, below, para 233.
11. Bell, Principles, s 1428.
12. (1875) 3 QBD 484.
13. Hotel Proprietors Act 1956 (c 62) s 2(2).
14. In both his Commentaries, 11,99-100 and his Principles, s 1428, he treats the right as a
straightforward case of special lien.
228. Property covered by the lien. The lien, subject to a statutory exception,
attaches to all goods brought by the guest into the hotel.1 That exception, which was
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set out in the previous paragraph, is in respect of any vehicle brought by the guest,
any property left in it, or any horse or other live animal or its harness or other
equipment.2 Thus bicycles are no longer subject to the lien.3 In Quebec, the guest's
personal documents and effects of no market value may not be detained.4
Leaving the vehicle exception aside, the lien extends over the guest's luggage no
matter what sort of property it is. The cases contain a number of examples : a box of
clothes and a pipe;5 a piano;6 the professional instruments and materials of a
dentist;7 a portmanteau;8 and a gun.9
The hotelier may not detain the guest himself or the clothing he is wearing.10 This
would amount to private imprisonment. An attempt to widen the rule was made in
the case of McKichen v Muir.n There the Muir family had booked into an inn in
order to attend a local ball. On returning from the event Mr Muir disagreed with the
innkeeper over the bill. The latter consequently detained the family's ordinary
clothes. This meant that the family had to walk eight or nine miles home on a rainy
night, with the ladies wearing only "thin shoes and light muslin dresses, and without
bonnets".12 In a subsequent petition, Mr Muir argued that as the journey was the
family's only alternative to being "detained" at the inn, the right claimed by the
innkeeper was "equivalent to a power of incarceration".13 The Circuit Court of
Justiciary rejected the submission. Thus it would seem that the general rule will be
construed narrowly.
The lien only attaches to the guest's personal luggage. It docs not cover goods sent
to him by a third party for his use during a stay.14 Thus where theatrical costumes
were sent to a hotel for the use of a film crew who were staying there, these were
found not to be subject to the hotelier's lien.15 In an English case, the same was
found in respect of a piano hired by the guest whilst he was at an inn.16
Gloag and Irvine discuss the matter of whether the lien attaches to the property of an
individual who comes into the hotel only for refreshment and not to stay.1' On the
basis that the hotelier is equally responsible for the safety of their property as for
that of a boarder, they conclude that it is "probable" the lien will apply. The logic is
difficult to doubt.
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1. Bell, Principles, s 1428; Clang and Irvine, pp 397-398: J J Dowries, SME vol 11, para 1757; W
M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law ofScotland. (10th cd. 1995), para 19.28..
2. Hotel Proprietors Act 1956 (c 62). s 2(2).
3. Cf Kingston and Co v Blair (1896) 12 Sh Ct Rep 20.
4. Civil Ctxie of Quebec, art 2302.
5. Gilhooly v Gilrain (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 164 (lodging house case).
6. Macbeth v Hutton (1892) 8 Sh Ct Rep 25 (lodging house case).
7. Skirving v Skirving (1869) 1 Guth Sh Cas 508 (lodging house case).
8. Gray v Hart( 1885) 1 Sh Ct Rep 269 (lodging house case).
9. Garden v Shaw (1874) 1 Guth Sh Cas 505.
10. Gloag and Irvine, p 397; A J Sim, SME vol 20, para 91: W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The
Law of Scotland, (10th ed, 1995), para 19.28. These works cite the English case of Sunbolt v
Alford (1838) 3 M & W 248; 150 ER 1135. There existed previous authority in England for the
proposition that the guest could be detained : Newton v Trigg (1691) Shower 268; 89 ER 566; (see
also Bankton, "Observations on the Law of England". 1.16.10). However, this authority was
dismissed in Sunbolfwhere it was also held that allowing the lien to attach to the clothes a guest was
wearing would mean permitting the innkeeper to assault him in order to get them. Baron Parke was
particularly concerned that this meant that an innkeeper could strip his female guests naked if they
did not pay their bills. See generally, G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), pp 221 -
222 and also the American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law ofSecurity. (1941). s 63( 1).
In Scotland, Bell stated that there existed the right to detain the guest in the 3rd edition (1819) of his
Commentaries, at 11,147. In the 4th edition (1821) at 11.109-110. he says the same thing but notes
that this is "an awkward remedy". These statements do not appear in the 5th edition (1826) or cither
of the subsequent editions.
11. (1849) J Shaw 223. Discussed by Professor McBryde, in his Contract, (1987), at pp 316-317.
12. Ibid, at 224.
13. Ibid.
14. Sheriff Guthrie in Bell, Principles, s 1428; Cdoag and Irvine, p 398; A J Sim, SME vol 20, para
91.
15. Bermans and Nathans Ltd v Weibyc 1983 SLT 299.
16. Broadwood v Granara (1854) 10 Exch 417. It might be thought that property hired by the guest
would not be subject to the lien because it is not his property. However, the orthodox view is that this
is irrelevant. Sec the next paragraph.
17. Gloag and Irvine, p 399.
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229. Property belonging to a third party. The hotelier's lien has been stated to
cover luggage which does not actually belong to the guest.1 In this way it sharply
differs from all other liens recognised in Scots law where the lien will be only
effective in terms of property owned by the debtor." The reasoning behind this was
set out by Lord Emslie :
"In the case of an innkeeper... a lien which cannot be exercised over any of
a traveller's possessions which arc not his own property can scarcely be
described as a counterpart of the special obligations and liability which the
law requires the innkeeper to accept. . . In the very nature of things travellers
have been arriving at inns for centuries with many articles in their baggage
which arc not their own . . . and the absence of any reported case on the
question we are considering now simply suggests to my mind that no one in
Scotland until now has thought it worthwhile to contend that the scope of the
innkeecpcr's lien docs not extend to all of the relevant possessions of the
defaulting guest but only to those in which he has right of property."3
Thus the reason why the lien attaches to the property of third parties is because it is
viewed as the counterpart of the hotelier's obligation to receive guests and ensure the
safety of their luggage. In other words, this unique feature of the lien comes directly
from its conceptual foundation in English law, and in terms of Bell and the
orthodoxy he engendered, Scots law also.4
As regards the hotelier's state of mind, it may be noted that in the Irish Republic, the
lien only extends to property which the guest docs not own if the hotelier "was
unaware" of the true position when he received the property into the hotel.-"1 The law
is to the same effect in some civilian jurisdictions, including France,6, and Italy.'
The explanation for this would seem to have more to do with these systems looking
upon good faith more favourably than our own, rather than a piece of law unique to
the hotelier's lien. In contrast, under the law of England and probably Scotland, such
knowledge is irrelevant.8
1. Bell. Commentaries, 11,99; Bell, Principles, s 1428; Gloag and Irvine, p 398; D VI Walker. Civil
Remedies, (1974), p 68; A J Sim, SME, vol 20. para 91; J J Downes. SME. vol 11. para 1757; W M
Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland. (l()th cd. 1995), para 19.28: Bermans and
Nathans Ltd v Weibye 1983 SLT 299.
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2. Gloag and Irvine, p 349; Mitchell v Hcys & Sons (1894) 21 R 600; Lamonby v Foulds Ltd
1928 SC 89.
3. Bermans and Nathans Ltd v Weihye 1983 SLT 299. 302.
4. Sec above, paras 224-226.
5. Hotel Proprietors Act 1963 (c 7), s 8(2). See too the American Law Institute, Restatement of the
Law ofSecurity, (1941). s 63(2).
6. M F Planiol. Civil Law Treatise, vol 2, (1959), s 2521. N'ote too the Civil Code of Louisiana, art
3234.
7. Italian Civil Code, art 2760.
8. Robins & Co v Gray [1895] 2 QB 501; Gloag and Irvine, p 398: W M Gloag and R C
Henderson, The Law of Scotland, (10th cd, 1995), para 19.28. citing Bermans and Nathans Ltd v
Weibye 1983 SLT 299. However, Sheriff Guthrie in Bell's Principles, s 1428, which is approved by
D ,V1 Walker. Civil Remedies. (1974), p 68, takes the view that knowledge does matter.
230. Lien or hypothec. As is well known, liens are founded on possession, or at
least on custody.1 If, however, the authorities arc examined closely as to whether
this is in fact true of the hotelier's lien, a rather surprising result is found. Bell's
Principles, as edited by Guthrie, state that the lien "extends over the goods, horses,
and carriages of travellers brought to the inn".2 Gloag and Irvine similarly write that
the lien "extends over everything which is brought to the inn by the guest".J These
statements arc echoed in other authorities.4 Unsurprisingly, this is how the lien is
stated to operate in England.5 Even the Irish Republic's hotelier's lien is provided by
statute to extend to property "brought to the hotel by or on behalf of any guest".6
All seem agreed that the lien attaches to luggage which the guest brings to the hotel.
However, bringing something to a hotel is not the same as putting it into the
possession of the hotelier. This seems to have been recognised by Lord Justice-
Clerk Alness, who said of the possession of a farmer of potatoes in his field :
"It [is] certainly superior in quality to the right of possession which an
hotelkccper has over the luggage of a guest in order to secure payment of the
guest's bill."7
The matter is one which requires to be thought through. Now certainly, if the guest
arrives at the hotel with her expensive iewcls and has them placed in its safe for
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security reasons, there seems no doubt that the hotel has custody. A subsequent lien
over the jewels can be seen to based on that custody. On the other hand, if as more
usually happens the guest takes her luggage to her room then she cannot be said to
be relinquishing custody to the hotelier. The security he has here in respect of the
luggage because it has been brought to his hotel must be one of hypothec.* There
would seem clear parallels with the hypothec of the landlord.9 With a lease the
tenant has possession of a certain property for a certain period. If he does not pay his
rent the landlord can sequestrate for it.1" Similarly with a hotel stay, if the guest does
not discharge his bill the hotelier may seize his luggage and detain it till he does so.
Lest it be thought that the argument advanced is without foundation, reference may
be made to both our case law and German law. Throughout the Scottish decisions,
there are references to the "lien" attaching to the "possessions" of the traveller." For
example, in Garden v Shaw, Sheriff Comric Thomson stated that the right "extends
over such effects as the [guest] may have in his possession".12
As regards German law, there is a well understood division between two types of
security implied by law (gcsetzlichc Pfandrcchtcn) in respect of corporeal
moveables.13 In the first place, there are securities based on possession (auf Grund
von Besitz). In this group are included securities in favour of carriers, storekeepers
and workmen, which correspond to our liens.14 In the second place, there arc
securities based on the property in question being brought into the immoveable
property of the creditor (auf Grund von Einbringung). In this group come the
securities of the landlord and, importantly for our purpose, the hotelier (dcr
Gastwirt).15 Consequently, the security in favour of the hotelier in German law (das
Pt'andrccht des Gastwirts) in respect of his guests' property is viewed as non-
possessory (bcsitzlos).
In terms of English law, Professor Bridge has accepted that the hotelier does not
have possession, "but rather the right to impede the party in possession [the guest]
from exercising in full the rights that normally accompany possession."16 In other
words he can detain the luggage when the guest docs not pay the bill. As lie says,
the "personal baggage of a guest in a hotel bedroom can hardly be said to be
possessed by the hotel".17 English law of course docs not recognise the hypothec.18
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The conclusion which may be drawn from all this is that the security the Scottish
hotelier has over his guests' luggage is not one which is dependent on custody or
possession. It is in fact misleading to refer to it as a lien, unless and until the hotelier
actually takes hold of the property. What has almost universally been called the
"innkeeper's lien" up to now should be called the "hotelier's hypothec".
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,86 91; Gloag and Irvine, pp 340-349.
2. Bell, Principles, s 1428.
3. Gloag and Irvine, p 397.
4. D M Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974), p 68; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 91; J J Dowries, SME. vol
11, para 1757; D .VI Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law. (4th ed. 1989). vol III. p 401:
Smith v Chisholm (1893) 9 Sh Ct Rep 44 per Sheriff Birnic: Lord President Emslic in Bermans and
Nathans Ltd v Wcibye 1983 SLT 299, at 302.
5. G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), p 218; A P Bell, p 140; Robins & Co v
Gray [1895] 2 QB 501.
6. Hotel Proprietors Act 1963 (c 7), s 8( 1).
7. Paton's Trs v Finlayson 1923 SC 872, at 877.
8. On hypothec in Scots law, see Bell, Commentaries, 11,25-40; Bell, Principles, ss 1385-1409:
Gloag and Irvine, chapter 12; A J Sim. SME, vol 20, paras 101-107.
9. On which, see Bell, Commentaries. 11,27-34; Bell. Principles, ss 1234 ct seep, Gloag and Irvine,
pp 416-436.
10. Bell, Commentaries, 11,33-34; Gloag and Irvine, pp 430-436.
11. For example. Gray v Hart (1885) 1 Sh Ct Rep 269 (Sheriff Dove Wilson in a case involving a
lodging house keeper's lien refers to the relevant property as that "which a lodger usually possesses);
Kingston and Co v Blair (1896) 12 Sh Ct Rep 20 (headnote refers to "bicycle in possession of one
of several guests"; Bcrmans and Nathans Ltd v Weibvc 1983 SLT 299 (Lord President Emslie
refers to "a traveller's possessions" at 302). In contrast in Skirving v Skirving (1869) 1 Guth Sh Cas
508. Sheriff Shand viewed the lodging house keeper as having possession of his lodger's property.
12. Garden v Shaw (1874) 1 Guth Sh Cas 505, at 507.
13. See F Lent, Sachcnreeht : Ein Studienbuch, (14th ed, by K H Schwab. 1974). p 261; F Baur.
Lehrbuch des Sachenrechts, (13th cd, 1985), pp 540-543.
14. Ibid. See HGB. art 440 (das Pfandrccht des Frachtfiihrers); HGB. art 421 (das Pfandrecht des
Lagerhalters); and BGB, art 647 (das Pfandrecht des Unternchmers bcim Werkvcrtrag).
15. Op cit, n 10. The hotelier's lien is found in the BGB at art 704.
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16. M G Bridge, Personal Property Law, (2nd ed, 1996). p 143.
17. Ibid, citing Fletcher Moulton LJ in Lord's Tr v Great Eastern Railway Co [1908] 2KB 54.
18. W W Buekland and A D McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, (1965). p 242.
231. Lodging houses. The question of whether a lodging house keeper has a lien
over his lodger's property in respect of his board was one which the sheriff courts
were asked to answer on a number of occasions around the turn of the century.' The
general approach taken by the sheriffs was to look at the duties of lodging house
keepers.2 On the basis of two old cases and Erskinc's Institute they recognised that
those who take in lodgers are responsible for the safety of their luggage and that this
liability stems from the Roman edict nautae cauponcs stabularii? Therefore, because
like hoteliers they have this liability, then like hoteliers they are entitled to a lien as
a counterpart to that liability. Gloag and Irvine arc in agreement with such a
conclusion.4
All this is very well, but most of the authorities seem to miss that a lodging house
keeper will have a lien (or rather, in some cases, a hypothec) anyway on the basis of
his contract with his lodger. This much was, however, recognised in Aberdeen
Sheriff Court by Sheriff Dove Wilson.-"1 He noted that a lodging house keeper was
different from an innkeeper in respect that he had no public duty to receive people
and that his responsibility in respect of luggage was perhaps stronger. Then he said :
"But neither of these points affect the present position. Liens arc allowed in
many cases where there is no special responsibility for the customer's goods,
and where the person who allowed it can select his customers at pleasure."5
The point is a good one. While it must be recognised that the lien can be based on
contract, the problem comes in relation to goods which the lodger does not own.
There has been no reported case on this matter. If the question was to arise, it must
be conceded that the weight of authority equates the lodging house keeper's lien
with that of the hotelier, and on that basis the third party owner of the goods should
have a real fear of losing out.7 It may be noted that in Louisiana the innkeeper's lien
applies to any individuals "who let lodgings or receive or take boarders".x
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1. Skirving v Skirving (1869) 1 Guth Sh Ca.s 508: Harp v Minto (1870) 1 Guth Sh Cas 508; Gray v
Hart (1885) 1 Sh Ct Rep 269; Macbeth v Hutton (1892) 8 Sli Ct Rep 25; Lorrain v Fulton (1903)
19 Sh Ct Rep 283: Gilhooly v Gilrain (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 164.
2. See for example. Sheriff (later Lord) Shand in Skirving v Skirving, above and Sheriff Henderson
in Lorrain v Fulton, above.
3. May v Wingatc (1694) Mor 9236; Erskinc, III.1.29; Scott v Yates (1800) Hume 207. Sec also
Watling v McDowall (1825) 4 S 83 where the court reserved its judgement on the matter. Note,
however, the position of J J Downes, SME. vol 11, para 1742, which must be considered to be
wrong. Further, note that Sheriff Guthrie Smith in Harp v Minto ( 1870) 1 Guth Sh Cas 508 followed
the English case of Holder v Soulby (1860) 29 LJCP 246; 141 ER 1163 and held that lodging house
keepers were not liable under the edict. On the liability of lodging house keepers in England,
generally, see N E Palmer, Bailment (2nd cd, 1991), pp 1512-1514.
4. Gloag and Irvine, pp 399-400. See also A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 90.
5. Gray v Hart( 1885) 1 Sh Ct Rep 269.
6. At 270.
7. But see below, para 235.
8. The lien is technically a privilege, but is dependent on the property being still in the hotel ; Civil
Code of Louisiana, art 3233.
232. Entitlement of other parties to the lien. Bell wrote that in England a livery
stable keeper, in other words a hotelier who receives equine rather than human
guests, has no lien.1 The reason is that he has no public duty to receive the horses.2
The rule remains the same down south today.3 As regards Scotland, Bell was of the
opinion that such an individual would have a lien arising from the actio contraria in
terms of his contract with the person who placed the animals with him.4 Lord Young
expressed a similar opinion and Gloag and Irvine see no reason why the English rule
would apply here.5 The present writer agrees.
The hotelier has a lien because he is a hotelier. Consequently he may not assign his
right to a third party. In Garden v Shaw? an innkeeper retained a gun which was in
the possession of one Mr Benson who had not paid his bill. Sometime later Mr
Benson's agent met his debt and obtained the gun from the innkeeper. At this point
Mr Garden entered the picture and went to court claiming the gun was his and that
he had only lent it to Mr Benson. Mr Benson's agent argued that he could keep the
item until Mr Garden paid him the amount he had paid the innkeeper. This
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amounted to saying that the innkeeper's lien had been assigned to him. The Sheriff
correctly had none of this, holding that:
"It would be altogether intolerable were [Mr Garden] obliged to follow his
property up and down the country through the hands of a scries of persons,
each claiming the rights of an assignee."7
1. Bell, Commentaries, II, 1(H); Bell, Principles, s 1428.
2. Further, livery stable keepers in Emgland do not have strict liabilty, the edict nautac, caupones.
stabularii, being interpreted differently there than in Scotland. See Scarie v Laverick (1874) LR 9
QB 123 per Blackburn J at 126; Mustard v Paterson 1923 SC 142, per Lord Justice-Clerk Alness at
148; Lord Hunter at 150-151 and Lord Anderson at 154.
3. Gloag and Irvine, p 398; G W Paton, Bailment in the Common Law, (1952), pp 217-218;
Jackson v Cummins (1839) 5 M & W 342; 151 ER 145; Orchard v Rackstraw (1850) 19 LJCP
303; 137 ER 1066; Smith v Dearlove (1848) 6 CB 132; 136 ER 1202. The livery stable keeper has
been held not to improve the value of the animals and thus cannot claim the lien of a bailee for work
done ; see Paton, ibid.
4. Bell, Commentaries, 11,100.
5. Lord Young in Miller v Hutchcson and Dixon (1881) 8 R 489, at 492; Gloag and Irvine, p 398.
6.(1874) 1 Guth Sh Cas 505.
7. At 507.
233. Enforcement of the lien. As with all other liens, the hotelier's lien encourages
the debtor ic guest to discharge his debt by debarring him from his property until he
does so. It is the guest alone who is liable for his bill. Thus where a person had
assisted a guest to remove the guest's property from a hotel, that person was held not
liable for the account due by the guest for board and lodging.1 Where, however, a
party of guests book into a hotel, the property of any of them may be detained in
respect of the bill of the party as a whole.2 The hotelier will be liable in damages if
he detains luggage when he has no right to do so.3
With regard to selling the property to meet the debt, the lien is subject to its own
statutory rules. As could be guessed, these rules come from England. It was held in
Milliliter v Florence in 1875 that an English innkeeper had no right to sell articles
subject to his lien.4 The rule was fen to be inconvenient and consequently the
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Innkeepers Act 1878 was passed.5 It is widely accepted that the Act was never
intended to apply to Scotland, where generally any lien holder can apply to the
Court for a power to sell.6 Nevertheless, all seem now agreed that it does so apply.7
In terms of the 1878 Act a hotelier has the right to sell by public auction any goods,
chattels, horses, carriages, wares, or merchandise deposited with him or left in the
hotel premises.8 It is more than arguable that the Act no longer applies to horses and
carriages in the light of later legislation, but other writers do not discuss the matter."
The right applies where the property has been deposited or left by a person who is or
who becomes indebted to the hotelier for board or lodging or the expenses of
looking after any horse or other animal brought to the hotel.10 The hotelier may only
exercise the right to sell in order to satisfy the debt for which he had a lien over the
property." Further, the property must have been left at the hotel for at least six
weeks without the debt having been paid.12 A minimum of one month before the
sale, the hotelier must advertise it in a London newspaper and in a locally
circulating newspaper, with a description of the goods and the name of the person
who left them, if known.13 After the sale, the hotelier must pay that person on
demand, after deducting the amount of the debt due to him along with the sale
expenses, any surplus arising from the sale.13
1. Smith v Chisholm (1893) 9 Sh Ct Rep 44.
2. Kingston and Co v Blair (1896) 12 Sh Ct Rep 20. The basis of the decision was that the contract
was formed between the party and the hotelier.
3. Ferguson v Petcrkin 1953 SLT (Sh Ct) 91 (detention of luggage for damage to wardrobe door
outside scope of special lien).
4. (1878) 3 QBD 484.
5. Innkeepers Act 1878 (c 38); Gloag and Irvine, p 399; G W Paton, Bailment in the Common
Law, (1952), p 218; NE Palmer, Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), pp 1499 and 1504-1505.
6. Gloag and Irvine, ibid; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 93. This was because of the requirement to
advertise any sale under the Act in a London newspaper : 1878 Act s 1, third proviso. For the general
ability of a Scots lien-holder to apply to the Court for the right to sell see Bell, Principles, s 1417.
7. Gloag and Irvine, ibid; A J Sim, ibid: D M Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, (4th ed,
1989), vol III, p 401; J J Downes, SME, vol 11, paras 1758-1759: W M Gloag and R C Henderson.
The Law ofScotland. (10th ed, 1995), para 19.28; Smith v Chisholm (1893) 9 Sh Ct Rep 44.
8. 1878 Act, s 1.
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9. That is, the Hotel Proprietors Act 1956 (c 62). s 2(2), which removes inter alia these things from
the scope of the hotelier's lien.
10. 1878 Act, s 1.
11. Ibid, s 1, second proviso.
12. Ibid, s 1, first proviso.
13. Ibid, s 1, third proviso.
14. Ibid, s 1, first proviso.
234. Extinction of the lien. The lien is lost if the luggage of the guest is removed
from the hotel. It docs not revive if he subsequently returns.1 There is an exception,
however, where during a lengthy stay a guest (along with his property) is
occasionally absent aninio rcvcrtcndi? If the guest departs without paying his bill,
but leaves his luggage at the hotel, it remains subject to the lien.3 It has been held in
England that the lien is not lost by the hotelier accepting a security for his bill, so if
that security proves to be insufficient he may then still enforce his lien.4
1. Sheriff Guthrie in Bell. Principles, s 1428; Gloag and Irvine, p 399; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para
92, citing Jones v Thurlowe (1723) 8 Mod Rep 172; 88 ER 126; Harp v Minto (1870) 1 Guth Sh
Cas 508.
2. That is, with the intention of returning. See Guthrie, Gloag and Irvine, and Sim, as above, all
citing Allen v Smith (1862) 12 CBNS 638; 142 ER 1293. See also. D M Walker, Principles of
Scottish Private Law, (4th cd, 1989), vol III, p 401.
3. Sheriff Guthrie in Bell. Principles, s 1428; A J Sim, SME vol 20, para 92, citing Sncad v Watkins
(1856) 1 CBNS 267; 140 ER 111.
4. Angus v McLachlan (1883) 23 Ch Div 330. On the extinction of the lien in England, generally,
see N E Palmer. Bailment, (2nd ed, 1991), pp 1502-1504.
235. Conclusions. It has been shown that the principles upon which the hotelier's
lien rests in Scotland today arc English principles, brought into our law by Bell.1
The question which remains is whether the law should be made to return to its
civilian roots and recognise the lien as arising out of the contract between hotelier
and guest.2 It may be argued that this is a purely theoretical matter, only of interest
to academics. Such an argument, however, is ill-founded. With regard to the matter
of property brought to the hotel which does not belong to the guest, the foundation
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of the lien is of the utmost importance. For it is only because the lien has been
viewed as arising from the hotelier's public duties, that it has been allowed to prevail
in respect of such property.-1
The present writer is not convinced that the public duties of the hotelier are onerous
enough to justify special treatment. Scots law at the time of Bankton certainly took
that view.4 Moreover, the strict liability of the hotelier derived from the edict nautac,
caupones, stabularii has had its stringency reduced by the Hotel Proprietors Act
1956.5 It may be concluded that there is little to support the perpetuation of the post
Bell orthodoxy and that the hotelier's lien should be treated like any other.
The other important issue identified was the fact that the lien in many eases is truly
a hypothec.6 The point must be stressed that the lien does live on with regard to
items that the hotelier has custody of, such as that which is in his safe.
Consequently, it would be inappropriate to rename this part of the thesis "The
Hotelier's Hypothec". On the other hand, many of the paragraphs within it, which
mention "lien" apply equally to the hypothec, for example, the sections on
enforcement and extinction.7
1. See above, particularly para 224.
2. This approach may find some support in the judgement of Sheriff Dove Wilson in Gray v Hart
(1885) 1 Sh Ct Rep 269 (see above, para 231) and in the views of Professor McBrvde : see his
Contract, (1987), pp 316-317. Sec also Ferguson v Pctcrkin 1953 SLT (Sh Ct) 91, where Sheriff-
Substitute Garrett on being asked to decide what sort of lien a hotelier has said : "Whether it be based
on implied obligation in a particular mutual contract and operates as a security for performance of the
counterpart or depends on custom, it is a special lien".
3. Bermans and Nathans Ltd v Wcibyc 1983 SLT 299. Sec above, para 229.
4. See above, para 223.
5. Hotel Proprietors Act 1956 (c 62), s 2. A point not missed by Professor McBrydc, Contract,
(1987), p 316. On the operation of the Act, see J J Downcs, SME. vol 11. paras 1748-1751 and W J
Stewart, Delict, (2nd ed, 1993), pp 31-32.
6. See above, para 230.
7. See above, paras 233 and 234.
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13. GENERAL LIEN
236. Introduction. A general lien is the right of a first party to retain property from
a second party until that party discharges a balance of debt owed by him for all work
performed by the first party in the same capacity in which that first party holds the
property.1 For example, a solicitor has the right to retain his client's papers until paid
for all the work which he has carried out as solicitor to his client, whether the work
related to those papers or not.2 General liens arise only in exceptional
circumstances.3 General liens also have a more restricted sphere of existence in that
they arc confined to contractual obligations.4 Nonetheless, they are regarded as
much real rights as special liens.5
1. For alternative definitions, sec Bell, Commentaries, 11,87; Bell, Principles, ss 1411 and 1431:
Gloag and Irvine, pp 340-341 and 353; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, paras 476 and 482; W
M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, (10th ed, 1995), para 19.20; A J Sim, SME. vol
20, paras 75 and 78.
2. See below, paras 265-271; Bell, Commentaries, 11,107; Bell, Principles, ss 1437-1438; Gloag
and Irvine, p 384; Macrae v Leith 1913 SC 901.
3. Gloag and Irvine, p 353; Shaw, p 58; W M Gloag, Contract, p 634: J J Gow, The Mercantile
and Industrial Law of Scotland. (1964), p 293; D VI Walker, Civil Remedies, (1974). p 69; A J
Sim, SME, vol 20, para 75.
4. Unlike special liens, they are not part of the general law of obligations. See above, paras 168-17!
and below, para 239.
5. Bell, Commentaries, 11.87; Gloag and Irvine, p 8; Scottish Central Railway Co v Ferguson
(1864) 2 M 781; Peebles & Son v Caledonian Railway Co (1875) 2 R 346; Morris v Whyte A
Mackay (1889) 5 Sh Ct Rep 163.
237. The meaning of "general". Like the term "special lien", the term "general
lien" was first used in Scots law by Bell.1 A general lien is said to be "general"
because rather than merely securing an amount due under one contract, it instead
secures a general balance owed to the lien-holder by his client or customer.2 The
point which must be made is that to say that a general lien secures a general balance
is not to say that it covers all sums due by the one party to the other. A right of
retention based on dominium is good generally for all sums.3 A general lien only
covers sums arising out of services performed by the lien-holder in the same
capacity in which lie holds the property subject to a lien.4 Thus a solicitor's lien
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secures his bill for the work he has carried out for his client as a law agent.3 It docs
not cover cash advances made to the client : solicitors are not moneylenders.6
Similarly the factor's lien will not cover debts arising out of transactions which arc
not factorial.7
The rule is seen to operate clearly in the situation where an individual carries out
services in two capacities. In McCall & Co v Black & Co8 an agent acted both as a
factor and a broker for a company. It was held that he could not assert a factor's lien
over goods which he held in the capacity of broker. Similarly, in Larguc v Urquharf
a law agent also acted as a factor. It was held that his law agent's lien did not cover
expenses incurred during an action which he had undertaken in the capacity of
factor and not law agent.
1. See above, paras 158-159.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,87; Bell, Principles, s 1411: Gloag and Irvine, pp 340-341. In Laurie v
Denny's 7> (1853) 15 D 404. at 408, Lord Fullcrton describes a general lien as a right "to retain
goods for a general balance, though deposited at first for a special purpose."
3. See above, para 199; Gloag and Irvine, pp 330-337: Melrose v Hastie (1850) 12 D 655:
Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152: Nelson v Gordon (1874) 1 R 1093. But cf Moor v
Atwal 1995 SCLR 1119.
4. Gloag and Irvine, p 358; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 486; A J Sim. SME vol 20,
para 80. In Garden Haig Scott & Wallace v Stevenson's Tr 1962 SLT 78. at 85, Lord Garment said
: "A solicitor's lien or right of retention is quite a different right from what [the solicitor in that case]
had in virtue of his holding an ex facie absolute title". It is of note that Professor Walker in his Civil
Remedies, (1974), states at p 69 that a general lien will cover "all debts" before going on to show
that this is not the case in the next two pages of his work.
5. Bell, Commentaries, 11.107; Gloag and Irvine, pp 384-389; Mcnzics v Murdoch (1841) 4 D
257; Paul v Mcikle (1868) 7 M 235; Liquidator of Grand Empire Theatres v Snodgrass 1932 SC
(HL) 73.
6. Christie v Ruxton (1862) 24 D 1182; Wylic's Exrx v McJannet (1901) 4 F 195.
7. Brown v Smith (1893) 1 SLT 158. Given authority such as this, it is perhaps misleading to
classify a general lien as an unrestricted security as Professor Gretton does in "The Concept of
Security" in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany (1987), p 126 at p 144.
8. (1824) 2 Sh App 188. See also the English case of Houghton v Mathews (1803) 3 B & P 485: 127
ER 263.
9. (1883) 10 R 1229.
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238. Policy of the law as regards general liens. As has been stated, a general lien
is an exceptional right which will only arise in limited circumstances.1 It is
surprising to note the number of writers who make this point, without explaining the
policy reasons behind it.2 This is particularly the case when Bell set out the matter
clearly, contrasting special and general liens :
"While the special or particular lien is admitted, as the natural result of the
mutual contract on which possession proceeds, and as circumscribed by that
contract, so as to produce little danger of false credit; there is an obvious
objection to the indiscrimatc admission of general liens, either for the whole
balance that happens at that time to stand in account between the parties, or
for the balance due on a particular train of employment of which there is no
obvious limit. This objection is somewhat analogous to that which has
operated so strongly on the doctrine of hypothecs."3
Bell was all too aware of what had happened in England at the turn of the nineteenth
century. There the views of Lord Hardwickc and Lord Mansfield who were much in
favour of recognising general liens in as many situations as possible, were cast aside
by dicta outlining the prejudicial effect of such liens upon other creditors in the
event of the debtor's insolvency.4 These dicta remain authoritative today/
Not only do general liens have the potential to create unfairness for creditors. They
may also prejudice singular successors. Lor example, if A sends goods to B via his
carrier, it is rather unfair upon B if the carrier is allowed to retain the goods until all
the debts owed by A to him in respect of carriage over the last five years are met.6
Given the ability of general liens to adversely affect third parties by securing
"hidden" debt, Scots law like English law will admit general liens only in closely
defined circumstances. In particular, whilst it is in theory possible to create such
liens expressly, certain criteria must be met before a court will enforce such rights.'
1. See above, para 236.
2. Gloag and Irvine, p 353: Shaw, p 58: Gloag, Contract, p 634: D M Walker. Civil Remedies,
(1974). p 69: A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 75. Note also the argument of the appellant in Strong v
Philips (1878) 5 R 770, at 771 that "The law was very jealous of general liens".
3. Bell, Commentaries, 11,101.
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4. Bell, Commentaries, 11,101-102. See above, para 141.
5. Halsbury, vol 28, para 516; A P Bell, pp 142-143; I Davics, Textbook on Commercial Law,
(1992), p 321.
6. Consequently such a lien would not be enforced ; Scottish Central Railway Co v Ferguson
(1864) 2 M 781; Peebles & Son v Caledonian Railway Co C1875) 2 R 346.
7. See below, para 243.
239. Basis of general liens. It has been seen that special liens have developed out
of the cxccptio doli and exceptio non adimplcti contractus of Roman law.1 It is very
straightforward to discover examples of special lien in other civilian and mixed
systems.2 In contrast, it is a considerably harder task to find cases of general lien in
these jurisdictions.3 The reason for this is that general liens have English rather than
civilian roots. Various pieces of evidence seem to point to this conclusion.
In the first place, the term "general lien" was not recognised in Scotland before
Bell's study of the subject.4 In the second place, this study is heavily anglicised.3 In
the third place, the general lien which has attracted by far the most litigation - the
solicitor's lien - may well have been borrowed from south of the border.6 In the
fourth place, English authority is particularly persuasive in the context of general
lien, for example in proving whether such a right has been established by usage.' In
general, the law north and south of the border is very similar, contrasting with the
position as regards special lien.8 As Lord Young stated in Miller v Hutchcson &
Dixon, "the law of general lien . . . does not differ in England and Scotland to any
material degree".9
In Scots law, like English law, a general lien must be founded upon contract. This
may be regarded as stating the obvious. That, however, is because the received
wisdom has been that all liens arise in contractual situations. One of the major
submissions of this thesis is that special lien is a doctrine of the law of obligations as
a whole, equally capable of arising in unjustified enrichment and delict as in
contract.10 In contrast, contract is the sole domain of the general lien.
It would seem to be the case that a general lien can either be created by implied or
express contract. As Bell stated : "The foundation of general lien is agreement,
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either express or implied."11
1. See above, paras 128. 145 and 204-210.
2. For example, France. Germany, Italy, Louisiana, Quebec and South Africa all recognise the
hotelier's lien : see above, para 222.
3. The present writer has yet to find a definite example.
4. See above, paras 158-159.
5. Ibid.
6. Sec Lord Cuninghame in Kemp v Youngs (1838) 16 S 500, 503 and. above, para 147
7. Sec, for example, Strong v Philips & Co (1878) 5 R 770: Mitchell v Hcys and Sons (1894) 21 R
600 and Glendinning v Hope & Co 1911 SC (HL) 73. See below, para 241.
8. Sec above, para 208.
9. (1881) 8 R 489, at 493.
10. See above, paras 168-171.
11. Bell, Commentaries. 11,102.
240. General lien arising by implied contract : (a) agency liens. The original
general liens in Scots law arc those of the factor and the solicitor, both of which can
be traced back as far as the seventeenth century.1 Since then, auctioneers,2 bankers,3
and brokers4 have also been accepted as entitled to general liens, on the ground that
they are types of factor. These five liens arc probably the best known cases of
general lien.3 Bell sees them6 as liens which had "gradually been established by
legal construction of particular contracts or connections."7 Gloag and Irvine regard
them as based upon usage and Sim regards their foundation as common law or
usage.8
It is submitted here that an alternative rationalisation is possible. All these
individuals are agents. It has been held in the House of Lords this century that an
agent is entitled to a general lien in respect of the property of his principal.1'
Moreover, it is the case that all the liens referred to here, with the exception of the
solicitor's lien, have their basis in the lien of the factor. Consequently, it may be
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accepted that it is an implied term of a contract between principal and agent that the
agent is entitled to a general lien. In the words of Lord McLaren :
"It is a general principle of our law that every agent has a lien or right of
retention against his principal for the balance due to him".10
1. Chalmers v Bassily (1666) Vlor 9137 and Pearson v \lurray (1672) Mor 2625 (factor);
Cuthlvrts v Ross (1697) 4 BS 374. See below, paras 265-271.
2. Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon (1881) 8 R 489. Sec below, para 257.
3. Robertson's Trv Royal Bank ofScotland (1890) 18 R 12. Sec below, paras 244-249.
4. Bell, Commentaries, 11,115 (policy broker); Glendinning v Hope & Co 1911 SC (HL) 73
(stockbrokers). See below, paras 250-253.
5. A J Sim. SME, vol 20, para 78. Note too that the American Law Institute. Restatement of the
Law ofSecurity, (1941), s 62, confers general liens on factors, attorneys at law anJ hankers.
6. Excluding the auctioneer's lien, which was not admitted until Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon
(1881) 8 R 489.
7. Bell, Commentaries, 11,106.
8. Gloag and Irvine, p 356; A J Sim. SME, vol 20, para 78.
9. Glendinning v Hope & Co 1911 SC (HL) 73, at 78 per Lord Kinnear. See below, para 257.
10. Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank ofScotland (1890) 18 R 12. at 19.
241. General lien arising by implied contract : (b) usage of trade. In his
Commentaries, Bell discusses the general liens recognised in England by usage of
trade.1 This is followed by the statement:
"In Scotland there docs not appear in our books any case in which a general
lien by usage of trade has been claimed or established."2
In the latter part of the nineteenth century this was to change, with a number cases
coming before the courts and the work of Bell being much cited. The courts insisted
that a party seeking to rely on a general lien created by usage of trade had to prove
that usage.3 Usage with respect to a particular locality could suffice.4 In one case, an
300
attempt to show that storekeepers have such a right failed because usage could not
be proved.'' In another, it was held that scourers have no general lien, because the
usage adduced was only local and found not to be universal in that locality.'1 It has,
however, been held that a general lien in favour of calcndcrers and packers has been
established by usage in Scotland.7 In that case, the court placed heavy reliance upon
the fact that such usage had been proven in England. Lord Gifford stated :
"Comparatively slight proof of the practice of trade in Scotland will be
sufficient to establish a rule of trade which is recognised and in full force in
England. It is very undesirable in matters of mercantile law and in precisely
the same circumstances that different rules should prevail or be fixed for
England and for Scotland when no reason whatever can be given for such
variance."8
Similar sentiments were expressed by Bell.4 It is generally accepted now that
evidence that a general lien exists in respect of a trade in England will help persuade
a court that a similar lien should be recognised in Scotland.10 Nevertheless, in the
only two other cases of a general lien established by usage resort was not made to
English practice. The first of these concerns calico printers, it being held that
Glaswegian members of that trade have a general lien." The second concerns
bleachers. It seems now accepted that these individuals in Scotland have the right to
retain that which they have bleached in respect of their account for the year.17 Once
a lien has been established by usage, its continuing existence will apparently not be
questioned.13
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,103-104.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,104. The distinction, however, between general liens arising by common
law and through use of trade is often not made. See, for example, Gloag and Irvine, p 356 and A J
Sim, SME, vol 20, para 78.
3. Gloag and Irvine, pp 356-357.
4. Smith v Aikmans (1859) 22 D 344, per Lord Curriehill at 346-347; Mitchell v Ileys & Sons
(1894) 21 R 600. W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 485, is therefore wrong to say that local
usage is not enough.
5. Laurie v Denny's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404.
6. Smith v Aikmans (1859) 22 D 344.
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7. Strong v Philips & Co (1878) 5 R 770.
8. Ibid, at 774. Cf with Laurie, above n 5, per Lord Cuninghame at 408.
9. Bell, Commentaries, 11,104.
10. Gloag and Irvine, p 357; W M Gloag, Contract, p 635; W VI Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para
485; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 79; Gloag and Henderson, para 19.22. In England it has been held
that packers, calico printers and wharfingers have a general lien by usage, but dyers, fullers and
millers do not: Gloag and Irvine, p 357.
11. Mitchell v Heys and Sons (1894) 21 R 600.
12. Anderson's Tr v Fleming (1871) 9 M 718.
13. In other words, continued usage need not be proved. This is certainly the position in English law :
Halsbury, vol 28, para 516.
242. General lien arising by implied contract : (c) through a course of dealing.
In many commercial circumstances parties deal with each other on an ongoing basis.
Accounts arc settled periodically rather than after each individual transaction. Here
the law may well imply a general lien whereby any goods being held by the
tradesman are subject to a lien securing payment of all the sums due under the
contracts in the period of accounting.1 Bell illustrates the point by referring to a
contract of manufacture :
"Where the employment of a workman is not in one solitary act of
manufacture, but in a course of work, the payments being made not on the
delivery of each parcel of goods, but periodically, once a year or half-yearly,
it may be fairly presumed that the renunciation of the undoubted lien which
the workman has on each parcel has in contemplation the continuance of the
custom, and the renewal of a lien upon other goods."2
Thus it was held in an early case that where an account for bleaching was settled on
an annual basis, any goods held by the bleacher at the end of the year could be
withheld from the owner until the annual account was paid.3 The general lien is of
benefit to both parties here in that individual goods can be handed over to the
customer without instantaneous payment as the bleacher has security for the debt
over the other goods over which he still has custody.4
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The difference between a general lien established by usage and one established by a
course of dealing, is that the latter need only arise out of the dealings between the
tradesman and a particular customer. Nevertheless, the border line between the two
has always been rather blurred and with particular respect to bleachers, as was
pointed out in the previous paragraph, a general lien has been established by usage.3
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,104-105; Bell. Principles, s 1435.
2. Bell, Commentaries. 11,104. See also Hume, Lectures. 111,48-50.
3. Hunter v Austin & Co (1794) and McCulIoch v Pattison & Co (1794), both unreported but
described in Bell, Commentaries. 11,104-105; Aberdeen & Smith v Paterson (1812) Hume 127.
4. See US Steel Products Co v Great Western Railway Co [1916] 1 AC 189, at p 211 per Lord
Parmoor: A PBell, p 142; 1 Davies, Textbook on Commercial Law. (1992), p 321.
5. See. in particular, the opinions in Anderson's Tr v Fleming (1871) 9 M 718, where the decisions
cited in n 3 are regarded as establishing a general lien in favour of a bleacher by usage rather than
through a course of dealing. See too Gloag and Irvine, p 357.
243. General lien created expressly It seems widely accepted that a general lien
may be created expressly in terms of an agreement between the parties.1 Bell writes
that an express general lien will be "effectual" if "stipulated in clear and
unambiguous terms".2 Lord Young was very certain in his views upon general liens,
remarking in one case :
"[Counsel] spoke as if it were a dangerous thing to hold that such liens may
be constituted by contract. But it is only the common law of freedom applying
to all who are sui juris. . . People can contract as to liens as they please".3
Thus, in Bon Accord Removals v Hainswortli4 a party entered into two contracts
with a removal company for the removal and temporary storage of certain goods.
The contracts provided that the company had a general lien for its charges. It was
held that goods which formed the subject matter of one of the contracts could be
detained until the sums due under both the contracts were met. Thus the rule that
carriers and storekeepers only have a special lien was ovcridden by the express
general lien.5
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In one English case it was held that a general hen had been constituted in the light of
public advertisement by the tradesman claiming it.h Bell notes the doubts in a later
decision "whether this power of creating liens by notice in handbills and newpapcrs
be consistent with the true interests of trade."7 Nevertheless he includes a section in
both his Commentaries and his Principles on general liens being raised by
advertisement.8
There is of course a difficulty here. The policy of the law is to restrict general liens
to exceptional eases, because of their prejudicial affect to creditors and singular
successors of the debtor." This policy is subverted if everyone has carte blanche to
create general liens when and where they like as Lord Young suggests. However, it
would appear to be the case that his view is misguided. For a start, the law seems
clear that in the ease of hoteliers and carriers the special hen which the law confers
upon these individuals may not be replaced by an express general lien.10 The reason
is that these persons have certain duties which they must exercise for the public
benefit. As Lord Young stated himself :
"I should greatly doubt the validity at common law of an agreement between a
carrier and the sender of goods which professed to create a general hen to the
prejudice of the consignee, to whom the carrier was legally bound to carry
them at the usual rate of carriage."11
In the Bon Accord Removals ease (above), the Sheriff Principal expressly
recognised that there were no third parties involved, before upholding the express
general lien for which the contract of carriage had provided. Thus while the
terminology of hen was used, all that was being recognised was retention at a mere
contractual level.
At a wider level, judicial attitudes towards the recognition of express general liens
have usually been lukewarm. The most important case on the subject is Anderson's
Trs v Fleming.12 It has often been cited by writers in a manner which suggests that it
is authority for the proposition that express general liens will invariably be upheld
by the courts.13 This reading of the case generates more unease when the same
writers tell us that the lien in that ease was not struck down as an unfair preference,
although created shortly before the insolvency of the debtor.14 There is, however,
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less to worry about than may seem at first. In the case bleachers who had been
employed for some time by the debtor regularly returned each parcel of bleached
goods with a receipt stating that all goods which they held were subject to a general
lien in respect of the balance of accounts (including acceptances and promissory
notes) between the parties. Upon the insolvency of the debtor, the lien constituted by
this notice was upheld and was not an unfair preference as it had been created in the
ordinary course of business.15
What was important for the judges was not so much the written notice, but the lien
implied by the common law in the given situation. Lord President Inglis pointed out
that the bleachers had an implied right arising by usage of trade to retain any goods
in their hands for the past year's account.16 Turning to the notice he said :
"This contract, taking the words in the widest literal sense, would establish a
lien for the general balance due on account, however long outstanding . . . But
such a contract would not only be a most unreasonable but also a most illegal
contract, and I cannot suppose that cither party meant anything of the kind. On
the contrary, I think that the fair and rational meaning of the contract is, that
the bleachers stipulate for a lien for the balance of their account, meaning
thereby, according to the ordinary usage of trade, the balance of the year's
account remaining unsettled".17
The only additional right which the express provision gave was to ensure that the
lien was not extinguished in respect of debts for which bills had been accepted, a
matter on which the law was unclear.18 As Lord Kinloch stated, this point did not
alter the fact that the lien "rest[cd] for its constitution on the act of law, not on
contract merely."19 What must be taken out of the ease is that the courts will not
simply enforce a general lien because it appears in an express provision.20 For, the
courts arc aware of the adverse affect of general liens upon third parties.
The point is illustrated by the subsequent ease of Morris v Whytc and Mackay21
where storekeepers stored goods under the condition that they were "held subject to
a lien by the storekeeper for his general balance against the same account". Sheriff
Lees upheld the lien. He noted its "clear and unambiguous terms"22 and that it was
not unreasonable. However, he warned :
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"If it were sought to convert a lien for storage rents into a security for all debts
due by the depositor to the storekeeper, a Court of law might not sustain such
a contention as being fundamentally inconsistent with the commercial
interests of the community at large".23
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,104; Bell, Principles, s 1432; Gloag and Irvine, p 355-356; SME vol 20,
para 67; Lamb v Kaselack, Alsen & Co (1X82) 9 R 482; Morris v Whyte & Mackay (1893) 9 Sh
Ct Rep 111.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,104.
3. Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon (1881) 8 R 489, at 492.
4. 1993 GWD 28-1785.
5. Stevenson v Likly (1824) 3 S 291 (carrier); Laurie & Co v Denny's Tr (1853) 15 D 404
(storekeeper).
6. Kirkman v Shawcross (1796) 6 TR 14; 101 ER 410.
7. Bell, Commentaries, 11,105. The doubts he refers to were expressed in Oppenheim v Russell
(1803) 3 B and P 42. McLaren notes (p 106) that following the case of Bowman v Malcolm (1843>
11 M & W 833; 152 ER 1042 the doctrine of lien by advertisement may have been negatived.
8. Bell, Commentaries, 11,105-106; Principles, s 1433.
9. See above, para 238.
10. See above, para 215; Gloag and Irvine, p 356; Shaw, pp 59-60; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia,
vol 9, para 483; A j Sim, SME, vol 20, para 78; Scottish Central Railway Co v Ferguson (1864) 2
M 781; Peebles & Son v Caledonian Railway Co (1875) 2 R 346.
11. Peebles & Son, ibid, at 348.
12. (1871) 9 M 718.
13. Gloag and Irvine, pp 355-356; Shaw, pp 58-59; Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 483; A J
Sim, SME, vol 20, para 78.
14. Ibid and Sim, at para 67.
15. The unsuccessful argument was that the lien was unenforceable, being created within sixty days
of the debtor's bankruptcy in terms of the now repealed Bankruptcy Act 1696, c 5. Unfair preferences
are now dealt with under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66), s 36.
16. (1871) 9 M 718. at 720-721.
17. Ibid, at 721. See also Lord Deas at 722, Lord Ardmillan at 723 and Lord Kinloch at 724-725. The
point is made in a footnote by Gloag and Irvine, p 356 and Sim. para 78.
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18. See the discussion hy Lord Kinloch at 725 and also Harper's Creditors v FauIds (1791) Bell's
Octavo Cases 440.
19. At 725.
20. This is despite Gloag's apparent assertion that this would he the ease : Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para
483. Thus Professor Gretton's fears on this, expressed in "The Concept of Security", in D j Cusine
(ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany, (1987), p 126, at p 144 are perhaps not entirely justified.
21 (1893) 9 Sh Ct Rep 111.
22. Ibid, at 114, following Bell, Commentaries. 11.103.
23. Ibid, at 113.
14. BANKER'S LIEN
244. Introduction. A banker has a general lien over all the securities of his
customer in his hands, which secures the general balance due to him by the
customer.1 The right is an important weapon in the armoury of the banker against
defaulting customers. It sits along side his right to set off separate accounts kept by
the customer, which allows him to combine an account in credit with one which is
overdrawn.2 These twin rights, which also exist in English law, have sometimes
been subject to conflation.3 Thus the right of set off may be analysed as a right to
retain the balance on one account to meet the balance on another.4 However, such an
analysis points to a right of retention based on ownership of the sum in question, the
money having been transferred to the bank.5 More fundamentally, the banker's right
here may seen to be one of compensation, rather than retention.6 Further, it may be
noted that the banker's lien still operates where customer and banker have expressly
agreed that accounts be kept separate.7
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,113; Bell, Principles, s 1451; Hume, Lectures, 111,56; Gloag and Irvine,
p 370; J Graham Stewart, Diligence, (1898), p 174; Shaw, p 61; W Wallace and A McNeil, Banking
Law. (l()th ed, 1991, ed D B Caskie), p 21; D J Cusinc, SME, vol 2. para 1201: A J Sim. SME, vol
20, para 81; L D Crcrar. The Law ofBanking in Scotland, (1997), p 107.
2. Gloag and Irvine, pp 370-371 and 381-383; Shaw, pp 66-67; Wallace and McNeil, pp 24-26.
3. Gloag and Irvine, p 381; Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd v Westminster Bank Ltd
[1970] 3 All ER 473. at 477 per Lord Denning MR. On the distinction in England, see E P Ellinger
and E Lomnicka, Modern Banking Law, (2nd ed. 1994). pp 501-502.
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4. Gloag and Irvine, ibid.
5. As Buckley LJ pointed out in the Halesowen ease, above. [ 1470] 3 All ER 473 at 487-488. no
man can have a lien over his own property. This was approved in the House of Lords by Viscount
Dilhorne and Lord Cross, at [ 1472] 1 All ER 641. 646 and 633. See Paget. Law of Banking, (11th
cd. 1496). p 523.
6. Shaw, p 68.
7. Paget, pp 529-530.
245. Basis of the lien. The banker's lien appears to have been first recognised in
Scotland by Bell in the second edition of his Commentaries. The previous edition
was silent on the matter. Bell introduces the subject as follows:
"Bankers arc in the nature of money-factors; and, by law, they have a general
lien upon all the proper securities in their hands, belonging to any particular
person, their customer, for his general balance; unless there be evidence to
show that they received any particular security, under special circumstances,
which would take it out of the common Rile.1
No Scottish authority is cited. Bell works simply on the basis that bankers arc a type
of factor and because factors are entitled to a general lien in Scots law so must
bankers. He docs, however, make reference to the English case of Davis v
Bowshcr,2 decided in 1794. This ease is accepted to be the first in English law to
recognise the banker's lien.3 It involved a Bristol banker. Lord Kenyon, however,
made very clear that he was not setting out law merely applicable to that city :
"I am clearly of opinion, that, by the general law of the land, a banker has a
general lien upon all the securities in his hands, belonging to any particular
person, for his general balance, unless there be evidence to shew that he
received any particular security, under special circumstances, which would
take it out of the common law rule."4
This passage is uncannily alike Bell's description of the banker's lien set out above.
As it appears verbatim in an extensive footnote in Bell's work, it is even more
difficult to miss the similarity.3 Bell perhaps noticed this himself as he substantially
alters his wording in later editions.^ This, however, docs not stop Gloag and Irvine's
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statement "that the lien of a banker, in the law of England, is founded on entirely
different principles from the similar lien . .. recognised by the law of Scotland" from
ringing distinctly hollow. To be fair to them, the courts north and south of the
border had, subsequent to Bell, taken divergent views on the basis of the lien. In
England, Lord Campbell saw it as "part of the law merchant".8 In Scotland, Lord
McLaren regarded it as arising because bankers arc agents;9 a point going back to
Bell's definition of bankers as money-factors.
The truth of the matter is that the Scottish banker's lien was born in England. Many
of the eases which appear in the standard treatments of it arc English.1" The lien was
unknown in Scotland until Bell realised he could import it via the second edition of
his Commentaries, because of the banker's agency. That said, the involvement of
agency does mean that the lien is by no means out of place amongst the general
liens recognised at Scots common law and is without question accepted today as a
key general lien."
1. Bell. Commentaries, (2nd ed. 1810), p 488.
2. (1794) Term Rep 488: 101 ER 275.
3. Paget, p 522.
4. (1794) Term Rep 488 at 491: 101 ER 275 at 276.
5. Bell, Commentaries, (2nd ed, 1810), p 489.
6. Bell, Commentaries, II, 113.
7. Gloag and Irvine, p 371.
8. Brandao v Barnett( 1846) 12 CI & Fin 787 at 805; 8 ER 1622, at 1629.
9. Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank ofScotland (1890) 18 R 12, at 20.
10. For example, Brandao v Bamett, above, n 9.
11. Gloag and In'inc. pp 370-381; Shaw, pp 61-70; A J Sim. SME. vol 20. paras 81-84.
246. Debts secured. The lien secures the general balance owed by the customer. It
covers all charges paid and disbursements made, as well as all advances made by
the banker in his banking capacity.1 Where the customer is bankrupt or vcrgens ad
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inopiam the banker is additionally entitled to retain in security the money due on
any bills which he has discounted although the term of payment is in the future.2
This is of course correctly classifiable as a right of retention rather than a lien. The
same may be said of the banker's right where the customer is vergens ad inopiam to
retain a balance in favour of the customer and refuse to honour his cheque, in
security of a bill which is yet to mature.3
1. Bell. Commentaries, 11,113; Bell, Principles, s 1451; Hume, Lectures. 111,56; Gloag and Irvine.
pp 372-373; Shaw, pp 61 and 66; Wallace and McNeil, p 21; Robertson's Tr v Roval Bank of
Scotland (1890) 23 R 12, at 16 per Lord President Inglis.
2. Bell, Commentaries. 11.115; Bell, Principles, s 1451; Gloag and Irvine, pp 372-373; British
Linen Co v Ferricr (1807), reported in Bell, Commentaries, ibid.
3. Paul & Thain v Royal Bank of Scotland (1869) 7 M 361; Ireland v North of Scotland Bank
(1880) 8 R 215; King v British Linen Col 1899) 1 F 920.
247. Property covered. The lien attaches to all negotiable securities belonging to
the customer which are deposited with the banker in the ordinary course of
business.1 Consequently, it does not cover valuable items, for example, plate,
deposited for safekeeping.2 The negotiable securities to which the lien docs attach
include bills of exchange, promissory notes, cheques and bearer bonds.3 In England,
unlike Scotland, the lien has been held to attach to pieces of paper which arc not
negotiable, such as share certificates, policies of insurance and share certificates.4
The lien docs not attach to bills of exchange which the banker has discounted.5
When a banker discounts a bill he buys it from his customer and the bill becomes
his property. Being his own property, he cannot have a lien over it.1b Professor
Grctton takes matters further by arguing that all holders of negotiable instruments
arc the owners thereof and thus cannot have a lien upon them.7 This approach seems
to lack support in the relevant authorities.8
The fact that negotiable instruments arc negotiable means that the banker may have
a valid lien over them even where his customer had no right to deposit them, for
example if they were stolen.9 In such circumstances the validity of the lien depends
on the banker being in good faith and giving value.10 Thus where a stockbroker had
pledged securities belonging to his clients to bankers who admitted that they did not
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believe that the securities were the stockbroker's, it was held that the bankers could
not assert a lien over the securities in respect of the general balance owed by the
stockbroker." Nevertheless, it was also held that the bankers were entitled to
assume that the stockbroker's clients had authorised the pledge. Therefore, the
securities could be retained until the specific advances for which they were pledged
were repaid.
1. Bell. Commentaries, 11.113: Bell, Principles, s 1451: Hume, Lectures, 111,56; Gloag and Irvine,
p 372; Shaw, pp 65-66; Wallace and McNeil, p 21; L D Crerar. The Law of Banking in Scotland.
(1997), p 107.
2. Gloag and Irvine, ibid, citing Lord Campbell in Brandao v Barnett (1846) 12 CI & Fin 7S7. at
809; 8 ER 1622. at 1631.
3. See the authorities cited in note 1.
4. Gloag and Irvine, p 372; Crerar, p 107; Ellinger and Lomnicka, pp 577-578: Paget, pp 524-
525; Re United Service Co, Johnstone's Claim (1870) LR 6 Ch App 212: Misa v Carrie (1876) 1
App Cas 554; Re Bowes, Earl ofStrathmorc v Vane (1886) 33 Ch D 586.
5. Gloag and Irvine, p 373; Shaw, pp 64-65.
6. Ibid.
7. G L Gretton, "The Concept of Security" in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany.
(1987), p 126, at p 144.
8. For example, Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank of Scotland (1890) 18 R 20, the court had no
difficulty with a lien in respect of bearer bonds. Sec too Clydesdale Bank v Liquidators of James
Allan Senior and Son 1926 SC 235, where it was held that bills endorsed and delivered to a bank for
the purpose of collection remained the property of the company. And sec Shaw, p 69, where it is
said that the customer may transfer the subjects over which the lien exists.
9. Gloag and Irvine, p 379: Shaw, pp 61 -62.
10. Ibid: Farrcr & Rooth v North British Banking Co (1850) 12 D 1190; London Joint Stock
Bank v Simmons [1892] AC 201. The normal rule, that the lien-holder must have custody given to
him by the owner of the property or someone authorised by him docs not apply here. For the normal
rule, sec above, paras 188-192.
11. National Bank v Dickie's Trs (1895) 22 R 740.
248. Exclusion of lien. In certain circumstances the banker's lien will not arise.
Where securities have been accepted for safekeeping by the banker as a depositary,
he has no general lien over them.1 The same holds if the securities come into the
bankers hands by mistake.2 The terms of a receipt issued by a banker will be
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important, although not conclusive evidence as to the capacity in which lie holds the
securities.3 In the case of Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank of Scotland,'1 bearer bonds
had been deposited with the bank which issued a receipt stating "We hold for safe
keeping on your account, and subject to your order." This receipt pointed to the
bank acting as a depositary. However, it was established that the bank had regularly
made advances on the security of the bonds. Given this, the court took the view that
the securities had been received in the ordinary course of business and that the bank
consequently had a general lien over them.
The lien will also not attach to securities which have been specifically appropriated,
in other words sent to the banker for a particular purpose.3 The onus of proof that
there has been such an appropriation rests with the customer.6 There are certain
clear eases of appropriation. For example, where a bill is handed over to meet a
specific debt, the banker must follow the customer's iutructions and so apply it.
Similarly, where bills have been sent for discount, the banker cannot refuse to do
this while at the same time purporting to exercise a lien over them.'3
1. Gloag and Irvine, p 375; Shaw, p 62; Wallace and McNeil, p 22; Crerar. p 107; Brandao v
BarnetG 1846) 12 CI & Fin 787; 8 ER 1622: Lcese v Martin (1873) LR 17 Eq 224.
2. Lucas v Dorrien (1817) 7 Taunt 278; 129 ER 112.
3. Gloag and Irvine, p 376.
4.(1890) 18 R 12.
5. Bell. Commentaries. 11,114: Bell. Principles, s 1451; Gloag and Irvine, p 377; Shaw, p 63:
Wallace and McNeil, p 22.
6. Shaw, p 63; D J Cusine, SME, vol 2. para 1201: Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank of Scotland (1890)
18 R 12.
7. Allan v Allan & Co (1831) 9 S 519.
8. Matheson v Anderson (1822) 1 S 486; Haig v Buchanan ( 1823) 2 S 412; Borthwick v Brcmncr
(1833) 11 S 716 ef Glen v National Bank (1849) 12 D 353.
249. Enforcement. The banker's lien is a real right, enforceable against creditors
and singular successors.1 It is generally accepted that in Scotland, a banker has no
right to sell the subjects of his lien in order to meet the debt owed to him.2 Where,
however, the date of payment for the bills has become due, the banker if he is the
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holder of the instrument, will be entitled to obtain payment. He then will put the
proceeds towards the discharge of the customer's debt.3 In the case of an unindorsed
order bill he will of course be unable to do this.4 In England, the banker's general
lien differs from most liens recognised there, in that there is an implied right of
sale.5
1. Robertson's Tr v Royal Bank of Scotland (1890) 18 R 12 (sequestration); Clydesdale Bank v
Liquidator of James Allan Senior Son Ltd 1926 SC 235 (liquidation); Shaw, p 69 (singular
successor).
2. Gloag and Irvine, p 380: Wallace and McScil, p 23; Crerar. p 108; Robertson's Tr v Royal
Bank ot Scotland (1890) 18 R 12. Shaw, at p 70, however, regards it as an "open question",
pointing out that in transactions between stockbrokers and bankers a right to realise may be implied.
3. Gloag and Irvine, pp 380-381; Shaw, p 70.
4. Not being the holder. Sec Bell, Commentaries. 11,23.
5. Paget, p 523: Ellinger and Lomnicka. p 576; Rosenberg v International Banking Corporation
(1923) 14 LI LR 344, 347.
15. BROKER'S LIEN
250. Introduction. A broker is entitled at common law to a general lien over the
property of his principal.1 Brokers arc essentially agents employed to transact a
certain piece of business. They may therefore be contrasted with factors who arc
given a more general authority by their principals in order to manage their business
affairs.2 In some eases the distinction between factor and broker may be rather
blurred,3 but as both arc entitled to general liens this is not perhaps a matter of great
significance in terms of present purposes.
1. Bell. Commentaries, 11,112 and 115; Bell. Principles, s 1452; H Goudy, Treatise on
Bankruptcy, (4th ed, 1914), p 548.
2. Gloag and Irvine, p 395.
3. Particularly in the ease of stockbrokers who are considered to be factors : Glendinning v Mope &
Co 1911 SC (HL.) 73.
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251. Basis of the lien. The earliest ease relevant here is that of Leslie and Thomson
v Linn, decided in 1783.1 There, it was argued by the pursuers that an insurance
broker was considered in law to be a factor and thus had the right to retain the
insurance policy until paid. The defender countered, arguing that such an individual
"acting in his proper sphere, is not a factor".2 The Lord Ordinary found in his favour,
but on appeal this decision was reversed. It is not clear whether the court on appeal
accepted that the broker was a factor, or whether its decision was based on the
particular facts of the ease.3 It may be noted that English law had recognised a
general lien in favour of a policy broker by the late eighteenth century and English
authority was cited by the pursuers.4
Bell recognised a distinct general lien in favour of brokers merely in the context of
policy brokers.5 For a statement of the law in relation to brokers in general,
reference must be made to part of his treatment of the factor's lien :
"A broker is considered as a factor, and has a general lien on any property that
is in his hands in the course of that employment, for the advances,
engagements, and charges on account of his principal.
See afterwards, Of Insurance Brokers, separately."6
Bell therefore appears to view brokers as a sub-category of factors. This approach
finds support in Leslie and Linn, and also in an important twentieth century ease,
where stockbrokers were considered to be factors and therefore held entitled to the
factor's general lien.7 On the other hand, the law is clear that a broker receiving
property in that capacity has no right to retain the property in respect of debts due to
him when he acted as a factor.6 Given this, it is felt that it is inappropriate to view a
broker as simply being a factor. A better approach is to regard both factors and
brokers as agents. Both may be regarded as having general liens because of their
agency .8
1. Leslie and Thomson v Linn (1783) Mor 2627.
2. Ibid, at 2628.
3. In particular, the insurance had been effected in the name of the broker.
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4. The authority cited was Godin v London Assurance Company (1758) Burr 489; 97 ER 419. See
also Harding v Carter (1781) 1 Park's Marine Insurances (8th ed) 4 and the cases noted in Bell,
Commentaries, 11,116.
5. Bell, Commentaries, 11.115: Bell, Principles, s 1452. The same approach is taken by Hume :
Lectures, 111.56.
6. Bell, Commentaries, II. 112.
7. Glendinning v Hope & Co 1911 SC (HL) 73.
8. See above, para 240.
252. Stockbrokers. It is now settled law that stockbrokers have a general lien in
respect of any documents belonging to their customer which they hold.' The point
was decided in English law at an earlier stage and Gloag and Irvine correctly
anticipated that the same rule would be held to apply north of the border.2 As has
been stated in the previous paragraph, the lien arises out of the contract of agency
between stockbroker and client.
1. Glendinning v Hope & Co 1911 SC (HL) 73. See Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 491; A J
Sim, SME, vol 20, para 87.
2. Jones v Peppercorne (1858) 28 LJ Ch 155; Gloag and Irvine, p 396. See also In re London and
Globe Finance Corporation [ 1902] 2 Ch 416.
253. Insurance brokers. Most of the authority in relation to the broker's lien relates
to insurance brokers and marine insurance brokers at that.1 Goudy seems to limit the
lien to cases involving marine insurance,2 but as Gloag and Irvine point out there
seems no ground why there should be such a limitation.3 Certainly there is nothing
written by Bell to support it.4 Indeed, Hume writes that policies may be detained
"against the ship owners or other persons assured".3
An insurance broker has a lien over any policy which he has effected, which enables
him to retain it until the balance due to him by the insured is paid.6 With specific
regard to marine insurance policies, the lien has been placed on a statutory footing.
If the policy is paid out by the underwriter, the lien becomes transferred into a right
of retention in respect of that sum.8 It may also be noted here that the underwriter
himself has a right of retention in respect of the policy until the premium is paid." If
the underwriter becomes insolvent neither the insured nor the broker may retain the
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premiums nor use them in a second insurance to secure against the effect of the
insolvency.10
The lien naturally depends on the broker having the policy in his hands." If of
course the broker has effected the insurance in his own name, the issue of the
policy's location becomes irrelevant, as it is the broker who is entitled to be paid.12
In the situation where the policy is effected by a sub-broker and thereafter its
proceeds arc paid out to him, the principal broker has a preference in respect of them
as against the principal and his creditors.13
Where the person dealing with the broker is merely an agent the broker's lien will
nonetheless secure the general balance owed by that party to him, provided the
agency has not been disclosed.14 If, however, the broker is aware of the agency or
ought in the circumstances to have been so aware his lien, in a question with the
principal, will not secure the general balance owed by the agent. In that case it will
only cover the premiums due under the particular policy.13 It has been held in
England that where the broker lost possession of the policy and then later regains it,
but before that becomes aware that the person dealing with him is in fact only an
agent, he has then only a lien in respect of the sum due under that policy."1
Normally, the recovery of possession would restore the broker's general lien.1'
1. For example, Leslie and Thomson v Linn (1783) Mor 2627; Ross's Assignee v Galloway
(1806) Mor App sv "Perieulum". No 1 and Scott and Clifford v The Sea Insurance Co Jan 22, 1825
FC.
2. H Goudy, Treatise on Bankruptcy. (4th cd, 1914), p 548.
3. Gloag and Irvine, p 396. As regards the position in English law, E R Hardy Ivamy, General
Principles of Insurance Law. (5th ed, 1986), p 513, observes : "It does not appear to have been
decided whether a general lien exists in other branches of insurance; presumably, such a lien may be
implied from the course of business or from usage."
4. Bell. Commentaries, 11,115-117; Bell. Principles, s 1452.
5. Hume, Lectures, 111,56.
6. Bell and Hume, above; Gloag and Ir\'ine. p 396. For an account of the relevant (and very similar)
English law, see Halshury, vol 25, paras 93-94.
7. Marine Insurance Act 1906 (c 41), s 53(2).
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8. Gloag and Irvine, p 396. The broker may. however, require a special power to recover from the
underwriter: sec Bell, Commentaries. II.115 and Goudy. above, n 2.
9. Scott and Gifford v The Sea Insurance Co 22 Jan 1825, FC.
10. Bell. Commentaries. II.116: Bell. Principles, s 1452; Selkrig v Pitcairn & Scott (1805) VIor App
sv "Insurance" No 10.
11. Gloag and Irvine, p 396; Goudy, above, n 2.
12. Leslie and Thomson v Linn (1783) Mor 2627.
13. Ross's Assignee v Galloway (1806) Mor App sv "Periculum". No 1.
14. Bell. Commentaries. 11.116-117: Bell. Principles, s 1452: Gloag and Irvine, p 397: Goudy.
above, n 2.
15. Ibid- Losh. Wilson & Bell v Douglas & Co (1857) 20 D 58. See also the English decision of
Fisher v Smith (1878) 4 App Cas 1.
16. Near East Relief v King. Chasseur & Co Ltd [1930] 2 KB 40, at 44 per Wright J.
17. Levy v Barnard (1818) 8 Taunt 149; 129 ER 340.
16. FACTOR'S LIEN
254. Introduction. The factor's lien is one of the two most important general liens
recognised at common law.1 It has been recognised by the law in order that factors
may willingly offer credit, knowing that the property of their principal which is in
their hands will act as security.2 Over the years, the courts have extended the
number of individuals who arc entitled to exercise this lien, thus magnifying the
importance of the right in commercial terms.3 The factor's lien is also recognised in
other jurisdictions, for example by English,4 German,3 and Roman-Dutch law.11
1. The other being the solicitor's lien. Sec below, paras 265-271.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,109: Bell, Principles, s 1445; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. para
490.
3. See below, para 257.
4. Halsbury, vol 28, para 526: Kruger v Wilcox (1775) Amb 252; 27 ER 168; Drinkwater v
Goodwin (1775) 1 Cowp 251: 98 ER 1070.
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5. HGB s 397: E J Colin, Manual of German Law. vol 2. (1971), paras 7.116 and 7.139. This is a
special rather than a general lien.
6. Voct. 16.2.20: Willed Law of Pledge and Mortgage in South Africa. (3rd ed. ed T J Scott and S
Scott, 1987), p 95. This is a special debtor-creditor lien.
255. Historical background. The factor's lien may be traced back to the
seventeenth century, arising initially in respect of factors appointed to look after
landed estates. In Chalmers v Bassily,' decided in the same year as the Great Fire of
London, it was held that a factory was revocable, but with "the factor being always
refunded of what he profitably expended upon consideration thereof, before he quit
possession".2 It was clear as early as 1735 that the lien applied to any type of
property which the factor was holding.3 Erskinc noted the factor's right and further,
that it extended to a right to retain debts from the principal :
"Thus a factor may . . . retain his balance, not only till he recover payment of
his expenses . . . but also till he be relieved of the separate engagements he
hath entered into on his constituent's account, which retention will be effectual
against all diligences that may be used by the constituent's creditors".4
Bell was the first writer to give a comprehensive account of the factor's right to
retain his principal's property, also being the first to refer to it as a lien and a general
lien at that.5 He made much use of the English law on the matter, in particular the
landmark case of Kruger v Wilcox,6 Heavy reliance has been placed upon Bell's
statement of the law in subsequent years.7 The period beginning with Bell may
simply be regarded as the modern law.
1.(1666) Mor 9137.
2. Ibid. See also Pearson v Murray (1672) Mor 2625.
3. Stephens v Creditors of York Buildings Co (1735) Mor 9140.
4. Erskinc, III.4.21.
5. Bell, Commentaries, 11,109-112; Bell. Principles, ss 1445-1450.
6. (1775) Amb252.
7. See, for example, Gloag and Irvine, pp 363 370; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9. paras. 490-
494; A J Sim, SME, vol 20, paras 86-89.
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256. A general lien ? It has been settled since Bell introduced the term "general
lien" into Scots law that the factor's lien is such a lien.1 Nevertheless, it is suggested
that matter may not be as certain as it seems. If a person appoints a factor, he is
appointing an agent with wide ranging powers. Factors perform a wide range of
functions, such as buying or selling their principal's property or lending him money.
The factor's lien covers all debts arising in terms of these functions : this is why it is
said that the lien is general. However, it is surely arguable that all the debts arise
under the same contract : the contract of factory. The lien, if this view is taken, can
only be regarded as a special lien. This much seems to have been appreciated by
Bell who said of the factor's lien :
"This right might almost be ranked among the special liens, from the peculiar
nature of the contract of factory, as a right resulting out of the actio contraria
of the contract by which the principal engages to indemnify the factor."2
To take this view would mean that if a party employed a factor for some months one
year and then for some months two years later, property in the factor's hand in terms
of the second factory could not be retained in respect of debts due in respect of the
first.
At a wider level, however, it must be accepted that the factor's lien is capable of
being viewed as a general one. The reason for this is that it may be possible to
analyse the relationship between factor and principal as simply that : a relationship.
In that way the principal can be regarded as having a set of separate contracts with
the factor in respect of different tasks, but with all the debts being secured by a
general lien. Parallels may be drawn with the relationship between solicitor and
client.3 It must also be noted that the factor's lien since Bell wrote has been held
cxerciseable by individuals who arc not factors in the pure sense of the word and as
regards whom a contract of factory is not applicable.4 With respect to these
individuals, the factor's lien clearly operates as a general lien.As has been shown
elsewhere, the law has moved to recognising a general lien in favour of all types of
agent, a factor just being one example.6
1. Bell. Commentaries. 11.109: Bell. Principles, s 1445: Gloag and Irvine, p 363: A J Sim. SMH vol
20. para 86.
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2. Bell, Principles, s 1445.
3. Sec below, para 266.
4. See the following paragraph.
5. Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon (1881) 8 R 489; Glcndinninp v Hope & Co 1911 SC (HL) 73.
6. See above, para 240. See also the following paragraph.
257. The meaning of "factor". Originally, the factor's lien applied merely to land
stewards or mercantile agents.1 A mercantile agent is an individual employed as a
general agent to conduct the business affairs of a merchant in a particular place.- Me
is entitled to buy and sell goods on behalf of his principal and will often make
advances of money to him. The Factors Acts apply to the activities of such an
individual.3 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the courts began to widen
the definition of "factor" so that the lien could be conferred in favour of a wider
class of individuals. In Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon,4 a firm of auctioneers received
horses to sell on commission and kept them in their stables until they were sold.
They made advances to the owner using the animals as security. On his bankruptcy
they claimed a general lien for the balance due to them, arguing that they were
factors. By a majority, the Second Division held in their favour. Lord Justice-Clerk
Moncrciff stated :
"1 do not know what an auctioneer is if he be not a commercial agent. Goods
are sent to him that he may turn them into money by public sale, and he may,
if he chooses, advance money on the goods consigned to him."3
Lord Young, who took a very wide view as to where general liens arise, saw the lien
as arising as a matter of contract.6 Lord Craighill, however, dissented. He pointed
out that the auctioneers admitted that they were also livery stable keepers.
Consequently, he reasoned that the horses were held by the auctioneers in that
capacity and not as factors.7
Lord Craighill's dissent has some force, but with judicial opinion moving in favour
of defining "factor" more widely, little notice has been taken of it. In subsequent
cases, it has been readily accepted that auctioneers arc entitled to exercise a factor's
lien.8 Likewise, it is also accepted that stockbrokers may also exercise it. The matter
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was settled in the important ease of Glendinning v Hope and Co.9 In that ease the
Second Division refused to admit a general lien in favour of Edinburgh stockbrokers
as they were not satisfied it had been established by usage. The House of Lords
reversed this decision, noting the English authority in favour of recognising such a
lien.10 However, they also upheld the appeal on the grounds of fundamental
principle. Lord Kinnear stated the law of Scotland to be as follows :
"Every agent who is required to undertake liabilities or make payments for his
principal, and who in the course of his employment comes into possession of
property belonging to his principal over which he has power of control and
disposal, is entitled, in the first place, to be indemnified for the moneys he has
expended or the loss he has incurred, and, in the second place, to retain such
properties as come into his hands in his character of agent until his claim for
indemnity has been satisfied."11
This statement has been accepted as an accurate one.12 The law now confers a
general lien on any type of agent rather than just a factor.13
1. Erskine, III.4.21; Bell, Commentaries, 11,109-110; Bell, Principles, s 1445. However, Bell in his
Commentaries at II, 112 that a broker is regarded as a factor.
2. Gloag and Irvine, p 364.
3. Factors Act 1889 (c 45); Factors (Scotland) Act 1890 (c 40).
4. (1881) 8 R 489.
5. Ibid, at 491.
6. Ibid, at 492-493.
7. Ibid, at 494.
8. Crockart's Tr v Hay & Co Ltd 1913 SC 509; Mackenzie v Cormack 1950 SC 183.
9. 1911 SC (HL) 73 rev 1910 SC 209.
10. In particular, Jones v Peppcrcorne (1858) 28 LJ Ch 158 and In re London and Globe Finance
Corporation [1902] 2 Ch 316. See Lord Atkinson at 74-75 and Lord Shaw of Dunfermline at 82-83.
11. 1911 SC (HL) 73, at 78.
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12. See Crockhart's Tr v Hay & Co Ltd 1S) 13 SC 509, at 520 per Lord Salvcson; W M Gloag,
Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 491.
13. See above, para 240.
258. Sub-factors. A factor may in turn appoint a sub-factor.1 Such an individual is
entitled to retain goods entrusted to him in respect of specific advances made upon
them, if he was unaware of the existence of the principal when contracting with the
factor.2 Bell states that a sub-factor cannot claim a lien for a general balance which
will be enforceable against the principal, even where he did not know that there was
a principal.3 Gloag and Irvine arc sceptical about the authority of Bell's statement
and cite the English position where the matter turns upon whether the sub-factor
knew about the principal or not.4 It is submitted, however, that there is much to be
said for Bell's view. It coheres with two clear principles of Scots law : firstly, that
general liens arc only admitted exceptionally and secondly, individuals are generally
not entitled to create liens over property which is not their own."1
1. Bell, Commentaries, 1,518-519; Bell. Principles, s 1446; Gloag and Irvine, p 366; Gloag,
Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 491.
2. Ibid: Ede and Bond v Findlay, Duff& Co, 15 May 1818, FC.
3. Bell. Commentaries, 1,519; Bell, Principles, s 1446, relying upon McCall & Co v Black & Co
(1824) 2 Sh App 188.
4. Gloag and Irvine, p 366. The English authority is Mildred v Maspons (1883) 8 App Cas 874.
5. Sec above, paras 188-192.
259. Debts secured. In principle the lien covers ail debts arising out of the factorial
relationship.1 Thus it will secure the factor's salary;2 commission;3 expenses;4
advances made to the principal5 and any guarantees authorised by the principal, or
of which the principal is aware.6 It will not, however, cover debts assigned to the
factor by other creditors of the principal.7 Naturally, the lien will not secure debts
which arise in circumstances where the factor is acting in a non-factorial capacity.
Consequently, it will not cover the price of goods supplied by the factor to the
principal as an independent merchant.8 Likewise, where the factor also acts as a
broker, debts due to him as broker arc not secured by the factor's lien.4
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1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,112: Bell. Principles, s 1448: Gloag and Irvine, p 363; Gloag,
Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 490; A J Sim. SME, vol 20, para 86.
2. Bell, ibid: Stephens v Creditors of York Buildings Col 1735) Mor 9140.
3. Sibbald v Gibson (1852) 15 D 217.
4. Bell, above; Gloag and Irvine, above, citing the English case of Curtis v Barclay (1826) 5 B & C
141; 108 ER 52.
5. Bell, above; Gloag and Irvine, above, citing the English case of Foxcroft v Devonshire (1760) 2
Burr 931; 97 ER 638.
6. Bell, above: Gloag and Irvine, above, citing the English ease of Houghton v Mathews (1803) 3
B & P 485; 127 ER 263.
7. Pearson v Murray (1672) Mor 2625.
8. Miller & Paterson v McNairi 1852) 14 D 955.
9. McCall & Co v Black & Co (1824) 2 Sh App 188.
260. Property subject to the lien. The lien extends in general to all the property of
the principal which is in the hands of the factor.1 Thus it will attach to goods sent to
the principal, goods bought for the principal, bills, policies of insurance, and
shipping documents.2 There would seem to be no reason why the factor's lien should
not cover land, although the matter has not been considered in modem times.3 The
lien has been said to attach also to the incorporeal property of the principal held by
the factor.4 This is perhaps misleading. Whilst the factor may indeed retain such
property, for example sums owed to the principal, his right here is a right of
retention than a lien.3
A unique feature of the factor's lien is that it is regarded as giving him a right to the
price of goods sold by him on behalf of the principal and then delivered to the
purchaser, where the factor has taken the price payable to himself but where the
purchaser has not yet paid.6 This point was first established in the case of Stephens v
Creditors of York Building Co,1 decided in 1735. There the Court of Session held
that:
"If a factor sells his constituent's effects and takes the price payable to
himself, he will be preferable in a competition to his constituent, so long as he
has anything to claim by the actio contraria. And for the same reason, it was
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found, that he must be preferable to the constituent's creditors arresting the
price in the purchaser's hand."s
The report docs not disclose the court's reasoning. In England the same conclusion
was reached by Lord Mansfield and his colleagues in the bankruptcy ease of
Drinkwatcr v Goodwin,9 decided forty years later, in 1775. Bell was quick to point
out the obvious difficulty with these decisions, namely that lien is a security
universally considered to rest upon possession and that possession is absent here.10
In England this problem is apparently reasoned away on the ground that the factor's
right to recover the price is independent from that of the principal."
The juridical nature of the right was discussed by the court in Miller and Paterson v
McNair}2 Eor some reason, Stephens was not cited to the court, but Drinkwater was.
Lord Justice-Clerk Hope, a noted civilian when it came to matters involving
security, could not bring himself to recognise it as one of lien.13 That a factor with
regard to the price as yet received was not in the same position as one with the
possession of goods was a matter on which he could "entertain little doubt".14 Lord
Medwyn was less troubled about what the recognition of such a right would do to
established principles of Scots law. Lor his part, lie saw the right in respect of the
unpaid price as "an extension of [the factor's] lien, which partakes rather of
compensation, or . . . balancing of accounts in bankruptcy".13 Lords Cockbum and
Murray seemed prepared to recognise the right simply as lien.10 The case was in the
event decided on another point.17 However, in Mackenzie v Cormack,18 decided a
century later, Lord Patrick focused on the judgements other than that of Lord Hope,
as well as the writings of Bell, to state that it was long "settled"10 that the right was
one of lien.
With respect, the right is not a lien over the price. In the first place, as Bell noted,20
the price is not in the factor's hands. That objection is prima facie not fatal, for the
right could be rationalised as a case of Scots law embracing the doctrine of equitable
lien known in England.21 However, such a rationalisation would a false one. A lien
is a real right enforceable against the world. Against whom is the factor's right in
respect of the unpaid price enforceable ? It is enforceable only against the principal
and his creditors. The right against the buyer is purely personal. Were it to be
otherwise the whole law of sale of goods would be subverted. A seller who has
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handed over goods to a buyer is not a secured creditor for the price. Factors arc not
privileged over other sellers. The right in England is not categorised as one of
equitable lien, as it is not enforceable upon the buyer's insolvency.22
The right is in fact not a right in respect of the price, but a right in respect of the
right to be paid the price. The principal has a personal right to be paid by the buyer.
The factor has a subordinate real right over that personal right. Whether this
subordinate real right can be categorised as one of lien is open to question, because
a lien in respect of incorporeal property is considered generally to be impossible.
Certainly, it forms part of the factor's armoury against the principal with regard to
securing payment of his account. In certain circumstances, however, the factor will
be regarded as having waived the right. Thus, in the Miller case (above),23 the factor
after selling in his own name had declared his principal and consented to a bill for
the price being drawn in the principal's favour. This was held to amount to waiver,
even although the principal became bankrupt before the bill was sent.
1. Bell, Principles, s 1447; Gloag and Irvine, p 363.
2. Ibid: Stephens v Creditors of York Buildings Co (1735) Mor 9140; Miller and Patcrson v
McNairt 1852) 14 D 955; Gairdner v Milne & Co (1858) 20 D 565.
3. It may be remembered that the factor's lien first applied to land stewards: sec above, para 255.
4. A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 86.
5. Erskinc, 111.4.21; Stevenson. Lauder & Gilchrist v Macbrayne & Co (1896) 23 R 496. Scots
law generally does not admit subordinate real rights in respect of incorporeal moveables. See above,
paras 63 and 174.
6. Bell, Commentaries, 11,111; Bell. Principles, s 1447; Gloag and Irvine, pp 367-368.
7.(1735) Mor 9140.
8. Ibid.
9. (1775) 1 Cowp 251; 98 ER 1070.
10. Bell, Commentaries, 11,111.
11. Ibid.
12.(1852) 14 D 955.
13. Ibid, at 959-960.
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14. Ibid, at 960.
15. Ibid, at 963.
16. Ibid, at 966-967.
17. That is, that the lien had been waived. See later in this paragraph.
18. 1950 SC 183.
19. Ibid, at 196.
20. Bell, Commentaries, 11,111.
21. Halsbury. vol 28, paras 551-600.
22. Ibid, para 526.
23.(1852) 14 D 955.
261. The need for custody. The lien depends on the factor holding the property of
the principal.1 Lord Justice-Clerk Hope considered that the factor's lien was
confined to property over which the factor has actual possession.2 The view echoes
that of Bell.3 It has subsequently been accepted, however, that the lien will extend to
property which is in the hands of an agent for the factor, even although the factor
has never held the property himself.4 Thus civil possession through an agent appears
enough to establish the lien. Symbolical possession, however, will not suffice.3
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,110: Bell, Principles, s 1449; Gloag and Irvine, p 367.
2. Miller and Paterson v McNair (1852) 14 D 955. at p 959. He was also prepared to recognise a
lien where the actual possession had been given up, but where the lien was reserved by agreement.
3. Bell, Commentaries, II. 110.
4. Gairdner v Milne & Co (1858) 20 D 565. Sec Gloag and Irvine, p 367.
5. Gloag and Irvine, ibid.
263. The lien as a real right. The lien of the factor is a real right which will be
good in the case of the principal's insolvency and also against his creditors
executing diligence.1 It must be noted that where the factor has sold goods and the
buyer has paid the price to the principal, the factor is then not permitted to retain the
goods in security of the general balance owed to him by the principal.2 The case
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which decided the point reached the House of Lords, where the Lord Chancellor
noted that that the buyer had made payment:
"The price was therefore paid, and it was impossible to maintain that the
respondents had any lien on the goods. If the cause had been tried at
Guildhall, it could not have lasted a moment."3
This approach, although it amounts to a statement of English superiority, docs
nonetheless cohere with the general approach of Scots law in limiting the effect of
general liens upon third parties.4 On the other hand, the general lien of the factor has
been held to prevail over any right to retain of a buyer in respect of damages where
the goods are disconform to contract.-"'
1. Stephens v Creditors of York Buildings Co (1735) Mor 9140: Miller and Patcrson v McNair
(1852) 14 D 955.
2. Bell, Principles, s 1447; Gloag and Irvine, pp 369-370.
3. Stirling & Sons v Duncan (1823) 1 Sh App 389, at 393. See also Scott & Neil! v Smith & Co
(1883) 11 R 316.
4. See above, paras 238 and 243.
5. Scott & Ncill v Smith & Coil 883) 11 R 316.
263. Exclusion of the lien. The lien of the factor will be excluded in respect of any
goods sent to him, if they arc regarded as having been specifically appropriated.1
Thus where goods arc sent for the benefit of specific creditors the factor may not
exercise a lien for his general balance in respect of them.2 Clear evidence of the
specific appropriation will be required.3 It has been held in England that where bills
are drawn upon the factor bearing on their face a reference to a particular cargo, that
this is insufficient to amount to specific appropriation of the cargo to the payee of
the bills.4
The lien will also be excluded if the factor waives it.5 In this connection, it has been
held that the factor is not implied to have waived his lien over certain property,
simply because he has taken a bill from the principal in respect of the amount owed
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to him for the purchase of the same.*1
1. Bell. Commentaries. 11.110-111: Bell. Principles, s 144": Gloag and Irvine, pp 368-369: W M
Gloag, Encyclopaedia, veil 9. para 494.
2. Ibid.
3. Gloag and Irvine, p 368.
4. Brown, Shipley & Co v Kough [ 1894] 29 Ch D 848.
5. Gloag and Irvine, p 369; A J Sim, SME, vol 21). para 89. See also McDonald & Halkett v
McGrouthcr( 1821) 1 S 190.
6. Ibid: Gairdncr v Milne & Co (1858) 20 D 565.
264. Enforcement and extinction. The lien allows the factor to retain the property
until his balance is met. Additionally, as factors have a general power to sell goods
which they hold, they arc able to do so in order to recover the sums which they are
owed.1 In England it has been held that a factor cannot do this if the principal
objects.2
The lien, like all liens, may be extinguished in a number of ways. In particular, the
lien will be lost if the property leaves the factor's hands.3 If this happens, he is not
entitled to stop the goods in transitu in order to preserve it.4 However, if the factor
recovers custody of the goods fairly, the lien being a general lien will be restored.3
More accurately, it may be said that a new general lien is created.6
1. Bell, Principles, s 1450; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para 487.
2.Smart v Sanders (1848) 5 CB 895; 136 ER 1132.
3. Bell, Commentaries, 11,112; Bell, Principles, s 1449; Gloag and Irvine, p 367.
4. Bell, Commentaries, 11,89; Gloag and Irvine, p 369; W M Gloag, Encyclopaedia, vol 9, para
493. Except where he is held to be the consignor: Bell, Commentaries, II. 112.
5. Bell, Principles, s 1449.
6. Bell. Commentaries. 1,112.
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17. SOLICITOR'S LIEN
265. Introduction. A solicitor has a general lien over the papers of his client in
respect of his account.' This is a long established right, the scope of which has been
the subject of a very large body of case law, particularly in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Indeed there have been more court decisions on the solicitor's
lien - or law agent's lien as it is alternatively known - than on all the other general
liens put together. This case law has provided the basis for detailed treatments of the
subject by Bell,2 Hume,3 Begg,4 and Gloag and Irvine.-'1 Given that these treatments
arc for the most part a satisfactory account of the law and, further, that parts of the
case law deal with matters of little relevance today,6 the present study is not
intended to be a comprehensive one. Rather, focus will be placed on what is felt arc
areas of particular importance.
1. Bell. Commentaries, 11,107; Bell, Principles, s 1438; Hume, Lectures, 111,50; Begg. p 204:
Gloag and Irvine, p 384; J Graham Stewart, Diligence, (1898), p 174: Shaw, p 61: A J Sim, SME.
vol 20, para 94.
2. Bell, Commentaries, 11,107-109; Bell, Principles, ss 1438-1444.
3. Hume, Lectures, 111,50-54.
4. Begg, pp 204-229.
5. Gloag and Irvine, pp 384-395.
6. For example, whether a lien over title deeds can be enforced against subsequent heirs of entail. On
this matter, see Murray v Elihank (1829) 8 S 161 and Gloag and Irvine, p 391.
266. Basis of the lien. The history of the solicitor's lien has already been the
subject of some attention when the general history of lien was examined.1 It was
shown there how the right was originally known as the writer's hypothec, before the
terminology was changed, under the influence of Bell, to that of the law agent's
lien.2 It was also seen that the origins of the lien probably lie with the similar right
recognised by English law.3 The first case on the matter was decided in 1697.4 The
first writer to refer to it was Bankton.5
The precise basis of the lien is a matter which is subject to an interesting discussion
by Gloag and Irvine.6 They isolate a number of authorities which, contrary lo the
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orthodoxy, apparently take the view that the right is a special and not a general lien.
Important among these is Erskinc who saw the lien as arising because the law agent
has performed labour on the papers which he is entitled to retain.7 Two things,
however, may be said about this. Firstly, the law of lien in Erskine's time was in a
somewhat nascent state. Secondly, his precise wording is that there can be retention
until the agent's "bill of accounts be paid". That wording would seem to suggest a
general lien.
Statements from Lord Rutherfurd Clark and Lord Young do, however, indicate that
these judges perceived the lien as special and not general.8 As Gloag and Irvine
correctly point out, these views arc misplaced.4 The solicitor's lien has always been
understood to be an exceptional right, rather than one simply arising in terms of
mutual obligations under a specific contract. In 1749, the Court of Session described
it as "a creature of the Court introduced for the agent's security, who otherwise
would not undertake the affairs of a person of doubted circumstances."10 In 1791, in
the landmark case of Harper's Creditors v Fan Ids,11 the defenders, who successfully
argued that a general lien did not arise under every contract, accepted that the law
agent's right was an exception. They submitted :
"But had there been a general right of retention, there could have been no
occasion for introducing it in the particular case of agents."12
For his part, Bell stated that the lien had come into existence "partly by the force of
usage and partly by judicial creation".13 It is thus clear that the basis of the solicitor's
lien is not to be found in the general law of contract. Rather, the right has arisen in
terms of the specific role the solicitor plays in society and the importance that role is
recognised to have. The same may be said as regards the solicitor's lien in English
law, which is accepted to have been introduced by the courts.14 The fact that the
solicitor enjoys a unique and important right has been illustrated both north and
south of the border by the consistent refusal of the courts to confer it upon
individuals other than qualified law agents.15
1. See above, para 147.
2. See above, paras 147, 149 and 158-159.
330
3. See above, para 147.
4. Cuthbcrts v Ross (1697) 4 BS 374.
5. Bankton. 1.17.15.
6. Gloag and Irvine, pp 385-386.
7. Erskine, III.4.21.
8. Lord Rutherfurd Clark in Robertson v Ross (1887) 15 R 67, at 72; Lord Young in the same case
at 71.
9. Gloag and Irvine, p 386.
10. Creditors ofLidderdale v Nasmyth (1749) Mor 6248. at 6249.
11. (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440.
12. Ibid, at 457.
13. Bell. Commentaries, 11,107. Others place the emphasis on usage : Hume. Lectures, 111,50 and
Begg, p 204.
14. Sir William Holdsworth, History ofEnglish Law. vol 12, p 60.
15. Morrison v Fulwell's 7r(1901) 9 SLT 34; Findlay v Waddell 1910 SC 670; Macrae v Leith
1913 SC 901 (Scotland); Hollis v Claridgc (1813) 4 Taunt 807; 128 ER 549; Stcadman v Hockley
(1846) 15 M & W 553; 153 ER 969: Sanderson v Bell (1834) 2 Cr & VI 304; 149 ER 776;
(England).
267. Development of the lien. The relative strength of the solicitor's lien as a
mechanism to make the client pay his account has been diminished over the years. It
was a right which was at its most powerful at the end of the eighteenth century, in
the light of the important case of Hamilton of Provcnhall's Creditors.1 There it was
held that the lien could be enforced against a creditor with a prior constituted
heritable security. The report docs not disclose why the judges saw fit to ignore the
principle of prior tempore potior jure? The argument of the successful agent was
that solicitors could not be expected to search the records for prior securities before
they accepted business. This hardly seems sufficient ground for disregarding general
principle. Nevertheless, the decision was looked upon favourably in a couple of later
decisions in one of which the court observed "that the case was well decided". '
As the years progressed, opinion became increasingly hostile towards the rule
established in Provcnhall's Creditors. Bell "lamented" it, stating that the effect was
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"to extend the lien beyond its legitimate terms".4 He recalled Lord Justice-Clerk
Macquecn saying that it "made his hair stand on end".3 Lord President Dunedin said
that Provenhall's Creditors had been "followed and regretted since".16 Eventually, the
decision was reversed by the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1924, s 27. The power
of the lien was thereby reduced.
The potency of the lien has also been lessened by the Conveyancing and Feudal
Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, s 45 8 which provides that a sasine extract is
equivalent in law to a recorded deed. The vast majority of cases concerning the
solicitor's lien involve the solicitor retaining title deeds.4 It was common practice for
agents to leave notes in red ink reminding their staff not to release deeds to clients
until they paid their accounts.10 The effect of the 1970 Act is that such an exercise of
the lien can be circumvented by the client - or any other party wishing the deeds -
going to Register House and obtaining extracts.
With respect to the Land Register, extract land certificates may be obtained in the
same way as Sasinc deeds." However, it is the actual land certificate which is
required in order to apply to the Keeper for registration of an interest in land.12 Thus
the detention of the certificate by a solicitor exercising his lien prima facie will
cause the client problems. In practice, the client is unaffected. For, the Land
Registration (Scotland) Rules allow the Keeper to dispense with the obligation to
produce the certificate where there is "good cause" for the failure to produce it.13
The Keeper has recently stated that "good cause" includes the fact that the
certificate is held by a solicitor exercising his lien.14
It must be accepted that the dc facto removal of title deeds from the scope of the
solicitor's lien seriously reduces its utility. Nevertheless, there arc numerous other
documents which the solicitor may effectively retain, such as deposit receipts"3
wills;16 and papers kept in the clients file.17 The solicitor's lien is therefore still a
useful right today, notwithstanding the statutory provisions which have somewhat
negatived its power.
1. (1781) Mor 6253.
2. On which, see Gtoag and Irvine, pp 76-77: KGC Reid. SMC, vol 18. para 684.
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3. Campbell v Smith 1 Feb 1817, FC. Cf the opinion of the Lord Ordinary. Sec also Campbell &
Clason v Goldie (1822) 2 S 16.
4. Bell. Commentaries, 11.108.
5. Ibid, at 11,109.
6. Macrae v Leith 1913 SC 901, at 905. There had also been eritcism in Murray v Scott (1829) 8 S
161; CaJlender v Laidlaw (1834) 12 S 417; Kemp v Young (1838) 16 S 500 and Renny &
Webster v Myles (1841) 9 D 619. See Begg, p 222.
7. Conveyancing (Scotland) Act 1924, (c 27), s 27.
8. Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, (c 35), s 45.
9. This fact becomes readily apparent on reading any of the standard treatments of the lien, for
example, Gloag and Irvine, pp 384-395.
10. G L F Henry, "Solicitor's Lien", (1962) 3 The Conveyancing Review, 85.
11. Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 (c 33), s 6(5).
12. Land Registration (Scotland) Rules 1980 (SI 1980/1413), r 9(3).
13. Ibid, r 18(1).
14. J Urquhart, "Snippets from the Conveyancing Committee". (1997) 42 JLSS 193, 194.
12. Wight's Tr v Allan (1840) 3 D 243.
13. Paul vMeiklc (1868) 7 M 235.
14. Yau v Ogilvie & Co 1985 SLT 91; McCormack v James Finlay Corporation Ltd. 11 March
1986 (OH), unreported.
268. Debts secured. The lien secures in general the solicitor's entire business
account.1 There arc, however, a considerable number of debts not covered. It docs
not extend to a yearly salary offered by the client.2 In the case of an instructing
agent, it will not cover the account of an Edinburgh agent because the former docs
not incur liability for the latter's account.3 Equally, the lien will not secure the
account of an English agent, unless the instaicting solicitor has paid that account or
is liable to do so.4 In contrast, where the solicitor is employed to borrow money, the
lien will extend to the account of the lender's agent, if he has paid it.3
The lien does not secure cash advances made to the client,6 nor cautionary
obligations undertaken for his benefit.7 The same is true of duties paid for the
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client,8 or recognisances for the expenses of the opposing party in an appeal to the
House of Lords.9
1. Bell. Commentaries. 11,107; Bell. Principles, s 1438; Hume. Lectures. 111,50; Begg, pp 211-214;
Gloagand Irvine, pp 388-389; Menzies v Murdxh (1841) 4 D 257, per Lord Fullerton at 265.
2. Cuthberts v Ross (1697) 4 BS 374; York Buildings Co v Dalrymple (1738) Elchics
"Hypothec", No 9.
3. Larguc v Urquhart (1883) 10 R 1229; Law Agents Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c 63), s 21.
Previously, there was liability and the lien was good : Walker v Phin f 1831) 9 S 691.
4. Liquidator ofGrand Empire Theatres v Snodgrass 1932 SC (HL) 73.
5. Inglis & Weir v Renny (1825) 4 S 113.
6. Creditors of Lidderdale v Nasmyth (1749) Mor 6248: Moncrieff v Colvillc (1799) Bell.
Commentaries. 11,107; Christie v Ruxton (1862) 24 D 1182.
7. Grant's Representatives v Robertson (1801) Mor "Hypothec" App, No 1.
8. Skinner v Paterson (1823) 2 S 354.
9. Kemp v Young (1838) 16 S 500.
269. Custody by the agent. The lien depends on the solicitor having custody or
possession of his client's papers.1 These must have come into his hands lawfully in
his capacity as agent for the client.2 Thus there will be no effectual lien if the
solicitor has obtained the papers under false pretences.3 The same is true where he
has received them after his employment as law agent has terminated.4 It has been
held, however, that papers handed to an agent before he is employed arc subject to
his lien.3 This may be explained on the ground that at the moment the agency
commences the papers are deemed to be obtained by him as solicitor from the
previous capacity in which they were held. Where the client has been sequestrated,
the lien is only effectual with respect to papers received by the agent before the
client became apparently insolvent.6
As the lien is general the papers may be retained competently for debts which
became due before they were delivered to the solicitor.7 It is of course open to the
client to exclude or vary the extent of the lien by express contract.8 The lien will
generally be extinguished when the agent ceases to hold the papers9 Where he
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hands back some of them to the client, the rest remain subject to the lien for the
entire account.10 It has been held that where a solicitor gives the papers to another
solicitor on loan, the lien is not extinguished.11 This conflicts with the general
principle that lien is dependent on custody and has been criticised elsewhere.12 The
production of the client's papers in a process will not result in the lien being lost.13
1. Bell, Commentaries, 11,107; Bell, Principles, s 1438; Begg, pp 209-210; Gloag and Irvine, p
389; Tnwsc v Rigg (1904) 6 F 544.
2. Ibid, Largue v Urquhart (1883) 10 R 1229; National Bank of Scotland v White and Park 1909
SC 1308.
3. Kerr v Beck (1849) 11 D 510, per Lord Robertson at 514.
4. Renny & Webster v Myles (1847) 9 D 619.
5. Kerr v Beck (1849) 1 D 510.
6. Jackson v Fenwick's Tr{ 1899) 6 SLT 319.
7. Menzies v Murdixth (1841) 4 D 257 per Lord Fullerton at 265.
8. Bell, Commentaries, 11,109; Bell, Principles, s 1444.
9. Bell, Commentaries, 11,107; Bell, Principles, s 1440; Tawsc v Rigg (1904) 6 F 544.
10. Gray v Graham (1855) 18 D (HL) 52.
11. Renny v Rutherford (1840) 2 D 676; Rcnny v Kemp (1841) 3 D 1134.
12. See above, para 185.
13. Bell. Commentaries, 11,107; Finlay v Syme ( 1773) Mor 6250; Callman v Bell (1793) Mor
6255.
270. The lien as a real right. Bcgg discusses the solicitor's right in the following
terms :
"It is merely a general lien or right of retention, not amounting to a real right
either of hypothec or pledge."1
Hume had previously expressed a similar view.2 While it is readily agreed that the
solicitor's lien is neither a pledge nor a hypothec, it is in fact a real right effectual
against singular successors and creditors.3 Being a real right, the solicitor is not
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obliged to renounce it in favour of caution.4 That the lien is effective against
singular successors was established at a very early time, the court holding that
otherwise "it would in most cases be good for nothing".3 Thus, in a later case a
solicitor was entitled to withhold a mortis causa deed from a person who had
acquired right under it until the account due by the grantcr of the deed - his client -
was paid.*1
With regard to title deeds the solicitor cannot enforce his right against third parties
who have an interest therein which is not derived from his client.' Consequently, a
vassal's law agent may not refuse production to a superior;8 a solicitor for a
lifercnter may not withhold from the fiar;9 and a solicitor for a heritable creditor
cannot keep the deeds from the proprietor.1" The rule dees not impinge on the real
nature of the lien, for such individuals are not singular successors.
The solicitor's lien is effective against the client's creditors." Thus, for example, it
may be enforced against an adjudgcr.12 Where, however, the solicitor has acted for
both the borrower and lender in arranging a heritable security, he will be personally
barred from asserting his lien against the lender, unless he informed him that he
intended to exercise the right at the time the security was granted.13
1. Begg, p 205.
2. Hume, Lectures, 111,54.
3. On lien as a real right, see, above, paras 193-197. That the solicitor's lien prevails against creditors
and singular successors is pointed out by Begg himself at p 220. Sec also. Bell, Commentaries,
11,108; Bell, Principles, s 1442. Hume denies that the lien is effectual against creditors and singular
successors : Lectures, 111,54. This, however, may be put down to his distaste for the decision in
Provcnhall's Creditors, (discussed above) and his wish to show that it was wrong.
4. Ferguson & Stuart v Grant (1856) 18 D 536.
5. Creditors of Lidderdalc v Nasmyth (1749) Mor 6248, at 6249.
6. Paul v Meikle (1868) 7 M 235. Sec, however, the interpretation of the case of Begg, p 221.
7. Bell, Principles, s 1442; Begg. pp 223-224; Gloag and Irvine, p 391.
8. Earl ofSutherland v Coupar! 1738) Mor 6247; Stewart! 1742) Mor 6248.
9. Sheriff Guthrie in Bell. Principles, s 1442.
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10. Liquidator of Weir and Wilson Ltd v Tumhuli & Findlay 1911 SC 1006.
11. Bell, Commentaries. 11.108; Bell. Principles, s 1442; Bcgg, p 220; Gloag and Irvine, p 390.
12. Dalrymplc v Earl ofSelkirk (1751) Elehics "Hypothec", No 17.
13. Bell, Principles, s 1442; Wilson v Lumsdainc (1837) 15 S 1211; Allan v Sawers (1842) 4 D
1356; Paterson v Currie (1846) 8 D 1005; Gray v Graham (1855) 18 D (HL) 52; Drummond v
Muirhcad and Guthrie Smith (1900) 2 F 585.
271. Enforcement of the lien. The solicitor has no right to sell the subject matter of
his lien.1 The right helps him to recover his debt because the client or other party
wishing the documents is caused inconvenience as long as access cannot be gained
to them. The fact that the agent is asserting his lien docs not in itself stop his
account negatively prescribing.2
In the event of the client being sequestrated, or - in the case of a company - being
liquidated, the solicitor is required to deliver up the papers on the request of the
taistee-in-sequcstration or liquidator.3 Such delivery, however, is without prejudice
to any preference of the solicitor as lien-holder, provided he can show that but for it
he had a valid lien for his account.4 The preference which the solicitor gets is one
over the whole estate, after the expenses of the sequestration or liquidation have
been paid.3 It has never been settled, however, whether the solicitor like a floating
charge holder, is postponed to any preferred creditors.0
It would seem somewhat unfair that a solicitor holding a few papers can on
surrendering them be preferred in respect of his whole account theoretically running
into thousands of pounds. The rule, however, dates back to the eighteenth century
and has never seriously been questioned.7 It is of course the right of the court to
interfere in any case where it feels that a lien is being exercised inequitably.'3
1. Ferguson & Stuart v Grant (1856) 18 D 536 per Lord Curriehill at 538.
2. Bell. Commentaries, 11,108; Foggo's Exrs v McAdam (1780) Mor 6252.
3. Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 (c 66), s 38(4); Insolvency (Scotland) Rules 1986. SI 1986/1915,
r 4.22(4).
4. Ihid: Rorie v Stevenson 1908 SC 559; Garden Haig-Scott and Wallace v Stevenson's Tr 1962
SC 51.
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5. Paul v Mathic (1826) 4 S 420: Skinner v Henderson (1865) 3 M 867; Rorie v Stevenson 1908
SC 559; Train & Mclntyrc Ltd v Forbes 1925 SLT 286; Miln's Judicial Factor v Spcnce's Trs
1927 SLT 425.
6. A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 99.
7. Bell, Commentaries, 11,108; Hume, Lectures, 111,52; Newland's Creditors v Mackenzie (1793)
Mor 6254; Hotchkis v Thomson (1794) .Vlor 6256; Jamicson v Mcintosh (1810), unreported;
Watson & McNaught v Crawford's Tr (1817), unreported; Paul v Mathie (1826) 4 S 424; Skinner
v Henderson (1865) 3 M 867.
8. Ferguson & Stuart v Grant (1856) 18 D 536; Mcintosh v Chalmers (1883) 11 R 8.
18. CONCLUSIONS ON LIEN
272. Comparative comments. Making comparisons between Scots law and the law
of other jurisdictions is a harder task as regards lien than it was with pledge. The law
varies greatly from system to system and it is not possible in this thesis to carry out
a detailed comparison.1 A good example of the variance is the matter of the extent to
which lien is regarded as a real right in different countries.2
Broadly, it may be stated that our law of special lien is civilian whereas our law of
general lien has a common law basis. Special lien can be traced back to the cxccptio
doli and cxceptio non adimplcti contractus of Roman law.3 The laws of France,4
Germany,5 Quebec,6 South Africa7 and Spain8 upon lien all show clear evidence of
Roman influence. The law of general lien is very similar to that found in England."
It is clear that Bell borrowed much from south of the border on this subject.10 The
division our law makes between special and general liens is one which was not
recognised before Bell's writings.11 Further, it is difficult to find evidence of general
lien in other civilian jurisdictions.
What perhaps is the most important point is that it is possible to find evidence of
lien in some shape or form in most legal systems. The core idea of the right to retain
the possession of a piece of property until a debt relating to that property is
discharged is in many ways as natural as the pledge idea of handing property over
expressly in order to secure a debt.
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1. Useful material is contained in J G Sauveplanne (ed), Security over Corporeal Movables, (1974)
and M G Dickson, W Rosener and P VI Storm (cds). Security on Movable Property and
Receivables in Europe (1988).
2. See above, para 198.
3. See above, paras 120-128 and 204.
4. See M Planiol, Civil Law Treatise, vol 2, (1959), ss 2520-2524.
5. See for example, BGB, art 273. For its relation to the exceptio non adimplcti contractus, sec G H
Treitcl. Remedies for Breach ofContract, (1988), pp 313-316.
6. See Civil Code of Quebec, art 1592 (right of retention).
7. See T J Scott, LA WSA, vol 15, paras 98-136.
8. See, for example, Spanish Civil Code, art 1780 (depositary's lien).
9. See above, paras 236-243.
10. See above, paras 158-159 and 239.
11. Ibid.
273. The state of Scots law. Like pledge, lien is in a rather undeveloped state in
Scots law.1 There has been very little fundamental analysis of the subject since Bell,
whose treatment of the law has come to be regarded as the unquestioned orthodoxy.2
In many ways the set of rules in this area have never been fully understood and
rationalised, with many being concerned that the law had been imported from
England.3
At the present time lien is generally seen as a concept which is part of the law of
contract and concerns only corporeal moveables. The argument of this thesis is that
with regard to special lien such an understanding of the law is a very partial one. It
would seem to be clear that special lien is a doctrine of the law of obligations and is
a right which may be competently exercised in respect of land.4 Another matter
which also has been subject to little analysis is the question of whether lien is a real
right. The view taken here is that it is and that lien is as much part of the law of
property as part of the law of obligations.5 A further argument of this thesis is that
lien may be capable of arising out of mere custody on the part of the creditor. It has
always previously been accepted that lien is dependent on possession.'1
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In conclusion, it would seem that lien is an area of our private law where there is
great potential for development. It is hoped that this thesis may be of some
assistance in this matter.
1. On pledge, see above, para 115. On lien, see G L Gretton, "The Concept of Security", in D J
Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany, (1987), p 126, at pp 144-145.
2. See, for example. Lord President Emslie in Bermans and Nathans Ltd v Weihye 1983 SLT 299.
302.
3. See for example, Grctton, above, n I; Lord Ivory in Hamilton v Western Bank (1856) 19 D 152,
at 160 and Lord Justice-Clerk Hope in Melrose v Hastie (1851) 13 D 880 at 888.
4. See above, paras 168-171 and 175.
5. See above, paras 193-197.
6. See above, paras 177-183.
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PART 4 : PLEDGE AND LIEN COMPARED
274. Introduction. The true nature of the distinction between pledge and lien is a
matter which has been the subject of little analysis in Scots law. In England the
general approach has been to say that the two rights arc distinct because a pledgee
has an automatic power of sale, whereas a lien-holder does not.1 Further, English
law regards a pledgee, but not a lien-holder, as having an assignable interest in the
subjects of his security.2 These two distinctions unfortunately do not take us very far
in Scotland, for the Scots pledgee has neither an implied right to sell nor to assign.1
Moreover, to decide whether the security holder has these rights in England, one is
still left with the preliminary question of whether he has a pledge rather than a lien.
It is possible to find some authorities relevant to the matter in Scotland. Bell states
in his Commentaries that "retention operates as a pledge constituted by tacit or
implied consent".4 Later on in the same work, he notes that "a general lien, by
express agreement, is in the nature of a pledge".5 Lord Young, in a well known
statement, opined that a lien is a "contract of pledge collateral to another contract of
which it is an incident".6 Gloag and Irvine, for their part, write that "it is not easy,
and may not in all cases be possible, to distinguish"7 pledge and lien. They regard an
express general lien as being "practically a pledge under a different namc".s With
respect to special lien, they say that where property is subject to such a right it is
"pledged for the debt, and the possessor has the rights of a pledgee".4 Such an
approach coheres with much of the case law on lien, where pledge terminology is
never far away.10
While a considerable body of authority clearly equates lien broadly with pledge, the
point may be repeated that very little analysis has ever been carried out. Gow, for
example, states that a "[ljien is a legal pledge".11 He docs not justify the statement.
Part of the problem here is that the word "pledge" can be used in a number of
different ways.12 Now, if it is used in the sense of a general term for a security, like
Bankton used it,13 there can be no doubt that a lien is a type of pledge. If a narrower
definition is taken, that "pledge" means an express security over moveables,14 then
naturally liens arising by operation of law must be regarded as implied pledges and
express liens simply as pledges per sc.
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This thesis (and most modern authority) has adopted a still more restrictive
definition of pledge, viewing it as the real right in security constituted over
moveable property by the transfer of possession of the property by pledger to
pledgee pursuant to an agreement between them that the property is to be used as
security.13 If such a definition is accepted, then it is submitted that pledge may be
distinguished from lien in Scots law in a number of ways which will now be
considered. After this, the particular distinctions between special lien and pledge,
and general lien and pledge, will be identified.
1. ,4 P Bell, pp 136-137; M G Bridge, Personal Property Law. (2nd cd, 1996). p 147; Crossley-
Vaines. Personal Property, (5th cd, 1973), pp 137 and 459; Ex p Hubbard (1886) 17 QBD 699;
The Odessa [ 1916] 1 AC 145, at 159 per Lord Mersey.
2. A P Bell, ibid: Bridge, ibid: Halsbury, vol 28. para 513; Donald v Suckling (1866) LR ! QB
585.
3. See above, paras 105 and 53.
4. Bell, Commentaries, 11,87.
5. Ibid, 11,102.
6. Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon (1881) 8 R 489. at 492.
7. Gloag and Irvine, pp 201-202.
8. Ibid, p 209.
9. Ibid.
10. For example, Renny v Kemp (1841) 3 D 1134 and Christie v Ruxton (1862) 24 D 1182.
11. J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland, (1964), p 292. In Germany, real liens
such as that of the carrier and the factor are treated as statutory pledges (gesctzlichc Pfandrechten).
See E J Cohn, Manual ofGerman Law, vol 2, paras 7.114-7.122.
12. See above, para 7.
13. Bankton, 1.17. See also, Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, (1978, ed R L Meek, D D
Raphael and P G Stein), pp 78-81.
14. See, for example, D M Walker, Principles ofScottish Private Law, (4th ed), pp 394-396.
15. Sec above, para 5.
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275. Relation of the debt to the security subjects. The key difference between
pledge and lien concerns the property which is the subject of the security. With lien,
it is inextricably linked witli the debt being secured.1 For example, the subject of a
repairer's lien is the thing which has been repaired, with the lien securing the repair
bill. Likewise, the subjects of a solicitor's lien arc the papers which the solicitor has
worked with as a solicitor, the lien securing his account. And similarly the property
which a bona fide possessor retains is the property which he has improved, the
improvements being that for which he seeks recompense. The law is clear that a lien
cannot be exercised in respect of debts which are extrinsic to the property or the
capacity in which it is being held.2
With pledge, any debt or obligation ad factum pracstandum decided upon by debtor
and creditor may be secured.3 Thus the subject of the pledge need have no
connection whatsoever to the secured obligation. For example, a gold bracelet can
be pledged in security of debt due to a milkman. Thus the only reason why the
property is in the pledgee's hands is for security. This contrasts with lien where the
property is handed over for another reason, for example, for work to be performed
and then the property is retained in security of the workman's bill, in the words of
Sim :
"[T]he basis of a lien is usually a collateral or ancillary condition implied by
law in a contract whose main preoccupation will be something other than the
creation of security."4
1. On this point, see Jowitt. Dictionary ofEnglish Law, sv "Lien".
2. See above, paras 246, 259, 268 and for example, Cuthherts v Ross (1697) 4 BS 374; MeCall &
Co v Black & Co (1824) 2 Sh App 188 and Largue v Urquhart (1883) 10 R 1229.
3. See above, para 51. On this as a distinction between pledge and lien, see also R Slovenko, "Of
Pledge", (1958) 33 Tul LR 59,60.
4. A J Sim, SME, vol 20, para 67.
276. The exigibility of the debt. Pledge may equally secure a term loan as a loan
which is payable on demand. Hence, a piece of property may be handed over in
order to secure the payment of a debt which is to be discharged in ten years time.
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With lien, the debt secured is due immediately. This much seems to be accepted in a
number of jurisdictions.1 With lien, the creditor is trying to speed up payment by the
debtor by inconveniencing him through the detention of his property.2 This contrasts
with pledge where he is prepared to give the debtor a period of time to perform his
obligation, because the debtor has provided security.
1. A P Bell, p 136; 1 Lawrence, Textbook on Commercial Law. (1992), p 319 (England); BGB, art
273 (Germany); Civil Code of Quebec, art 1592.
2. See above, para 163.
277. Pledge restricted to moveable property. It is only possible to pledge
moveable property, more precisely corporeal moveables and negotiable
instruments.1 Whilst it is equally competent to have a lien over such property, it
would also seem possible to exercise a lien in respect of land. There is case law and
institutional authority giving a bona fide possessor the right to retain land until he
receives recompense for improvements which lie has made.2 Professor McBrydc
sees no reason why there can be a lien over land arising under contract and the
present writer agrees with him, although for different reasons.2 On the other hand, a
pledge of land is clearly incompetent.4
1. See above, paras 60-66.
2. In particular. Binning v Brotherstoncs (1676) Mor 13401 and Bankton, 11.9.68. See above, para
175.
3. W W McBryde, Contract, (1987), pp 315-316. See above, para 175.
4. Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 (c 35), s 9(3). See above, para 66.
278. Pledgee has possession. Scots law following Roman law holds that in order
for the creditor to have a valid real right of pledge, he must be in possession of the
property in question.1 It would seem in contrast that a lien may arise where the
creditor has mere custody of the property.2 Carriers, repairers and storekeepers arc
very good examples. They have mere custody but arc entitled to liens.3 Other cases
also come to mind, such as solicitors who have a general lien over title deeds and
other papers in their custody. In some cases a lien will require possession on the part
of the creditor : the key example is the bona fide possessor's lien.4 There is also a
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very stateable argument that once an individual, say a carrier, becomes entitled to a
lien, by performing his duties, he then possesses the property as he is then holding
the property for his own benefit.3 The acceptance of this argument, however, does
not alter the fact that the lien arises in a situation where the creditor has custody of
the property, in contrast to pledge where he is put directly into possession of the
thing.
1. See above, para 101.
2. See above, paras 177-183.
3. Stevenson v Likly (1824) 3 S 291; Camtyne Motors v Curran 1958 SLT (Sh Ct) 6; Laurie v
Denny's Tr( 1853) 15 D 404.
4. See above, para 179.
5. See above, para 180.
279. Pledge and special lien. A special lien arises by operation of law where
certain criteria are satisfied.1 These have been discussed fully elsewhere.2 For the
sake of convenience it may be stated that such a lien will arise where one party
holds the property of another and has a duty to return it but also a counterclaim
connected to it. No agreement between the parties, express or implied, is required to
bring the lien into existence. In contrast, pledge must be founded upon a contract of
pledge, the basis of which is consensus between the pledger and pledgee that the
property in question will be pledged.3
Special lien can definitively be said not to be a "contract of pledge collateral to
another contract of which it is an incident".4 It is a right which arises automatically
in the circumstances set out above.5 It is no more a contract than the right of
compensation or set-off.6
1. It is of course possible to state in a contract that an individual, for example an unpaid seller, has a
special lien. However, such a provision is merely declaratory.
2. See above, paras 168 and 204-210.
3. Sec above, paras 83-85.
4. Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon (1881) 8 R 489, at 492 per Lord Young. See above, para 274.
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5. See too the position in Louisiana where a lien arises by operation of law depending on the nature
of the debt, whereas pledge is contractual : R Slovcnko, "Of Pledge", (1958) 33 Tul LR 59, 60.
6. See Stair, 1.18.6-7, which treats compensation and retention back-to-back. Note also the
discussion in Harper's Creditors v Faulds (1791) Bell's Octavo Cases 440.
280. Pledge and general lien. As has been seen elsewhere, general lien arises
either by implied or express contract.1 More precisely they are created by express or
implied terms in contracts, rather than being contracts themselves.2 The majority of
general liens, for example agency liens, arise by implied contract. They may be
distinguished from pledge which is only capable of being created by express
contract.3 As for express lien, it must be conceded that it is the type of lien most
alike pledge. This, as we saw, was the view of Bell, and Gloag and Irvine.4
What, however, must also be pointed out is that express general lien docs differ
from pledge with regard to matters such as the relation of the secured property to the
debt and the exigibility of the debt, discussed previously.3
1. See above, paras 236-243.
2. Cf Lord Young in Miller v Hutcheson & Dixon (1881) 8 R 489, at 492.
3. See above, paras 83-85.
4. See above, para 274.
5. See above, paras 275-278.
281. Conclusion. It has been shown that there exist a number of differences
between pledge and lien in a study which has not been exhaustive. Of course it
would be foolish not to admit that there are similarities. Both are types of real
security which depend essentially on the creditor holding on to the property in
question. An express general lien is probably the lien most like pledge, as both arise
from express contract. But just because something shares common features with
another, does not mean it is the same thing as the other. A lien may appear like an
implied pledge and an express lien simply as a pledge. However, as with all things
we should judge not by appearance but by substance. The similarities which do exist
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